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tka: implement State and applying AUMs
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom DNetto
Tom
parent
1cfd96cdc2
commit
3709074e55
90
tka/aum.go
90
tka/aum.go
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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@ -104,8 +105,7 @@ type AUM struct {
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// State describes the full state of the key authority.
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// This field is used for Checkpoint AUMs.
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// TODO(tom): Use type *State once a future PR brings in that type.
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State interface{} `cbor:"5,keyasint,omitempty"`
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State *State `cbor:"5,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// DisablementSecret is used to transmit a secret for disabling
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// the TKA.
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@ -122,6 +122,13 @@ type AUM struct {
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Signatures []Signature `cbor:"23,keyasint,omitempty"`
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}
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// Upper bound on checkpoint elements, chosen arbitrarily. Intended to
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// cap out insanely large AUMs.
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const (
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maxDisablementSecrets = 32
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maxKeys = 512
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)
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// StaticValidate returns a nil error if the AUM is well-formed.
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func (a *AUM) StaticValidate() error {
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if a.Key != nil {
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@ -138,7 +145,36 @@ func (a *AUM) StaticValidate() error {
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}
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}
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// TODO(tom): Validate State once a future PR brings in that type.
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if a.State != nil {
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if len(a.State.LastAUMHash) != 0 {
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return errors.New("checkpoint state cannot specify a parent AUM")
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}
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if len(a.State.DisablementSecrets) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one disablement secret required")
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}
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if numDS := len(a.State.DisablementSecrets); numDS > maxDisablementSecrets {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many disablement secrets (%d, max %d)", numDS, maxDisablementSecrets)
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}
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for i, ds := range a.State.DisablementSecrets {
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if len(ds) != disablementLength {
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return fmt.Errorf("disablement[%d]: invalid length (got %d, want %d)", i, len(ds), disablementLength)
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}
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}
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// TODO(tom): Check for duplicate disablement secrets.
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if len(a.State.Keys) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one key is required")
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}
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if numKeys := len(a.State.Keys); numKeys > maxKeys {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many keys (%d, max %d)", numKeys, maxKeys)
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}
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for i, k := range a.State.Keys {
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if err := k.StaticValidate(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("key[%d]: %v", i, err)
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}
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}
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// TODO(tom): Check for duplicate keys.
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}
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switch a.MessageKind {
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case AUMAddKey:
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@ -253,4 +289,50 @@ func (a *AUM) sign25519(priv ed25519.PrivateKey) {
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})
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}
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// TODO(tom): Implement Weight() once a future PR brings in the State type.
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// Weight computes the 'signature weight' of the AUM
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// based on keys in the state machine. The caller must
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// ensure that all signatures are valid.
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//
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// More formally: W = Sum(key.votes)
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//
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// AUMs with a higher weight than their siblings
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// are preferred when resolving forks in the AUM chain.
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func (a *AUM) Weight(state State) uint {
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var weight uint
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// Track the keys that have already been used, so two
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// signatures with the same key do not result in 2x
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// the weight.
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//
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// We use the first 8 bytes as the key for this map,
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// because KeyIDs are either a blake2s hash or
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// the 25519 public key, both of which approximate
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// random distribution.
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seenKeys := make(map[uint64]struct{}, 6)
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for _, sig := range a.Signatures {
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if len(sig.KeyID) < 8 {
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// Invalid, don't count it
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continue
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}
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keyID := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(sig.KeyID)
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key, err := state.GetKey(sig.KeyID)
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if err != nil {
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if err == ErrNoSuchKey {
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// Signatures with an unknown key do not contribute
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// to the weight.
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continue
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}
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panic(err)
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}
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if _, seen := seenKeys[keyID]; seen {
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continue
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}
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weight += key.Votes
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seenKeys[keyID] = struct{}{}
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}
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return weight
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}
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150
tka/aum_test.go
150
tka/aum_test.go
@ -10,10 +10,12 @@
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"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
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"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s"
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)
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func TestSerialization(t *testing.T) {
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uint2 := uint(2)
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var fakeAUMHash AUMHash
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tcs := []struct {
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Name string
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@ -94,44 +96,45 @@ func TestSerialization(t *testing.T) {
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0x04, // |- major type 0 (int), value 4 (byte 4)
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},
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},
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// TODO(tom): Uncomment once a future PR brings in the State type.
