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tempfork/acme: add new package for x/crypto package acme fork, move

Browse Source 
We've been maintaining temporary dev forks of golang.org/x/crypto/{acme,ssh}
in https://github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto instead of using
this repo's tempfork directory as we do with other packages. The reason we were
doing that was because x/crypto/ssh depended on x/crypto/ssh/internal/poly1305
and I hadn't noticed there are forwarding wrappers already available
in x/crypto/poly1305. It also depended internal/bcrypt_pbkdf but we don't use that
so it's easy to just delete that calling code in our tempfork/ssh.

Now that our SSH changes have been upstreamed, we can soon unfork from SSH.

That leaves ACME remaining.

This change copies our tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme code to
tempfork/acme but adds a test that our vendored copied still matches
our tailscale/golang-x-crypto repo, where we can continue to do
development work and rebases with upstream. A comment on the new test
describes the expected workflow.

While we could continue to just import & use
tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme, it seems a bit nicer to not have that
entire-fork-of-x-crypto visible at all in our transitive deps and the
questions that invites. Showing just a fork of an ACME client is much
less scary. It does add a step to the process of hacking on the ACME
client code, but we do that approximately never anyway, and the extra
step is very incremental compared to the existing tedious steps.

Updates #8593
Updates #10238

Change-Id: I8af4378c04c1f82e63d31bf4d16dba9f510f9199
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This commit is contained in:
Brad Fitzpatrick 2025-01-27 03:07:21 +00:00 committed by Brad Fitzpatrick
parent bd9725c5f8
commit 2691b9f6be
16 changed files with 5679 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
cmd/k8s-operator/depaware.txt
View File

@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/k8s-operator dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/
W 💣 github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/socket from github.com/tailscale/go-winio
W github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/stringbuffer from github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/fs
W github.com/tailscale/go-winio/pkg/guid from github.com/tailscale/go-winio+
github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/internal/poly1305 from github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf from github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh
@ -888,6 +887,7 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/k8s-operator dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/
tailscale.com/syncs from tailscale.com/control/controlknobs+
tailscale.com/tailcfg from tailscale.com/client/tailscale+
tailscale.com/taildrop from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal+
tailscale.com/tempfork/acme from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
tailscale.com/tempfork/heap from tailscale.com/wgengine/magicsock
tailscale.com/tempfork/httprec from tailscale.com/control/controlclient
tailscale.com/tka from tailscale.com/client/tailscale+

2
cmd/tailscaled/depaware.txt
View File

@ -152,7 +152,6 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/de
W 💣 github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/socket from github.com/tailscale/go-winio
W github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/stringbuffer from github.com/tailscale/go-winio/internal/fs
W github.com/tailscale/go-winio/pkg/guid from github.com/tailscale/go-winio+
github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/internal/poly1305 from github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal+
LD github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf from github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh
@ -339,6 +338,7 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/de
tailscale.com/syncs from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled+
tailscale.com/tailcfg from tailscale.com/client/tailscale+
tailscale.com/taildrop from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal+
tailscale.com/tempfork/acme from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
LD tailscale.com/tempfork/gliderlabs/ssh from tailscale.com/ssh/tailssh
tailscale.com/tempfork/heap from tailscale.com/wgengine/magicsock
tailscale.com/tempfork/httprec from tailscale.com/control/controlclient

2
ipn/ipnlocal/cert.go
View File

@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ import (
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme"
"tailscale.com/atomicfile"
"tailscale.com/envknob"
"tailscale.com/hostinfo"
@ -41,6 +40,7 @@ import (
"tailscale.com/ipn/store"
"tailscale.com/ipn/store/mem"
"tailscale.com/net/bakedroots"
"tailscale.com/tempfork/acme"
"tailscale.com/types/logger"
"tailscale.com/util/testenv"
"tailscale.com/version"

14
tempfork/acme/README.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# tempfork/acme
This is a vendored copy of Tailscale's https://github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto,
which is a fork of golang.org/x/crypto/acme.
See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/10238 for unforking
status.
The https://github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto location exists to
let us do rebases from upstream easily, and then we update tempfork/acme
in the same commit we go get github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto@main.
See the comment on the TestSyncedToUpstream test for details. That
test should catch that forgotten step.

861
tempfork/acme/acme.go Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,861 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package acme provides an implementation of the
// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec,
// most famously used by Let's Encrypt.
//
// The initial implementation of this package was based on an early version
// of the spec. The current implementation supports only the modern
// RFC 8555 but some of the old API surface remains for compatibility.
// While code using the old API will still compile, it will return an error.
// Note the deprecation comments to update your code.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for the spec.
//
// Most common scenarios will want to use autocert subdirectory instead,
// which provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
// and any other ACME-based CA.
package acme
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
const (
// LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA.
LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
// ALPNProto is the ALPN protocol name used by a CA server when validating
// tls-alpn-01 challenges.
//
// Package users must ensure their servers can negotiate the ACME ALPN in
// order for tls-alpn-01 challenge verifications to succeed.
// See the crypto/tls package's Config.NextProtos field.
ALPNProto = "acme-tls/1"
)
// idPeACMEIdentifier is the OID for the ACME extension for the TLS-ALPN challenge.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-tls-alpn-05#section-5.1
var idPeACMEIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 31}
const (
maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain
maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in DER bytes
// Used for decoding certs from application/pem-certificate-chain response,
// the default when in RFC mode.
maxCertChainSize = maxCertSize * maxChainLen
// Max number of collected nonces kept in memory.
// Expect usual peak of 1 or 2.
maxNonces = 100
)
// Client is an ACME client.
//
// The only required field is Key. An example of creating a client with a new key
// is as follows:
//
// key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
// if err != nil {
// log.Fatal(err)
// }
// client := &Client{Key: key}
type Client struct {
// Key is the account key used to register with a CA and sign requests.
// Key.Public() must return a *rsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey.
//
// The following algorithms are supported:
// RS256, ES256, ES384 and ES512.
// See RFC 7518 for more details about the algorithms.
Key crypto.Signer
// HTTPClient optionally specifies an HTTP client to use
// instead of http.DefaultClient.
HTTPClient *http.Client
// DirectoryURL points to the CA directory endpoint.
// If empty, LetsEncryptURL is used.
// Mutating this value after a successful call of Client's Discover method
// will have no effect.
DirectoryURL string
// RetryBackoff computes the duration after which the nth retry of a failed request
// should occur. The value of n for the first call on failure is 1.
// The values of r and resp are the request and response of the last failed attempt.
// If the returned value is negative or zero, no more retries are done and an error
// is returned to the caller of the original method.
//
// Requests which result in a 4xx client error are not retried,
// except for 400 Bad Request due to "bad nonce" errors and 429 Too Many Requests.
//
// If RetryBackoff is nil, a truncated exponential backoff algorithm
// with the ceiling of 10 seconds is used, where each subsequent retry n
// is done after either ("Retry-After" + jitter) or (2^n seconds + jitter),
// preferring the former if "Retry-After" header is found in the resp.
// The jitter is a random value up to 1 second.
RetryBackoff func(n int, r *http.Request, resp *http.Response) time.Duration
// UserAgent is prepended to the User-Agent header sent to the ACME server,
// which by default is this package's name and version.
//
// Reusable libraries and tools in particular should set this value to be
// identifiable by the server, in case they are causing issues.
UserAgent string
cacheMu sync.Mutex
dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method
// KID is the key identifier provided by the CA. If not provided it will be
// retrieved from the CA by making a call to the registration endpoint.
KID KeyID
noncesMu sync.Mutex
nonces map[string]struct{} // nonces collected from previous responses
}
// accountKID returns a key ID associated with c.Key, the account identity
// provided by the CA during RFC based registration.
// It assumes c.Discover has already been called.
//
// accountKID requires at most one network roundtrip.
// It caches only successful result.
//
// When in pre-RFC mode or when c.getRegRFC responds with an error, accountKID
// returns noKeyID.
func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) KeyID {
c.cacheMu.Lock()
defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
if c.KID != noKeyID {
return c.KID
}
a, err := c.getRegRFC(ctx)
if err != nil {
return noKeyID
}
c.KID = KeyID(a.URI)
return c.KID
}
var errPreRFC = errors.New("acme: server does not support the RFC 8555 version of ACME")
// Discover performs ACME server discovery using c.DirectoryURL.
//
// It caches successful result. So, subsequent calls will not result in
// a network round-trip. This also means mutating c.DirectoryURL after successful call
// of this method will have no effect.
func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) {
c.cacheMu.Lock()
defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
if c.dir != nil {
return *c.dir, nil
}
res, err := c.get(ctx, c.directoryURL(), wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return Directory{}, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
c.addNonce(res.Header)
var v struct {
Reg string `json:"newAccount"`
Authz string `json:"newAuthz"`
Order string `json:"newOrder"`
Revoke string `json:"revokeCert"`
Nonce string `json:"newNonce"`
KeyChange string `json:"keyChange"`
RenewalInfo string `json:"renewalInfo"`
Meta struct {
Terms string `json:"termsOfService"`
Website string `json:"website"`
CAA []string `json:"caaIdentities"`
ExternalAcct bool `json:"externalAccountRequired"`
}
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return Directory{}, err
}
if v.Order == "" {
return Directory{}, errPreRFC
}
c.dir = &Directory{
RegURL: v.Reg,
AuthzURL: v.Authz,
OrderURL: v.Order,
RevokeURL: v.Revoke,
NonceURL: v.Nonce,
KeyChangeURL: v.KeyChange,
RenewalInfoURL: v.RenewalInfo,
Terms: v.Meta.Terms,
Website: v.Meta.Website,
CAA: v.Meta.CAA,
ExternalAccountRequired: v.Meta.ExternalAcct,
}
return *c.dir, nil
}
func (c *Client) directoryURL() string {
if c.DirectoryURL != "" {
return c.DirectoryURL
}
return LetsEncryptURL
}
// CreateCert was part of the old version of ACME. It is incompatible with RFC 8555.
//
// Deprecated: this was for the pre-RFC 8555 version of ACME. Callers should use CreateOrderCert.
func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
return nil, "", errPreRFC
}
// FetchCert retrieves already issued certificate from the given url, in DER format.
// It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved,
// context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received.
//
// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contains the CA (issuer)
// certificate chain.
//
// FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large.
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid
// and has expected features.
func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle)
}
// RevokeCert revokes a previously issued certificate cert, provided in DER format.
//
// The key argument, used to sign the request, must be authorized
// to revoke the certificate. It's up to the CA to decide which keys are authorized.
// For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized.
// If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason)
}
// FetchRenewalInfo retrieves the RenewalInfo from Directory.RenewalInfoURL.
func (c *Client) FetchRenewalInfo(ctx context.Context, leaf []byte) (*RenewalInfo, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
parsedLeaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leaf)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing leaf certificate: %w", err)
}
renewalURL, err := c.getRenewalURL(parsedLeaf)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating renewal info URL: %w", err)
}
res, err := c.get(ctx, renewalURL, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetching renewal info: %w", err)
}
defer res.Body.Close()
var info RenewalInfo
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&info); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing renewal info response: %w", err)
}
return &info, nil
}
func (c *Client) getRenewalURL(cert *x509.Certificate) (string, error) {
// See https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-acme-ari-04.html#name-the-renewalinfo-resource
// for how the request URL is built.
url := c.dir.RenewalInfoURL
if !strings.HasSuffix(url, "/") {
url += "/"
}
aki := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert.AuthorityKeyId)
serial := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert.SerialNumber.Bytes())
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s.%s", url, aki, serial), nil
}
// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA's Terms of Service
// during account registration. See Register method of Client for more details.
func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
// Register creates a new account with the CA using c.Key.
// It returns the registered account. The account acct is not modified.
//
// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
// If so, and the account has not indicated the acceptance of the terms (see Account for details),
// Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
// whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS.
//
// When interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA, non-RFC 8555 fields of acct are ignored
// and prompt is called if Directory's Terms field is non-zero.
// Also see Error's Instance field for when a CA requires already registered accounts to agree
// to an updated Terms of Service.
func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
if c.Key == nil {
return nil, errors.New("acme: client.Key must be set to Register")
}
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt)
}
// GetReg retrieves an existing account associated with c.Key.
//
// The url argument is a legacy artifact of the pre-RFC 8555 API
// and is ignored.
func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.getRegRFC(ctx)
}
// UpdateReg updates an existing registration.
// It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified.
//
// The account's URI is ignored and the account URL associated with
// c.Key is used instead.
func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct)
}
// AccountKeyRollover attempts to transition a client's account key to a new key.
// On success client's Key is updated which is not concurrency safe.
// On failure an error will be returned.
// The new key is already registered with the ACME provider if the following is true:
// - error is of type acme.Error
// - StatusCode should be 409 (Conflict)
// - Location header will have the KID of the associated account
//
// More about account key rollover can be found at
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.5.
func (c *Client) AccountKeyRollover(ctx context.Context, newKey crypto.Signer) error {
return c.accountKeyRollover(ctx, newKey)
}
// Authorize performs the initial step in the pre-authorization flow,
// as opposed to order-based flow.
// The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned
// challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization.
//
// Once complete, the caller can use AuthorizeOrder which the CA
// should provision with the already satisfied authorization.
// For pre-RFC CAs, the caller can proceed directly to requesting a certificate
// using CreateCert method.
//
// If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return
// a valid authorization which has its Status field set to StatusValid.
//
// More about pre-authorization can be found at
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.4.1.
func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) {
return c.authorize(ctx, "dns", domain)
}
// AuthorizeIP is the same as Authorize but requests IP address authorization.
// Clients which successfully obtain such authorization may request to issue
// a certificate for IP addresses.
//
// See the ACME spec extension for more details about IP address identifiers:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-ip.
func (c *Client) AuthorizeIP(ctx context.Context, ipaddr string) (*Authorization, error) {
return c.authorize(ctx, "ip", ipaddr)
}
func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
type authzID struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
req := struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
Identifier authzID `json:"identifier"`
}{
Resource: "new-authz",
Identifier: authzID{Type: typ, Value: val},
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, c.dir.AuthzURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
var v wireAuthz
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
}
if v.Status != StatusPending && v.Status != StatusValid {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: unexpected status: %s", v.Status)
}
return v.authorization(res.Header.Get("Location")), nil
}
// GetAuthorization retrieves an authorization identified by the given URL.
//
// If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final,
// see the WaitAuthorization method.
func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
var v wireAuthz
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
}
return v.authorization(url), nil
}
// RevokeAuthorization relinquishes an existing authorization identified
// by the given URL.
// The url argument is an Authorization.URI value.
//
// If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization
// using the Authorize or AuthorizeOrder methods before being able to request
// a new certificate for the domain associated with the authorization.
//
// It does not revoke existing certificates.
func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
req := struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Delete bool `json:"delete"`
}{
Resource: "authz",
Status: "deactivated",
Delete: true,
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return nil
}
// WaitAuthorization polls an authorization at the given URL
// until it is in one of the final states, StatusValid or StatusInvalid,
// the ACME CA responded with a 4xx error code, or the context is done.
//
// It returns a non-nil Authorization only if its Status is StatusValid.
// In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error.
// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError.
func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for {
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var raw wireAuthz
err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&raw)
res.Body.Close()
switch {
case err != nil:
// Skip and retry.
case raw.Status == StatusValid:
return raw.authorization(url), nil
case raw.Status == StatusInvalid:
return nil, raw.error(url)
}
// Exponential backoff is implemented in c.get above.
// This is just to prevent continuously hitting the CA
// while waiting for a final authorization status.
d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After"))
if d == 0 {
// Given that the fastest challenges TLS-SNI and HTTP-01
// require a CA to make at least 1 network round trip
// and most likely persist a challenge state,
// this default delay seems reasonable.
d = time.Second
}
t := time.NewTimer(d)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-t.C:
// Retry.
}
}
}
// GetChallenge retrieves the current status of an challenge.
//
// A client typically polls a challenge status using this method.
func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
v := wireChallenge{URI: url}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
}
return v.challenge(), nil
}
// Accept informs the server that the client accepts one of its challenges
// previously obtained with c.Authorize.
//
// The server will then perform the validation asynchronously.
func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, json.RawMessage("{}"), wantStatus(
http.StatusOK, // according to the spec
http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt: see https://goo.gl/WsJ7VT (acme-divergences.md)
))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
var v wireChallenge
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
}
return v.challenge(), nil
}
// DNS01ChallengeRecord returns a DNS record value for a dns-01 challenge response.
// A TXT record containing the returned value must be provisioned under
// "_acme-challenge" name of the domain being validated.
//
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
func (c *Client) DNS01ChallengeRecord(token string) (string, error) {
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
}
// HTTP01ChallengeResponse returns the response for an http-01 challenge.
// Servers should respond with the value to HTTP requests at the URL path
// provided by HTTP01ChallengePath to validate the challenge and prove control
// over a domain name.
//
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengeResponse(token string) (string, error) {
return keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
}
// HTTP01ChallengePath returns the URL path at which the response for an http-01 challenge
// should be provided by the servers.
// The response value can be obtained with HTTP01ChallengeResponse.
//
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string {
return "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token
}
// TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response.
//
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
}
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
name = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{name}, opt)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
}
return cert, name, nil
}
// TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response.
//
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
sanA := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.token.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
}
b = sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
h = hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
sanB := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.ka.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{sanA, sanB}, opt)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
}
return cert, sanA, nil
}
// TLSALPN01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-ALPN-01 challenge response.
// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-ALPN-01 see
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shoemaker-acme-tls-alpn-00#section-3
//
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
// and the public part is used to specify the signee.
// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
//
// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches the domain, and the special acme-tls/1 ALPN protocol
// has been specified.
func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, err error) {
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
shasum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
extValue, err := asn1.Marshal(shasum[:])
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
acmeExtension := pkix.Extension{
Id: idPeACMEIdentifier,
Critical: true,
Value: extValue,
}
tmpl := defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate()
var newOpt []CertOption
for _, o := range opt {
switch o := o.(type) {
case *certOptTemplate:
t := *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok
tmpl = &t
default:
newOpt = append(newOpt, o)
}
}
tmpl.ExtraExtensions = append(tmpl.ExtraExtensions, acmeExtension)
newOpt = append(newOpt, WithTemplate(tmpl))
return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt)
}
// popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce
// or fetches a fresh one from c.dir.NonceURL.
// If NonceURL is empty, it first tries c.directoryURL() and, failing that,
// the provided url.
func (c *Client) popNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) {
c.noncesMu.Lock()
defer c.noncesMu.Unlock()
if len(c.nonces) == 0 {
if c.dir != nil && c.dir.NonceURL != "" {
return c.fetchNonce(ctx, c.dir.NonceURL)
}
dirURL := c.directoryURL()
v, err := c.fetchNonce(ctx, dirURL)
if err != nil && url != dirURL {
v, err = c.fetchNonce(ctx, url)
}
return v, err
}
var nonce string
for nonce = range c.nonces {
delete(c.nonces, nonce)
break
}
return nonce, nil
}
// clearNonces clears any stored nonces
func (c *Client) clearNonces() {
c.noncesMu.Lock()
defer c.noncesMu.Unlock()
c.nonces = make(map[string]struct{})
}
// addNonce stores a nonce value found in h (if any) for future use.
func (c *Client) addNonce(h http.Header) {
v := nonceFromHeader(h)
if v == "" {
return
}
c.noncesMu.Lock()
defer c.noncesMu.Unlock()
if len(c.nonces) >= maxNonces {
return
}
if c.nonces == nil {
c.nonces = make(map[string]struct{})
}
c.nonces[v] = struct{}{}
}
func (c *Client) fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) {
r, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
resp, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, r)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
nonce := nonceFromHeader(resp.Header)
if nonce == "" {
if resp.StatusCode > 299 {
return "", responseError(resp)
}
return "", errors.New("acme: nonce not found")
}
return nonce, nil
}
func nonceFromHeader(h http.Header) string {
return h.Get("Replay-Nonce")
}
// linkHeader returns URI-Reference values of all Link headers
// with relation-type rel.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5988#section-5 for details.
func linkHeader(h http.Header, rel string) []string {
var links []string
for _, v := range h["Link"] {
parts := strings.Split(v, ";")
for _, p := range parts {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "rel=") {
continue
}
if v := strings.Trim(p[4:], `"`); v == rel {
links = append(links, strings.Trim(parts[0], "<>"))
}
}
}
return links
}
// keyAuth generates a key authorization string for a given token.
func keyAuth(pub crypto.PublicKey, token string) (string, error) {
th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", token, th), nil
}
// defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate is a template used to create challenge certs for TLS challenges.
func defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate() *x509.Certificate {
return &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}
}
// tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges
// with the given SANs and auto-generated public/private key pair.
// The Subject Common Name is set to the first SAN to aid debugging.
// To create a cert with a custom key pair, specify WithKey option.
func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
var key crypto.Signer
tmpl := defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate()
for _, o := range opt {
switch o := o.(type) {
case *certOptKey:
if key != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, errors.New("acme: duplicate key option")
}
key = o.key
case *certOptTemplate:
t := *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok
tmpl = &t
default:
// package's fault, if we let this happen:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported option type %T", o))
}
}
if key == nil {
var err error
if key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader); err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
}
tmpl.DNSNames = san
if len(san) > 0 {
tmpl.Subject.CommonName = san[0]
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, key.Public(), key)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
return tls.Certificate{
Certificate: [][]byte{der},
PrivateKey: key,
}, nil
}
// encodePEM returns b encoded as PEM with block of type typ.
func encodePEM(typ string, b []byte) []byte {
pb := &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: b}
return pem.EncodeToMemory(pb)
}
// timeNow is time.Now, except in tests which can mess with it.
var timeNow = time.Now

