TheArchive/session-android
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android.git synced 2024-12-30 03:37:46 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
session-android/jni/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
Moxie Marlinspike d83a3d71bc Support for Signal calls. 
Merge in RedPhone

// FREEBIE
2015-09-30 14:30:09 -07:00

1128 lines
30 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* ssl/s2_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
static int get_server_finished(SSL *s);
static int get_server_verify(SSL *s);
static int get_server_hello(SSL *s);
static int client_hello(SSL *s);
static int client_master_key(SSL *s);
static int client_finished(SSL *s);
static int client_certificate(SSL *s);
static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to,int padding);
#define BREAK break
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl2_connect,
ssl2_get_client_method)
int ssl2_connect(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
int ret= -1;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int new_state,state;
RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server=0;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
buf=s->init_buf;
if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
if (buf == s->init_buf)
buf=NULL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
buf=NULL;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->handshake_func=ssl2_connect;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B:
ret=get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->hit) /* new session */
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
BREAK;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
break;
}
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
ret=client_master_key(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
break;
case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
/* Ok, we now have all the stuff needed to
* start encrypting, so lets fire it up :-) */
if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,1))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->s2->clear_text=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
ret=client_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
break;
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
ret=get_server_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
ret=get_server_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
break;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D:
case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
ret=client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
s->init_num=0;
/* ERR_clear_error();*/
/* If we want to cache session-ids in the client
* and we successfully add the session-id to the
* cache, and there is a callback, then pass it out.
* 26/11/96 - eay - only add if not a re-used session.
*/
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret=1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
return(-1);
/* break; */
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p;
int i,j;
unsigned long len;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=buf;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),11-s->init_num);
if (i < (11-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
s->init_num = 11;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
}
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
#if 0
s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
/* Some [PPC?] compilers fail to increment p in above
statement, e.g. one provided with Rhapsody 5.5, but
most recent example XL C 11.1 for AIX, even without
optimization flag... */
#else
s->hit=(*p)?1:0; p++;
#endif
s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
n2s(p,i);
if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cert_length=i;
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.csl=i;
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length=i;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B */
len = 11 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cert_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.csl + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
j = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
if (i != j) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-HELLO */
/* things are looking good */
p = buf + 11;
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->s2->tmp.cert_length != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO);
return(-1);
}
if (s->s2->tmp.cert_type != 0)
{
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO);
return(-1);
}
}
if (s->s2->tmp.csl != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO);
return(-1);
}
}
else
{
#ifdef undef
/* very bad */
memset(s->session->session_id,0,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES);
s->session->session_id_length=0;
*/
#endif
/* we need to do this in case we were trying to reuse a
* client session but others are already reusing it.
* If this was a new 'blank' session ID, the session-id
* length will still be 0 */
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
}
if (ssl2_set_certificate(s,s->s2->tmp.cert_type,
s->s2->tmp.cert_length,p) <= 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
return(-1);
}
p+=s->s2->tmp.cert_length;
if (s->s2->tmp.csl == 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST);
return(-1);
}
/* We have just received a list of ciphers back from the
* server. We need to get the ones that match, then select
* the one we want the most :-). */
/* load the ciphers */
sk=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.csl,
&s->session->ciphers);
p+=s->s2->tmp.csl;
if (sk == NULL)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
/* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
/*
* If server preference flag set, choose the first
* (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
* client preference has priority.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
{
prio = sk;
allow = cl;
}
else
{
prio = cl;
allow = sk;
}
/* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
* don't want to use but that does not matter since we
* will check against the list we originally sent and
* for performance reasons we should not bother to match
* the two lists up just to check. */
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
{
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
break;
}
if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return(-1);
}
s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
/* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL
|| s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
/* can't happen */
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
s->s2->conn_id_length=s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s2->conn_id,p,s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length);
return(1);
}
static int client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
/* CIPHER **cipher;*/
int i,n,j;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
{
if ((s->session == NULL) ||
(s->session->ssl_version != s->version))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=buf; /* header */
d=p+9; /* data section */
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; /* type */
s2n(SSL2_VERSION,p); /* version */
n=j=0;
n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d,0);
d+=n;
if (n == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
return(-1);
}
s2n(n,p); /* cipher spec num bytes */
if ((s->session->session_id_length > 0) &&
(s->session->session_id_length <=
SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
{
i=s->session->session_id_length;
s2n(i,p); /* session id length */
memcpy(d,s->session->session_id,(unsigned int)i);
d+=i;
}
else
{
s2n(0,p);
}
s->s2->challenge_length=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
s2n(SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH,p); /* challenge length */
/*challenge id data*/
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
return -1;
memcpy(d,s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
d+=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
s->init_num=d-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B */
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int clear,enc,karg,i;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *md;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
{
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
return(-1);
}
sess=s->session;
p=buf;
