mirror of
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3667 lines
91 KiB
C
3667 lines
91 KiB
C
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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
||
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
||
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
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|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
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|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
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|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
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|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
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|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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|
* are met:
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|
*
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|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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|
*
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|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
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|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
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|
* distribution.
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|
*
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|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
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|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
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|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
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|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
||
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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|
* ====================================================================
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*
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|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include "kssl_lcl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
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#include <openssl/fips.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#endif
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static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
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static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
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static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
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{
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if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
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return(SSLv3_client_method());
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else
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return(NULL);
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}
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IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
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ssl_undefined_function,
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ssl3_connect,
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ssl3_get_client_method)
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int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
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unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
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void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
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int ret= -1;
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int new_state,state,skip=0;
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RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
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/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
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* already got and don't await it anymore, because
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* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
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{
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s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
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s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
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}
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#endif
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if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
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{
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/* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
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}
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for (;;)
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{
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state=s->state;
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switch(s->state)
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{
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->renegotiate=1;
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s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
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/* break */
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
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case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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s->server=0;
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if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
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if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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ret = -1;
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goto end;
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}
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/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
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s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL)
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{
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if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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|
}
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s->init_buf=buf;
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buf=NULL;
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}
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|
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
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|
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/* setup buffing BIO */
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
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|
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||
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/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
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|
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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|
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
|
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s->init_num=0;
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|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
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||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
|
||
|
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
|
||
|
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->hit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* receive renewed session ticket */
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
if (ret == 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->hit = 1;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
|
||
|
/* or non-RSA PSK */
|
||
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
||
|
!((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
|
||
|
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
skip = 1;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
skip=1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* at this point we check that we have the
|
||
|
* required stuff from the server */
|
||
|
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret= -1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
|
||
|
* sent back */
|
||
|
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
|
||
|
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
|
||
|
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
||
|
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
|
||
|
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
|
||
|
* We need to skip the certificate verify
|
||
|
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
|
||
|
* inside the client certificate.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
||
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
||
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
|
||
|
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
||
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
||
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
||
|
s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
||
|
s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->session->compress_meth=
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret= -1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret= -1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* clear flags */
|
||
|
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
||
|
if (s->hit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
||
|
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
||
|
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
||
|
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it
|
||
|
* involves ChannelID, then record the
|
||
|
* handshake hashes at this point in the
|
||
|
* session so that any resumption of this
|
||
|
* session with ChannelID can sign those
|
||
|
* hashes. */
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
|
||
|
&& ssl3_can_cutthrough(s)
|
||
|
&& s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
|
||
|
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
||
|
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
||
|
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->hit)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
||
|
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret= -1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
||
|
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
|
||
|
* DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
|
||
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
||
|
ret = 1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
/* break; */
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
||
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
||
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
||
|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
|
||
|
* remove the buffering now */
|
||
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
|
||
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
||
|
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->init_num=0;
|
||
|
s->renegotiate=0;
|
||
|
s->new_session=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
|
||
|
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret=1;
|
||
|
/* s->server=0; */
|
||
|
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
|
||
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
||
|
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
/* break; */
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
||
|
ret= -1;
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
/* break; */
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* did we do anything */
|
||
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->debug)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto end;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
new_state=s->state;
|
||
|
s->state=state;
|
||
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
|
||
|
s->state=new_state;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
skip=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
end:
|
||
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
||
|
if (buf != NULL)
|
||
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
||
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
||
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
|
||
|
return(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
||
|
int i;
|
||
|
unsigned long l;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
||
|
int j;
|
||
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
|
||
|
if ((sess == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
|
||
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
!sess->session_id_length ||
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
(sess->not_resumable))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
|
||
|
|
||
|
p=s->s3->client_random;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
||
|
d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
|
||
|
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
|
||
|
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
|
||
|
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
|
||
|
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
|
||
|
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
|
||
|
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
|
||
|
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
|
||
|
* 1.0.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
|
||
|
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
|
||
|
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
|
||
|
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
|
||
|
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
|
||
|
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
|
||
|
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
|
||
|
* know that is maximum server supports.