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@ -0,0 +1,973 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// newTestClient creates a client with a non-nil Directory so that it skips
// the discovery which is otherwise done on the first call of almost every
// exported method.
func newTestClient() *Client {
return &Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
dir: &Directory{}, // skip discovery
}
}
// newTestClientWithMockDirectory creates a client with a non-nil Directory
// that contains mock field values.
func newTestClientWithMockDirectory() *Client {
return &Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
dir: &Directory{
RenewalInfoURL: "https://example.com/acme/renewal-info/",
},
}
}
// Decodes a JWS-encoded request and unmarshals the decoded JSON into a provided
// interface.
func decodeJWSRequest(t *testing.T, v interface{}, r io.Reader) {
// Decode request
var req struct{ Payload string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&req); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.Payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = json.Unmarshal(payload, v)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
type jwsHead struct {
Alg string
Nonce string
URL string `json:"url"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
JWK map[string]string `json:"jwk"`
}
func decodeJWSHead(r io.Reader) (*jwsHead, error) {
var req struct{ Protected string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&req); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.Protected)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var head jwsHead
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &head); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &head, nil
}
func TestRegisterWithoutKey(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{}`)
}))
defer ts.Close()
// First verify that using a complete client results in success.
c := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{RegURL: ts.URL},
}
if _, err := c.Register(context.Background(), &Account{}, AcceptTOS); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("c.Register() = %v; want success with a complete test client", err)
}
c.Key = nil
if _, err := c.Register(context.Background(), &Account{}, AcceptTOS); err == nil {
t.Error("c.Register() from client without key succeeded, wanted error")
}
}
func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
tt := []struct{ typ, value string }{
{"dns", "example.com"},
{"ip", "1.2.3.4"},
}
for _, test := range tt {
t.Run(test.typ, func(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string
Identifier struct {
Type string
Value string
}
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "new-authz" {
t.Errorf("j.Resource = %q; want new-authz", j.Resource)
}
if j.Identifier.Type != test.typ {
t.Errorf("j.Identifier.Type = %q; want %q", j.Identifier.Type, test.typ)
}
if j.Identifier.Value != test.value {
t.Errorf("j.Identifier.Value = %q; want %q", j.Identifier.Value, test.value)
}
w.Header().Set("Location", "https://ca.tld/acme/auth/1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"identifier": {"type":%q,"value":%q},
"status":"pending",
"challenges":[
{
"type":"http-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1",
"token":"token1"
},
{
"type":"tls-sni-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2",
"token":"token2"
}
],
"combinations":[[0],[1]]
}`, test.typ, test.value)
}))
defer ts.Close()
var (
auth *Authorization
err error
)
cl := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
switch test.typ {
case "dns":
auth, err = cl.Authorize(context.Background(), test.value)
case "ip":
auth, err = cl.AuthorizeIP(context.Background(), test.value)
default:
t.Fatalf("unknown identifier type: %q", test.typ)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if auth.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/auth/1" {
t.Errorf("URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/auth/1", auth.URI)
}
if auth.Status != "pending" {
t.Errorf("Status = %q; want pending", auth.Status)
}
if auth.Identifier.Type != test.typ {
t.Errorf("Identifier.Type = %q; want %q", auth.Identifier.Type, test.typ)
}
if auth.Identifier.Value != test.value {
t.Errorf("Identifier.Value = %q; want %q", auth.Identifier.Value, test.value)
}
if n := len(auth.Challenges); n != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(auth.Challenges) = %d; want 2", n)
}
c := auth.Challenges[0]
if c.Type != "http-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want http-01", c.Type)
}
if c.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1", c.URI)
}
if c.Token != "token1" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token1", c.Token)
}
c = auth.Challenges[1]
if c.Type != "tls-sni-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want tls-sni-01", c.Type)
}
if c.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2", c.URI)
}
if c.Token != "token2" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token2", c.Token)
}
combs := [][]int{{0}, {1}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(auth.Combinations, combs) {
t.Errorf("auth.Combinations: %+v\nwant: %+v\n", auth.Combinations, combs)
}
})
}
}
func TestAuthorizeValid(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"valid"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
_, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com")
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("err = %v", err)
}
}
func TestWaitAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("wait loop", func(t *testing.T) {
var count int
authz, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
if count > 1 {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"valid"}`)
return
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"pending"}`)
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("non-nil error: %v", err)
}
if authz == nil {
t.Fatal("authz is nil")
}
})
t.Run("invalid status", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"invalid"}`)
})
if _, ok := err.(*AuthorizationError); !ok {
t.Errorf("err is %v (%T); want non-nil *AuthorizationError", err, err)
}
})
t.Run("invalid status with error returns the authorization error", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"type": "dns-01",
"status": "invalid",
"error": {
"type": "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
"detail": "CAA record for <domain> prevents issuance",
"status": 403
},
"url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall-v3/xxx/xxx",
"token": "xxx",
"validationRecord": [
{
"hostname": "<domain>"
}
]
}`)
})
want := &AuthorizationError{
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for <domain> prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
}
_, ok := err.(*AuthorizationError)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("err is %T; want non-nil *AuthorizationError", err)
}
if err.Error() != want.Error() {
t.Errorf("err is %v; want %v", err, want)
}
})
t.Run("non-retriable error", func(t *testing.T) {
const code = http.StatusBadRequest
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(code)
})
res, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err is %v (%T); want a non-nil *Error", err, err)
}
if res.StatusCode != code {
t.Errorf("res.StatusCode = %d; want %d", res.StatusCode, code)
}
})
for _, code := range []int{http.StatusTooManyRequests, http.StatusInternalServerError} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("retriable %d error", code), func(t *testing.T) {
var count int
authz, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
if count > 1 {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"valid"}`)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(code)
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("non-nil error: %v", err)
}
if authz == nil {
t.Fatal("authz is nil")
}
})
}
t.Run("context cancel", func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(ctx, t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"pending"}`)
time.AfterFunc(1*time.Millisecond, cancel)
})
if err == nil {
t.Error("err is nil")
}
})
}
func runWaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) (*Authorization, error) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", fmt.Sprintf("bad-test-nonce-%v", time.Now().UnixNano()))
h(w, r)
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{},
KID: "some-key-id", // set to avoid lookup attempt
}
return client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, ts.URL)
}
func TestRevokeAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
return
}
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/1":
var req struct {
Resource string
Status string
Delete bool
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &req, r.Body)
if req.Resource != "authz" {
t.Errorf("req.Resource = %q; want authz", req.Resource)
}
if req.Status != "deactivated" {
t.Errorf("req.Status = %q; want deactivated", req.Status)
}
if !req.Delete {
t.Errorf("req.Delete is false")
}
case "/2":
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL, // don't dial outside of localhost
dir: &Directory{}, // don't do discovery
}
ctx := context.Background()
if err := client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, ts.URL+"/1"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("err = %v", err)
}
if client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, ts.URL+"/2") == nil {
t.Error("nil error")
}
}
func TestFetchCertCancel(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
}))
defer ts.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan struct{})
var err error
go func() {
cl := newTestClient()
_, err = cl.FetchCert(ctx, ts.URL, false)
close(done)
}()
cancel()
<-done
if err != context.Canceled {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want %v", err, context.Canceled)
}
}
func TestFetchCertDepth(t *testing.T) {
var count byte
var ts *httptest.Server
ts = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
if count > maxChainLen+1 {
t.Errorf("count = %d; want at most %d", count, maxChainLen+1)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
w.Header().Set("Link", fmt.Sprintf("<%s>;rel=up", ts.URL))
w.Write([]byte{count})
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := newTestClient()
_, err := cl.FetchCert(context.Background(), ts.URL, true)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("err is nil")
}
}
func TestFetchCertBreadth(t *testing.T) {
var ts *httptest.Server
ts = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
for i := 0; i < maxChainLen+1; i++ {
w.Header().Add("Link", fmt.Sprintf("<%s>;rel=up", ts.URL))
}
w.Write([]byte{1})
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := newTestClient()
_, err := cl.FetchCert(context.Background(), ts.URL, true)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("err is nil")
}
}
func TestFetchCertSize(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
b := bytes.Repeat([]byte{1}, maxCertSize+1)
w.Write(b)
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := newTestClient()
_, err := cl.FetchCert(context.Background(), ts.URL, false)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("err is nil")
}
}
const (
leafPEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
)
func TestGetRenewalURL(t *testing.T) {
leaf, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(leafPEM))
parsedLeaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leaf.Bytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
client := newTestClientWithMockDirectory()
urlString, err := client.getRenewalURL(parsedLeaf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(urlString)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if scheme := parsedURL.Scheme; scheme == "" {
t.Fatalf("malformed URL scheme: %q from %q", scheme, urlString)
}
if host := parsedURL.Host; host == "" {
t.Fatalf("malformed URL host: %q from %q", host, urlString)
}
if parsedURL.RawQuery != "" {
t.Fatalf("malformed URL: should not have a query")
}
path := parsedURL.EscapedPath()
slash := strings.LastIndex(path, "/")
if slash == -1 {
t.Fatalf("malformed URL path: %q from %q", path, urlString)
}
certID := path[slash+1:]
if certID == "" {
t.Fatalf("missing certificate identifier in URL path: %q from %q", path, urlString)
}
certIDParts := strings.Split(certID, ".")
if len(certIDParts) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("certificate identifier should consist of 2 base64-encoded values separated by a dot: %q from %q", certID, urlString)
}
if _, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(certIDParts[0]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("malformed AKI part in certificate identifier: %q from %q: %v", certIDParts[0], urlString, err)
}
if _, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(certIDParts[1]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("malformed Serial part in certificate identifier: %q from %q: %v", certIDParts[1], urlString, err)
}
}
func TestUnmarshalRenewalInfo(t *testing.T) {
renewalInfoJSON := `{
"suggestedWindow": {
"start": "2021-01-03T00:00:00Z",
"end": "2021-01-07T00:00:00Z"
},
"explanationURL": "https://example.com/docs/example-mass-reissuance-event"
}`
expectedStart := time.Date(2021, time.January, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
expectedEnd := time.Date(2021, time.January, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
var info RenewalInfo
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(renewalInfoJSON), &info); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := url.Parse(info.ExplanationURL); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !info.SuggestedWindow.Start.Equal(expectedStart) {
t.Fatalf("%v != %v", expectedStart, info.SuggestedWindow.Start)
}
if !info.SuggestedWindow.End.Equal(expectedEnd) {
t.Fatalf("%v != %v", expectedEnd, info.SuggestedWindow.End)
}
}
func TestNonce_add(t *testing.T) {
var c Client
c.addNonce(http.Header{"Replay-Nonce": {"nonce"}})
c.addNonce(http.Header{"Replay-Nonce": {}})
c.addNonce(http.Header{"Replay-Nonce": {"nonce"}})
nonces := map[string]struct{}{"nonce": {}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(c.nonces, nonces) {
t.Errorf("c.nonces = %q; want %q", c.nonces, nonces)
}
}
func TestNonce_addMax(t *testing.T) {
c := &Client{nonces: make(map[string]struct{})}
for i := 0; i < maxNonces; i++ {
c.nonces[fmt.Sprintf("%d", i)] = struct{}{}
}
c.addNonce(http.Header{"Replay-Nonce": {"nonce"}})
if n := len(c.nonces); n != maxNonces {
t.Errorf("len(c.nonces) = %d; want %d", n, maxNonces)
}
}
func TestNonce_fetch(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
code int
nonce string
}{
{http.StatusOK, "nonce1"},
{http.StatusBadRequest, "nonce2"},
{http.StatusOK, ""},
}
var i int
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != "HEAD" {
t.Errorf("%d: r.Method = %q; want HEAD", i, r.Method)
}
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", tests[i].nonce)
w.WriteHeader(tests[i].code)
}))
defer ts.Close()
for ; i < len(tests); i++ {
test := tests[i]
c := newTestClient()
n, err := c.fetchNonce(context.Background(), ts.URL)
if n != test.nonce {
t.Errorf("%d: n=%q; want %q", i, n, test.nonce)
}
switch {
case err == nil && test.nonce == "":
t.Errorf("%d: n=%q, err=%v; want non-nil error", i, n, err)
case err != nil && test.nonce != "":
t.Errorf("%d: n=%q, err=%v; want %q", i, n, err, test.nonce)
}
}
}
func TestNonce_fetchError(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer ts.Close()
c := newTestClient()
_, err := c.fetchNonce(context.Background(), ts.URL)
e, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err is %T; want *Error", err)
}
if e.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("e.StatusCode = %d; want %d", e.StatusCode, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}
}
func TestNonce_popWhenEmpty(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != "HEAD" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want HEAD", r.Method)
}
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/dir-with-nonce":
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "dirnonce")
case "/new-nonce":
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "newnonce")
case "/dir-no-nonce", "/empty":
// No nonce in the header.
default:
t.Errorf("Unknown URL: %s", r.URL)
}
}))
defer ts.Close()
ctx := context.Background()
tt := []struct {
dirURL, popURL, nonce string
wantOK bool
}{
{ts.URL + "/dir-with-nonce", ts.URL + "/new-nonce", "dirnonce", true},
{ts.URL + "/dir-no-nonce", ts.URL + "/new-nonce", "newnonce", true},
{ts.URL + "/dir-no-nonce", ts.URL + "/empty", "", false},
}
for _, test := range tt {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("nonce:%s wantOK:%v", test.nonce, test.wantOK), func(t *testing.T) {
c := Client{DirectoryURL: test.dirURL}
v, err := c.popNonce(ctx, test.popURL)
if !test.wantOK {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("c.popNonce(%q) returned nil error", test.popURL)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("c.popNonce(%q): %v", test.popURL, err)
}
if v != test.nonce {
t.Errorf("c.popNonce(%q) = %q; want %q", test.popURL, v, test.nonce)
}
})
}
}
func TestLinkHeader(t *testing.T) {
h := http.Header{"Link": {
`<https://example.com/acme/new-authz>;rel="next"`,
`<https://example.com/acme/recover-reg>; rel=recover`,
`<https://example.com/acme/terms>; foo=bar; rel="terms-of-service"`,
`<dup>;rel="next"`,
}}
tests := []struct {
rel string
out []string
}{
{"next", []string{"https://example.com/acme/new-authz", "dup"}},
{"recover", []string{"https://example.com/acme/recover-reg"}},
{"terms-of-service", []string{"https://example.com/acme/terms"}},
{"empty", nil},
}
for i, test := range tests {
if v := linkHeader(h, test.rel); !reflect.DeepEqual(v, test.out) {
t.Errorf("%d: linkHeader(%q): %v; want %v", i, test.rel, v, test.out)
}
}
}
func TestTLSSNI01ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
const (
token = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
// echo -n <token.testKeyECThumbprint> | shasum -a 256
san = "dbbd5eefe7b4d06eb9d1d9f5acb4c7cd.a27d320e4b30332f0b6cb441734ad7b0.acme.invalid"
)
tlscert, name, err := newTestClient().TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if n := len(tlscert.Certificate); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(tlscert.Certificate) = %d; want 1", n)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(cert.DNSNames) != 1 || cert.DNSNames[0] != san {
t.Fatalf("cert.DNSNames = %v; want %q", cert.DNSNames, san)
}
if cert.DNSNames[0] != name {
t.Errorf("cert.DNSNames[0] != name: %q vs %q", cert.DNSNames[0], name)
}
if cn := cert.Subject.CommonName; cn != san {
t.Errorf("cert.Subject.CommonName = %q; want %q", cn, san)
}
}
func TestTLSSNI02ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
const (
token = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
// echo -n evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA | shasum -a 256
sanA = "7ea0aaa69214e71e02cebb18bb867736.09b730209baabf60e43d4999979ff139.token.acme.invalid"
// echo -n <token.testKeyECThumbprint> | shasum -a 256
sanB = "dbbd5eefe7b4d06eb9d1d9f5acb4c7cd.a27d320e4b30332f0b6cb441734ad7b0.ka.acme.invalid"
)
tlscert, name, err := newTestClient().TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if n := len(tlscert.Certificate); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(tlscert.Certificate) = %d; want 1", n)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
names := []string{sanA, sanB}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert.DNSNames, names) {
t.Fatalf("cert.DNSNames = %v;\nwant %v", cert.DNSNames, names)
}
sort.Strings(cert.DNSNames)
i := sort.SearchStrings(cert.DNSNames, name)
if i >= len(cert.DNSNames) || cert.DNSNames[i] != name {
t.Errorf("%v doesn't have %q", cert.DNSNames, name)
}
if cn := cert.Subject.CommonName; cn != sanA {
t.Errorf("CommonName = %q; want %q", cn, sanA)
}
}
func TestTLSALPN01ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
const (
token = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
keyAuth = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA." + testKeyECThumbprint
// echo -n <token.testKeyECThumbprint> | shasum -a 256
h = "0420dbbd5eefe7b4d06eb9d1d9f5acb4c7cda27d320e4b30332f0b6cb441734ad7b0"
domain = "example.com"
)
extValue, err := hex.DecodeString(h)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tlscert, err := newTestClient().TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if n := len(tlscert.Certificate); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(tlscert.Certificate) = %d; want 1", n)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
names := []string{domain}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert.DNSNames, names) {
t.Fatalf("cert.DNSNames = %v;\nwant %v", cert.DNSNames, names)
}
if cn := cert.Subject.CommonName; cn != domain {
t.Errorf("CommonName = %q; want %q", cn, domain)
}
acmeExts := []pkix.Extension{}
for _, ext := range cert.Extensions {
if idPeACMEIdentifier.Equal(ext.Id) {
acmeExts = append(acmeExts, ext)
}
}
if len(acmeExts) != 1 {
t.Errorf("acmeExts = %v; want exactly one", acmeExts)
}
if !acmeExts[0].Critical {
t.Errorf("acmeExt.Critical = %v; want true", acmeExts[0].Critical)
}
if bytes.Compare(acmeExts[0].Value, extValue) != 0 {
t.Errorf("acmeExt.Value = %v; want %v", acmeExts[0].Value, extValue)
}
}
func TestTLSChallengeCertOpt(t *testing.T) {
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 512)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
Subject: pkix.Name{Organization: []string{"Test"}},
DNSNames: []string{"should-be-overwritten"},
}
opts := []CertOption{WithKey(key), WithTemplate(tmpl)}
client := newTestClient()
cert1, _, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert("token", opts...)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cert2, _, err := client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert("token", opts...)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for i, tlscert := range []tls.Certificate{cert1, cert2} {
// verify generated cert private key
tlskey, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("%d: tlscert.PrivateKey is %T; want *rsa.PrivateKey", i, tlscert.PrivateKey)
continue
}
if tlskey.D.Cmp(key.D) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d: tlskey.D = %v; want %v", i, tlskey.D, key.D)
}
// verify generated cert public key
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%d: %v", i, err)
continue
}
tlspub, ok := x509Cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("%d: x509Cert.PublicKey is %T; want *rsa.PublicKey", i, x509Cert.PublicKey)
continue
}
if tlspub.N.Cmp(key.N) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d: tlspub.N = %v; want %v", i, tlspub.N, key.N)
}
// verify template option
sn := big.NewInt(2)
if x509Cert.SerialNumber.Cmp(sn) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d: SerialNumber = %v; want %v", i, x509Cert.SerialNumber, sn)
}
org := []string{"Test"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org) {
t.Errorf("%d: Subject.Organization = %+v; want %+v", i, x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org)
}
for _, v := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
if !strings.HasSuffix(v, ".acme.invalid") {
t.Errorf("%d: invalid DNSNames element: %q", i, v)
}
}
}
}
func TestHTTP01Challenge(t *testing.T) {
const (
token = "xxx"
// thumbprint is precomputed for testKeyEC in jws_test.go
value = token + "." + testKeyECThumbprint
urlpath = "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token
)
client := newTestClient()
val, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if val != value {
t.Errorf("val = %q; want %q", val, value)
}
if path := client.HTTP01ChallengePath(token); path != urlpath {
t.Errorf("path = %q; want %q", path, urlpath)
}
}
func TestDNS01ChallengeRecord(t *testing.T) {
// echo -n xxx.<testKeyECThumbprint> | \
// openssl dgst -binary -sha256 | \
// base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'
const value = "8DERMexQ5VcdJ_prpPiA0mVdp7imgbCgjsG4SqqNMIo"
val, err := newTestClient().DNS01ChallengeRecord("xxx")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if val != value {
t.Errorf("val = %q; want %q", val, value)
}
}

