Update vendored dependencies

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go

@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
 // which may be empty but must not contain any of "()<>\x00".
 // If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
 func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, error) {
-	currentTime := config.Now()
+	creationTime := config.Now()
 
 	bits := defaultRSAKeyBits
 	if config != nil && config.RSABits != 0 {
@@ -525,8 +525,8 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 	}
 
 	e := &Entity{
-		PrimaryKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &signingPriv.PublicKey),
-		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, signingPriv),
+		PrimaryKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &signingPriv.PublicKey),
+		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime, signingPriv),
 		Identities: make(map[string]*Identity),
 	}
 	isPrimaryId := true
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 		Name:   uid.Id,
 		UserId: uid,
 		SelfSignature: &packet.Signature{
-			CreationTime: currentTime,
+			CreationTime: creationTime,
 			SigType:      packet.SigTypePositiveCert,
 			PubKeyAlgo:   packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
 			Hash:         config.Hash(),
@@ -563,10 +563,10 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 
 	e.Subkeys = make([]Subkey, 1)
 	e.Subkeys[0] = Subkey{
-		PublicKey:  packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
-		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, encryptingPriv),
+		PublicKey:  packet.NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
+		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime, encryptingPriv),
 		Sig: &packet.Signature{
-			CreationTime:              currentTime,
+			CreationTime:              creationTime,
 			SigType:                   packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding,
 			PubKeyAlgo:                packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
 			Hash:                      config.Hash(),

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go

@@ -36,49 +36,49 @@ type PrivateKey struct {
 	iv            []byte
 }
 
-func NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+func NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
-	pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
 	pk.PrivateKey = priv
 	return pk
 }
 
-func NewDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+func NewDSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
-	pk.PublicKey = *NewDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
 	pk.PrivateKey = priv
 	return pk
 }
 
-func NewElGamalPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+func NewElGamalPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
-	pk.PublicKey = *NewElGamalPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewElGamalPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
 	pk.PrivateKey = priv
 	return pk
 }
 
-func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+func NewECDSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
-	pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
 	pk.PrivateKey = priv
 	return pk
 }
 
 // NewSignerPrivateKey creates a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
 // implements RSA or ECDSA.
-func NewSignerPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
+func NewSignerPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
 	// In general, the public Keys should be used as pointers. We still
 	// type-switch on the values, for backwards-compatibility.
 	switch pubkey := signer.Public().(type) {
 	case *rsa.PublicKey:
-		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, pubkey)
 	case rsa.PublicKey:
-		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &pubkey)
 	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, pubkey)
 	case ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &pubkey)
 	default:
 		panic("openpgp: unknown crypto.Signer type in NewSignerPrivateKey")
 	}

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ package scrypt // import "golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt"
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
+	"math/bits"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
 )
@@ -52,77 +53,45 @@ func salsaXOR(tmp *[16]uint32, in, out []uint32) {
 	x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15 := w9, w10, w11, w12, w13, w14, w15
 
 	for i := 0; i < 8; i += 2 {
-		u := x0 + x12
-		x4 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x4 + x0
-		x8 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x8 + x4
-		x12 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x12 + x8
-		x0 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x4 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x0+x12, 7)
+		x8 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x4+x0, 9)
+		x12 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x8+x4, 13)
+		x0 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x12+x8, 18)
 
-		u = x5 + x1
-		x9 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x9 + x5
-		x13 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x13 + x9
-		x1 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x1 + x13
-		x5 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x9 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x5+x1, 7)
+		x13 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x9+x5, 9)
+		x1 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x13+x9, 13)
+		x5 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x1+x13, 18)
 
-		u = x10 + x6
-		x14 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x14 + x10
-		x2 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x2 + x14
-		x6 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x6 + x2
-		x10 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x14 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x10+x6, 7)
+		x2 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x14+x10, 9)
+		x6 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x2+x14, 13)
+		x10 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x6+x2, 18)
 
-		u = x15 + x11
-		x3 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x3 + x15
-		x7 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x7 + x3
-		x11 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x11 + x7
-		x15 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x3 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x15+x11, 7)
+		x7 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x3+x15, 9)
+		x11 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x7+x3, 13)
+		x15 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x11+x7, 18)
 
-		u = x0 + x3
-		x1 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x1 + x0
-		x2 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x2 + x1
-		x3 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x3 + x2
-		x0 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x1 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x0+x3, 7)
+		x2 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x1+x0, 9)
+		x3 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x2+x1, 13)
+		x0 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x3+x2, 18)
 
-		u = x5 + x4
-		x6 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x6 + x5
-		x7 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x7 + x6
-		x4 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x4 + x7
-		x5 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x6 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x5+x4, 7)
+		x7 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x6+x5, 9)
+		x4 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x7+x6, 13)
+		x5 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x4+x7, 18)
 