|
||
|
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
|
||
|
* containing version 1.0.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
|
||
|
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
|
||
|
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
|
||
|
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
|
||
|
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
|
||
|
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
|
||
|
* the negotiated version.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
||
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
||
|
s->client_version=s->version;
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
|
||
|
*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Random stuff */
|
||
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Session ID */
|
||
|
if (s->new_session)
|
||
|
i=0;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
i=s->session->session_id_length;
|
||
|
*(p++)=i;
|
||
|
if (i != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Ciphers supported */
|
||
|
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
|
||
|
if (i == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
|
||
|
/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
|
||
|
* as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
|
||
|
* to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
|
||
|
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
|
||
|
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s2n(i,p);
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
||
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
||
|
*(p++)=1;
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
||
|
|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
|
||
|
j=0;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
||
|
*(p++)=1+j;
|
||
|
for (i=0; i<j; i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
|
||
|
*(p++)=comp->id;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
/* TLS extensions*/
|
||
|
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
l=(p-d);
|
||
|
d=buf;
|
||
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
||
|
l2n3(l,d);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
||
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
||
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
||
|
s->init_off=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
||
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
||
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
||
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
||
|
int i,al,ok;
|
||
|
unsigned int j;
|
||
|
long n;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
||
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
20000, /* ?? */
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else /* already sent a cookie */
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
|
||
|
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* load the server hello data */
|
||
|
/* load the server random */
|
||
|
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* get the session-id */
|
||
|
j= *(p++);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
|
||
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
||
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
||
|
&s->session->master_key_length,
|
||
|
NULL, &pref_cipher,
|
||
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
|
||
|
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
|
||
|
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|
||
|
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* actually a client application bug */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
||
|
s->hit=1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
|
||
|
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
|
||
|
s->hit=0;
|
||
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->session_id_length=j;
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=j;
|
||
|
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
|
||
|
if (c == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* unknown cipher */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
|
||
|
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
|
||
|
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
|
||
|
|
||
|
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
|
||
|
i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
|
||
|
if (i < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
|
||
|
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
|
||
|
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
|
||
|
if (s->session->cipher)
|
||
|
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
||
|
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
if (!(s->options &
|
||
|
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
||
|
/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
|
||
|
* client authentication.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
|
||
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
||
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
||
|
if (*(p++) != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
||
|
* using compression.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
j= *(p++);
|
||
|
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (j == 0)
|
||
|
comp=NULL;
|
||
|
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
/* TLS extensions*/
|
||
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (p != (d+n))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
|
||
|
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
|
||
|
X509 *x=NULL;
|
||
|
const unsigned char *q,*p;
|
||
|
unsigned char *d;
|
||
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
||
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
||
|
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
|
||
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
|
||
|
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2l3(p,llen);
|
||
|
if (llen+3 != n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2l3(p,l);
|
||
|
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
q=p;
|
||
|
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
|
||
|
if (x == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (q != (p+l))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
x=NULL;
|
||
|
nc+=l+3;
|
||
|
p=q;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
||
|
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
||
|
&& !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
||
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
|
||
|
|
||
|
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
||
|
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
|
||
|
|
||
|
sc->cert_chain=sk;
|
||
|
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
|
||
|
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
|
||
|
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
|
||
|
sk=NULL;
|
||
|
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
||
|
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
||
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
||
|
? 0 : 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
||
|
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
|
||
|
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
|
||
|
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
|
||
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
x=NULL;
|
||
|
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
|
||
|
if (need_cert && i < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
x=NULL;
|
||
|
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (need_cert)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
||
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
||
|
/* Why would the following ever happen?