325
tempfork/acme/http.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// retryTimer encapsulates common logic for retrying unsuccessful requests.
// It is not safe for concurrent use.
type retryTimer struct {
// backoffFn provides backoff delay sequence for retries.
// See Client.RetryBackoff doc comment.
backoffFn func(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration
// n is the current retry attempt.
n int
}
func (t *retryTimer) inc() {
t.n++
}
// backoff pauses the current goroutine as described in Client.RetryBackoff.
func (t *retryTimer) backoff(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) error {
d := t.backoffFn(t.n, r, res)
if d <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: no more retries for %s; tried %d time(s)", r.URL, t.n)
}
wakeup := time.NewTimer(d)
defer wakeup.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-wakeup.C:
return nil
}
}
func (c *Client) retryTimer() *retryTimer {
f := c.RetryBackoff
if f == nil {
f = defaultBackoff
}
return &retryTimer{backoffFn: f}
}
// defaultBackoff provides default Client.RetryBackoff implementation
// using a truncated exponential backoff algorithm,
// as described in Client.RetryBackoff.
//
// The n argument is always bounded between 1 and 30.
// The returned value is always greater than 0.
func defaultBackoff(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration {
const max = 10 * time.Second
var jitter time.Duration
if x, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000)); err == nil {
// Set the minimum to 1ms to avoid a case where
// an invalid Retry-After value is parsed into 0 below,
// resulting in the 0 returned value which would unintentionally
// stop the retries.
jitter = (1 + time.Duration(x.Int64())) * time.Millisecond
}
if v, ok := res.Header["Retry-After"]; ok {
return retryAfter(v[0]) + jitter
}
if n < 1 {
n = 1
}
if n > 30 {
n = 30
}
d := time.Duration(1<<uint(n-1))*time.Second + jitter
if d > max {
return max
}
return d
}
// retryAfter parses a Retry-After HTTP header value,
// trying to convert v into an int (seconds) or use http.ParseTime otherwise.
// It returns zero value if v cannot be parsed.
func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration {
if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
return time.Duration(i) * time.Second
}
t, err := http.ParseTime(v)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return t.Sub(timeNow())
}
// resOkay is a function that reports whether the provided response is okay.
// It is expected to keep the response body unread.
type resOkay func(*http.Response) bool
// wantStatus returns a function which reports whether the code
// matches the status code of a response.
func wantStatus(codes ...int) resOkay {
return func(res *http.Response) bool {
for _, code := range codes {
if code == res.StatusCode {
return true
}
}
return false
}
}
// get issues an unsigned GET request to the specified URL.
// It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true.
//
// get retries unsuccessful attempts according to c.RetryBackoff
// until the context is done or a non-retriable error is received.
func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) {
retry := c.retryTimer()
for {
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, req)
switch {
case err != nil:
return nil, err
case ok(res):
return res, nil
case isRetriable(res.StatusCode):
retry.inc()
resErr := responseError(res)
res.Body.Close()
// Ignore the error value from retry.backoff
// and return the one from last retry, as received from the CA.
if retry.backoff(ctx, req, res) != nil {
return nil, resErr
}
default:
defer res.Body.Close()
return nil, responseError(res)
}
}
}
// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC 8555
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3.
// It makes a POST request in KID form with zero JWS payload.
// See nopayload doc comments in jws.go.
func (c *Client) postAsGet(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) {
return c.post(ctx, nil, url, noPayload, ok)
}
// post issues a signed POST request in JWS format using the provided key
// to the specified URL. If key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
// It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true.
//
// post retries unsuccessful attempts according to c.RetryBackoff
// until the context is done or a non-retriable error is received.
// It uses postNoRetry to make individual requests.
func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) {
retry := c.retryTimer()
for {
res, req, err := c.postNoRetry(ctx, key, url, body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if ok(res) {
return res, nil
}
resErr := responseError(res)
res.Body.Close()
switch {
// Check for bad nonce before isRetriable because it may have been returned
// with an unretriable response code such as 400 Bad Request.
case isBadNonce(resErr):
// Consider any previously stored nonce values to be invalid.
c.clearNonces()
case !isRetriable(res.StatusCode):
return nil, resErr
}
retry.inc()
// Ignore the error value from retry.backoff
// and return the one from last retry, as received from the CA.
if err := retry.backoff(ctx, req, res); err != nil {
return nil, resErr
}
}
}
// postNoRetry signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url.
// It is used by c.post to retry unsuccessful attempts.
// The body argument must be JSON-serializable.
//
// If key argument is nil, c.Key is used to sign the request.
// If key argument is nil and c.accountKID returns a non-zero keyID,
// the request is sent in KID form. Otherwise, JWK form is used.
//
// In practice, when interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form
// and JWK is used only when KID is unavailable: new account endpoint and certificate
// revocation requests authenticated by a cert key.
// See jwsEncodeJSON for other details.
func (c *Client) postNoRetry(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, *http.Request, error) {
kid := noKeyID
if key == nil {
if c.Key == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("acme: Client.Key must be populated to make POST requests")
}
key = c.Key
kid = c.accountKID(ctx)
}
nonce, err := c.popNonce(ctx, url)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, kid, nonce, url)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/jose+json")
res, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
c.addNonce(res.Header)
return res, req, nil
}
// doNoRetry issues a request req, replacing its context (if any) with ctx.
func (c *Client) doNoRetry(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", c.userAgent())
res, err := c.httpClient().Do(req.WithContext(ctx))
if err != nil {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
// Prefer the unadorned context error.
// (The acme package had tests assuming this, previously from ctxhttp's
// behavior, predating net/http supporting contexts natively)
// TODO(bradfitz): reconsider this in the future. But for now this
// requires no test updates.
return nil, ctx.Err()
default:
return nil, err
}
}
return res, nil
}
func (c *Client) httpClient() *http.Client {
if c.HTTPClient != nil {
return c.HTTPClient
}
return http.DefaultClient
}
// packageVersion is the version of the module that contains this package, for
// sending as part of the User-Agent header. It's set in version_go112.go.
var packageVersion string
// userAgent returns the User-Agent header value. It includes the package name,
// the module version (if available), and the c.UserAgent value (if set).
func (c *Client) userAgent() string {
ua := "golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
if packageVersion != "" {
ua += "@" + packageVersion
}
if c.UserAgent != "" {
ua = c.UserAgent + " " + ua
}
return ua
}
// isBadNonce reports whether err is an ACME "badnonce" error.
func isBadNonce(err error) bool {
// According to the spec badNonce is urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce.
// However, ACME servers in the wild return their versions of the error.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02#section-5.4
// and https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/blob/0e07eacb/docs/acme-divergences.md#section-66.
ae, ok := err.(*Error)
return ok && strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(ae.ProblemType), ":badnonce")
}
// isRetriable reports whether a request can be retried
// based on the response status code.
//
// Note that a "bad nonce" error is returned with a non-retriable 400 Bad Request code.
// Callers should parse the response and check with isBadNonce.
func isRetriable(code int) bool {
return code <= 399 || code >= 500 || code == http.StatusTooManyRequests
}
// responseError creates an error of Error type from resp.
func responseError(resp *http.Response) error {
// don't care if ReadAll returns an error:
// json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway
b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
e := &wireError{Status: resp.StatusCode}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, e); err != nil {
// this is not a regular error response:
// populate detail with anything we received,
// e.Status will already contain HTTP response code value
e.Detail = string(b)
if e.Detail == "" {
e.Detail = resp.Status
}
}
return e.error(resp.Header)
}