-		u = x10 + x9
-		x11 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x11 + x10
-		x8 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x8 + x11
-		x9 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x9 + x8
-		x10 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x11 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x10+x9, 7)
+		x8 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x11+x10, 9)
+		x9 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x8+x11, 13)
+		x10 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x9+x8, 18)
 
-		u = x15 + x14
-		x12 ^= u<<7 | u>>(32-7)
-		u = x12 + x15
-		x13 ^= u<<9 | u>>(32-9)
-		u = x13 + x12
-		x14 ^= u<<13 | u>>(32-13)
-		u = x14 + x13
-		x15 ^= u<<18 | u>>(32-18)
+		x12 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x15+x14, 7)
+		x13 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x12+x15, 9)
+		x14 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x13+x12, 13)
+		x15 ^= bits.RotateLeft32(x14+x13, 18)
 	}
 	x0 += w0
 	x1 += w1

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go

@@ -523,3 +523,117 @@ func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string {
 func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod {
 	return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries}
 }
+
+// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication.
+// See RFC 4462 section 3
+// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details.
+// target is the server host you want to log in to.
+func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod {
+	if gssAPIClient == nil {
+		panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic")
+	}
+	return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target}
+}
+
+type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct {
+	gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient
+	target       string
+}
+
+func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
+	m := &userAuthRequestMsg{
+		User:    user,
+		Service: serviceSSH,
+		Method:  g.method(),
+	}
+	// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST.
+	// See RFC 4462 section 3.2.
+	m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1)
+	m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID))
+	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil {
+		return authFailure, nil, err
+	}
+	// The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an
+	// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or
+	// with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE.
+	// See RFC 4462 section 3.3.
+	// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check
+	// selected mech if it is valid.
+	packet, err := c.readPacket()
+	if err != nil {
+		return authFailure, nil, err
+	}
+	userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{}
+	if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil {
+		return authFailure, nil, err
+	}
+	// Start the loop into the exchange token.
+	// See RFC 4462 section 3.4.
+	var token []byte
+	defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext()
+	for {
+		// Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer.
+		nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false)
+		if err != nil {
+			return authFailure, nil, err
+		}
+		if len(nextToken) > 0 {
+			if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
+				Token: nextToken,
+			})); err != nil {
+				return authFailure, nil, err
+			}
+		}
+		if !needContinue {
+			break
+		}
+		packet, err = c.readPacket()
+		if err != nil {
+			return authFailure, nil, err
+		}
+		switch packet[0] {
+		case msgUserAuthFailure:
+			var msg userAuthFailureMsg
+			if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
+				return authFailure, nil, err
+			}
+			if msg.PartialSuccess {
+				return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
+			}
+			return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
+		case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError:
+			userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{}
+			if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil {
+				return authFailure, nil, err
+			}
+			return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+
+				"Major Status: %d\n"+
+				"Minor Status: %d\n"+
+				"Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus,
+				userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message)
+		case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken:
+			userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
+			if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
+				return authFailure, nil, err
+			}
+			token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token
+		}
+	}
+	// Binding Encryption Keys.
+	// See RFC 4462 section 3.5.
+	micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic")
+	micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField)
+	if err != nil {
+		return authFailure, nil, err
+	}
+	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{
+		MIC: micToken,
+	})); err != nil {
+		return authFailure, nil, err
+	}
+	return handleAuthResponse(c)
+}
+
+func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string {
+	return "gssapi-with-mic"
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go

@@ -275,6 +275,42 @@ type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct {
 	PubKey []byte
 }
 
+// See RFC 4462, section 3
+const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60
+
+type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct {
+	SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"`
+}
+
+const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61
+
+type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct {
+	Token []byte `sshtype:"61"`
+}
+
+const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66
+
+type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct {
+	MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"`
+}
+
+// See RFC 4462, section 3.9
+const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64
+
+type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct {
+	ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"`
+}
+
+// See RFC 4462, section 3.8
+const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65
+
+type userAuthGSSAPIError struct {
+	MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"`
+	MinorStatus uint32
+	Message     string
+	LanguageTag string
+}
+
 // typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which
 // should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character.
 func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) {
@@ -756,6 +792,14 @@ func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
 		msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg)
 	case msgChannelFailure:
 		msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg)
+	case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken:
+		msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken)
+	case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC:
+		msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC)
+	case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok:
+		msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok)
+	case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError:
+		msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError)
 	default:
 		return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0])
 	}

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go

@@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ type Permissions struct {
 	Extensions map[string]string
 }
 
+type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
+	// AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic
+	// authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the
+	// results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN.
+	// GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions.
+	// This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with
+	// which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error.
+	AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error)
+
+	// Server must be set. It's the implementation
+	// of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details.
+	Server GSSAPIServer
+}
+
 // ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data.
 type ServerConfig struct {
 	// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
@@ -99,6 +113,10 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
 	// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
 	BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
+
+	// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used
+	// when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3).
+	GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
 }
 
 // AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
@@ -204,7 +222,9 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys")
 	}
 
-	if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
+	if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil &&
+		config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil ||
+		config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) {
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
 	}
 
@@ -295,6 +315,55 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
 	return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
 }
 
+func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *connection,
+	sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) {
+	gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server
+	defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext()
+	var srcName string
+	for {
+		var (
+			outToken     []byte
+			needContinue bool
+		)
+		outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(firstToken)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err, nil, nil
+		}
+		if len(outToken) != 0 {
+			if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
+				Token: outToken,
+			})); err != nil {
+				return nil, nil, err
+			}
+		}
+		if !needContinue {
+			break
+		}
+		packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+		userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
+		if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{}
+	if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method)
+	if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil {
+		return err, nil, nil
+	}
+	perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName)
+	return authErr, perms, nil
+}
+
 // ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
 // sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
 // errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
@@ -496,6 +565,49 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				authErr = candidate.result
 				perms = candidate.perms
 			}
+		case "gssapi-with-mic":
+			gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
+			userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
+			}
+			// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication.
+			if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 {
+				authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported")
+				break
+			}
+			var i uint32
+			present := false
+			for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ {
+				if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) {
+					present = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !present {
+				authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism")
+				break
+			}
+			// Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3.
+			if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{
+				SupportMech: krb5OID,
+			})); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			// Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4.
+			packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
+			if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID,
+				userAuthReq)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
 		default:
 			authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method)
 		}
@@ -522,6 +634,10 @@ userAuthLoop:
 		if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
 			failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
 		}
+		if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
+			config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
+			failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
+		}
 
 		if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
 			return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")

vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ssh
+
+import (
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+var krb5OID []byte
+
+func init() {
+	krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh)
+}
+
+// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins.
+type GSSAPIClient interface {
+	// InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the
+	// ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil.
+	// The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to
+	// the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to
+	// AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting
+	// needContinue to false. To complete the context
+	// establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh
+	// server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true.
+	// In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the
+	// reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply
+	// token to InitSecContext via the token parameters.
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4.
+	InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error)
+	// GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places
+	// the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server.
+	// The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC()
+	// over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just
+	// established:
+	//  string    session identifier
+	//  byte      SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+	//  string    user name
+	//  string    service
+	//  string    "gssapi-with-mic"
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5.
+	GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error)
+	// Whenever possible, it should be possible for
+	// DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even
+	// if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related
+	// resources to be released.
+	// In addition to deleting established security contexts,
+	// gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built"
+	// security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of
+	// InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls.
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3.
+	DeleteSecContext() error
+}
+
+// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins.
+type GSSAPIServer interface {
+	// AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application
+	// and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a
+	// outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client,
+	// where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext.
+	// If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this
+	// by setting the needContinue to false. To
+	// complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be
+	// required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext
+	// will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it
+	// should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh
+	// client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the
+	// token parameters.
+	// The srcName return value is the authenticated username.
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4.
+	AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error)
+	// VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter,
+	// fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client.
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2.
+	VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error
+	// Whenever possible, it should be possible for
+	// DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even
+	// if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related
+	// resources to be released.
+	// In addition to deleting established security contexts,
+	// gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built"
+	// security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of
+	// InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls.
+	// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3.
+	DeleteSecContext() error
+}
+
+var (
+	// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,
+	// so we also support the krb5 mechanism only.
+	// See RFC 1964 section 1.
+	krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2}
+)
+
+// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+// See RFC 4462 section 3.2.
+type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct {
+	N    uint32
+	OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+}
+
+func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
+	n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed")
+	}
+	s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{
+		N:    n,
+		OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n),
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ {
+		var (
+			desiredMech []byte
+			err         error
+		)
+		desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.New("parse string failed")
+		}
+		if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+// See RFC 4462 section 3.6.
+func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, 0, 0)
+	out = appendString(out, sessionID)
+	out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest)
+	out = appendString(out, username)
+	out = appendString(out, service)
+	out = appendString(out, authMethod)
+	return out
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/transport.go

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ type ClientConn struct {
 	t         *Transport
 	tconn     net.Conn             // usually *tls.Conn, except specialized impls
 	tlsState  *tls.ConnectionState // nil only for specialized impls
+	reused    uint32               // whether conn is being reused; atomic
 	singleUse bool                 // whether being used for a single http.Request
 