|
||
|
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
|
||
|
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
|
||
|
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
|
||
|
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
|
||
|
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
||
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
||
|
s->session->peer=x;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
||
|
sc->peer_key= NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
||
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
||
|
s->session->peer=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
||
|
|
||
|
x=NULL;
|
||
|
ret=1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
X509_free(x);
|
||
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
||
|
return(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
||
|
unsigned char *param,*p;
|
||
|
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
|
||
|
long n,alg_k,alg_a;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
||
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
DH *dh=NULL;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
|
||
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
||
|
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
||
|
int curve_nid = 0;
|
||
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
|
||
|
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
|
||
|
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
|
||
|
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
|
||
|
later.*/
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
||
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
||
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
param_len=0;
|
||
|
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
|
||
|
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len=i+2;
|
||
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
||
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (i != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
|
||
|
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
|
||
|
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
|
||
|
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
|
||
|
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
|
||
|
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
|
||
|
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
|
||
|
* NULL-terminated string. */
|
||
|
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
|
||
|
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
|
||
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
|
||
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
n-=param_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (0) {}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
|
||
|
p++;
|
||
|
param_len+=i+1;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
n-=param_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
if (0)
|
||
|
;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
n-=param_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
|
||
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
||
|
rsa=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
||
|
if (param_len > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p+=i;
|
||
|
n-=param_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
if (0)
|
||
|
;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
|
||
|
dh=NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
|
||
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
|
||
|
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
|
||
|
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
|
||
|
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
|
||
|
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
param_len=3;
|
||
|
if ((param_len > n) ||
|
||
|
(*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
|
||
|
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
|
||
|
if (ngroup == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
|
||
|
|
||
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
||
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
p+=3;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
|
||
|
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
|
||
|
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
|
||
|
p+=1;
|
||
|
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
|
||
|
if ((param_len > n) ||
|
||
|
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
|
||
|
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
n-=param_len;
|
||
|
p+=encoded_pt_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
|
||
|
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
|
||
|
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (0) ;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
||
|
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
|
||
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
|
||
|
ecdh=NULL;
|
||
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||
|
bn_ctx = NULL;
|
||
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
||
|
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
||
|
|
||
|
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
|
||
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
|
||
|
/* Should never happen */
|
||
|
if (sigalg == -1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
|
||
|
if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
|
||
|
if (md == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
p += 2;
|
||
|
n -= 2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
md = EVP_sha1();
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(p,i);
|
||
|
n-=2;
|
||
|
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int num;
|
||
|
|
||
|
j=0;
|
||
|
q=md_buf;
|
||
|
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
||
|
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
|
||
|
q+=i;
|
||
|
j+=i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
|
||
|
pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
||
|
if (i < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (i == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* bad signature */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
|
||
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
||
|
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* bad signature */
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
||
|
/* Among PSK ciphers only RSA_PSK needs a public key */
|
||
|
!((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* still data left over */
|
||
|
if (n != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (rsa != NULL)
|
||
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
if (dh != NULL)
|
||
|
DH_free(dh);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
||
|
if (ecdh != NULL)
|
||
|
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ok,ret=0;
|
||
|
unsigned long n,nc,l;
|
||
|
unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
|
||
|
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
|
||
|
const unsigned char *p,*q;
|
||
|
unsigned char *d;
|
||
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
||
|
/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
|
||
|
* as we wont be doing client auth.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
|
||
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* get the certificate types */
|
||
|
ctype_num= *(p++);
|
||
|
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
|
||
|
ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
|
||
|
for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
|
||
|
p+=ctype_num;
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2s(p, llen);
|
||
|
/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
|
||
|
* following length value.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (llen & 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen);
|
||
|
p += llen;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* get the CA RDNs */
|
||
|
n2s(p,llen);
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
FILE *out;
|
||
|
out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
|
||
|
fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
|
||
|
fclose(out);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2s(p,l);
|
||
|
if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
||
|
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
q=p;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
|
||
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
|
||
|
goto cont;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (q != (p+l))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
p+=l;
|
||
|
nc+=l+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
cont:
|
||
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
|
||
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
|
||
|
ca_sk=NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret=1;
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
|
||
|
return(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
|
||
|
long n;
|
||
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
|
unsigned char *d;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
16384,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok)
|
||
|
return((int)n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (n < 6)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
|
||
|
n2s(p, ticklen);
|
||
|
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
|
||
|
if (ticklen + 6 != n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
||
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
||
|
/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
|
||
|
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
|
||
|
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
|
||
|
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
|
||
|
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
|
||
|
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
|
||
|
* session resumption.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
|
||
|
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
|
||
|
* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
|
||
