diff --git a/client/tailscale/localclient.go b/client/tailscale/localclient.go index c4fff4b7d..cd53e062b 100644 --- a/client/tailscale/localclient.go +++ b/client/tailscale/localclient.go @@ -961,6 +961,42 @@ func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockVerifySigningDeeplink(ctx context.Context, url return decodeJSON[*tka.DeeplinkValidationResult](body) } +// NetworkLockGenRecoveryAUM generates an AUM for recovering from a tailnet-lock key compromise. +func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockGenRecoveryAUM(ctx context.Context, removeKeys []tkatype.KeyID, forkFrom tka.AUMHash) ([]byte, error) { + vr := struct { + Keys []tkatype.KeyID + ForkFrom string + }{removeKeys, forkFrom.String()} + + body, err := lc.send(ctx, "POST", "/localapi/v0/tka/generate-recovery-aum", 200, jsonBody(vr)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sending generate-recovery-aum: %w", err) + } + + return body, nil +} + +// NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM co-signs a recovery AUM using the node's tailnet lock key. +func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(ctx context.Context, aum tka.AUM) ([]byte, error) { + r := bytes.NewReader(aum.Serialize()) + body, err := lc.send(ctx, "POST", "/localapi/v0/tka/cosign-recovery-aum", 200, r) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sending cosign-recovery-aum: %w", err) + } + + return body, nil +} + +// NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM submits a recovery AUM to the control plane. +func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(ctx context.Context, aum tka.AUM) error { + r := bytes.NewReader(aum.Serialize()) + _, err := lc.send(ctx, "POST", "/localapi/v0/tka/submit-recovery-aum", 200, r) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("sending cosign-recovery-aum: %w", err) + } + return nil +} + // SetServeConfig sets or replaces the serving settings. // If config is nil, settings are cleared and serving is disabled. func (lc *LocalClient) SetServeConfig(ctx context.Context, config *ipn.ServeConfig) error { diff --git a/cmd/tailscale/cli/network-lock.go b/cmd/tailscale/cli/network-lock.go index 2130b0c84..b1d4ed978 100644 --- a/cmd/tailscale/cli/network-lock.go +++ b/cmd/tailscale/cli/network-lock.go @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ "tailscale.com/ipn/ipnstate" "tailscale.com/tka" "tailscale.com/types/key" + "tailscale.com/types/tkatype" ) var netlockCmd = &ffcli.Command{ @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ nlDisablementKDFCmd, nlLogCmd, nlLocalDisableCmd, + nlRevokeKeysCmd, }, Exec: runNetworkLockNoSubcommand, } @@ -711,3 +713,114 @@ func wrapAuthKey(ctx context.Context, keyStr string, status *ipnstate.Status) er fmt.Println(wrapped) return nil } + +var nlRevokeKeysArgs struct { + cosign bool + finish bool + forkFrom string +} + +var nlRevokeKeysCmd = &ffcli.Command{ + Name: "revoke-keys", + ShortUsage: "revoke-keys ...\n revoke-keys [--cosign] [--finish] ", + ShortHelp: "Revoke compromised tailnet-lock keys", + LongHelp: `Retroactively revoke the specified tailnet lock keys (tlpub:abc). + +Revoked keys are prevented from being used in the future. Any nodes previously signed +by revoked keys lose their authorization and must be signed again. + +Revocation is a multi-step process that requires several signing nodes to ` + "`--cosign`" + ` the revocation. Use ` + "`tailscale lock remove`" + ` instead if the key has not been compromised. + +1. To start, run ` + "`tailscale revoke-keys `" + ` with the tailnet lock keys to revoke. +2. Re-run the ` + "`--cosign`" + ` command output by ` + "`revoke-keys`" + ` on other signing nodes. Use the + most recent command output on the next signing node in sequence. +3. Once the number of ` + "`--cosign`" + `s is greater than the number of keys being revoked, + run the command one final time with ` + "`--finish`" + ` instead of ` + "`--cosign`" + `.`, + Exec: runNetworkLockRevokeKeys, + FlagSet: (func() *flag.FlagSet { + fs := newFlagSet("lock revoke-keys") + fs.BoolVar(&nlRevokeKeysArgs.cosign, "cosign", false, "continue generating the recovery using the tailnet lock key on this device and the provided recovery blob") + fs.BoolVar(&nlRevokeKeysArgs.finish, "finish", false, "finish the recovery process by transmitting the revocation") + fs.StringVar(&nlRevokeKeysArgs.forkFrom, "fork-from", "", "parent AUM hash to rewrite from (advanced users only)") + return fs + })(), +} + +func runNetworkLockRevokeKeys(ctx context.Context, args []string) error { + // First step in the process + if !nlRevokeKeysArgs.cosign && !nlRevokeKeysArgs.finish { + removeKeys, _, err := parseNLArgs(args, true, false) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + keyIDs := make([]tkatype.KeyID, len(removeKeys)) + for i, k := range removeKeys { + keyIDs[i], err = k.ID() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("generating keyID: %v", err) + } + } + + var forkFrom tka.AUMHash + if nlRevokeKeysArgs.forkFrom != "" { + if len(nlRevokeKeysArgs.forkFrom) == (len(forkFrom) * 2) { + // Hex-encoded: like the output of the lock log command. + b, err := hex.DecodeString(nlRevokeKeysArgs.forkFrom) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid fork-from hash: %v", err) + } + copy(forkFrom[:], b) + } else { + if err := forkFrom.UnmarshalText([]byte(nlRevokeKeysArgs.forkFrom)); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid fork-from hash: %v", err) + } + } + } + + aumBytes, err := localClient.NetworkLockGenRecoveryAUM(ctx, keyIDs, forkFrom) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("generation of recovery AUM failed: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Printf(`Run the following command on another machine with a trusted tailnet lock key: + %s lock recover-compromised-key --cosign %X +`, os.Args[0], aumBytes) + return nil + } + + // If we got this far, we need to co-sign the AUM and/or transmit it for distribution. + b, err := hex.DecodeString(args[0]) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parsing hex: %v", err) + } + var recoveryAUM tka.AUM + if err := recoveryAUM.Unserialize(b); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("decoding recovery AUM: %v", err) + } + + if nlRevokeKeysArgs.cosign { + aumBytes, err := localClient.NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(ctx, recoveryAUM) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("co-signing recovery AUM failed: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Printf(`Co-signing completed successfully. + +To accumulate an additional signature, run the following command on another machine with a trusted tailnet lock key: + %s lock recover-compromised-key --cosign %X + +Alternatively if you are done with co-signing, complete recovery by running the following command: + %s lock recover-compromised-key --finish %X +`, os.Args[0], aumBytes, os.Args[0], aumBytes) + } + + if nlRevokeKeysArgs.finish { + if err := localClient.NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(ctx, recoveryAUM); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("submitting recovery AUM failed: %w", err) + } + fmt.Println("Recovery completed.") + } + + return nil +} diff --git a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go index eb26263e2..0057c1bb9 100644 --- a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go +++ b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go @@ -845,6 +845,93 @@ func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockAffectedSigs(keyID tkatype.KeyID) ([]tkatype.M return resp.Signatures, nil } +// NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM generates an AUM which retroactively removes trust in the +// specified keys. This AUM is signed by the current node and returned. +// +// If forkFrom is specified, it is used as the parent AUM to fork from. If the zero value, +// the parent AUM is determined automatically. +func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM(removeKeys []tkatype.KeyID, forkFrom tka.AUMHash) (*tka.AUM, error) { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + if b.tka == nil { + return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive + } + var nlPriv key.NLPrivate + if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() { + nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey() + } + if nlPriv.IsZero() { + return nil, errMissingNetmap + } + + aum, err := b.tka.authority.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(b.tka.storage, removeKeys, nlPriv.KeyID(), forkFrom) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Sign it ourselves. + aum.Signatures, err = nlPriv.SignAUM(aum.SigHash()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing failed: %w", err) + } + + return aum, nil +} + +// NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM co-signs the provided recovery AUM and returns +// the updated structure. +// +// The recovery AUM provided should be the output from a previous call to +// NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM or NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM. +func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(aum *tka.AUM) (*tka.AUM, error) { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + if b.tka == nil { + return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive + } + var nlPriv key.NLPrivate + if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() { + nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey() + } + if