Introduce new sepolicy injection mechanism

In the current implementation, Magisk will either have to recreate
all early mount implementation (for legacy SAR and rootfs devices) or
delegate early mount to first stage init (for 2SI devices) to access
required partitions for loading sepolicy. It then has to recreate the
split sepolicy loading implementation in-house, apply patches, then
dump the compiled + patched policies into monolithic format somewhere.
Finally, it patches the original init to force it to load the sepolicy
file we just created.

With the increasing complexity involved in early mount and split
sepolicy (there is even APEX module involved in the future!),
it is about time to rethink Magisk's sepolicy strategy as rebuilding
init's functionality is not scalable and easy to maintain.

In this commit, instead of building sepolicy ourselves, we mock
selinuxfs with FIFO files connected to a pre-init daemon, waiting
for the actual init process to directly write the sepolicy file into
MagiskInit. We then patch the file and load it into the kernel. Some
FIFO tricks has to be used to hijack the original init process's
control flow and prevent race conditions, details are directly in the
comments in code.

At the moment, only system-as-root (read-only root) support is added.
Support for legacy rootfs devices will come with a follow up commit.

native/jni/include/magisk.hpp

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ extern std::string  MAGISKTMP;
 #define SHELLPTS    INTLROOT "/pts"
 #define ROOTMNT     ROOTOVL "/.mount_list"
 #define ZYGISKBIN   INTLROOT "/zygisk"
+#define SELINUXMOCK INTLROOT "/selinux"
 
 constexpr const char *applet_names[] = { "su", "resetprop", nullptr };
 constexpr const char *init_applet[] = { "magiskpolicy", "supolicy", nullptr };

native/jni/include/magiskpolicy.hpp

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <selinux.hpp>
+#include <string>
 
 #define ALL nullptr
 
@@ -9,10 +10,11 @@ struct policydb;
 
 class sepolicy {
 public:
-    typedef const char * c_str;
+    using c_str = const char *;
     ~sepolicy();
 
     // Public static factory functions
+    static sepolicy *from_data(char *data, size_t len);
     static sepolicy *from_file(c_str file);
     static sepolicy *from_split();
     static sepolicy *compile_split();
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ public:
     // External APIs
     bool to_file(c_str file);
     void parse_statement(c_str stmt);
+    void load_rules(const std::string &rules);
     void load_rule_file(c_str file);
 
     // Operation on types

native/jni/init/getinfo.cpp

@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static kv_pairs parse_bootconfig(string_view str) {
 #define test_bit(bit, array) (array[bit / 8] & (1 << (bit % 8)))
 
 static bool check_key_combo() {
+    LOGD("Running in recovery mode, waiting for key...\n");
     uint8_t bitmask[(KEY_MAX + 1) / 8];
     vector<int> events;
     constexpr const char *name = "/event";
@@ -226,7 +227,6 @@ void load_kernel_info(BootConfig *config) {
 
     parse_prop_file("/.backup/.magisk", [=](auto key, auto value) -> bool {
         if (key == "RECOVERYMODE" && value == "true") {
-            LOGD("Running in recovery mode, waiting for key...\n");
             config->skip_initramfs = config->emulator || !check_key_combo();
             return false;
         }

native/jni/init/init.cpp

@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ static int test_main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 #endif // ENABLE_TEST
 
 static int magisk_proxy_main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-    setup_klog();
     auto init = make_unique<MagiskProxy>(argv);
     init->start();
     return 1;

native/jni/init/init.hpp

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ using kv_pairs = std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string>>;
 // For API 28 AVD, it uses legacy SAR setup that requires
 // special hacks in magiskinit to work properly. We do not
 // necessarily want this enabled in production builds.
-#define ENABLE_AVD_HACK 0
+#define ENABLE_AVD_HACK 1
 
 struct BootConfig {
     bool skip_initramfs;
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct fstab_entry {
     fstab_entry &operator=(fstab_entry&&) = default;
 };
 
-#define INIT_SOCKET "MAGISKINIT"
 #define DEFAULT_DT_DIR "/proc/device-tree/firmware/android"
 
 extern std::vector<std::string> mount_list;
@@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ protected:
     char **argv = nullptr;
 
     [[noreturn]] void exec_init();
-    void read_dt_fstab(std::vector<fstab_entry> &fstab);
 public:
     BaseInit(char *argv[], BootConfig *config = nullptr) : config(config), argv(argv) {}
     virtual ~BaseInit() = default;
@@ -75,12 +73,12 @@ protected:
     // running magiskinit on legacy SAR AVD emulator
     bool avd_hack = false;
 #else
-    // Make it const so compiler can optimize hacks out of the code
+    // Make it constexpr so compiler can optimize hacks out of the code
-    static const bool avd_hack = false;
+    static constexpr bool avd_hack = false;
 #endif
 
-    void mount_with_dt();
     bool patch_sepolicy(const char *file);
+    void hijack_sepolicy();
     void setup_tmp(const char *path);
     void mount_rules_dir(const char *dev_base, const char *mnt_base);
     void patch_rw_root();
@@ -94,7 +92,6 @@ protected:
 
     void backup_files();
     void patch_ro_root();
-    void mount_system_root();
 public:
     using MagiskInit::MagiskInit;
 };
@@ -140,14 +137,14 @@ public:
 
 class LegacySARInit : public SARBase {
 private:
-    bool early_mount();
+    bool mount_system_root();
     void first_stage_prep();
 public:
     LegacySARInit(char *argv[], BootConfig *config) : SARBase(argv, config) {
         LOGD("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
     };
     void start() override {
-        if (early_mount())
+        if (mount_system_root())
             first_stage_prep();
         else
             patch_ro_root();
@@ -176,6 +173,7 @@ public:
 class MagiskProxy : public MagiskInit {
 public:
     explicit MagiskProxy(char *argv[]) : MagiskInit(argv) {
+        setup_klog();
         LOGD("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
     }
     void start() override;

native/jni/init/mount.cpp

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ if (access(#val, F_OK) == 0) {\
     entry.val = rtrim(full_read(#val)); \
 }
 
-void BaseInit::read_dt_fstab(vector<fstab_entry> &fstab) {
+static void read_dt_fstab(BootConfig *config, vector<fstab_entry> &fstab) {
     if (access(config->dt_dir, F_OK) != 0)
         return;
 
@@ -152,13 +152,28 @@ void BaseInit::read_dt_fstab(vector<fstab_entry> &fstab) {
     }
 }
 
-void MagiskInit::mount_with_dt() {
+static void mount_with_dt(BootConfig *config) {
     vector<fstab_entry> fstab;
-    read_dt_fstab(fstab);
+    read_dt_fstab(config, fstab);
     for (const auto &entry : fstab) {
         if (is_lnk(entry.mnt_point.data()))
             continue;
-        if (avd_hack && entry.mnt_point == "/system") {
+        // Derive partname from dev
+        sprintf(blk_info.partname, "%s%s", basename(entry.dev.data()), config->slot);
+        setup_block(true);
+        xmkdir(entry.mnt_point.data(), 0755);
+        xmount(blk_info.block_dev, entry.mnt_point.data(), entry.type.data(), MS_RDONLY, nullptr);
+        mount_list.push_back(entry.mnt_point);
+    }
+}
+
+static void avd_hack_mount(BootConfig *config) {
+    vector<fstab_entry> fstab;
+    read_dt_fstab(config, fstab);
+    for (const auto &entry : fstab) {
+        if (is_lnk(entry.mnt_point.data()))
+            continue;
+        if (entry.mnt_point == "/system") {
             // When we force AVD to disable SystemAsRoot, it will always add system
             // to dt fstab. We actually already mounted it as root, so skip this one.
             continue;
@@ -168,11 +183,8 @@ void MagiskInit::mount_with_dt() {
         setup_block(true);
         xmkdir(entry.mnt_point.data(), 0755);
         xmount(blk_info.block_dev, entry.mnt_point.data(), entry.type.data(), MS_RDONLY, nullptr);
-        if (!avd_hack) {
+        // Do not add any early mount partitions to mount_list as we will
-            // When avd_hack is true, do not add any early mount partitions to mount_list
+        // actually forcefully disable original init's early mount.
-            // as we will actually forcefully disable original init's early mount
-            mount_list.push_back(entry.mnt_point);
-        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -300,7 +312,7 @@ void RootFSInit::early_mount() {
     LOGD("Restoring /init\n");
     rename(backup_init(), "/init");
 