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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
tt := []struct {
nretry int
retryAfter string // Retry-After header
out time.Duration // expected min; max = min + jitter
}{
{-1, "", time.Second}, // verify the lower bound is 1
{0, "", time.Second}, // verify the lower bound is 1
{100, "", 10 * time.Second}, // verify the ceiling
{1, "3600", time.Hour}, // verify the header value is used
{1, "", 1 * time.Second},
{2, "", 2 * time.Second},
{3, "", 4 * time.Second},
{4, "", 8 * time.Second},
}
for i, test := range tt {
r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
resp := &http.Response{Header: http.Header{}}
if test.retryAfter != "" {
resp.Header.Set("Retry-After", test.retryAfter)
}
d := defaultBackoff(test.nretry, r, resp)
max := test.out + time.Second // + max jitter
if d < test.out || max < d {
t.Errorf("%d: defaultBackoff(%v) = %v; want between %v and %v", i, test.nretry, d, test.out, max)
}
}
}
func TestErrorResponse(t *testing.T) {
s := `{
"status": 400,
"type": "urn:acme:error:xxx",
"detail": "text"
}`
res := &http.Response{
StatusCode: 400,
Status: "400 Bad Request",
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(s)),
Header: http.Header{"X-Foo": {"bar"}},
}
err := responseError(res)
v, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err = %+v (%T); want *Error type", err, err)
}
if v.StatusCode != 400 {
t.Errorf("v.StatusCode = %v; want 400", v.StatusCode)
}
if v.ProblemType != "urn:acme:error:xxx" {
t.Errorf("v.ProblemType = %q; want urn:acme:error:xxx", v.ProblemType)
}
if v.Detail != "text" {
t.Errorf("v.Detail = %q; want text", v.Detail)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(v.Header, res.Header) {
t.Errorf("v.Header = %+v; want %+v", v.Header, res.Header)
}
}
func TestPostWithRetries(t *testing.T) {
var count int
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", fmt.Sprintf("nonce%d", count))
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
// We expect the client to do 2 head requests to fetch
// nonces, one to start and another after getting badNonce
return
}
head, err := decodeJWSHead(r.Body)
switch {
case err != nil:
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
case head.Nonce == "":
t.Error("head.Nonce is empty")
case head.Nonce == "nonce1":
// Return a badNonce error to force the call to retry.
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
w.Write([]byte(`{"type":"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce"}`))
return
}
// Make client.Authorize happy; we're not testing its result.
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"valid"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
// This call will fail with badNonce, causing a retry
if _, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("client.Authorize 1: %v", err)
}
if count != 3 {
t.Errorf("total requests count: %d; want 3", count)
}
}
func TestRetryErrorType(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte(`{"type":"rateLimited"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
RetryBackoff: func(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration {
// Do no retries.
return 0
},
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
t.Run("post", func(t *testing.T) {
testRetryErrorType(t, func() error {
_, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com")
return err
})
})
t.Run("get", func(t *testing.T) {
testRetryErrorType(t, func() error {
_, err := client.GetAuthorization(context.Background(), ts.URL)
return err
})
})
}
func testRetryErrorType(t *testing.T, callClient func() error) {
t.Helper()
err := callClient()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client.Authorize returned nil error")
}
acmeErr, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err is %v (%T); want *Error", err, err)
}
if acmeErr.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("acmeErr.StatusCode = %d; want %d", acmeErr.StatusCode, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}
if acmeErr.ProblemType != "rateLimited" {
t.Errorf("acmeErr.ProblemType = %q; want 'rateLimited'", acmeErr.ProblemType)
}
}
func TestRetryBackoffArgs(t *testing.T) {
const resCode = http.StatusInternalServerError
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
w.WriteHeader(resCode)
}))
defer ts.Close()
// Canceled in backoff.
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
var nretry int
backoff := func(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration {
nretry++
if n != nretry {
t.Errorf("n = %d; want %d", n, nretry)
}
if nretry == 3 {
cancel()
}
if r == nil {
t.Error("r is nil")
}
if res.StatusCode != resCode {
t.Errorf("res.StatusCode = %d; want %d", res.StatusCode, resCode)
}
return time.Millisecond
}
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
RetryBackoff: backoff,
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
if _, err := client.Authorize(ctx, "example.com"); err == nil {
t.Error("err is nil")
}
if nretry != 3 {
t.Errorf("nretry = %d; want 3", nretry)
}
}
func TestUserAgent(t *testing.T) {
for _, custom := range []string{"", "CUSTOM_UA"} {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Log(r.UserAgent())
if s := "golang.org/x/crypto/acme"; !strings.Contains(r.UserAgent(), s) {
t.Errorf("expected User-Agent to contain %q, got %q", s, r.UserAgent())
}
if !strings.Contains(r.UserAgent(), custom) {
t.Errorf("expected User-Agent to contain %q, got %q", custom, r.UserAgent())
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"newOrder": "sure"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
UserAgent: custom,
}
if _, err := client.Discover(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Errorf("client.Discover: %v", err)
}
}
}
func TestAccountKidLoop(t *testing.T) {
// if Client.postNoRetry is called with a nil key argument
// then Client.Key must be set, otherwise we fall into an
// infinite loop (which also causes a deadlock).
client := &Client{dir: &Directory{OrderURL: ":)"}}
_, _, err := client.postNoRetry(context.Background(), nil, "", nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Client.postNoRetry didn't fail with a nil key")
}
expected := "acme: Client.Key must be populated to make POST requests"
if err.Error() != expected {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected error returned: wanted %q, got %q", expected, err.Error())
}
}

