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ipn/ipnlocal: discard node keys that have been rotated out
A non-signing node can be allowed to re-sign its new node keys following key renewal/rotation (e.g. via `tailscale up --force-reauth`). To be able to do this, node's TLK is written into WrappingPubkey field of the initial SigDirect signature, signed by a signing node. The intended use of this field implies that, for each WrappingPubkey, we typically expect to have at most one active node with a signature tracing back to that key. Multiple valid signatures referring to the same WrappingPubkey can occur if a client's state has been cloned, but it's something we explicitly discourage and don't support: https://tailscale.com/s/clone This change propagates rotation details (wrapping public key, a list of previous node keys that have been rotated out) to netmap processing, and adds tracking of obsolete node keys that, when found, will get filtered out. Updates tailscale/corp#19764 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Anton Tolchanov

parent
42cfbf427c
commit
01847e0123
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ func (c *Direct) doLogin(ctx context.Context, opt loginOpt) (mustRegen bool, new
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var nodeKeySignature tkatype.MarshaledSignature
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if !oldNodeKey.IsZero() && opt.OldNodeKeySignature != nil {
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if nodeKeySignature, err = resignNKS(persist.NetworkLockKey, tryingNewKey.Public(), opt.OldNodeKeySignature); err != nil {
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if nodeKeySignature, err = tka.ResignNKS(persist.NetworkLockKey, tryingNewKey.Public(), opt.OldNodeKeySignature); err != nil {
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c.logf("Failed re-signing node-key signature: %v", err)
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}
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} else if isWrapped {
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@@ -729,45 +729,6 @@ func (c *Direct) doLogin(ctx context.Context, opt loginOpt) (mustRegen bool, new
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return false, resp.AuthURL, nil, nil
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}
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// resignNKS re-signs a node-key signature for a new node-key.
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//
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// This only matters on network-locked tailnets, because node-key signatures are
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// how other nodes know that a node-key is authentic. When the node-key is
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// rotated then the existing signature becomes invalid, so this function is
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// responsible for generating a new wrapping signature to certify the new node-key.
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//
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// The signature itself is a SigRotation signature, which embeds the old signature
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// and certifies the new node-key as a replacement for the old by signing the new
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// signature with RotationPubkey (which is the node's own network-lock key).
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func resignNKS(priv key.NLPrivate, nodeKey key.NodePublic, oldNKS tkatype.MarshaledSignature) (tkatype.MarshaledSignature, error) {
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var oldSig tka.NodeKeySignature
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if err := oldSig.Unserialize(oldNKS); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding NKS: %w", err)
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}
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nk, err := nodeKey.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshalling node-key: %w", err)
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}
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if bytes.Equal(nk, oldSig.Pubkey) {
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// The old signature is valid for the node-key we are using, so just
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// use it verbatim.
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return oldNKS, nil
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}
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newSig := tka.NodeKeySignature{
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SigKind: tka.SigRotation,
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Pubkey: nk,
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Nested: &oldSig,
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}
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if newSig.Signature, err = priv.SignNKS(newSig.SigHash()); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing NKS: %w", err)
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}
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return newSig.Serialize(), nil
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}
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// newEndpoints acquires c.mu and sets the local port and endpoints and reports
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// whether they've changed.
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//
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