-    mount_with_dt();
+    mount_with_dt(config);
 }
 
 void SARBase::backup_files() {
@@ -316,8 +328,10 @@ void SARBase::backup_files() {
         magisk_cfg = mmap_data("/data/.backup/.magisk");
 }
 
-void SARBase::mount_system_root() {
+bool LegacySARInit::mount_system_root() {
-    LOGD("Early mount system_root\n");
+    backup_files();
+
+    LOGD("Mounting system_root\n");
     strcpy(blk_info.block_dev, "/dev/root");
 
     do {
@@ -344,31 +358,36 @@ void SARBase::mount_system_root() {
     // We don't really know what to do at this point...
     LOGE("Cannot find root partition, abort\n");
     exit(1);
+
 mount_root:
     xmkdir("/system_root", 0755);
-    if (xmount("/dev/root", "/system_root", "ext4", MS_RDONLY, nullptr))
-        xmount("/dev/root", "/system_root", "erofs", MS_RDONLY, nullptr);
-}
 
-bool LegacySARInit::early_mount() {
+    if (xmount("/dev/root", "/system_root", "ext4", MS_RDONLY, nullptr)) {
-    backup_files();
+        if (xmount("/dev/root", "/system_root", "erofs", MS_RDONLY, nullptr)) {
-    mount_system_root();
+            // We don't really know what to do at this point...
+            LOGE("Cannot mount root partition, abort\n");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+    }
+
     switch_root("/system_root");
 
     // Use the apex folder to determine whether 2SI (Android 10+)
     bool is_two_stage = access("/apex", F_OK) == 0;
     LOGD("is_two_stage: [%d]\n", is_two_stage);
 
-    if (!is_two_stage) {
-        // Make dev writable
-        xmkdir("/dev", 0755);
-        xmount("tmpfs", "/dev", "tmpfs", 0, "mode=755");
-        mount_list.emplace_back("/dev");
 #if ENABLE_AVD_HACK
-        avd_hack = config->emulator;
+    if (!is_two_stage) {
-#endif
+        if (config->emulator) {
-        mount_with_dt();
+            avd_hack = true;
+            // Make dev writable
+            xmkdir("/dev", 0755);
+            xmount("tmpfs", "/dev", "tmpfs", 0, "mode=755");
+            mount_list.emplace_back("/dev");
+            avd_hack_mount(config);
+        }
     }
+#endif
 
     return is_two_stage;
 }

native/jni/init/rootdir.cpp

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #include <magisk.hpp>
 #include <magiskpolicy.hpp>
 #include <utils.hpp>
-#include <socket.hpp>
+#include <stream.hpp>
 
 #include "init.hpp"
 #include "magiskrc.inc"
@@ -139,6 +139,94 @@ bool MagiskInit::patch_sepolicy(const char *file) {
     return patch_init;
 }
 
