From 753808a4ce524f6979dc580fa00dc9baafee620c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: topjohnwu Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 00:46:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Also hijack plat_file_contexts if necessary Since Android 13, sepolicy are also loaded from APEX modules. Part of the change is to run restorecon before SELinux is set to enforce. In order to support this situation, we also hijack plat_file_contexts if necessary to properly order our operations. Original idea credits to @yujincheng08, close #5603 --- native/jni/init/selinux.cpp | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/native/jni/init/selinux.cpp b/native/jni/init/selinux.cpp index b6cb1720f..12148a2c4 100644 --- a/native/jni/init/selinux.cpp +++ b/native/jni/init/selinux.cpp @@ -37,36 +37,53 @@ void MagiskInit::patch_sepolicy(const char *file) { } } -#define MOCK_LOAD SELINUXMOCK "/load" -#define MOCK_ENFORCE SELINUXMOCK "/enforce" #define MOCK_COMPAT SELINUXMOCK "/compatible" +#define MOCK_LOAD SELINUXMOCK "/load" +#define MOCK_BLOCKING SELINUXMOCK "/blocking" #define REAL_SELINUXFS SELINUXMOCK "/fs" void MagiskInit::hijack_sepolicy() { - // Read all custom rules into memory - string rules; - if (!custom_rules_dir.empty()) { - if (auto dir = xopen_dir(custom_rules_dir.data())) { - for (dirent *entry; (entry = xreaddir(dir.get()));) { - auto rule_file = custom_rules_dir + "/" + entry->d_name + "/sepolicy.rule"; - if (xaccess(rule_file.data(), R_OK) == 0) { - LOGD("Load custom sepolicy patch: [%s]\n", rule_file.data()); - full_read(rule_file.data(), rules); - rules += '\n'; - } - } + const char *blocking_target; + string actual_content; + + xmkdir(SELINUXMOCK, 0); + + if (access("/system/etc/selinux/apex", F_OK) == 0) { + // On devices with apex sepolicy, it runs restorecon before enforcing SELinux. + // To block control flow before that happens, we will have to hijack the + // plat_file_contexts file to achieve that. + + if (access("/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts", F_OK) == 0) { + blocking_target = "/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts"; + } else if (access("/plat_file_contexts", F_OK) == 0) { + blocking_target = "/plat_file_contexts"; + } else { + // Error, should never happen + LOGE("! Cannot find plat_file_contexts\n"); + return; } + actual_content = full_read(blocking_target); + + LOGD("Hijack [%s]\n", blocking_target); + mkfifo(MOCK_BLOCKING, 0644); + xmount(MOCK_BLOCKING, blocking_target, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr); + } else { + // We block using the "enforce" node + blocking_target = SELINUX_ENFORCE; + actual_content = "0"; } // Hijack the "load" and "enforce" node in selinuxfs to manipulate // the actual sepolicy being loaded into the kernel - xmkdir(SELINUXMOCK, 0); - auto hijack = [] { - LOGD("Hijack [" SELINUX_LOAD "] and [" SELINUX_ENFORCE "]\n"); + auto hijack = [&] { + LOGD("Hijack [" SELINUX_LOAD "]\n"); mkfifo(MOCK_LOAD, 0600); - mkfifo(MOCK_ENFORCE, 0644); xmount(MOCK_LOAD, SELINUX_LOAD, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr); - xmount(MOCK_ENFORCE, SELINUX_ENFORCE, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr); + if (strcmp(blocking_target, SELINUX_ENFORCE) == 0) { + LOGD("Hijack [" SELINUX_ENFORCE "]\n"); + mkfifo(MOCK_BLOCKING, 0644); + xmount(MOCK_BLOCKING, SELINUX_ENFORCE, nullptr, MS_BIND, nullptr); + } }; string dt_compat; @@ -94,6 +111,21 @@ void MagiskInit::hijack_sepolicy() { hijack(); } + // Read all custom rules into memory + string rules; + if (!custom_rules_dir.empty()) { + if (auto dir = xopen_dir(custom_rules_dir.data())) { + for (dirent *entry; (entry = xreaddir(dir.get()));) { + auto rule_file = custom_rules_dir + "/" + entry->d_name + "/sepolicy.rule"; + if (xaccess(rule_file.data(), R_OK) == 0) { + LOGD("Load custom sepolicy patch: [%s]\n", rule_file.data()); + full_read(rule_file.data(), rules); + rules += '\n'; + } + } + } + } + // Create a new process waiting for init operations if (xfork()) { // In parent, return and continue boot process @@ -110,6 +142,7 @@ void MagiskInit::hijack_sepolicy() { xumount2(buf, MNT_DETACH); hijack(); + xwrite(fd, dt_compat.data(), dt_compat.size()); close(fd); } @@ -123,29 +156,27 @@ void MagiskInit::hijack_sepolicy() { sepol->magisk_rules(); sepol->load_rules(rules); - // Mount selinuxfs to another path - xmkdir(REAL_SELINUXFS, 0755); - xmount("selinuxfs", REAL_SELINUXFS, "selinuxfs", 0, nullptr); - - // This open will block until init calls security_getenforce - fd = xopen(MOCK_ENFORCE, O_WRONLY); + // This open will block until init calls security_getenforce or selinux_android_restorecon + fd = xopen(MOCK_BLOCKING, O_WRONLY); // Cleanup the hijacks umount2("/init", MNT_DETACH); xumount2(SELINUX_LOAD, MNT_DETACH); - xumount2(SELINUX_ENFORCE, MNT_DETACH); + xumount2(blocking_target, MNT_DETACH); // Load patched policy + xmkdir(REAL_SELINUXFS, 0755); + xmount("selinuxfs", REAL_SELINUXFS, "selinuxfs", 0, nullptr); sepol->to_file(REAL_SELINUXFS "/load"); - // Write to mock "enforce" ONLY after sepolicy is loaded. We need to make sure + // Write to mock blocking target ONLY after sepolicy is loaded. We need to make sure // the actual init process is blocked until sepolicy is loaded, or else // restorecon will fail and re-exec won't change context, causing boot failure. - // We (ab)use the fact that security_getenforce reads the "enforce" file, and + // We (ab)use the fact that init reads from our blocking target, and // because it has been replaced with our FIFO file, init will block until we // write something into the pipe, effectively hijacking its control flow. - xwrite(fd, "0", 1); + xwrite(fd, actual_content.data(), actual_content.length()); close(fd); // At this point, the init process will be unblocked