d=p+10;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY;/* type */
i=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,sess->cipher,p);
p+=i;
/* make key_arg data */
i=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
sess->key_arg_length=i;
if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (i > 0)
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg,i) <= 0)
return -1;
/* make a master key */
i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
sess->master_key_length=i;
if (i > 0)
{
if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i) <= 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
}
if (sess->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
enc=8;
else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(sess->cipher))
enc=5;
else
enc=i;
if ((int)i < enc)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
clear=i-enc;
s2n(clear,p);
memcpy(d,sess->master_key,(unsigned int)clear);
d+=clear;
enc=ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(sess->sess_cert,enc,
&(sess->master_key[clear]),d,
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (enc <= 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) d[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
sess->master_key[clear]++;
#endif
s2n(enc,p);
d+=enc;
karg=sess->key_arg_length;
s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(d,sess->key_arg,(unsigned int)karg);
d+=karg;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
s->init_num=d-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
static int client_finished(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(p,s->s2->conn_id,(unsigned int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
s->init_num=s->s2->conn_id_length+1;
s->init_off=0;
}
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
/* read the data and then respond */
static int client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int n;
int cert_ch_len;
unsigned char *cert_ch;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
* the session if it does not have one */
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
s->init_num += i;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
/* type=buf[0]; */
/* type eq x509 */
if (buf[1] != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
return(-1);
}
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
}
else
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
}
cert_ch = buf + 2;
cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
/* If we get an error we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(error);
* We should then be retried when things are ok and we
* can get a cert or not */
i=0;
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
{
i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
}
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return(-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
{
i=0;
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
else if (i == 1)
{
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
i=0;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* We have no client certificate to respond with
* so send the correct error message back */
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B;
p=buf;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
s2n(SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE,p);
s->init_off=0;
s->init_num=3;
/* Write is done at the end */
}
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B)
{
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
/* ok, now we calculate the checksum
* do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
p=buf;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
s->s2->key_material_length);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
/* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
if(i > 0)
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
p=buf;
d=p+6;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
*(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
n=i2d_X509(s->cert->key->x509,&d);
s2n(n,p);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx,d,&n,s->cert->key->privatekey))
{
/* this is not good. If things have failed it
* means there so something wrong with the key.
* We will continue with a 0 length signature
*/
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
s2n(n,p);
d+=n;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D;
s->init_num=d-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D) */
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int i, n, len;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
if (i < (1-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
s->init_num += i;
s->state= SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY)
{
if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
/* try to read the error message */
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
}
return(-1);
}
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len = 1 + s->s2->challenge_length;
n = len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
if (i < n)
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
p += 1;
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
return(-1);
}
return(1);
}
static int get_server_finished(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p;
int i, n, len;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=buf;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
if (i < (1-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
s->init_num += i;
if (*p == SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE)
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A;
return(1);
}
else if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED)
{
if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
/* try to read the error message */
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
}
return(-1);
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
}
len = 1 + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
n = len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]), n);
if (i < n) /* XXX could be shorter than SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, that's the maximum */
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
s->init_num += i;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-FINISHED */
if (!s->hit) /* new session */
{
/* new session-id */
/* Make sure we were not trying to re-use an old SSL_SESSION
* or bad things can happen */
/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
s->session->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p+1,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
}
else
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG))
{
if ((s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
|| (0 != memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
(unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length)))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
return(-1);
}
}
}
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
return(1);
}
/* loads in the certificate from the server */
int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc=NULL;
int i;
X509 *x509=NULL;
int ret=0;
x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&data,(long)len);
if (x509 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk,x509))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* server's cert for this session */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509=x509;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
x509=NULL;
if (pkey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_peer_cert_type(sc,SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE))
goto err;
ret=1;
err:
sk_X509_free(sk);
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
}
static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, int padding)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int i= -1;
if ((sc == NULL) || (sc->peer_key->x509 == NULL) ||
((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_key->x509)) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY);
return(-1);
}
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
goto end;
}
/* we have the public key */
i=RSA_public_encrypt(len,from,to,pkey->pkey.rsa,padding);
if (i < 0)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
end:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(i);
}
#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
# if PEDANTIC
static void *dummy=&dummy;
# endif
#endif
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink