- The lambda here infers its return type as `std::string`,
and since `info` is `const`, the labmda copies `info.name`
and returns a `std::string&&`. After captured by the
`std::string_view`, the `std::string&&` return value
deconstructs and makes `std::string_view` refers to a
dangling pointer.
libselinux.so will be unmounted when magiskd starts. If magiskd restarts (like it died before boot completed), the files we want to unmount is the original files because the modified files is unmounted in previous start, which will causes many crashes due to missing libselinux.so.
* This seems to be a logic that has been abandoned for a
long time. Now we automatically choose which partition
to store sepolicy.rule. Furthermore, touching /persist is
what we should avoid doing whenever possible.
Fix#4204
`_root` is uninitialized for non-root nodes. And it will cause `module_node::mount` fail because it uses `root()`. Once the bug is triggered, signal 11 is received but Magisk catch all signals and therefore stuck forever.
* There will be garbage output when executing `su` (#4016)
* Failed to check root status and showing N/A in status (#4005)
Signed-off-by: Shaka Huang <shakalaca@gmail.com>
- Block signals in logging routine (fix#3976)
- Prevent possible deadlock after fork (stdio locks internally)
by creating a new FILE pointer per logging call (thread/stack local)
Previously, Magisk uses persist or cache for storing modules' custom
sepolicy rules. In this commit, we significantly broaden its
compatibility and also prevent mounting errors.
The persist partition is non-standard and also critical for Snapdragon
devices, so we prefer not to use it by default.
We will go through the following logic to find the best suitable
non-volatile, writable location to store and load sepolicy.rule files:
Unencrypted data -> FBE data unencrypted dir -> cache -> metadata -> persist
This should cover almost all possible cases: very old devices have
cache partitions; newer devices will use FBE; latest devices will use
metadata FBE (which guarantees a metadata parition); and finally,
all Snapdragon devices have the persist partition (as a last resort).
Fix#3179
Due to changes in ec3705f2ed187863efc34af5415495e1ee7775d2, the app can
no longer communicate with the dameon through a socket opened on the
daemon side due to SELinux restrictions. The workaround here is to have
the daemon decide a socket name, send it to the app, have the app create
the socket server, then finally the daemon connects to the app through
the socket.
Introduce new domain `magisk_client` and new file type `magisk_exec`.
Connection to magiskd's always-on socket is restricted to magisk_client
only. Whitelisted process domains can transit to magisk_client through
executing files labelled magisk_exec. The main magisk binary shall be
the only file labelled as magisk_exec throughout the whole system.
All processes thus are no longer allowed to connect to magiskd directly
without going through the proper magisk binary.
Connection failures are silenced from audit logs with dontaudit rules,
so crazy processes which traverse through all unix domain sockets to try
connection can no longer check logcat to know the actual reason behind
EACCES, leaking the denied process policy (which is u:r:magisk:s0).
This also allows us to remove many rules that open up holes in
untrusted_app domains that were used to make remote shell work properly.
Since all processes establishing the remote shell are now restricted to
the magisk_client domain, all these rules are moved to magisk_client.
This makes Magisk require fewer compromises in Android's security model.
Note: as of this commit, requesting new root access via Magisk Manager
will stop working as Magisk Manager can no longer communicate with
magiskd directly. This will be addressed in a future commit that
involves changes in both native and application side.