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// {
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// "Checkpoint",
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// AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, PrevAUMHash: []byte{1, 2}, State: &State{
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// LastAUMHash: []byte{3, 4},
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// Keys: []Key{
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// {Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6}},
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// },
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// }},
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// []byte{
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// 0xa3, // major type 5 (map), 3 items
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// 0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, MessageKind)
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// 0x06, // |- major type 0 (int), value 6 (first value, AUMCheckpoint)
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// 0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, PrevAUMHash)
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// 0x42, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 2 items (second value)
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// 0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (byte 1)
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// 0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (byte 2)
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// 0x05, // |- major type 0 (int), value 5 (third key, State)
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// 0xa3, // |- major type 5 (map), 3 items (third value, State type)
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// 0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, LastAUMHash)
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// 0x42, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 2 items (first value)
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// 0x03, // |- major type 0 (int), value 3 (byte 3)
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// 0x04, // |- major type 0 (int), value 4 (byte 4)
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// 0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, DisablementSecrets)
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// 0xf6, // |- major type 7 (val), value null (second value, nil)
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// 0x03, // |- major type 0 (int), value 3 (third key, Keys)
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// 0x81, // |- major type 4 (array), value 1 (one item in array)
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// 0xa3, // |- major type 5 (map), 3 items (Key type)
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// 0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, Kind)
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// 0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first value, Key25519)
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// 0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, Votes)
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// 0x00, // |- major type 0 (int), value 0 (second value, 0)
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// 0x03, // |- major type 0 (int), value 3 (third key, Public)
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// 0x42, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 2 items (third value)
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// 0x05, // |- major type 0 (int), value 5 (byte 5)
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// 0x06, // |- major type 0 (int), value 6 (byte 6)
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// },
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// },
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{
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"Checkpoint",
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AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, PrevAUMHash: []byte{1, 2}, State: &State{
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LastAUMHash: &fakeAUMHash,
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Keys: []Key{
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{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6}},
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},
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}},
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append(
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append([]byte{
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0xa3, // major type 5 (map), 3 items
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0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, MessageKind)
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0x06, // |- major type 0 (int), value 6 (first value, AUMCheckpoint)
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0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, PrevAUMHash)
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0x42, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 2 items (second value)
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0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (byte 1)
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0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (byte 2)
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0x05, // |- major type 0 (int), value 5 (third key, State)
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0xa3, // |- major type 5 (map), 3 items (third value, State type)
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0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, LastAUMHash)
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0x58, 0x20, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 32 items (first value)
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},
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bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 32)...),
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[]byte{
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0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, DisablementSecrets)
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0xf6, // |- major type 7 (val), value null (second value, nil)
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0x03, // |- major type 0 (int), value 3 (third key, Keys)
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0x81, // |- major type 4 (array), value 1 (one item in array)
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0xa3, // |- major type 5 (map), 3 items (Key type)
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0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first key, Kind)
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0x01, // |- major type 0 (int), value 1 (first value, Key25519)
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0x02, // |- major type 0 (int), value 2 (second key, Votes)
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0x00, // |- major type 0 (int), value 0 (second value, 0)
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0x03, // |- major type 0 (int), value 3 (third key, Public)
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0x42, // |- major type 2 (byte string), 2 items (third value)
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0x05, // |- major type 0 (int), value 5 (byte 5)
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0x06, // |- major type 0 (int), value 6 (byte 6)
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}...),
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},
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{
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"Signature",
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AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Signatures: []Signature{{KeyID: []byte{1}}}},
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@ -171,6 +174,77 @@ func TestSerialization(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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func TestAUMWeight(t *testing.T) {
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var fakeKeyID [blake2s.Size]byte
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testingRand(t, 1).Read(fakeKeyID[:])
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pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1)
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key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
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pub, _ = testingKey25519(t, 2)
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key2 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
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tcs := []struct {
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Name string
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AUM AUM
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State State
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Want uint
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}{
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{
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"Empty",
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AUM{},
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State{},
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0,
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},
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{
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"Key unknown",
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AUM{
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Signatures: []Signature{{KeyID: fakeKeyID[:]}},
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},
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State{},
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0,
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},
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{
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"Unary key",
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AUM{
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Signatures: []Signature{{KeyID: key.ID()}},
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},
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State{
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Keys: []Key{key},
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},
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2,
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},
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{
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"Multiple keys",
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AUM{
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Signatures: []Signature{{KeyID: key.ID()}, {KeyID: key2.ID()}},
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},
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State{
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Keys: []Key{key, key2},
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},
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4,
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},
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{
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"Double use",
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AUM{
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Signatures: []Signature{{KeyID: key.ID()}, {KeyID: key.ID()}},
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},
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State{
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Keys: []Key{key},
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},
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2,
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range tcs {
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t.Run(tc.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got := tc.AUM.Weight(tc.State)
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if got != tc.Want {
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t.Errorf("Weight() = %d, want %d", got, tc.Want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestAUMHashes(t *testing.T) {
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// .Hash(): a hash over everything.