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// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
_ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
)
// KeyID is the account key identity provided by a CA during registration.
type KeyID string
// noKeyID indicates that jwsEncodeJSON should compute and use JWK instead of a KID.
// See jwsEncodeJSON for details.
const noKeyID = KeyID("")
// noPayload indicates jwsEncodeJSON will encode zero-length octet string
// in a JWS request. This is called POST-as-GET in RFC 8555 and is used to make
// authenticated GET requests via POSTing with an empty payload.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3 for more details.
const noPayload = ""
// noNonce indicates that the nonce should be omitted from the protected header.
// See jwsEncodeJSON for details.
const noNonce = ""
// jsonWebSignature can be easily serialized into a JWS following
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-3.2.
type jsonWebSignature struct {
Protected string `json:"protected"`
Payload string `json:"payload"`
Sig string `json:"signature"`
}
// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
// The result is serialized in JSON format containing either kid or jwk
// fields based on the provided KeyID value.
//
// The claimset is marshalled using json.Marshal unless it is a string.
// In which case it is inserted directly into the message.
//
// If kid is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected header
// as "kid" field value. Otherwise, JWK is computed using jwkEncode and inserted
// as "jwk" field value. The "jwk" and "kid" fields are mutually exclusive.
//
// If nonce is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected header.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7.
func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid KeyID, nonce, url string) ([]byte, error) {
if key == nil {
return nil, errors.New("nil key")
}
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key.Public())
if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
headers := struct {
Alg string `json:"alg"`
KID string `json:"kid,omitempty"`
JWK json.RawMessage `json:"jwk,omitempty"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
URL string `json:"url"`
}{
Alg: alg,
Nonce: nonce,
URL: url,
}
switch kid {
case noKeyID:
jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
headers.JWK = json.RawMessage(jwk)
default:
headers.KID = string(kid)
}
phJSON, err := json.Marshal(headers)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
phead := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phJSON))
var payload string
if val, ok := claimset.(string); ok {
payload = val
} else {
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
}
hash := sha.New()
hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
enc := jsonWebSignature{
Protected: phead,
Payload: payload,
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
}
return json.Marshal(&enc)
}
// jwsWithMAC creates and signs a JWS using the given key and the HS256
// algorithm. kid and url are included in the protected header. rawPayload
// should not be base64-URL-encoded.
func jwsWithMAC(key []byte, kid, url string, rawPayload []byte) (*jsonWebSignature, error) {
if len(key) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme: cannot sign JWS with an empty MAC key")
}
header := struct {
Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
}{
// Only HMAC-SHA256 is supported.
Algorithm: "HS256",
KID: kid,
URL: url,
}
rawProtected, err := json.Marshal(header)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
protected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rawProtected)
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rawPayload)
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
if _, err := h.Write([]byte(protected + "." + payload)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
mac := h.Sum(nil)
return &jsonWebSignature{
Protected: protected,
Payload: payload,
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac),
}, nil
}
// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK.
// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
switch pub := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.3.1
n := pub.N
e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
// Field order is important.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"e":"%s","kty":"RSA","n":"%s"}`,
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
), nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.2.1
p := pub.Curve.Params()
n := p.BitSize / 8
if p.BitSize%8 != 0 {
n++
}
x := pub.X.Bytes()
if n > len(x) {
x = append(make([]byte, n-len(x)), x...)
}
y := pub.Y.Bytes()
if n > len(y) {
y = append(make([]byte, n-len(y)), y...)
}
// Field order is important.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"crv":"%s","kty":"EC","x":"%s","y":"%s"}`,
p.Name,
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
), nil
}
return "", ErrUnsupportedKey
}
// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
// The hash is unused for ECDSA keys.
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch pub := key.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
sigASN1, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var rs struct{ R, S *big.Int }
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sigASN1, &rs); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rb, sb := rs.R.Bytes(), rs.S.Bytes()
size := pub.Params().BitSize / 8
if size%8 > 0 {
size++
}
sig := make([]byte, size*2)
copy(sig[size-len(rb):], rb)
copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb)
return sig, nil
}
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function
// to use for signing a digest with the provided key.
// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported.
func jwsHasher(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, crypto.Hash) {
switch pub := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return "RS256", crypto.SHA256
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
switch pub.Params().Name {
case "P-256":
return "ES256", crypto.SHA256
case "P-384":
return "ES384", crypto.SHA384
case "P-521":
return "ES512", crypto.SHA512
}
}
return "", 0
}
// JWKThumbprint creates a JWK thumbprint out of pub
// as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638.
func JWKThumbprint(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
jwk, err := jwkEncode(pub)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jwk))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
}