|
* ticket.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
|
||
|
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
||
|
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
ret=1;
|
||
|
return(ret);
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ok, al;
|
||
|
unsigned long resplen,n;
|
||
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
|
||
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
|
||
|
16384,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
if (n < 4)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* need at least status type + length */
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||
|
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2l3(p, resplen);
|
||
|
if (resplen + 4 != n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
|
||
|
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret;
|
||
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
||
|
if (ret == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ret < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ok,ret=0;
|
||
|
long n;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
|
||
|
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
|
||
|
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
if (n > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* should contain no data */
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ret=1;
|
||
|
return(ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
||
|
int n = 0;
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
unsigned char *q;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
||
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
|
||
|
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
||
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
||
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
||
|
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
unsigned int psk_len = 0;
|
||
|
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
||
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
||
|
|
||
|
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
|
||
|
size_t identity_len;
|
||
|
unsigned char *t = NULL;
|
||
|
unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
|
||
|
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
|
||
|
int psk_err = 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n = 0;
|
||
|
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
|
||
|
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
|
||
|
identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
|
||
|
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto psk_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if (psk_len == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
||
|
goto psk_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
identity_len = strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
|
||
|
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto psk_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
|
||
|
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
|
||
|
t = pre_ms;
|
||
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
||
|
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
|
||
|
t+=psk_len;
|
||
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
||
|
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key,
|
||
|
pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
|
||
|
s2n(identity_len, p);
|
||
|
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
|
||
|
n = 2 + identity_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
||
|
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
|
||
|
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto psk_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
psk_err = 0;
|
||
|
psk_err:
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
|
||
|
if (psk_err != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* Fool emacs indentation */
|
||
|
if (0) {}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA *rsa;
|
||
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
||
|
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
||
|
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
||
|
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
|
||
|
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
|
||
|
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
q=p;
|
||
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
||
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
||
|
p+=2;
|
||
|
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
|
||
|
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
||
|
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
|
||
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
|
||
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (n <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
||
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s2n(n,q);
|
||
|
n+=2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key,
|
||
|
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
||
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
||
|
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
|
||
|
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
|
||
|
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
||
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
||
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
||
|
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
||
|
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
||
|
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
|
||
|
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
||
|
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
|
||
|
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
|
||
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
||
|
|
||
|
authp = NULL;
|
||
|
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
|
||
|
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
|
||
|
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
|
||
|
|
||
|
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
|
||
|
&kssl_err);
|
||
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
||
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
|
||
|
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
|
||
|
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (krb5rc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
||
|
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
|
||
|
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
|
||
|
**
|
||
|
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
|
||
|
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
|
||
|
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
|
||
|
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
|
||
|
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
|
||
|
**
|
||
|
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
|
||
|
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
|
||
|
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
|
||
|
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
|
||
|
** Example:
|
||
|
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
|
||
|
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
|
||
|
** optional authenticator omitted.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
|
||
|
s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
|
||
|
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
|
||
|
p+= enc_ticket->length;
|
||
|
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
|
||
|
if (authp && authp->length)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s2n(authp->length,p);
|
||
|
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
|
||
|
p+= authp->length;
|
||
|
n+= authp->length + 2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
free(authp->data);
|
||
|
authp->data = NULL;
|
||
|
authp->length = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
|
||
|
n+=2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
|
||
|
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
|
||
|
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
|
||
|
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
|
||
|
** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
|
||
|
** kssl_ctx->length);
|
||
|
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
||
|
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
|
||
|
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
|
||
|
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
|
||
|
sizeof tmp_buf);
|
||
|
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
|
||
|
outl += padl;
|
||
|
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
||
|
s2n(outl,p);
|
||
|
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
|
||
|
p+=outl;
|
||
|
n+=outl + 2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key,
|
||
|
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
|
||
|
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* we get them from the cert */
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* generate a new random key */
|
||
|
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
||
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
|
||
|
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
|
||
|
|
||
|
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (n <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
||
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key,p,n);
|
||
|
/* clean up */
|
||
|
memset(p,0,n);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* send off the data */
|
||
|
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
|
||
|
s2n(n,p);
|
||
|
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
|
||
|
n+=2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
|
||
|
EC_KEY *tkey;
|
||
|
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
|
||
|
int field_size = 0;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
unsigned char *pre_ms;
|
||
|
unsigned char *t;
|
||
|
unsigned int pre_ms_len;
|
||
|
unsigned int i;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Did we send out the client's
|
||
|
* ECDH share for use in premaster
|
||
|
* computation as part of client certificate?