 	// readLoop goroutine fields:
@@ -440,7 +442,8 @@ func (t *Transport) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Res
 			t.vlogf("http2: Transport failed to get client conn for %s: %v", addr, err)
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		traceGotConn(req, cc)
+		reused := !atomic.CompareAndSwapUint32(&cc.reused, 0, 1)
+		traceGotConn(req, cc, reused)
 		res, gotErrAfterReqBodyWrite, err := cc.roundTrip(req)
 		if err != nil && retry <= 6 {
 			if req, err = shouldRetryRequest(req, err, gotErrAfterReqBodyWrite); err == nil {
@@ -2559,15 +2562,15 @@ func traceGetConn(req *http.Request, hostPort string) {
 	trace.GetConn(hostPort)
 }
 
-func traceGotConn(req *http.Request, cc *ClientConn) {
+func traceGotConn(req *http.Request, cc *ClientConn, reused bool) {
 	trace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(req.Context())
 	if trace == nil || trace.GotConn == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	ci := httptrace.GotConnInfo{Conn: cc.tconn}
+	ci.Reused = reused
 	cc.mu.Lock()
-	ci.Reused = cc.nextStreamID > 1
-	ci.WasIdle = len(cc.streams) == 0 && ci.Reused
+	ci.WasIdle = len(cc.streams) == 0 && reused
 	if ci.WasIdle && !cc.lastActive.IsZero() {
 		ci.IdleTime = time.Now().Sub(cc.lastActive)
 	}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna10.0.0.go

@@ -4,14 +4,16 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
+// +build go1.10
+
 // Package idna implements IDNA2008 using the compatibility processing
 // defined by UTS (Unicode Technical Standard) #46, which defines a standard to
 // deal with the transition from IDNA2003.
 //
 // IDNA2008 (Internationalized Domain Names for Applications), is defined in RFC
 // 5890, RFC 5891, RFC 5892, RFC 5893 and RFC 5894.
-// UTS #46 is defined in http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
-// See http://unicode.org/cldr/utility/idna.jsp for a visualization of the
+// UTS #46 is defined in https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
+// See https://unicode.org/cldr/utility/idna.jsp for a visualization of the
 // differences between these two standards.
 package idna // import "golang.org/x/net/idna"
 
@@ -297,7 +299,7 @@ func (e runeError) Error() string {
 }
 
 // process implements the algorithm described in section 4 of UTS #46,
-// see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
+// see https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
 func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
 	var err error
 	var isBidi bool

vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna9.0.0.go

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+// Code generated by running "go generate" in golang.org/x/text. DO NOT EDIT.
+
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !go1.10
+
+// Package idna implements IDNA2008 using the compatibility processing
+// defined by UTS (Unicode Technical Standard) #46, which defines a standard to
+// deal with the transition from IDNA2003.
+//
+// IDNA2008 (Internationalized Domain Names for Applications), is defined in RFC
+// 5890, RFC 5891, RFC 5892, RFC 5893 and RFC 5894.
+// UTS #46 is defined in https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
+// See https://unicode.org/cldr/utility/idna.jsp for a visualization of the
+// differences between these two standards.
+package idna // import "golang.org/x/net/idna"
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"golang.org/x/text/secure/bidirule"
+	"golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm"
+)
+
+// NOTE: Unlike common practice in Go APIs, the functions will return a
+// sanitized domain name in case of errors. Browsers sometimes use a partially
+// evaluated string as lookup.
+// TODO: the current error handling is, in my opinion, the least opinionated.
+// Other strategies are also viable, though:
+// Option 1) Return an empty string in case of error, but allow the user to
+//    specify explicitly which errors to ignore.
+// Option 2) Return the partially evaluated string if it is itself a valid
+//    string, otherwise return the empty string in case of error.
+// Option 3) Option 1 and 2.
+// Option 4) Always return an empty string for now and implement Option 1 as
+//    needed, and document that the return string may not be empty in case of
+//    error in the future.
+// I think Option 1 is best, but it is quite opinionated.
+
+// ToASCII is a wrapper for Punycode.ToASCII.
+func ToASCII(s string) (string, error) {
+	return Punycode.process(s, true)
+}
+
+// ToUnicode is a wrapper for Punycode.ToUnicode.
+func ToUnicode(s string) (string, error) {
+	return Punycode.process(s, false)
+}
+
+// An Option configures a Profile at creation time.
+type Option func(*options)
+
+// Transitional sets a Profile to use the Transitional mapping as defined in UTS
+// #46. This will cause, for example, "ß" to be mapped to "ss". Using the
+// transitional mapping provides a compromise between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008
+// compatibility. It is used by most browsers when resolving domain names. This
+// option is only meaningful if combined with MapForLookup.
+func Transitional(transitional bool) Option {
+	return func(o *options) { o.transitional = true }
+}
+
+// VerifyDNSLength sets whether a Profile should fail if any of the IDN parts
+// are longer than allowed by the RFC.
+func VerifyDNSLength(verify bool) Option {
+	return func(o *options) { o.verifyDNSLength = verify }
+}
+
+// RemoveLeadingDots removes leading label separators. Leading runes that map to
+// dots, such as U+3002 IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP, are removed as well.
+//
+// This is the behavior suggested by the UTS #46 and is adopted by some
+// browsers.
+func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
+	return func(o *options) { o.removeLeadingDots = remove }
+}
+
+// ValidateLabels sets whether to check the mandatory label validation criteria
+// as defined in Section 5.4 of RFC 5891. This includes testing for correct use
+// of hyphens ('-'), normalization, validity of runes, and the context rules.
+func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
+	return func(o *options) {
+		// Don't override existing mappings, but set one that at least checks
+		// normalization if it is not set.
+		if o.mapping == nil && enable {
+			o.mapping = normalize
+		}
+		o.trie = trie
+		o.validateLabels = enable
+		o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
+	}
+}
+
+// StrictDomainName limits the set of permissable ASCII characters to those
+// allowed in domain names as defined in RFC 1034 (A-Z, a-z, 0-9 and the
+// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration.
+//
+// This option is useful, for instance, for browsers that allow characters
+// outside this range, for example a '_' (U+005F LOW LINE). See
+// http://www.rfc-editor.org/std/std3.txt for more details This option
+// corresponds to the UseSTD3ASCIIRules option in UTS #46.
+func StrictDomainName(use bool) Option {
+	return func(o *options) {
+		o.trie = trie
+		o.useSTD3Rules = use
+		o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
+	}
+}
+
+// NOTE: the following options pull in tables. The tables should not be linked
+// in as long as the options are not used.
+
+// BidiRule enables the Bidi rule as defined in RFC 5893. Any application
+// that relies on proper validation of labels should include this rule.
+func BidiRule() Option {
+	return func(o *options) { o.bidirule = bidirule.ValidString }
+}
+
+// ValidateForRegistration sets validation options to verify that a given IDN is
+// properly formatted for registration as defined by Section 4 of RFC 5891.
+func ValidateForRegistration() Option {
+	return func(o *options) {
+		o.mapping = validateRegistration
+		StrictDomainName(true)(o)
+		ValidateLabels(true)(o)
+		VerifyDNSLength(true)(o)
+		BidiRule()(o)
+	}
+}
+
+// MapForLookup sets validation and mapping options such that a given IDN is
+// transformed for domain name lookup according to the requirements set out in
+// Section 5 of RFC 5891. The mappings follow the recommendations of RFC 5894,
+// RFC 5895 and UTS 46. It does not add the Bidi Rule. Use the BidiRule option
+// to add this check.
+//
+// The mappings include normalization and mapping case, width and other
+// compatibility mappings.
+func MapForLookup() Option {
+	return func(o *options) {
+		o.mapping = validateAndMap
+		StrictDomainName(true)(o)
+		ValidateLabels(true)(o)
+		RemoveLeadingDots(true)(o)
+	}
+}
+
+type options struct {
+	transitional      bool
+	useSTD3Rules      bool
+	validateLabels    bool
+	verifyDNSLength   bool
+	removeLeadingDots bool
+
+	trie *idnaTrie
+
+	// fromPuny calls validation rules when converting A-labels to U-labels.
+	fromPuny func(p *Profile, s string) error
+
+	// mapping implements a validation and mapping step as defined in RFC 5895
+	// or UTS 46, tailored to, for example, domain registration or lookup.
+	mapping func(p *Profile, s string) (string, error)
+
+	// bidirule, if specified, checks whether s conforms to the Bidi Rule
+	// defined in RFC 5893.
+	bidirule func(s string) bool
+}
+
+// A Profile defines the configuration of a IDNA mapper.
+type Profile struct {
+	options
+}
+
+func apply(o *options, opts []Option) {
+	for _, f := range opts {
+		f(o)
+	}
+}
+
+// New creates a new Profile.
+//
+// With no options, the returned Profile is the most permissive and equals the
+// Punycode Profile. Options can be passed to further restrict the Profile. The
+// MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration options set a collection of options,
+// for lookup and registration purposes respectively, which can be tailored by
+// adding more fine-grained options, where later options override earlier
+// options.
+func New(o ...Option) *Profile {
+	p := &Profile{}
+	apply(&p.options, o)
+	return p
+}
+
+// ToASCII converts a domain or domain label to its ASCII form. For example,
+// ToASCII("bücher.example.com") is "xn--bcher-kva.example.com", and
+// ToASCII("golang") is "golang". If an error is encountered it will return
+// an error and a (partially) processed result.
+func (p *Profile) ToASCII(s string) (string, error) {
+	return p.process(s, true)
+}
+
+// ToUnicode converts a domain or domain label to its Unicode form. For example,
+// ToUnicode("xn--bcher-kva.example.com") is "bücher.example.com", and
+// ToUnicode("golang") is "golang". If an error is encountered it will return
+// an error and a (partially) processed result.
+func (p *Profile) ToUnicode(s string) (string, error) {
+	pp := *p
+	pp.transitional = false
+	return pp.process(s, false)
+}
+
+// String reports a string with a description of the profile for debugging
+// purposes. The string format may change with different versions.
+func (p *Profile) String() string {
+	s := ""
+	if p.transitional {
+		s = "Transitional"
+	} else {
+		s = "NonTransitional"
+	}
+	if p.useSTD3Rules {
+		s += ":UseSTD3Rules"
+	}
+	if p.validateLabels {
+		s += ":ValidateLabels"
+	}
+	if p.verifyDNSLength {
+		s += ":VerifyDNSLength"
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+var (
+	// Punycode is a Profile that does raw punycode processing with a minimum
+	// of validation.
+	Punycode *Profile = punycode
+
+	// Lookup is the recommended profile for looking up domain names, according
+	// to Section 5 of RFC 5891. The exact configuration of this profile may
+	// change over time.
+	Lookup *Profile = lookup
+
+	// Display is the recommended profile for displaying domain names.
+	// The configuration of this profile may change over time.
+	Display *Profile = display
+
+	// Registration is the recommended profile for checking whether a given
+	// IDN is valid for registration, according to Section 4 of RFC 5891.
+	Registration *Profile = registration
+
+	punycode = &Profile{}
+	lookup   = &Profile{options{
+		transitional:      true,
+		useSTD3Rules:      true,
+		validateLabels:    true,
+		removeLeadingDots: true,
+		trie:              trie,
+		fromPuny:          validateFromPunycode,
+		mapping:           validateAndMap,
+		bidirule:          bidirule.ValidString,
+	}}
+	display = &Profile{options{
+		useSTD3Rules:      true,
+		validateLabels:    true,
+		removeLeadingDots: true,
+		trie:              trie,
+		fromPuny:          validateFromPunycode,
+		mapping:           validateAndMap,
+		bidirule:          bidirule.ValidString,
+	}}
+	registration = &Profile{options{
+		useSTD3Rules:    true,
+		validateLabels:  true,
+		verifyDNSLength: true,
+		trie:            trie,
+		fromPuny:        validateFromPunycode,
+		mapping:         validateRegistration,
+		bidirule:        bidirule.ValidString,
+	}}
+
+	// TODO: profiles
+	// Register: recommended for approving domain names: don't do any mappings
+	// but rather reject on invalid input. Bundle or block deviation characters.
+)
+
+type labelError struct{ label, code_ string }
+
+func (e labelError) code() string { return e.code_ }
+func (e labelError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("idna: invalid label %q", e.label)
+}
+
+type runeError rune
+
+func (e runeError) code() string { return "P1" }
+func (e runeError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("idna: disallowed rune %U", e)
+}
+
+// process implements the algorithm described in section 4 of UTS #46,
+// see https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
+func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
+	var err error
+	if p.mapping != nil {
+		s, err = p.mapping(p, s)
+	}
+	// Remove leading empty labels.
+	if p.removeLeadingDots {
+		for ; len(s) > 0 && s[0] == '.'; s = s[1:] {
+		}
+	}
+	// It seems like we should only create this error on ToASCII, but the
+	// UTS 46 conformance tests suggests we should always check this.
+	if err == nil && p.verifyDNSLength && s == "" {
+		err = &labelError{s, "A4"}
+	}
+	labels := labelIter{orig: s}
+	for ; !labels.done(); labels.next() {
+		label := labels.label()
+		if label == "" {
+			// Empty labels are not okay. The label iterator skips the last
+			// label if it is empty.
+			if err == nil && p.verifyDNSLength {
+				err = &labelError{s, "A4"}
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.HasPrefix(label, acePrefix) {
+			u, err2 := decode(label[len(acePrefix):])
+			if err2 != nil {
+				if err == nil {
+					err = err2
+				}
+				// Spec says keep the old label.
+				continue
+			}
+			labels.set(u)
+			if err == nil && p.validateLabels {
+				err = p.fromPuny(p, u)
+			}
+			if err == nil {
+				// This should be called on NonTransitional, according to the
+				// spec, but that currently does not have any effect. Use the
+				// original profile to preserve options.
+				err = p.validateLabel(u)
+			}
+		} else if err == nil {
+			err = p.validateLabel(label)
+		}
+	}
+	if toASCII {
+		for labels.reset(); !labels.done(); labels.next() {
+			label := labels.label()
+			if !ascii(label) {
+				a, err2 := encode(acePrefix, label)
+				if err == nil {
+					err = err2
+				}
+				label = a
+				labels.set(a)
+			}
+			n := len(label)
+			if p.verifyDNSLength && err == nil && (n == 0 || n > 63) {
+				err = &labelError{label, "A4"}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	s = labels.result()
+	if toASCII && p.verifyDNSLength && err == nil {
+		// Compute the length of the domain name minus the root label and its dot.
+		n := len(s)
+		if n > 0 && s[n-1] == '.' {
+			n--
+		}
+		if len(s) < 1 || n > 253 {
+			err = &labelError{s, "A4"}
+		}
+	}
+	return s, err
+}
+
+func normalize(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
+	return norm.NFC.String(s), nil
+}
+
+func validateRegistration(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
+	if !norm.NFC.IsNormalString(s) {
+		return s, &labelError{s, "V1"}
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); {
+		v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
+		// Copy bytes not copied so far.
+		switch p.simplify(info(v).category()) {
+		// TODO: handle the NV8 defined in the Unicode idna data set to allow
+		// for strict conformance to IDNA2008.
+		case valid, deviation:
+		case disallowed, mapped, unknown, ignored:
+			r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[i:])
+			return s, runeError(r)
+		}
+		i += sz
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
+	var (
+		err error
+		b   []byte
+		k   int
+	)
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); {
+		v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
+		start := i
+		i += sz
+		// Copy bytes not copied so far.
+		switch p.simplify(info(v).category()) {
+		case valid:
+			continue
+		case disallowed:
+			if err == nil {
+				r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[start:])
+				err = runeError(r)
+			}
+			continue
+		case mapped, deviation:
+			b = append(b, s[k:start]...)
+			b = info(v).appendMapping(b, s[start:i])
+		case ignored:
+			b = append(b, s[k:start]...)
+			// drop the rune
+		case unknown:
+			b = append(b, s[k:start]...)
+			b = append(b, "\ufffd"...)
+		}
+		k = i
+	}
+	if k == 0 {
+		// No changes so far.
+		s = norm.NFC.String(s)
+	} else {
+		b = append(b, s[k:]...)
+		if norm.NFC.QuickSpan(b) != len(b) {
+			b = norm.NFC.Bytes(b)
+		}
+		// TODO: the punycode converters require strings as input.
+		s = string(b)
+	}
+	return s, err
+}
+
+// A labelIter allows iterating over domain name labels.
+type labelIter struct {
+	orig     string
+	slice    []string
+	curStart int
+	curEnd   int
+	i        int
+}
+
+func (l *labelIter) reset() {
+	l.curStart = 0
+	l.curEnd = 0
+	l.i = 0
+}
+
+func (l *labelIter) done() bool {
+	return l.curStart >= len(l.orig)
+}
+
+func (l *labelIter) result() string {
+	if l.slice != nil {
+		return strings.Join(l.slice, ".")
+	}
+	return l.orig
+}
+
+func (l *labelIter) label() string {
+	if l.slice != nil {
+		return l.slice[l.i]
+	}
+	p := strings.IndexByte(l.orig[l.curStart:], '.')
+	l.curEnd = l.curStart + p
+	if p == -1 {
+		l.curEnd = len(l.orig)
+	}
+	return l.orig[l.curStart:l.curEnd]
+}
+
+// next sets the value to the next label. It skips the last label if it is empty.
+func (l *labelIter) next() {
+	l.i++
+	if l.slice != nil {
+		if l.i >= len(l.slice) || l.i == len(l.slice)-1 && l.slice[l.i] == "" {
+			l.curStart = len(l.orig)
+		}
+	} else {
+		l.curStart = l.curEnd + 1
+		if l.curStart == len(l.orig)-1 && l.orig[l.curStart] == '.' {
+			l.curStart = len(l.orig)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (l *labelIter) set(s string) {
+	if l.slice == nil {
+		l.slice = strings.Split(l.orig, ".")
+	}
+	l.slice[l.i] = s
+}
+
+// acePrefix is the ASCII Compatible Encoding prefix.
+const acePrefix = "xn--"
+
+func (p *Profile) simplify(cat category) category {
+	switch cat {
+	case disallowedSTD3Mapped:
+		if p.useSTD3Rules {
+			cat = disallowed
+		} else {
+			cat = mapped
+		}
+	case disallowedSTD3Valid:
+		if p.useSTD3Rules {
+			cat = disallowed
+		} else {
+			cat = valid
+		}
+	case deviation:
+		if !p.transitional {
+			cat = valid
+		}
+	case validNV8, validXV8:
+		// TODO: handle V2008
+		cat = valid
+	}
+	return cat
+}
+
+func validateFromPunycode(p *Profile, s string) error {
+	if !norm.NFC.IsNormalString(s) {
+		return &labelError{s, "V1"}
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); {
+		v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
+		if c := p.simplify(info(v).category()); c != valid && c != deviation {
+			return &labelError{s, "V6"}
+		}
+		i += sz
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+const (
+	zwnj = "\u200c"
+	zwj  = "\u200d"
+)
+
+type joinState int8
+
+const (
+	stateStart joinState = iota
+	stateVirama
+	stateBefore
+	stateBeforeVirama
+	stateAfter
+	stateFAIL
+)
+
+var joinStates = [][numJoinTypes]joinState{
+	stateStart: {
+		joiningL:   stateBefore,
+		joiningD:   stateBefore,
+		joinZWNJ:   stateFAIL,
+		joinZWJ:    stateFAIL,
+		joinVirama: stateVirama,
+	},
+	stateVirama: {
+		joiningL: stateBefore,
+		joiningD: stateBefore,
+	},
+	stateBefore: {
+		joiningL:   stateBefore,
+		joiningD:   stateBefore,
+		joiningT:   stateBefore,
+		joinZWNJ:   stateAfter,
+		joinZWJ:    stateFAIL,
+		joinVirama: stateBeforeVirama,
+	},
+	stateBeforeVirama: {
+		joiningL: stateBefore,
+		joiningD: stateBefore,
+		joiningT: stateBefore,
+	},
+	stateAfter: {
+		joiningL:   stateFAIL,
+		joiningD:   stateBefore,
+		joiningT:   stateAfter,
+		joiningR:   stateStart,
+		joinZWNJ:   stateFAIL,
+		joinZWJ:    stateFAIL,
+		joinVirama: stateAfter, // no-op as we can't accept joiners here
+	},
+	stateFAIL: {
+		0:          stateFAIL,
+		joiningL:   stateFAIL,
+		joiningD:   stateFAIL,
+		joiningT:   stateFAIL,
+		joiningR:   stateFAIL,
+		joinZWNJ:   stateFAIL,
+		joinZWJ:    stateFAIL,
+		joinVirama: stateFAIL,
+	},
+}
+
+// validateLabel validates the criteria from Section 4.1. Item 1, 4, and 6 are
+// already implicitly satisfied by the overall implementation.
+func (p *Profile) validateLabel(s string) error {
+	if s == "" {
+		if p.verifyDNSLength {
+			return &labelError{s, "A4"}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if p.bidirule != nil && !p.bidirule(s) {
+		return &labelError{s, "B"}
+	}
+	if !p.validateLabels {
+		return nil
+	}
+	trie := p.trie // p.validateLabels is only set if trie is set.
+	if len(s) > 4 && s[2] == '-' && s[3] == '-' {
+		return &labelError{s, "V2"}
+	}
+	if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
+		return &labelError{s, "V3"}
+	}
+	// TODO: merge the use of this in the trie.
+	v, sz := trie.lookupString(s)
+	x := info(v)
+	if x.isModifier() {
+		return &labelError{s, "V5"}
+	}
+	// Quickly return in the absence of zero-width (non) joiners.
+	if strings.Index(s, zwj) == -1 && strings.Index(s, zwnj) == -1 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	st := stateStart
+	for i := 0; ; {
+		jt := x.joinType()
+		if s[i:i+sz] == zwj {
+			jt = joinZWJ
+		} else if s[i:i+sz] == zwnj {
+			jt = joinZWNJ
+		}
+		st = joinStates[st][jt]
+		if x.isViramaModifier() {
+			st = joinStates[st][joinVirama]
+		}
+		if i += sz; i == len(s) {
+			break
+		}
+		v, sz = trie.lookupString(s[i:])
+		x = info(v)
+	}
+	if st == stateFAIL || st == stateAfter {
+		return &labelError{s, "C"}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func ascii(s string) bool {
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		if s[i] >= utf8.RuneSelf {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/tables10.0.0.go