+#define MOCK_LOAD      SELINUXMOCK "/load"
+#define MOCK_ENFORCE   SELINUXMOCK "/enforce"
+#define REAL_SELINUXFS SELINUXMOCK "/fs"
+
+void MagiskInit::hijack_sepolicy() {
+    // Read all custom rules into memory
+    string rules;
+    if (!custom_rules_dir.empty()) {
+        if (auto dir = xopen_dir(custom_rules_dir.data())) {
+            for (dirent *entry; (entry = xreaddir(dir.get()));) {
+                auto rule_file = custom_rules_dir + "/" + entry->d_name + "/sepolicy.rule";
+                if (xaccess(rule_file.data(), R_OK) == 0) {
+                    LOGD("Load custom sepolicy patch: [%s]\n", rule_file.data());
+                    full_read(rule_file.data(), rules);
+                    rules += '\n';
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Hijack the "load" and "enforce" node in selinuxfs to manipulate
+    // the actual sepolicy being loaded into the kernel
+
+    // We need to preserve sysfs and selinuxfs after re-exec
+    mount_list.erase(std::remove_if(
+            mount_list.begin(), mount_list.end(),
+            [](const string &s) { return s == "/sys"; }), mount_list.end());
+
+    if (access(SELINUX_ENFORCE, F_OK) != 0) {
+        // selinuxfs needs to be mounted
+        xmount("selinuxfs", SELINUX_MNT, "selinuxfs", 0, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    LOGD("Hijack [" SELINUX_LOAD "] and [" SELINUX_ENFORCE "]\n");
+
+    xmkdir(SELINUXMOCK, 0);
+    mkfifo(MOCK_LOAD, 0600);
+    mkfifo(MOCK_ENFORCE, 0644);
+    xmount(MOCK_LOAD, SELINUX_LOAD, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr);
+    xmount(MOCK_ENFORCE, SELINUX_ENFORCE, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr);
+
+    // Create a new process waiting for original init to load sepolicy into our fifo
+    if (xfork()) {
+        // In parent, return and continue boot process
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Read full sepolicy
+    int fd = xopen(MOCK_LOAD, O_RDONLY);
+    string policy = fd_full_read(fd);
+    close(fd);
+    auto sepol = unique_ptr<sepolicy>(sepolicy::from_data(policy.data(), policy.length()));
+
+    sepol->magisk_rules();
+    sepol->load_rules(rules);
+
+    // Mount selinuxfs to another path
+    xmkdir(REAL_SELINUXFS, 0755);
+    xmount("selinuxfs", REAL_SELINUXFS, "selinuxfs", 0, nullptr);
+
+    // This open will block until the actual init calls security_getenforce
+    fd = xopen(MOCK_ENFORCE, O_WRONLY);
+
+    // Cleanup the hijacks
+    umount2("/init", MNT_DETACH);
+    xumount2(SELINUX_LOAD, MNT_DETACH);
+    xumount2(SELINUX_ENFORCE, MNT_DETACH);
+
+    // Load patched policy
+    sepol->to_file(REAL_SELINUXFS "/load");
+
+    // Write to mock "enforce" ONLY after sepolicy is loaded. We need to make sure
+    // the actual init process is blocked until sepolicy is loaded, or else
+    // restorecon will fail and re-exec won't change context, causing boot failure.
+    // We (ab)use the fact that security_getenforce reads the "enforce" file, and
+    // because it has been replaced with our FIFO file, init will block until we
+    // write something into the pipe, effectively hijacking its control flow.
+
+    xwrite(fd, "0", 1);
+    close(fd);
+
+    // At this point, the actual init process will be unblocked
+    // and continue on with restorecon + re-exec.
+
+    // Terminate process
+    exit(0);
+}
+
 static void recreate_sbin(const char *mirror, bool use_bind_mount) {
     auto dp = xopen_dir(mirror);
     int src = dirfd(dp.get());
@@ -199,22 +287,18 @@ static void patch_socket_name(const char *path) {
 }
 
 #define ROOTMIR     MIRRDIR "/system_root"
-#define MONOPOLICY  "/sepolicy"
 #define NEW_INITRC  "/system/etc/init/hw/init.rc"
 
 void SARBase::patch_ro_root() {
     string tmp_dir;
-    const char *sepol;
 
     if (access("/sbin", F_OK) == 0) {
         tmp_dir = "/sbin";
-        sepol = "/sbin/.se";
     } else {
         char buf[8];
         gen_rand_str(buf, sizeof(buf));
         tmp_dir = "/dev/"s + buf;
         xmkdir(tmp_dir.data(), 0);
-        sepol = "/dev/.se";
     }
 
     setup_tmp(tmp_dir.data());
@@ -231,20 +315,14 @@ void SARBase::patch_ro_root() {
     if (tmp_dir == "/sbin")
         recreate_sbin(ROOTMIR "/sbin", true);
 