|
||
|
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
||
|
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
|
||
|
* To add such support, one needs to add
|
||
|
* code that checks for appropriate
|
||
|
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
||
|
* For example, the cert have an ECC
|
||
|
* key on the same curve as the server's
|
||
|
* and the key should be authorized for
|
||
|
* key agreement.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
|
||
|
* to skip sending the certificate verify
|
||
|
* message.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
|
||
|
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
|
||
|
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
|
||
|
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
|
||
|
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
|
||
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
||
|
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
|
||
|
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
||
|
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
|
||
|
* We only need our private key to perform
|
||
|
* the ECDH computation.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
||
|
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
||
|
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
||
|
if (priv_key == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
|
||
|
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
|
||
|
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
|
||
|
if (field_size <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
|
||
|
if (n <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
|
||
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n;
|
||
|
pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
|
||
|
if (pre_ms == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
|
||
|
t = pre_ms;
|
||
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
||
|
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
|
||
|
t += psk_len;
|
||
|
s2n(n, t);
|
||
|
memcpy(t, p, n);
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
|
||
|
-> generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
||
|
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
|
||
|
-> generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key, p, n);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
|
||
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Send empty client key exch message */
|
||
|
n = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* First check the size of encoding and
|
||
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
encoded_pt_len =
|
||
|
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
||
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
||
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
||
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
||
|
|
||
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
|
||
|
sizeof(unsigned char));
|
||
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(bn_ctx == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Encode the public key */
|
||
|
encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
||
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
||
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
||
|
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
n = 0;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
i = strlen(s->session->psk_identity);
|
||
|
s2n(i, p);
|
||
|
memcpy(p, s->session->psk_identity, i);
|
||
|
p += i;
|
||
|
n = i + 2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
*p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */
|
||
|
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
|
||
|
p += 1;
|
||
|
n += 1;
|
||
|
/* copy the point */
|
||
|
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len);
|
||
|
/* increment n to account for length field */
|
||
|
n += encoded_pt_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Free allocated memory */
|
||
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
||
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
||
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
||
|
X509 *peer_cert;
|
||
|
size_t msglen;
|
||
|
unsigned int md_len;
|
||
|
int keytype;
|
||
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
|
||
|
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
|
||
|
if (!peer_cert)
|
||
|
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
|
||
|
if (!peer_cert) {
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
|
||
|
/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
|
||
|
|
||
|
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
|
||
|
* certificate key for key exchange
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
|
||
|
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
|
||
|
/* Generate session key */
|
||
|
RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
|
||
|
/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
|
||
|
/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
|
||
|
* would be used
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
|
||
|
* context data */
|
||
|
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||
|
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
|
||
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
||
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
|
||
|
8,shared_ukm)<0) {
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
|
||
|
/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
|
||
|
*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
||
|
msglen=255;
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (msglen >= 0x80)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*(p++)=0x81;
|
||
|
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
|
||
|
n=msglen+3;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
|
||
|
n=msglen+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
|
||
|
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
|
||
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
||
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
||
|
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* send off the data */
|
||
|
n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
|
||
|
s2n(n,p);
|
||
|
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
|
||
|
n+=2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
||
|
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
||
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK) || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && !(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
||
|
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
||
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
||
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
||
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
||
|
s->init_off=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
|
||
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
||
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
||
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
||
|
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
|
||
|
unsigned u=0;
|
||
|
unsigned long n;
|
||
|
int j;
|
||
|
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
||
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
||
|
pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
|
||
|
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
|
||
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
||
|
NID_sha1,
|
||
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
|
||
|
* using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
long hdatalen = 0;
|
||
|
void *hdata;
|
||
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||
|
switch (ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
|
||
|
md = s->s3->digest_rsa;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
|
||
|
md = s->s3->digest_dsa;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
|
||
|
md = s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
md = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!md)
|
||
|
/* Unlike with the SignatureAlgorithm extension (sent by clients),
|
||
|
* there are no default algorithms for the CertificateRequest message
|
||
|
* (sent by servers). However, now that we've sent a certificate
|
||
|
* for which we don't really know what hash to use for signing, the
|
||
|
* best we can do is try a default algorithm. */
|
||
|
md = EVP_sha1();
|
||
|
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
|
||
|
&hdata);
|
||
|
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p += 2;
|
||
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
|
||
|
EVP_MD_name(md));
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|
||
|
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|
||
|
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
||
|