550
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// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"testing"
)
// The following shell command alias is used in the comments
// throughout this file:
// alias b64raw="base64 -w0 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'"
const (
// Modulus in raw base64:
// 4xgZ3eRPkwoRvy7qeRUbmMDe0V-xH9eWLdu0iheeLlrmD2mqWXfP9IeSKApbn34
// g8TuAS9g5zhq8ELQ3kmjr-KV86GAMgI6VAcGlq3QrzpTCf_30Ab7-zawrfRaFON
// a1HwEzPY1KHnGVkxJc85gNkwYI9SY2RHXtvln3zs5wITNrdosqEXeaIkVYBEhbh
// Nu54pp3kxo6TuWLi9e6pXeWetEwmlBwtWZlPoib2j3TxLBksKZfoyFyek380mHg
// JAumQ_I2fjj98_97mk3ihOY4AgVdCDj1z_GCoZkG5Rq7nbCGyosyKWyDX00Zs-n
// NqVhoLeIvXC4nnWdJMZ6rogxyQQ
testKeyPEM = `
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
`
// This thumbprint is for the testKey defined above.
testKeyThumbprint = "6nicxzh6WETQlrvdchkz-U3e3DOQZ4heJKU63rfqMqQ"
// openssl ecparam -name secp256k1 -genkey -noout
testKeyECPEM = `
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIK07hGLr0RwyUdYJ8wbIiBS55CjnkMD23DWr+ccnypWLoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE5lhEug5xK4xBDZ2nAbaxLtaLiv85bxJ7ePd1dkO23HThqIrvawF5
QAaS/RNouybCiRhRjI3EaxLkQwgrCw0gqQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
`
// openssl ecparam -name secp384r1 -genkey -noout
testKeyEC384PEM = `
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGkAgEBBDAQ4lNtXRORWr1bgKR1CGysr9AJ9SyEk4jiVnlUWWUChmSNL+i9SLSD
Oe/naPqXJ6CgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAAQzKtj+Ms0vHoTX5dzv3/L5YMXOWuI5UKRj
JigpahYCqXD2BA1j0E/2xt5vlPf+gm0PL+UHSQsCokGnIGuaHCsJAp3ry0gHQEke
WYXapUUFdvaK1R2/2hn5O+eiQM8YzCg=
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
`
// openssl ecparam -name secp521r1 -genkey -noout
testKeyEC512PEM = `
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MIHcAgEBBEIBSNZKFcWzXzB/aJClAb305ibalKgtDA7+70eEkdPt28/3LZMM935Z
KqYHh/COcxuu3Kt8azRAUz3gyr4zZKhlKUSgBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAHUNKbx
7JwC7H6pa2sV0tERWhHhB3JmW+OP6SUgMWryvIKajlx73eS24dy4QPGrWO9/ABsD
FqcRSkNVTXnIv6+0mAF25knqIBIg5Q8M9BnOu9GGAchcwt3O7RDHmqewnJJDrbjd
GGnm6rb+NnWR9DIopM0nKNkToWoF/hzopxu4Ae/GsQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
`
// 1. openssl ec -in key.pem -noout -text
// 2. remove first byte, 04 (the header); the rest is X and Y
// 3. convert each with: echo <val> | xxd -r -p | b64raw
testKeyECPubX = "5lhEug5xK4xBDZ2nAbaxLtaLiv85bxJ7ePd1dkO23HQ"
testKeyECPubY = "4aiK72sBeUAGkv0TaLsmwokYUYyNxGsS5EMIKwsNIKk"
testKeyEC384PubX = "MyrY_jLNLx6E1-Xc79_y-WDFzlriOVCkYyYoKWoWAqlw9gQNY9BP9sbeb5T3_oJt"
testKeyEC384PubY = "Dy_lB0kLAqJBpyBrmhwrCQKd68tIB0BJHlmF2qVFBXb2itUdv9oZ-TvnokDPGMwo"
testKeyEC512PubX = "AdQ0pvHsnALsfqlraxXS0RFaEeEHcmZb44_pJSAxavK8gpqOXHvd5Lbh3LhA8atY738AGwMWpxFKQ1VNeci_r7SY"
testKeyEC512PubY = "AXbmSeogEiDlDwz0Gc670YYByFzC3c7tEMeap7CckkOtuN0Yaebqtv42dZH0MiikzSco2ROhagX-HOinG7gB78ax"
// echo -n '{"crv":"P-256","kty":"EC","x":"<testKeyECPubX>","y":"<testKeyECPubY>"}' | \
// openssl dgst -binary -sha256 | b64raw
testKeyECThumbprint = "zedj-Bd1Zshp8KLePv2MB-lJ_Hagp7wAwdkA0NUTniU"
)
var (
testKey *rsa.PrivateKey
testKeyEC *ecdsa.PrivateKey
testKeyEC384 *ecdsa.PrivateKey
testKeyEC512 *ecdsa.PrivateKey
)
func init() {
testKey = parseRSA(testKeyPEM, "testKeyPEM")
testKeyEC = parseEC(testKeyECPEM, "testKeyECPEM")
testKeyEC384 = parseEC(testKeyEC384PEM, "testKeyEC384PEM")
testKeyEC512 = parseEC(testKeyEC512PEM, "testKeyEC512PEM")
}
func decodePEM(s, name string) []byte {
d, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(s))
if d == nil {
panic("no block found in " + name)
}
return d.Bytes
}
func parseRSA(s, name string) *rsa.PrivateKey {
b := decodePEM(s, name)
k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(b)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("%s: %v", name, err))
}
return k
}
func parseEC(s, name string) *ecdsa.PrivateKey {
b := decodePEM(s, name)
k, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(b)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("%s: %v", name, err))
}
return k
}
func TestJWSEncodeJSON(t *testing.T) {
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"Hello JWS"}
// JWS signed with testKey and "nonce" as the nonce value
// JSON-serialized JWS fields are split for easier testing
const (
// {"alg":"RS256","jwk":{"e":"AQAB","kty":"RSA","n":"..."},"nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}
protected = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImp3ayI6eyJlIjoiQVFBQiIsImt0eSI6" +
"IlJTQSIsIm4iOiI0eGdaM2VSUGt3b1J2eTdxZVJVYm1NRGUwVi14" +
"SDllV0xkdTBpaGVlTGxybUQybXFXWGZQOUllU0tBcGJuMzRnOFR1" +
"QVM5ZzV6aHE4RUxRM2ttanItS1Y4NkdBTWdJNlZBY0dscTNRcnpw" +
"VENmXzMwQWI3LXphd3JmUmFGT05hMUh3RXpQWTFLSG5HVmt4SmM4" +
"NWdOa3dZSTlTWTJSSFh0dmxuM3pzNXdJVE5yZG9zcUVYZWFJa1ZZ" +
"QkVoYmhOdTU0cHAza3hvNlR1V0xpOWU2cFhlV2V0RXdtbEJ3dFda" +
"bFBvaWIyajNUeExCa3NLWmZveUZ5ZWszODBtSGdKQXVtUV9JMmZq" +
"ajk4Xzk3bWszaWhPWTRBZ1ZkQ0RqMXpfR0NvWmtHNVJxN25iQ0d5" +
"b3N5S1d5RFgwMFpzLW5OcVZob0xlSXZYQzRubldkSk1aNnJvZ3h5" +
"UVEifSwibm9uY2UiOiJub25jZSIsInVybCI6InVybCJ9"
// {"Msg":"Hello JWS"}
payload = "eyJNc2ciOiJIZWxsbyBKV1MifQ"
// printf '<protected>.<payload>' | openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -sign testKey | b64raw
signature = "YFyl_xz1E7TR-3E1bIuASTr424EgCvBHjt25WUFC2VaDjXYV0Rj_" +
"Hd3dJ_2IRqBrXDZZ2n4ZeA_4mm3QFwmwyeDwe2sWElhb82lCZ8iX" +
"uFnjeOmSOjx-nWwPa5ibCXzLq13zZ-OBV1Z4oN_TuailQeRoSfA3" +
"nO8gG52mv1x2OMQ5MAFtt8jcngBLzts4AyhI6mBJ2w7Yaj3ZCriq" +
"DWA3GLFvvHdW1Ba9Z01wtGT2CuZI7DUk_6Qj1b3BkBGcoKur5C9i" +
"bUJtCkABwBMvBQNyD3MmXsrRFRTgvVlyU_yMaucYm7nmzEr_2PaQ" +
"50rFt_9qOfJ4sfbLtG1Wwae57BQx1g"
)
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, testKey, noKeyID, "nonce", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var jws struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &jws); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("protected:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Protected, protected)
}
if jws.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("payload:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Payload, payload)
}
if jws.Signature != signature {
t.Errorf("signature:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Signature, signature)
}
}
func TestJWSEncodeNoNonce(t *testing.T) {
kid := KeyID("https://example.org/account/1")
claims := "RawString"
const (
// {"alg":"ES256","kid":"https://example.org/account/1","nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}
protected = "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvYWNjb3VudC8xIiwidXJsIjoidXJsIn0"
// "Raw String"
payload = "RawString"
)
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, testKeyEC, kid, "", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var jws struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &jws); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("protected:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Protected, protected)
}
if jws.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("payload:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Payload, payload)
}
sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Signature)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jws.Signature: %v", err)
}
r, s := big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0)
r.SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
s.SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(protected + "." + payload))
if !ecdsa.Verify(testKeyEC.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
t.Error("invalid signature")
}
}
func TestJWSEncodeKID(t *testing.T) {
kid := KeyID("https://example.org/account/1")
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"Hello JWS"}
// JWS signed with testKeyEC
const (
// {"alg":"ES256","kid":"https://example.org/account/1","nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}
protected = "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5" +
"vcmcvYWNjb3VudC8xIiwibm9uY2UiOiJub25jZSIsInVybCI6InVybCJ9"
// {"Msg":"Hello JWS"}
payload = "eyJNc2ciOiJIZWxsbyBKV1MifQ"
)
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, testKeyEC, kid, "nonce", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var jws struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &jws); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("protected:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Protected, protected)
}
if jws.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("payload:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Payload, payload)
}
sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Signature)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jws.Signature: %v", err)
}
r, s := big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0)
r.SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
s.SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(protected + "." + payload))
if !ecdsa.Verify(testKeyEC.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
t.Error("invalid signature")
}
}
func TestJWSEncodeJSONEC(t *testing.T) {
tt := []struct {
key *ecdsa.PrivateKey
x, y string
alg, crv string
}{
{testKeyEC, testKeyECPubX, testKeyECPubY, "ES256", "P-256"},
{testKeyEC384, testKeyEC384PubX, testKeyEC384PubY, "ES384", "P-384"},
{testKeyEC512, testKeyEC512PubX, testKeyEC512PubY, "ES512", "P-521"},
}
for i, test := range tt {
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"Hello JWS"}
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, test.key, noKeyID, "nonce", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%d: %v", i, err)
continue
}
var jws struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &jws); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%d: %v", i, err)
continue
}
b, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Protected)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%d: jws.Protected: %v", i, err)
}
var head struct {
Alg string
Nonce string
URL string `json:"url"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
JWK struct {
Crv string
Kty string
X string
Y string
} `json:"jwk"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &head); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%d: jws.Protected: %v", i, err)
}
if head.Alg != test.alg {
t.Errorf("%d: head.Alg = %q; want %q", i, head.Alg, test.alg)
}
if head.Nonce != "nonce" {
t.Errorf("%d: head.Nonce = %q; want nonce", i, head.Nonce)
}
if head.URL != "url" {
t.Errorf("%d: head.URL = %q; want 'url'", i, head.URL)
}
if head.KID != "" {
// We used noKeyID in jwsEncodeJSON: expect no kid value.
t.Errorf("%d: head.KID = %q; want empty", i, head.KID)
}
if head.JWK.Crv != test.crv {
t.Errorf("%d: head.JWK.Crv = %q; want %q", i, head.JWK.Crv, test.crv)
}
if head.JWK.Kty != "EC" {
t.Errorf("%d: head.JWK.Kty = %q; want EC", i, head.JWK.Kty)
}
if head.JWK.X != test.x {
t.Errorf("%d: head.JWK.X = %q; want %q", i, head.JWK.X, test.x)
}
if head.JWK.Y != test.y {
t.Errorf("%d: head.JWK.Y = %q; want %q", i, head.JWK.Y, test.y)
}
}
}
type customTestSigner struct {
sig []byte
pub crypto.PublicKey
}
func (s *customTestSigner) Public() crypto.PublicKey { return s.pub }
func (s *customTestSigner) Sign(io.Reader, []byte, crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
return s.sig, nil
}
func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"hello"}
const (
// printf '{"Msg":"hello"}' | b64raw
payload = "eyJNc2ciOiJoZWxsbyJ9"
// printf 'testsig' | b64raw
testsig = "dGVzdHNpZw"
// the example P256 curve point from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#appendix-A.3.1
// encoded as ASN.1…
es256stdsig = "MEUCIA7RIVN5Y2xIPC9/FVgH1AKjsigDOvl8fheBmsMWnqZlAiEA" +
"xQoH04w8cOXY8S2vCEpUgKZlkMXyk1Cajz9/ioOjVNU"
// …and RFC7518 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-3.4)
es256jwsig = "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw" +
"5djxLa8ISlSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"
// printf '{"alg":"ES256","jwk":{"crv":"P-256","kty":"EC","x":<testKeyECPubY>,"y":<testKeyECPubY>},"nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}' | b64raw
es256phead = "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImp3ayI6eyJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsImt0" +
"eSI6IkVDIiwieCI6IjVsaEV1ZzV4SzR4QkRaMm5BYmF4THRhTGl2" +
"ODVieEo3ZVBkMWRrTzIzSFEiLCJ5IjoiNGFpSzcyc0JlVUFHa3Yw" +
"VGFMc213b2tZVVl5TnhHc1M1RU1JS3dzTklLayJ9LCJub25jZSI6" +
"Im5vbmNlIiwidXJsIjoidXJsIn0"
// {"alg":"RS256","jwk":{"e":"AQAB","kty":"RSA","n":"..."},"nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}
rs256phead = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImp3ayI6eyJlIjoiQVFBQiIsImt0eSI6" +
"IlJTQSIsIm4iOiI0eGdaM2VSUGt3b1J2eTdxZVJVYm1NRGUwVi14" +
"SDllV0xkdTBpaGVlTGxybUQybXFXWGZQOUllU0tBcGJuMzRnOFR1" +
"QVM5ZzV6aHE4RUxRM2ttanItS1Y4NkdBTWdJNlZBY0dscTNRcnpw" +
"VENmXzMwQWI3LXphd3JmUmFGT05hMUh3RXpQWTFLSG5HVmt4SmM4" +
"NWdOa3dZSTlTWTJSSFh0dmxuM3pzNXdJVE5yZG9zcUVYZWFJa1ZZ" +
"QkVoYmhOdTU0cHAza3hvNlR1V0xpOWU2cFhlV2V0RXdtbEJ3dFda" +
"bFBvaWIyajNUeExCa3NLWmZveUZ5ZWszODBtSGdKQXVtUV9JMmZq" +
"ajk4Xzk3bWszaWhPWTRBZ1ZkQ0RqMXpfR0NvWmtHNVJxN25iQ0d5" +
"b3N5S1d5RFgwMFpzLW5OcVZob0xlSXZYQzRubldkSk1aNnJvZ3h5" +
"UVEifSwibm9uY2UiOiJub25jZSIsInVybCI6InVybCJ9"
)
tt := []struct {
alg, phead string
pub crypto.PublicKey
stdsig, jwsig string
}{
{"ES256", es256phead, testKeyEC.Public(), es256stdsig, es256jwsig},
{"RS256", rs256phead, testKey.Public(), testsig, testsig},
}
for _, tc := range tt {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.alg, func(t *testing.T) {
stdsig, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(tc.stdsig)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("couldn't decode test vector: %v", err)
}
signer := &customTestSigner{
sig: stdsig,
pub: tc.pub,
}
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, signer, noKeyID, "nonce", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var j jsonWebSignature
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &j); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if j.Protected != tc.phead {
t.Errorf("j.Protected = %q\nwant %q", j.Protected, tc.phead)
}
if j.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("j.Payload = %q\nwant %q", j.Payload, payload)
}
if j.Sig != tc.jwsig {
t.Errorf("j.Sig = %q\nwant %q", j.Sig, tc.jwsig)
}
})
}
}
func TestJWSWithMAC(t *testing.T) {
// Example from RFC 7520 Section 4.4.3.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7520#section-4.4.3
b64Key := "hJtXIZ2uSN5kbQfbtTNWbpdmhkV8FJG-Onbc6mxCcYg"
rawPayload := []byte("It\xe2\x80\x99s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your " +
"door. You step onto the road, and if you don't keep your feet, " +
"there\xe2\x80\x99s no knowing where you might be swept off " +
"to.")
protected := "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW" +
"VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9"
payload := "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg" +
"Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h" +
"ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi" +
"gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m" +
"ZiB0by4"
sig := "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
key, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(b64Key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to decode key: %q", b64Key)
}
got, err := jwsWithMAC(key, "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037", "", rawPayload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jwsWithMAC() = %q", err)
}
if got.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("got.Protected = %q\nwant %q", got.Protected, protected)
}
if got.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("got.Payload = %q\nwant %q", got.Payload, payload)
}
if got.Sig != sig {
t.Errorf("got.Signature = %q\nwant %q", got.Sig, sig)
}
}
func TestJWSWithMACError(t *testing.T) {
p := "{}"
if _, err := jwsWithMAC(nil, "", "", []byte(p)); err == nil {
t.Errorf("jwsWithMAC(nil, ...) = success; want err")
}
}
func TestJWKThumbprintRSA(t *testing.T) {
// Key example from RFC 7638
const base64N = "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx4cbbfAAt" +
"VT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMstn6" +
"4tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FD" +
"W2QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n9" +
"1CbOpbISD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINH" +
"aQ-G_xBniIqbw0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw"
const base64E = "AQAB"
const expected = "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs"
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(base64N)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error parsing example key N: %v", err)
}
n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
b, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(base64E)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error parsing example key E: %v", err)
}
e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
pub := &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Uint64())}
th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
if th != expected {
t.Errorf("thumbprint = %q; want %q", th, expected)
}
}
func TestJWKThumbprintEC(t *testing.T) {
// Key example from RFC 7520
// expected was computed with
// printf '{"crv":"P-521","kty":"EC","x":"<base64X>","y":"<base64Y>"}' | \
// openssl dgst -binary -sha256 | b64raw
const (
base64X = "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9A5RkT" +
"KqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt"
base64Y = "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVySsUda" +
"QkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1"
expected = "dHri3SADZkrush5HU_50AoRhcKFryN-PI6jPBtPL55M"
)
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(base64X)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error parsing example key X: %v", err)
}
x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
b, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(base64Y)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error parsing example key Y: %v", err)
}
y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: elliptic.P521(), X: x, Y: y}
th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
if th != expected {
t.Errorf("thumbprint = %q; want %q", th, expected)
}
}
func TestJWKThumbprintErrUnsupportedKey(t *testing.T) {
_, err := JWKThumbprint(struct{}{})
if err != ErrUnsupportedKey {
t.Errorf("err = %q; want %q", err, ErrUnsupportedKey)
}
}