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 // Code generated by running "go generate" in golang.org/x/text. DO NOT EDIT.
 
+// +build go1.10,!go1.13
+
 package idna
 
 // UnicodeVersion is the Unicode version from which the tables in this package are derived.
 const UnicodeVersion = "10.0.0"
 
-var mappings string = "" + // Size: 8176 bytes
+var mappings string = "" + // Size: 8175 bytes
 	"\x00\x01 \x03 ̈\x01a\x03 ̄\x012\x013\x03 ́\x03 ̧\x011\x01o\x051⁄4\x051⁄2" +
 	"\x053⁄4\x03i̇\x03l·\x03ʼn\x01s\x03dž\x03ⱥ\x03ⱦ\x01h\x01j\x01r\x01w\x01y" +
 	"\x03 ̆\x03 ̇\x03 ̊\x03 ̨\x03 ̃\x03 ̋\x01l\x01x\x04̈́\x03 ι\x01;\x05 ̈́" +
@@ -4554,4 +4556,4 @@ var idnaSparseValues = [1915]valueRange{
 	{value: 0x0040, lo: 0xb0, hi: 0xbf},
 }
 
-// Total table size 42115 bytes (41KiB); checksum: F4A1FA4E
+// Total table size 42114 bytes (41KiB); checksum: 355A58A4