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// .SigHash(): a hash over everything except the signatures.
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23
tka/key.go
23
tka/key.go
@ -51,6 +51,29 @@ type Key struct {
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Meta map[string]string `cbor:"12,keyasint,omitempty"`
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}
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// Clone makes an independent copy of Key.
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//
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// NOTE: There is a difference between a nil slice and an empty
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// slice for encoding purposes, so an implementation of Clone()
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// must take care to preserve this.
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func (k Key) Clone() Key {
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out := k
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if k.Public != nil {
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out.Public = make([]byte, len(k.Public))
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copy(out.Public, k.Public)
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}
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if k.Meta != nil {
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out.Meta = make(map[string]string, len(k.Meta))
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for k, v := range k.Meta {
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out.Meta[k] = v
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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func (k Key) ID() KeyID {
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switch k.Kind {
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// Because 25519 public keys are so short, we just use the 32-byte
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204
tka/state.go
Normal file
204
tka/state.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
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// Copyright (c) 2022 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tka
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
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)
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// ErrNoSuchKey is returned if the key referenced by a KeyID does not exist.
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var ErrNoSuchKey = errors.New("key not found")
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// State describes Tailnet Key Authority state at an instant in time.
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//
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// State is mutated by applying Authority Update Messages (AUMs), resulting
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// in a new State.
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type State struct {
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// LastAUMHash is the blake2s digest of the last-applied AUM.
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// Because AUMs are strictly ordered and form a hash chain, we
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// check the previous AUM hash in an update we are applying
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// is the same as the LastAUMHash.
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LastAUMHash *AUMHash `cbor:"1,keyasint"`
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// DisablementSecrets are KDF-derived values which can be used
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// to turn off the TKA in the event of a consensus-breaking bug.
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// An AUM of type DisableNL should contain a secret when results
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// in one of these values when run through the disablement KDF.
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//
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// TODO(tom): This is an alpha feature, remove this mechanism once
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// we have confidence in our implementation.
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DisablementSecrets [][]byte `cbor:"2,keyasint"`
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// Keys are the public keys currently trusted by the TKA.
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Keys []Key `cbor:"3,keyasint"`
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}
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// GetKey returns the trusted key with the specified KeyID.
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func (s State) GetKey(key KeyID) (Key, error) {
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for _, k := range s.Keys {
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if bytes.Equal(k.ID(), key) {
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return k, nil
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}
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}
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return Key{}, ErrNoSuchKey
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}
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// Clone makes an independent copy of State.
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//
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// NOTE: There is a difference between a nil slice and an empty
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// slice for encoding purposes, so an implementation of Clone()
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// must take care to preserve this.
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func (s State) Clone() State {
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out := State{}
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if s.LastAUMHash != nil {
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dupe := *s.LastAUMHash
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out.LastAUMHash = &dupe
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}
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if s.DisablementSecrets != nil {
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out.DisablementSecrets = make([][]byte, len(s.DisablementSecrets))
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for i := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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out.DisablementSecrets[i] = make([]byte, len(s.DisablementSecrets[i]))
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copy(out.DisablementSecrets[i], s.DisablementSecrets[i])
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}
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}
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if s.Keys != nil {
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out.Keys = make([]Key, len(s.Keys))
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for i := range s.Keys {
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out.Keys[i] = s.Keys[i].Clone()
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// cloneForUpdate is like Clone, except LastAUMHash is set based
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// on the hash of the given update.