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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"time"
)
// DeactivateReg permanently disables an existing account associated with c.Key.
// A deactivated account can no longer request certificate issuance or access
// resources related to the account, such as orders or authorizations.
//
// It only works with CAs implementing RFC 8555.
func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return err
}
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
if url == "" {
return ErrNoAccount
}
req := json.RawMessage(`{"status": "deactivated"}`)
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return err
}
res.Body.Close()
return nil
}
// registerRFC is equivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
c.cacheMu.Lock() // guard c.kid access
defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
req := struct {
TermsAgreed bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed,omitempty"`
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
ExternalAccountBinding *jsonWebSignature `json:"externalAccountBinding,omitempty"`
}{
Contact: acct.Contact,
}
if c.dir.Terms != "" {
req.TermsAgreed = prompt(c.dir.Terms)
}
// set 'externalAccountBinding' field if requested
if acct.ExternalAccountBinding != nil {
eabJWS, err := c.encodeExternalAccountBinding(acct.ExternalAccountBinding)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: failed to encode external account binding: %v", err)
}
req.ExternalAccountBinding = eabJWS
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.RegURL, req, wantStatus(
http.StatusOK, // account with this key already registered
http.StatusCreated, // new account created
))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
a, err := responseAccount(res)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Cache Account URL even if we return an error to the caller.
// It is by all means a valid and usable "kid" value for future requests.
c.KID = KeyID(a.URI)
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
return nil, ErrAccountAlreadyExists
}
return a, nil
}
// encodeExternalAccountBinding will encode an external account binding stanza
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4.
func (c *Client) encodeExternalAccountBinding(eab *ExternalAccountBinding) (*jsonWebSignature, error) {
jwk, err := jwkEncode(c.Key.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return jwsWithMAC(eab.Key, eab.KID, c.dir.RegURL, []byte(jwk))
}
// updateRegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) {
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
if url == "" {
return nil, ErrNoAccount
}
req := struct {
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
}{
Contact: a.Contact,
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return responseAccount(res)
}
// getRegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
func (c *Client) getRegRFC(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
req := json.RawMessage(`{"onlyReturnExisting": true}`)
res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.RegURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if e, ok := err.(*Error); ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist" {
return nil, ErrNoAccount
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return responseAccount(res)
}
func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) {
var v struct {
Status string
Contact []string
Orders string
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid account response: %v", err)
}
return &Account{
URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
Status: v.Status,
Contact: v.Contact,
OrdersURL: v.Orders,
}, nil
}
// accountKeyRollover attempts to perform account key rollover.
// On success it will change client.Key to the new key.
func (c *Client) accountKeyRollover(ctx context.Context, newKey crypto.Signer) error {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) // Also required by c.accountKID
if err != nil {
return err
}
kid := c.accountKID(ctx)
if kid == noKeyID {
return ErrNoAccount
}
oldKey, err := jwkEncode(c.Key.Public())
if err != nil {
return err
}
payload := struct {
Account string `json:"account"`
OldKey json.RawMessage `json:"oldKey"`
}{
Account: string(kid),
OldKey: json.RawMessage(oldKey),
}
inner, err := jwsEncodeJSON(payload, newKey, noKeyID, noNonce, dir.KeyChangeURL)
if err != nil {
return err
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.KeyChangeURL, base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(inner), wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
c.Key = newKey
return nil
}
// AuthorizeOrder initiates the order-based application for certificate issuance,
// as opposed to pre-authorization in Authorize.
// It is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555.
//
// The caller then needs to fetch each authorization with GetAuthorization,
// identify those with StatusPending status and fulfill a challenge using Accept.
// Once all authorizations are satisfied, the caller will typically want to poll
// order status using WaitOrder until it's in StatusReady state.
// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateOrderCert.
func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderOption) (*Order, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req := struct {
Identifiers []wireAuthzID `json:"identifiers"`
NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"`
NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"`
}{}
for _, v := range id {
req.Identifiers = append(req.Identifiers, wireAuthzID{
Type: v.Type,
Value: v.Value,
})
}
for _, o := range opt {
switch o := o.(type) {
case orderNotBeforeOpt:
req.NotBefore = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339)
case orderNotAfterOpt:
req.NotAfter = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339)
default:
// Package's fault if we let this happen.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported order option type %T", o))
}
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.OrderURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return responseOrder(res)
}
// GetOrder retrives an order identified by the given URL.
// For orders created with AuthorizeOrder, the url value is Order.URI.
//
// If a caller needs to poll an order until its status is final,
// see the WaitOrder method.
func (c *Client) GetOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return responseOrder(res)
}
// WaitOrder polls an order from the given URL until it is in one of the final states,
// StatusReady, StatusValid or StatusInvalid, the CA responded with a non-retryable error
// or the context is done.
//
// It returns a non-nil Order only if its Status is StatusReady or StatusValid.
// In all other cases WaitOrder returns an error.
// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *OrderError.
func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for {
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
o, err := responseOrder(res)
res.Body.Close()
switch {
case err != nil:
// Skip and retry.
case o.Status == StatusInvalid:
return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
case o.Status == StatusReady || o.Status == StatusValid:
return o, nil
}
d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After"))
if d == 0 {
// Default retry-after.
// Same reasoning as in WaitAuthorization.
d = time.Second
}
t := time.NewTimer(d)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-t.C:
// Retry.
}
}
}
func responseOrder(res *http.Response) (*Order, error) {
var v struct {
Status string
Expires time.Time
Identifiers []wireAuthzID
NotBefore time.Time
NotAfter time.Time
Error *wireError
Authorizations []string
Finalize string
Certificate string
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: error reading order: %v", err)
}
o := &Order{
URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
Status: v.Status,
Expires: v.Expires,
NotBefore: v.NotBefore,
NotAfter: v.NotAfter,
AuthzURLs: v.Authorizations,
FinalizeURL: v.Finalize,
CertURL: v.Certificate,
}
for _, id := range v.Identifiers {
o.Identifiers = append(o.Identifiers, AuthzID{Type: id.Type, Value: id.Value})
}
if v.Error != nil {
o.Error = v.Error.error(nil /* headers */)
}
return o, nil
}
// CreateOrderCert submits the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA at the specified URL.
// The URL is the FinalizeURL field of an Order created with AuthorizeOrder.
//
// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contain the CA (issuer)
// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned.
// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert.
//
// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs.
//
// CreateOrderCert returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large.
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return nil, "", err
}
// RFC describes this as "finalize order" request.
req := struct {
CSR string `json:"csr"`
}{
CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr),
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
o, err := responseOrder(res)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// Wait for CA to issue the cert if they haven't.
if o.Status != StatusValid {
o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// The only acceptable status post finalize and WaitOrder is "valid".
if o.Status != StatusValid {
return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
}
crt, err := c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, o.CertURL, bundle)
return crt, o.CertURL, err
}
// fetchCertRFC downloads issued certificate from the given URL.
// It expects the CA to respond with PEM-encoded certificate chain.
//
// The URL argument is the CertURL field of Order.
func (c *Client) fetchCertRFC(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
// Get all the bytes up to a sane maximum.
// Account very roughly for base64 overhead.
const max = maxCertChainSize + maxCertChainSize/33
b, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: fetch cert response stream: %v", err)
}
if len(b) > max {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too big")
}
// Decode PEM chain.
var chain [][]byte
for {
var p *pem.Block
p, b = pem.Decode(b)
if p == nil {
break
}
if p.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid PEM cert type %q", p.Type)
}
chain = append(chain, p.Bytes)
if !bundle {
return chain, nil
}
if len(chain) > maxChainLen {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too long")
}
}
if len(chain) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is empty")
}
return chain, nil
}
// sends a cert revocation request in either JWK form when key is non-nil or KID form otherwise.
func (c *Client) revokeCertRFC(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
req := &struct {
Cert string `json:"certificate"`
Reason int `json:"reason"`
}{
Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert),
Reason: int(reason),
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
if isAlreadyRevoked(err) {
// Assume it is not an error to revoke an already revoked cert.
return nil
}
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return nil
}
func isAlreadyRevoked(err error) bool {
e, ok := err.(*Error)
return ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked"
}
// ListCertAlternates retrieves any alternate certificate chain URLs for the
// given certificate chain URL. These alternate URLs can be passed to FetchCert
// in order to retrieve the alternate certificate chains.
//
// If there are no alternate issuer certificate chains, a nil slice will be
// returned.
func (c *Client) ListCertAlternates(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]string, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
// We don't need the body but we need to discard it so we don't end up
// preventing keep-alive
if _, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: cert alternates response stream: %v", err)
}
alts := linkHeader(res.Header, "alternate")
return alts, nil
}

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package acme
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
_ "github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme" // so it's on disk for the test
)
// Verify that the files tempfork/acme/*.go (other than this test file) match the
// files in "github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme" which is where we develop
// our fork of golang.org/x/crypto/acme and merge with upstream, but then we vendor
// just its acme package into tailscale.com/tempfork/acme.
//
// Development workflow:
//
// - make a change in github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme
// - merge it (ideally with golang.org/x/crypto/acme too)
// - rebase github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme with upstream x/crypto/acme
// as needed
// - in the tailscale.com repo, run "go get github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme@main"
// - run go test ./tempfork/acme to watch it fail; the failure includes
// a shell command you should run to copy the *.go files from tailscale/golang-x-crypto
// to tailscale.com.
// - watch tests pass. git add it all.
// - send PR to tailscale.com
func TestSyncedToUpstream(t *testing.T) {
const pkg = "github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/acme"
out, err := exec.Command("go", "list", "-f", "{{.Dir}}", pkg).Output()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to find %s's location o disk: %v", pkg, err)
}
xDir := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
t.Logf("at %s", xDir)
scanDir := func(dir string) map[string]string {
m := map[string]string{} // filename => Go contents
ents, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, de := range ents {
name := de.Name()
if name == "sync_to_upstream_test.go" {
continue
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".go") {
continue
}
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
m[name] = string(b)
}
return m
}
want := scanDir(xDir)
got := scanDir(".")
if diff := cmp.Diff(want, got); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("files differ (-want +got):\n%s", diff)
t.Errorf("to fix, run from module root:\n\ncp %s/*.go ./tempfork/acme && ./tool/go mod tidy\n", xDir)
}
}