-    // Patch init
+    xmkdir(ROOTOVL, 0);
-    int patch_count;
+
-    {
+    // Handle avd hack
+    if (avd_hack) {
         int src = xopen("/init", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
         auto init = mmap_data("/init");
-        patch_count = init.patch({
+        // Force disable early mount on original init
-            make_pair(SPLIT_PLAT_CIL, "xxx"), /* Force loading monolithic sepolicy */
+        init.patch({ make_pair("android,fstab", "xxx") });
-            make_pair(MONOPOLICY, sepol)      /* Redirect /sepolicy to custom path */
-         });
-        if (avd_hack) {
-            // Force disable early mount on original init
-            init.patch({ make_pair("android,fstab", "xxx") });
-        }
-        xmkdir(ROOTOVL, 0);
         int dest = xopen(ROOTOVL "/init", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC, 0);
         xwrite(dest, init.buf, init.sz);
         fclone_attr(src, dest);
@@ -252,30 +330,6 @@ void SARBase::patch_ro_root() {
         close(dest);
     }
 
-    if (patch_count != 2) {
-        // init is dynamically linked, need to patch libselinux
-        const char *path = "/system/lib64/libselinux.so";
-        if (access(path, F_OK) != 0) {
-            path = "/system/lib/libselinux.so";
-            if (access(path, F_OK) != 0)
-                path = nullptr;
-        }
-        if (path) {
-            char ovl[128];
-            sprintf(ovl, ROOTOVL "%s", path);
-            auto lib = mmap_data(path);
-            lib.patch({ make_pair(MONOPOLICY, sepol) });
-            xmkdirs(dirname(ovl), 0755);
-            int dest = xopen(ovl, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC, 0);
-            xwrite(dest, lib.buf, lib.sz);
-            close(dest);
-            clone_attr(path, ovl);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // sepolicy
-    patch_sepolicy(sepol);
-
     // Handle overlay.d
     restore_folder(ROOTOVL, overlays);
     overlays.clear();
@@ -321,6 +375,8 @@ void SARBase::patch_ro_root() {
     write(dest, magic_mount_list.data(), magic_mount_list.length());
     close(dest);
 
+    hijack_sepolicy();
+
     chdir("/");
 }
 

native/jni/magiskpolicy/policydb.cpp

@@ -79,6 +79,27 @@ static void load_cil(struct cil_db *db, const char *file) {
     LOGD("cil_add [%s]\n", file);
 }
 
+sepolicy *sepolicy::from_data(char *data, size_t len) {
+    LOGD("Load policy from data\n");
+
+    policy_file_t pf;
+    policy_file_init(&pf);
+    pf.data = data;
+    pf.len = len;
+    pf.type = PF_USE_MEMORY;
+
+    auto db = static_cast<policydb_t *>(xmalloc(sizeof(policydb_t)));
+    if (policydb_init(db) || policydb_read(db, &pf, 0)) {
+        LOGE("Fail to load policy from data\n");
+        free(db);
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    auto sepol = new sepolicy();
+    sepol->db = db;
+    return sepol;
+}
+
 sepolicy *sepolicy::from_file(const char *file) {
     LOGD("Load policy from: %s\n", file);
 

native/jni/magiskpolicy/rules.cpp

@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ void sepolicy::magisk_rules() {
     // Let everyone access tmpfs files (for SAR sbin overlay)
     allow(ALL, "tmpfs", "file", ALL);
 
+    // Allow magiskinit daemon to handle mock selinuxfs
+    allow("kernel", "tmpfs", "fifo_file", "write");
+
     // For relabelling files
     allow("rootfs", "labeledfs", "filesystem", "associate");
     allow(SEPOL_FILE_TYPE, "pipefs", "filesystem", "associate");