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func (s State) cloneForUpdate(update *AUM) State {
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out := s.Clone()
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aumHash := update.Hash()
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out.LastAUMHash = &aumHash
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return out
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}
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const disablementLength = 32
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var disablementSalt = []byte("tailscale network-lock disablement salt")
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func disablementKDF(secret []byte) []byte {
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// time = 4 (3 recommended, booped to 4 to compensate for less memory)
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// memory = 16 (32 recommended)
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// threads = 4
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// keyLen = 32 (256 bits)
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return argon2.Key(secret, disablementSalt, 4, 16*1024, 4, disablementLength)
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}
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// checkDisablement returns true for a valid disablement secret.
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func (s State) checkDisablement(secret []byte) bool {
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derived := disablementKDF(secret)
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for _, candidate := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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if bytes.Equal(derived, candidate) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// parentMatches returns true if an AUM can chain to (be applied)
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// to the current state.
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//
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// Specifically, the rules are:
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// - The last AUM hash must match (transitively, this implies that this
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// update follows the last update message applied to the state machine)
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// - Or, the state machine knows no parent (its brand new).
|
||||
func (s State) parentMatches(update AUM) bool {
|
||||
if s.LastAUMHash == nil {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return bytes.Equal(s.LastAUMHash[:], update.PrevAUMHash)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// applyVerifiedAUM computes a new state based on the update provided.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The provided update MUST be verified: That is, the AUM must be well-formed
|
||||
// (as defined by StaticValidate()), and signatures over the AUM must have
|
||||
// been verified.
|
||||
func (s State) applyVerifiedAUM(update AUM) (State, error) {
|
||||
// Validate that the update message has the right parent.
|
||||
if !s.parentMatches(update) {
|
||||
return State{}, errors.New("parent AUMHash mismatch")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch update.MessageKind {
|
||||
case AUMNoOp:
|
||||
out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
|
||||
case AUMCheckpoint:
|
||||
return update.State.cloneForUpdate(&update), nil
|
||||
|
||||
case AUMAddKey:
|
||||
if _, err := s.GetKey(update.Key.ID()); err == nil {
|
||||
return State{}, errors.New("key already exists")
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
|
||||
out.Keys = append(out.Keys, *update.Key)
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
|
||||
case AUMUpdateKey:
|
||||
k, err := s.GetKey(update.KeyID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return State{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if update.Votes != nil {
|
||||
k.Votes = *update.Votes
|
||||
}
|
||||
if update.Meta != nil {
|
||||
k.Meta = update.Meta
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
|
||||
for i := range out.Keys {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(out.Keys[i].ID(), update.KeyID) {
|
||||
out.Keys[i] = k
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
|
||||
case AUMRemoveKey:
|
||||
idx := -1
|
||||
for i := range s.Keys {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(update.KeyID, s.Keys[i].ID()) {
|
||||
idx = i
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if idx < 0 {
|
||||
return State{}, ErrNoSuchKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
|
||||
out.Keys = append(out.Keys[:idx], out.Keys[idx+1:]...)
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
|
||||
case AUMDisableNL:
|
||||
// TODO(tom): We should handle this at a higher level than State.
|
||||
if !s.checkDisablement(update.DisablementSecret) {
|
||||
return State{}, errors.New("incorrect disablement secret")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Valid disablement secret, lets reset
|
||||
return State{}, nil
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// TODO(tom): Instead of erroring, update lastHash and
|
||||
// continue (to preserve future compatibility).
|
||||
return State{}, fmt.Errorf("unhandled message: %v", update.MessageKind)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
252
tka/state_test.go
Normal file
252
tka/state_test.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) 2022 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package tka
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
|
||||
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
|
||||
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp/cmpopts"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func fromHex(in string) []byte {
|
||||
out, err := hex.DecodeString(in)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hashFromHex(in string) *AUMHash {
|
||||
var out AUMHash
|
||||
copy(out[:], fromHex(in))
|
||||
return &out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCloneState(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tcs := []struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
State State
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Empty",
|
||||
State{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Key",
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Votes: 2, Public: []byte{5, 6, 7, 8}, Meta: map[string]string{"a": "b"}}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"DisablementSecrets",
|
||||
State{
|
||||
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{
|
||||
{1, 2, 3, 4},
|
||||
{5, 6, 7, 8},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range tcs {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if diff := cmp.Diff(tc.State, tc.State.Clone()); diff != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("output state differs (-want, +got):\n%s", diff)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure the cloned State is the same even after
|
||||
// an encode + decode into + from CBOR.