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(u,p);
|
||
|
n = u + 4;
|
||
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
||
|
NID_md5,
|
||
|
&(data[0]));
|
||
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
|
||
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
|
||
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(u,p);
|
||
|
n=u+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
||
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
||
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
||
|
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(j,p);
|
||
|
n=j+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
||
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
||
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
||
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
||
|
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
||
|
ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(j,p);
|
||
|
n=j+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char signbuf[64];
|
||
|
int i;
|
||
|
size_t sigsize=64;
|
||
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
||
|
NID_id_GostR3411_94,
|
||
|
data);
|
||
|
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
||
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
|
||
|
p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(j,p);
|
||
|
n=j+2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
||
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
|
||
|
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
|
||
|
s->init_off=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
||
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
X509 *x509=NULL;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
||
|
int i;
|
||
|
unsigned long l;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
|
||
|
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* We need to get a client cert */
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* If we get an error, we need to
|
||
|
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
|
||
|
* We then get retied later */
|
||
|
i=0;
|
||
|
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
|
||
|
if (i < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
||
|
return(-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
||
|
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
||
|
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
|
||
|
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
|
||
|
i=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if (i == 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
i=0;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
|
||
|
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
if (i == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Ok, we have a cert */
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
|
||
|
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
|
||
|
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
|
||
|
s->init_num=(int)l;
|
||
|
s->init_off=0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
|
||
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int i,idx;
|
||
|
long alg_k,alg_a;
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
||
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
RSA *rsa;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
DH *dh;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* we don't have a certificate */
|
||
|
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
|
||
|
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
|
||
|
if (sc == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* This is the passed certificate */
|
||
|
|
||
|
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
||
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
|
||
|
s) == 0)
|
||
|
{ /* check failed */
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
|
||
|
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
|
||
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||
|
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
|
||
|
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
|
||
|
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||
|
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
||
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (rsa == NULL
|
||
|
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (dh == NULL
|
||
|
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
||
|
goto f_err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return(1);
|
||
|
f_err:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
return(0);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
||
|
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
||
|
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned int len, padding_len;
|
||
|
unsigned char *d;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
|
||
|
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
|
||
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
||
|
d[4] = len;
|
||
|
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
|
||
|
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
|
||
|
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
|
||
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
|
||
|
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
|
||
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
|
||
|
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
|
||
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *d;
|
||
|
int ret = -1, public_key_len;
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
||
|
size_t sig_len;
|
||
|
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
|
||
|
unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
|
||
|
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
|
||
|
s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
|
||
|
if (key != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
|
||
|
return (-1);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
||
|
|
||
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
||
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
|
||
|
l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
|
||
|
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
|
||
|
if (public_key_len <= 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
|
||
|
* P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
|
||
|
* field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
|
||
|
if (public_key_len != 65)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
|
||
|
if (!public_key)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
derp = public_key;
|
||
|
i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
|
||
|
s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
|
||
|
if (!der_sig)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
derp = der_sig;
|
||
|
sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len);
|
||
|
if (sig == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
|
||
|
memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
|
||
|
d += 64;
|
||
|
memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
|
||
|
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
|
||
|
d += 32;
|
||
|
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
|
||
|
d += 32;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
|
||
|
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
|
||
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
|
||
|
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
||
|
if (public_key)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(public_key);
|
||
|
if (der_sig)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
|
||
|
if (sig)
|
||
|
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
|
||
|
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
|
||
|
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||
|
int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ok;
|
||
|
long n;
|
||
|
/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
|
||
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
|
||
|
* message, so permit appropriate message length */
|
||
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
||
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
||
|
-1,
|
||
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
||
|
&ok);
|
||
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
||
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|
||
|
|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
|
||
|
return 2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int i = 0;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
|
||
|
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
|
||
|
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||
|
if (i != 0)
|
||
|
return i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
|
||
|
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
|
||
|
return i;
|
||
|
}
|