native/jni/magiskpolicy/statement.cpp

@@ -313,7 +313,38 @@ void sepolicy::parse_statement(const char *stmt) {
 }
 
 void sepolicy::load_rule_file(const char *file) {
-    file_readline(true, file, [=](string_view line) -> bool {
+    file_readline(true, file, [&](string_view line) -> bool {
+        if (line.empty() || line[0] == '#')
+            return true;
+        parse_statement(line.data());
+        return true;
+    });
+}
+
+void sepolicy::load_rules(const string &rules) {
+    struct cookie {
+        const string &s;
+        size_t pos;
+    };
+    cookie c{rules, 0};
+    FILE *fp = funopen(&c, /* read */ [](void *v, char *buf, int sz) -> int {
+        auto c = reinterpret_cast<cookie*>(v);
+        if (c->pos == c->s.length())
+            return 0;
+        size_t end = std::min(c->pos + sz, c->s.length());
+        int len = end - c->pos;
+        memcpy(buf, c->s.data() + c->pos, len);
+        c->pos = end;
+        return len;
+    }, /* write */ [](auto, auto, auto) -> int {
+        return 0;
+    }, /* seek */ [](auto, auto, auto) -> fpos_t {
+        return 0;
+    }, /* close */ [](auto) -> int {
+        return 0;
+    });
+
+    file_readline(true, fp, [&](string_view line) -> bool {
         if (line.empty() || line[0] == '#')
             return true;
         parse_statement(line.data());

native/jni/utils/compat/compat.cpp

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@
 #include <cerrno>
 #include <mntent.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 
 extern "C" {
 
@@ -103,6 +105,10 @@ int faccessat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags) {
     return syscall(__NR_faccessat, dirfd, pathname, mode, flags);
 }
 
+int mkfifo(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
+    return mknod(path, (mode & ~S_IFMT) | S_IFIFO, 0);
+}
+
 #define SPLIT_64(v) (unsigned)((v) & 0xFFFFFFFF), (unsigned)((v) >> 32)
 
 #if defined(__arm__)

native/jni/utils/files.cpp

@@ -291,18 +291,29 @@ void full_read(const char *filename, void **buf, size_t *size) {
     close(fd);
 }
 
-string fd_full_read(int fd) {
+void fd_full_read(int fd, string &str) {
     char buf[4096];
-    string str;
     for (ssize_t len; (len = xread(fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0;)
         str.insert(str.end(), buf, buf + len);
+}
+
+void full_read(const char *filename, string &str) {
+    if (int fd = xopen(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); fd >= 0) {
+        fd_full_read(fd, str);
+        close(fd);
+    }
+}
+
+string fd_full_read(int fd) {
+    string str;
+    fd_full_read(fd, str);
     return str;
 }
 
 string full_read(const char *filename) {
-    int fd = xopen(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+    string str;
-    run_finally f([=]{ close(fd); });
+    full_read(filename, str);
-    return fd < 0 ? "" : fd_full_read(fd);
+    return str;
 }
 
 void write_zero(int fd, size_t size) {
@@ -315,10 +326,7 @@ void write_zero(int fd, size_t size) {
     }
 }
 
-void file_readline(bool trim, const char *file, const function<bool(string_view)> &fn) {
+void file_readline(bool trim, FILE *fp, const function<bool(string_view)> &fn) {
-    FILE *fp = xfopen(file, "re");
-    if (fp == nullptr)
-        return;
     size_t len = 1024;
     char *buf = (char *) malloc(len);
     char *start;

native/jni/utils/files.hpp

@@ -77,10 +77,19 @@ void fclone_attr(int src, int dest);
 void clone_attr(const char *src, const char *dest);
 void fd_full_read(int fd, void **buf, size_t *size);
 void full_read(const char *filename, void **buf, size_t *size);
+void fd_full_read(int fd, std::string &str);
+void full_read(const char *filename, std::string &str);
 std::string fd_full_read(int fd);
 std::string full_read(const char *filename);
 void write_zero(int fd, size_t size);
-void file_readline(bool trim, const char *file, const std::function<bool(std::string_view)> &fn);
+void file_readline(bool trim, FILE *fp, const std::function<bool(std::string_view)> &fn);
+static inline void file_readline(
+        bool trim, const char *file, const std::function<bool(std::string_view)> &fn) {
+    FILE *fp = xfopen(file, "re");
+    if (fp == nullptr)
+        return;
+    file_readline(trim, fp, fn);
+}
 static inline void file_readline(const char *file,
         const std::function<bool(std::string_view)> &fn) {
     file_readline(false, file, fn);