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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
// ACME status values of Account, Order, Authorization and Challenge objects.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6 for details.
const (
StatusDeactivated = "deactivated"
StatusExpired = "expired"
StatusInvalid = "invalid"
StatusPending = "pending"
StatusProcessing = "processing"
StatusReady = "ready"
StatusRevoked = "revoked"
StatusUnknown = "unknown"
StatusValid = "valid"
)
// CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation.
type CRLReasonCode int
// CRL reason codes as defined in RFC 5280.
const (
CRLReasonUnspecified CRLReasonCode = 0
CRLReasonKeyCompromise CRLReasonCode = 1
CRLReasonCACompromise CRLReasonCode = 2
CRLReasonAffiliationChanged CRLReasonCode = 3
CRLReasonSuperseded CRLReasonCode = 4
CRLReasonCessationOfOperation CRLReasonCode = 5
CRLReasonCertificateHold CRLReasonCode = 6
CRLReasonRemoveFromCRL CRLReasonCode = 8
CRLReasonPrivilegeWithdrawn CRLReasonCode = 9
CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10
)
var (
// ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered.
ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported")
// ErrAccountAlreadyExists indicates that the Client's key has already been registered
// with the CA. It is returned by Register method.
ErrAccountAlreadyExists = errors.New("acme: account already exists")
// ErrNoAccount indicates that the Client's key has not been registered with the CA.
ErrNoAccount = errors.New("acme: account does not exist")
)
// A Subproblem describes an ACME subproblem as reported in an Error.
type Subproblem struct {
// Type is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
// typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
Type string
// Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
Detail string
// Instance indicates a URL that the client should direct a human user to visit
// in order for instructions on how to agree to the updated Terms of Service.
// In such an event CA sets StatusCode to 403, Type to
// "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired", and adds a Link header with relation
// "terms-of-service" containing the latest TOS URL.
Instance string
// Identifier may contain the ACME identifier that the error is for.
Identifier *AuthzID
}
func (sp Subproblem) String() string {
str := fmt.Sprintf("%s: ", sp.Type)
if sp.Identifier != nil {
str += fmt.Sprintf("[%s: %s] ", sp.Identifier.Type, sp.Identifier.Value)
}
str += sp.Detail
return str
}
// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem.
type Error struct {
// StatusCode is The HTTP status code generated by the origin server.
StatusCode int
// ProblemType is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
// typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
ProblemType string
// Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
Detail string
// Instance indicates a URL that the client should direct a human user to visit
// in order for instructions on how to agree to the updated Terms of Service.
// In such an event CA sets StatusCode to 403, ProblemType to
// "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired" and a Link header with relation
// "terms-of-service" containing the latest TOS URL.
Instance string
// Header is the original server error response headers.
// It may be nil.
Header http.Header
// Subproblems may contain more detailed information about the individual problems
// that caused the error. This field is only sent by RFC 8555 compatible ACME
// servers. Defined in RFC 8555 Section 6.7.1.
Subproblems []Subproblem
}
func (e *Error) Error() string {
str := fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
if len(e.Subproblems) > 0 {
str += fmt.Sprintf("; subproblems:")
for _, sp := range e.Subproblems {
str += fmt.Sprintf("\n\t%s", sp)
}
}
return str
}
// AuthorizationError indicates that an authorization for an identifier
// did not succeed.
// It contains all errors from Challenge items of the failed Authorization.
type AuthorizationError struct {
// URI uniquely identifies the failed Authorization.
URI string
// Identifier is an AuthzID.Value of the failed Authorization.
Identifier string
// Errors is a collection of non-nil error values of Challenge items
// of the failed Authorization.
Errors []error
}
func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
e := make([]string, len(a.Errors))
for i, err := range a.Errors {
e[i] = err.Error()
}
if a.Identifier != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error: %s", strings.Join(e, "; "))
}
// OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods.
// It indicates the order is unusable and the clients should start over with
// AuthorizeOrder.
//
// The clients can still fetch the order object from CA using GetOrder
// to inspect its state.
type OrderError struct {
OrderURL string
Status string
}
func (oe *OrderError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: order %s status: %s", oe.OrderURL, oe.Status)
}
// RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and
// any Retry-After duration returned by the server.
//
// See the following for more details on rate limiting:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-05#section-5.6
func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) {
e, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
return 0, false
}
// Some CA implementations may return incorrect values.
// Use case-insensitive comparison.
if !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(e.ProblemType), ":ratelimited") {
return 0, false
}
if e.Header == nil {
return 0, true
}
return retryAfter(e.Header.Get("Retry-After")), true
}
// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key.
// Non-RFC 8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA.
type Account struct {
// URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve
// account data from the CA.
// When interfacing with RFC 8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field
// value in JWS signed requests.
URI string
// Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3 for supported
// formats.
Contact []string
// Status indicates current account status as returned by the CA.
// Possible values are StatusValid, StatusDeactivated, and StatusRevoked.
Status string
// OrdersURL is a URL from which a list of orders submitted by this account
// can be fetched.
OrdersURL string
// The terms user has agreed to.
// A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed
// to the actual Terms of Service of the CA.
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to
// during Client's Register call in the prompt callback function.
AgreedTerms string
// Actual terms of a CA.
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field.
// When a CA updates their terms and requires an account agreement,
// a URL at which instructions to do so is available in Error's Instance field.
CurrentTerms string
// Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow.
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL.
Authz string
// Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations
// granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request.
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
Authorizations string
// Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates
// issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request.
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
Certificates string
// ExternalAccountBinding represents an arbitrary binding to an account of
// the CA which the ACME server is tied to.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4 for more details.
ExternalAccountBinding *ExternalAccountBinding
}
// ExternalAccountBinding contains the data needed to form a request with
// an external account binding.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4 for more details.
type ExternalAccountBinding struct {
// KID is the Key ID of the symmetric MAC key that the CA provides to
// identify an external account from ACME.
KID string
// Key is the bytes of the symmetric key that the CA provides to identify
// the account. Key must correspond to the KID.
Key []byte
}
func (e *ExternalAccountBinding) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("&{KID: %q, Key: redacted}", e.KID)
}
// Directory is ACME server discovery data.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.1 for more details.
type Directory struct {
// NonceURL indicates an endpoint where to fetch fresh nonce values from.
NonceURL string
// RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new accounts.
// Pre-RFC 8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL.
RegURL string
// OrderURL is used to initiate the certificate issuance flow
// as described in RFC 8555.
OrderURL string
// AuthzURL is used to initiate identifier pre-authorization flow.
// Empty string indicates the flow is unsupported by the CA.
AuthzURL string
// CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL.
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL.
CertURL string
// RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow.
RevokeURL string
// KeyChangeURL allows to perform account key rollover flow.
KeyChangeURL string
// RenewalInfoURL allows to perform certificate renewal using the ACME
// Renewal Information (ARI) Extension.
RenewalInfoURL string
// Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service.
Terms string
// Website is an HTTP or HTTPS URL locating a website
// providing more information about the ACME server.
Website string
// CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server
// recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation
// as defined in RFC 6844.
CAA []string
// ExternalAccountRequired indicates that the CA requires for all account-related
// requests to include external account binding information.
ExternalAccountRequired bool
}
// Order represents a client's request for a certificate.
// It tracks the request flow progress through to issuance.
type Order struct {
// URI uniquely identifies an order.
URI string
// Status represents the current status of the order.
// It indicates which action the client should take.
//
// Possible values are StatusPending, StatusReady, StatusProcessing, StatusValid and StatusInvalid.
// Pending means the CA does not believe that the client has fulfilled the requirements.
// Ready indicates that the client has fulfilled all the requirements and can submit a CSR
// to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateOrderCert.
// Processing means the certificate is being issued.
// Valid indicates the CA has issued the certificate. It can be downloaded
// from the Order's CertURL. This is done with Client's FetchCert.
// Invalid means the certificate will not be issued. Users should consider this order
// abandoned.
Status string
// Expires is the timestamp after which CA considers this order invalid.
Expires time.Time
// Identifiers contains all identifier objects which the order pertains to.
Identifiers []AuthzID
// NotBefore is the requested value of the notBefore field in the certificate.
NotBefore time.Time
// NotAfter is the requested value of the notAfter field in the certificate.
NotAfter time.Time
// AuthzURLs represents authorizations to complete before a certificate
// for identifiers specified in the order can be issued.
// It also contains unexpired authorizations that the client has completed
// in the past.
//
// Authorization objects can be fetched using Client's GetAuthorization method.
//
// The required authorizations are dictated by CA policies.
// There may not be a 1:1 relationship between the identifiers and required authorizations.
// Required authorizations can be identified by their StatusPending status.
//
// For orders in the StatusValid or StatusInvalid state these are the authorizations
// which were completed.
AuthzURLs []string
// FinalizeURL is the endpoint at which a CSR is submitted to obtain a certificate
// once all the authorizations are satisfied.
FinalizeURL string
// CertURL points to the certificate that has been issued in response to this order.
CertURL string
// The error that occurred while processing the order as received from a CA, if any.
Error *Error
}
// OrderOption allows customizing Client.AuthorizeOrder call.
type OrderOption interface {
privateOrderOpt()
}
// WithOrderNotBefore sets order's NotBefore field.
func WithOrderNotBefore(t time.Time) OrderOption {
return orderNotBeforeOpt(t)
}
// WithOrderNotAfter sets order's NotAfter field.
func WithOrderNotAfter(t time.Time) OrderOption {
return orderNotAfterOpt(t)
}
type orderNotBeforeOpt time.Time
func (orderNotBeforeOpt) privateOrderOpt() {}
type orderNotAfterOpt time.Time
func (orderNotAfterOpt) privateOrderOpt() {}
// Authorization encodes an authorization response.
type Authorization struct {
// URI uniquely identifies a authorization.
URI string
// Status is the current status of an authorization.
// Possible values are StatusPending, StatusValid, StatusInvalid, StatusDeactivated,
// StatusExpired and StatusRevoked.
Status string
// Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent.
Identifier AuthzID
// The timestamp after which the CA considers the authorization invalid.
Expires time.Time
// Wildcard is true for authorizations of a wildcard domain name.
Wildcard bool
// Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession
// of the identifier (for pending authorizations).
// For valid authorizations, the challenge that was validated.
// For invalid authorizations, the challenge that was attempted and failed.
//
// RFC 8555 compatible CAs require users to fuflfill only one of the challenges.
Challenges []*Challenge
// A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient
// to prove possession of the identifier.
// Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set.
// Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array.
// If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges.
//
// This field is unused in RFC 8555.
Combinations [][]int
}
// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent.
type AuthzID struct {
Type string // The type of identifier, "dns" or "ip".
Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org".
}
// DomainIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "dns" identifier type.
func DomainIDs(names ...string) []AuthzID {
a := make([]AuthzID, len(names))
for i, v := range names {
a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: v}
}
return a
}
// IPIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "ip" identifier type.
// Each element of addr is textual form of an address as defined
// in RFC 1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC 5952 Section 4 for IPv6.
func IPIDs(addr ...string) []AuthzID {
a := make([]AuthzID, len(addr))
for i, v := range addr {
a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "ip", Value: v}
}
return a
}
// wireAuthzID is ACME JSON representation of authorization identifier objects.
type wireAuthzID struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects.
type wireAuthz struct {
Identifier wireAuthzID
Status string
Expires time.Time
Wildcard bool
Challenges []wireChallenge
Combinations [][]int
Error *wireError
}
func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
a := &Authorization{
URI: uri,
Status: z.Status,
Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value},
Expires: z.Expires,
Wildcard: z.Wildcard,
Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)),
Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
}
for i, v := range z.Challenges {
a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge()
}
return a
}
func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError {
err := &AuthorizationError{
URI: uri,
Identifier: z.Identifier.Value,
}
if z.Error != nil {
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, z.Error.error(nil))
}
for _, raw := range z.Challenges {
if raw.Error != nil {
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, raw.Error.error(nil))
}
}
return err
}
// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization
// with StatusInvalid.
type Challenge struct {
// Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-alpn-01", "dns-01".
Type string
// URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
URI string
// Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
Token string
// Status identifies the status of this challenge.
// In RFC 8555, possible values are StatusPending, StatusProcessing, StatusValid,
// and StatusInvalid.
Status string
// Validated is the time at which the CA validated this challenge.
// Always zero value in pre-RFC 8555.
Validated time.Time
// Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure
// when this challenge was used.
// The type of a non-nil value is *Error.
Error error
}
// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation.
type wireChallenge struct {
URL string `json:"url"` // RFC
URI string `json:"uri"` // pre-RFC
Type string
Token string
Status string
Validated time.Time
Error *wireError
}
func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
v := &Challenge{
URI: c.URL,
Type: c.Type,
Token: c.Token,
Status: c.Status,
}
if v.URI == "" {
v.URI = c.URI // c.URL was empty; use legacy
}
if v.Status == "" {
v.Status = StatusPending
}
if c.Error != nil {
v.Error = c.Error.error(nil)
}
return v
}
// wireError is a subset of fields of the Problem Details object
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807#section-3.1.
type wireError struct {
Status int
Type string
Detail string
Instance string
Subproblems []Subproblem
}
func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error {
err := &Error{
StatusCode: e.Status,
ProblemType: e.Type,
Detail: e.Detail,
Instance: e.Instance,
Header: h,
Subproblems: e.Subproblems,
}
return err
}
// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLS ChallengeCert methods for
// customizing a temporary certificate for TLS-based challenges.
type CertOption interface {
privateCertOpt()
}
// WithKey creates an option holding a private/public key pair.
// The private part signs a certificate, and the public part represents the signee.
func WithKey(key crypto.Signer) CertOption {
return &certOptKey{key}
}
type certOptKey struct {
key crypto.Signer
}
func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {}
// WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template.
// See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details.
//
// In TLS ChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent,
// resulting in a self-signed certificate.
// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs.
func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption {
return (*certOptTemplate)(t)
}
type certOptTemplate x509.Certificate
func (*certOptTemplate) privateCertOpt() {}
// RenewalInfoWindow describes the time frame during which the ACME client
// should attempt to renew, using the ACME Renewal Info Extension.
type RenewalInfoWindow struct {
Start time.Time `json:"start"`
End time.Time `json:"end"`
}
// RenewalInfo describes the suggested renewal window for a given certificate,
// returned from an ACME server, using the ACME Renewal Info Extension.
type RenewalInfo struct {
SuggestedWindow RenewalInfoWindow `json:"suggestedWindow"`
ExplanationURL string `json:"explanationURL"`
}

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// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestExternalAccountBindingString(t *testing.T) {
eab := ExternalAccountBinding{
KID: "kid",
Key: []byte("key"),
}
got := eab.String()
want := `&{KID: "kid", Key: redacted}`
if got != want {
t.Errorf("eab.String() = %q, want: %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2017, 04, 27, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
f := timeNow
defer func() { timeNow = f }()
timeNow = func() time.Time { return now }
h120, hTime := http.Header{}, http.Header{}
h120.Set("Retry-After", "120")
hTime.Set("Retry-After", "Tue Apr 27 11:00:00 2017")
err1 := &Error{
ProblemType: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:nolimit",
Header: h120,
}
err2 := &Error{
ProblemType: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rateLimited",
Header: h120,
}
err3 := &Error{
ProblemType: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rateLimited",
Header: nil,
}
err4 := &Error{
ProblemType: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rateLimited",
Header: hTime,
}
tt := []struct {
err error
res time.Duration
ok bool
}{
{nil, 0, false},
{errors.New("dummy"), 0, false},
{err1, 0, false},
{err2, 2 * time.Minute, true},
{err3, 0, true},
{err4, time.Hour, true},
}
for i, test := range tt {
res, ok := RateLimit(test.err)
if ok != test.ok {
t.Errorf("%d: RateLimit(%+v): ok = %v; want %v", i, test.err, ok, test.ok)
continue
}
if res != test.res {
t.Errorf("%d: RateLimit(%+v) = %v; want %v", i, test.err, res, test.res)
}
}
}
func TestAuthorizationError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
desc string
err *AuthorizationError
msg string
}{
{
desc: "when auth error identifier is set",
err: &AuthorizationError{
Identifier: "domain.com",
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
},
msg: "acme: authorization error for domain.com: 403 urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa: CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
},
{
desc: "when auth error identifier is unset",
err: &AuthorizationError{
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
},
msg: "acme: authorization error: 403 urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa: CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if tt.err.Error() != tt.msg {
t.Errorf("got: %s\nwant: %s", tt.err, tt.msg)
}
}
}
func TestSubproblems(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
wire wireError
expectedOut Error
}{
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
},
},
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
},
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
},
},
},
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
out := tc.wire.error(nil)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(*out, tc.expectedOut) {
t.Errorf("Unexpected error: wanted %v, got %v", tc.expectedOut, *out)
}
}
}
func TestErrorStringerWithSubproblems(t *testing.T) {
err := Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
}
expectedStr := "1 urn:error: it's an error; subproblems:\n\turn:error:sub: it's a subproblem\n\turn:error:sub: [dns: example] it's a subproblem"
if err.Error() != expectedStr {
t.Errorf("Unexpected error string: wanted %q, got %q", expectedStr, err.Error())
}
}

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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.12
package acme
import "runtime/debug"
func init() {
// Set packageVersion if the binary was built in modules mode and x/crypto
// was not replaced with a different module.
info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
if !ok {
return
}
for _, m := range info.Deps {
if m.Path != "golang.org/x/crypto" {
continue
}
if m.Replace == nil {
packageVersion = m.Version
}
break
}
}