|
||||
t.Run("cbor", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
out := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
|
||||
encoder, err := cbor.CTAP2EncOptions().EncMode()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := encoder.NewEncoder(out).Encode(tc.State.Clone()); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var decodedState State
|
||||
if err := cbor.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &decodedState); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Unmarshal failed: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if diff := cmp.Diff(tc.State, decodedState); diff != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("decoded state differs (-want, +got):\n%s", diff)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestApplyUpdatesChain(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
intOne := uint(1)
|
||||
tcs := []struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Updates []AUM
|
||||
Start State
|
||||
End State
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"AddKey",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}}},
|
||||
State{},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"RemoveKey",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03")}},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("15d65756abfafbb592279503f40759898590c9c59056be1e2e9f02684c15ba4b"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"UpdateKey",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMUpdateKey, KeyID: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, Votes: &intOne, Meta: map[string]string{"a": "b"}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03")}},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("828fe04c16032cf3e0b021abca0b4d79924b0a18b2e627b308347aa87ce7c21c"),
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Votes: 1, Meta: map[string]string{"a": "b"}, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"ChainedKeyUpdates",
|
||||
[]AUM{
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6, 7, 8}}},
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("f09bda3bb7cf6756ea9adc25770aede4b3ca8142949d6ef5ca0add29af912fd4")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6, 7, 8}}},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("218165fe5f757304b9deaff4ac742890364f5f509e533c74e80e0ce35e44ee1d"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Disablement",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMDisableNL, DisablementSecret: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03")}},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{disablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4})},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("53898e4311d0b6087fcbb871563868a16c629d9267df851fcfa7b52b31d2bd03"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Checkpoint",
|
||||
[]AUM{
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6, 7, 8}}},
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("f09bda3bb7cf6756ea9adc25770aede4b3ca8142949d6ef5ca0add29af912fd4")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{[]byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
LastAUMHash: hashFromHex("2e34f7e21883c35c8e34ec06e735f7ed8a14c3ceeb11ccb18fcbc11d51c8dabb"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range tcs {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
state := tc.Start
|
||||
for i := range tc.Updates {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
// t.Logf("update[%d] start-state = %+v", i, state)
|
||||
state, err = state.applyVerifiedAUM(tc.Updates[i])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Apply message[%d] failed: %v", i, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// t.Logf("update[%d] end-state = %+v", i, state)
|
||||
|
||||
updateHash := tc.Updates[i].Hash()
|
||||
if tc.Updates[i].MessageKind != AUMDisableNL {
|
||||
if got, want := *state.LastAUMHash, updateHash[:]; !bytes.Equal(got[:], want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected state.LastAUMHash = %x (update %d), got %x", want, i, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if diff := cmp.Diff(tc.End, state, cmpopts.EquateEmpty()); diff != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("output state differs (+got, -want):\n%s", diff)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestApplyUpdateErrors(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tcs := []struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Updates []AUM
|
||||
Start State
|
||||
Error error
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"AddKey exists",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}}},
|
||||
State{Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}}},
|
||||
errors.New("key already exists"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"RemoveKey notfound",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}}},
|
||||
State{},
|
||||
ErrNoSuchKey,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"UpdateKey notfound",
|
||||
[]AUM{{MessageKind: AUMUpdateKey, KeyID: []byte{1}}},
|
||||
State{},
|
||||
ErrNoSuchKey,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Bad lastAUMHash",
|
||||
[]AUM{
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{5, 6, 7, 8}}},
|
||||
{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, PrevAUMHash: fromHex("1234")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
State{
|
||||
Keys: []Key{{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
errors.New("parent AUMHash mismatch"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range tcs {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
state := tc.Start
|
||||
for i := range tc.Updates {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
// t.Logf("update[%d] start-state = %+v", i, state)
|
||||
state, err = state.applyVerifiedAUM(tc.Updates[i])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err.Error() != tc.Error.Error() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("state[%d].Err = %v, want %v", i, err, tc.Error)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// t.Logf("update[%d] end-state = %+v", i, state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Errorf("did not error, expected %v", tc.Error)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user