nlPriv.IsZero() { + return nil, errMissingNetmap + } + for _, sig := range aum.Signatures { + if bytes.Equal(sig.KeyID, nlPriv.KeyID()) { + return nil, errors.New("this node has already signed this recovery AUM") + } + } + + // Sign it ourselves. + sigs, err := nlPriv.SignAUM(aum.SigHash()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing failed: %w", err) + } + aum.Signatures = append(aum.Signatures, sigs...) + + return aum, nil +} + +func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(aum *tka.AUM) error { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + if b.tka == nil { + return errNetworkLockNotActive + } + var ourNodeKey key.NodePublic + if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() { + ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey() + } + if ourNodeKey.IsZero() { + return errors.New("no node-key: is tailscale logged in?") + } + + b.mu.Unlock() + _, err := b.tkaDoSyncSend(ourNodeKey, aum.Hash(), []tka.AUM{*aum}, false) + b.mu.Lock() + return err +} + var tkaSuffixEncoder = base64.RawStdEncoding // NetworkLockWrapPreauthKey wraps a pre-auth key with information to diff --git a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock_test.go b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock_test.go index 98e4acf2f..c6a9f5331 100644 --- a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock_test.go +++ b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock_test.go @@ -994,3 +994,129 @@ func() *tka.NodeKeySignature { }) } } + +func TestTKARecoverCompromisedKeyFlow(t *testing.T) { + nodePriv := key.NewNode() + nlPriv := key.NewNLPrivate() + cosignPriv := key.NewNLPrivate() + compromisedPriv := key.NewNLPrivate() + + pm := must.Get(newProfileManager(new(mem.Store), t.Logf)) + must.Do(pm.SetPrefs((&ipn.Prefs{ + Persist: &persist.Persist{ + PrivateNodeKey: nodePriv, + NetworkLockKey: nlPriv, + }, + }).View())) + + // Make a fake TKA authority, to seed local state. + disablementSecret := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xa5}, 32) + key := tka.Key{Kind: tka.Key25519, Public: nlPriv.Public().Verifier(), Votes: 2} + cosignKey := tka.Key{Kind: tka.Key25519, Public: cosignPriv.Public().Verifier(), Votes: 2} + compromisedKey := tka.Key{Kind: tka.Key25519, Public: compromisedPriv.Public().Verifier(), Votes: 1} + + temp := t.TempDir() + tkaPath := filepath.Join(temp, "tka-profile", string(pm.CurrentProfile().ID)) + os.Mkdir(tkaPath, 0755) + chonk, err := tka.ChonkDir(tkaPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + authority, _, err := tka.Create(chonk, tka.State{ + Keys: []tka.Key{key, compromisedKey, cosignKey}, + DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{tka.DisablementKDF(disablementSecret)}, + }, nlPriv) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("tka.Create() failed: %v", err) + } + + ts, client := fakeNoiseServer(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + defer r.Body.Close() + switch r.URL.Path { + case "/machine/tka/sync/send": + body := new(tailcfg.TKASyncSendRequest) + if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(body); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Logf("got sync send:\n%+v", body) + + var remoteHead tka.AUMHash + if err := remoteHead.UnmarshalText([]byte(body.Head)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("head unmarshal: %v", err) + } + toApply := make([]tka.AUM, len(body.MissingAUMs)) + for i, a := range body.MissingAUMs { + if err := toApply[i].Unserialize(a); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("decoding missingAUM[%d]: %v", i, err) + } + } + + // Apply the recovery AUM to an authority to make sure it works. + if err := authority.Inform(chonk, toApply); err != nil { + t.Errorf("recovery AUM could not be applied: %v", err) + } + // Make sure the key we removed isn't trusted. + if authority.KeyTrusted(compromisedPriv.KeyID()) { + t.Error("compromised key was not removed from tka") + } + + w.WriteHeader(200) + if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(tailcfg.TKASubmitSignatureResponse{}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + default: + t.Errorf("unhandled endpoint path: %v", r.URL.Path) + w.WriteHeader(404) + } + })) + defer ts.Close() + cc := fakeControlClient(t, client) + b := LocalBackend{ + varRoot: temp, + cc: cc, + ccAuto: cc, + logf: t.Logf, + tka: &tkaState{ + authority: authority, + storage: chonk, + }, + pm: pm, + store: pm.Store(), + } + + aum, err := b.NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM([]tkatype.KeyID{compromisedPriv.KeyID()}, tka.AUMHash{}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM() failed: %v", err) + } + + // Cosign using the cosigning key. + { + pm := must.Get(newProfileManager(new(mem.Store), t.Logf)) + must.Do(pm.SetPrefs((&ipn.Prefs{ + Persist: &persist.Persist{ + PrivateNodeKey: nodePriv, + NetworkLockKey: cosignPriv, + }, + }).View())) + b := LocalBackend{ + varRoot: temp, + logf: t.Logf, + tka: &tkaState{ + authority: authority, + storage: chonk, + }, + pm: pm, + store: pm.Store(), + } + if aum, err = b.NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(aum); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM() failed: %v", err) + } + } + + // Finally, submit the recovery AUM. Validation is done + // in the fake control handler. + if err := b.NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(aum); err != nil { + t.Errorf("NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM() failed: %v", err) + } +} diff --git a/ipn/localapi/localapi.go b/ipn/localapi/localapi.go index 36b8cbf16..0bc2870d2 100644 --- a/ipn/localapi/localapi.go +++ b/ipn/localapi/localapi.go @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ "tailscale.com/types/logger" "tailscale.com/types/logid" "tailscale.com/types/ptr" + "tailscale.com/types/tkatype" "tailscale.com/util/clientmetric" "tailscale.com/util/httpm" "tailscale.com/util/mak" @@ -106,6 +107,9 @@ "tka/affected-sigs": (*Handler).serveTKAAffectedSigs, "tka/wrap-preauth-key": (*Handler).serveTKAWrapPreauthKey, "tka/verify-deeplink": (*Handler).serveTKAVerifySigningDeeplink, + "tka/generate-recovery-aum": (*Handler).serveTKAGenerateRecoveryAUM, + "tka/cosign-recovery-aum": (*Handler).serveTKACosignRecoveryAUM, + "tka/submit-recovery-aum": (*Handler).serveTKASubmitRecoveryAUM, "upload-client-metrics": (*Handler).serveUploadClientMetrics, "watch-ipn-bus": (*Handler).serveWatchIPNBus, "whois": (*Handler).serveWhoIs, @@ -1747,6 +1751,103 @@ func (h *Handler) serveTKAAffectedSigs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.Write(j) } +func (h *Handler) serveTKAGenerateRecoveryAUM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if !h.PermitWrite { + http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + if r.Method != httpm.POST { + http.Error(w, "use POST", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + + type verifyRequest struct { + Keys []tkatype.KeyID + ForkFrom string + } + var req verifyRequest + if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "invalid JSON for verifyRequest body", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + var forkFrom tka.AUMHash + if req.ForkFrom != "" { + if err := forkFrom.UnmarshalText([]byte(req.ForkFrom)); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "decoding fork-from: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + } + + res, err := h.b.NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM(req.Keys, forkFrom) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500) + return + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") + w.Write(res.Serialize()) +} + +func (h *Handler) serveTKACosignRecoveryAUM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if !h.PermitWrite { + http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + if r.Method != httpm.POST { + http.Error(w, "use POST", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + + body := io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1024*1024) + aumBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(body) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "reading AUM", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + var aum tka.AUM + if err := aum.Unserialize(aumBytes); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "decoding AUM", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + res, err := h.b.NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(&aum) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") + w.Write(res.Serialize()) +} + +func (h *Handler) serveTKASubmitRecoveryAUM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if !h.PermitWrite { + http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + if r.Method != httpm.POST { + http.Error(w, "use POST", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + + body := io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1024*1024) + aumBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(body) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "reading AUM", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + var aum tka.AUM + if err := aum.Unserialize(aumBytes); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "decoding AUM", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + if err := h.b.NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(&aum); err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) +} + // serveProfiles serves profile switching-related endpoints. Supported methods // and paths are: // - GET /profiles/: list all profiles (JSON-encoded array of ipn.LoginProfiles) diff --git a/tka/tka.go b/tka/tka.go index 8dfc146ad..293ed2f67 100644 --- a/tka/tka.go +++ b/tka/tka.go @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ MaxMapPairs: 1024, } +// Arbitrarily chosen limit on scanning AUM trees. +const maxScanIterations = 2000 + // Authority is a Tailnet Key Authority. This type is the main coupling // point to the rest of the tailscale client. // @@ -471,7 +474,7 @@ func Open(storage Chonk) (*Authority, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading last ancestor: %v", err) } - c, err := computeActiveChain(storage, a, 2000) + c, err := computeActiveChain(storage, a, maxScanIterations) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("active chain: %v", err) } @@ -604,7 +607,7 @@ func (a *Authority) InformIdempotent(storage Chonk, updates []AUM) (Authority, e state, hasState := stateAt[parent] var err error if !hasState { - if state, err = computeStateAt(storage, 2000, parent); err != nil { + if state, err = computeStateAt(storage, maxScanIterations, parent); err != nil { return Authority{}, fmt.Errorf("update %d computing state: %v", i, err) } stateAt[parent] = state @@ -639,7 +642,7 @@ func (a *Authority) InformIdempotent(storage Chonk, updates []AUM) (Authority, e } oldestAncestor := a.oldestAncestor.Hash() - c, err := computeActiveChain(storage, &oldestAncestor, 2000) + c, err := computeActiveChain(storage, &oldestAncestor, maxScanIterations) if err != nil { return Authority{}, fmt.Errorf("recomputing active chain: %v", err) } @@ -721,3 +724,115 @@ func (a *Authority) Compact(storage CompactableChonk, o CompactionOptions) error a.oldestAncestor = ancestor return nil } + +// findParentForRewrite finds the parent AUM to use when rewriting state to +// retroactively remove trust in the specified keys. +func (a *Authority) findParentForRewrite(storage Chonk, removeKeys []tkatype.KeyID, ourKey tkatype.KeyID) (AUMHash, error) { + cursor := a.Head() + + for { + if cursor == a.oldestAncestor.Hash() { + // We've reached as far back in our history as we can, + // so we have to rewrite from here. + break + } + + aum, err := storage.AUM(cursor) + if err != nil { + return AUMHash{}, fmt.Errorf("reading AUM %v: %w", cursor, err) + } + + // An ideal rewrite parent trusts none of the keys to be removed. + state, err := computeStateAt(storage, maxScanIterations, cursor) + if err != nil { + return AUMHash{}, fmt.Errorf("computing state for %v: %w", cursor, err) + } + keyTrusted := false + for _, key := range removeKeys { + if _, err := state.GetKey(key); err == nil { + keyTrusted = true + } + } + if !keyTrusted { + // Success: the revoked keys are not trusted! + // Lets check that our key was trusted to ensure + // we can sign a fork from here. + if _, err := state.GetKey(ourKey); err == nil { + break + } + } + + parent, hasParent := aum.Parent() + if !hasParent { + // This is the genesis AUM, so we have to rewrite from here. + break + } + cursor = parent + } + + return cursor, nil +} + +// MakeRetroactiveRevocation generates a forking update which revokes the specified keys, in +// such a manner that any malicious use of those keys is erased. +// +// If forkFrom is specified, it is used as the parent AUM to fork from. If the zero value, +// the parent AUM is determined automatically. +// +// The generated AUM must be signed with more signatures than the sum of key votes that +// were compromised, before being consumed by tka.Authority methods. +func (a *Authority) MakeRetroactiveRevocation(storage Chonk, removeKeys []tkatype.KeyID, ourKey tkatype.KeyID, forkFrom AUMHash) (*AUM, error) { + var parent AUMHash + if forkFrom == (AUMHash{}) { + // Make sure at least one of the recovery keys is currently trusted. + foundKey := false + for _, k := range removeKeys { + if _, err := a.state.GetKey(k); err == nil { + foundKey = true + break + } + } + if !foundKey { + return nil, errors.New("no provided key is currently trusted") + } + + p, err := a.findParentForRewrite(storage, removeKeys, ourKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("finding parent: %v", err) + } + parent = p + } else { + parent = forkFrom + } + + // Construct the new state where the revoked keys are no longer trusted. + state := a.state.Clone() + for _, keyToRevoke := range removeKeys { + idx := -1 + for i := range state.Keys { + keyID, err := state.Keys[i].ID() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing keyID: %v", err) + } + if bytes.Equal(keyToRevoke, keyID) { + idx = i + break + } + } + if idx >= 0 { + state.Keys = append(state.Keys[:idx], state.Keys[idx+1:]...) + } + } + if len(state.Keys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("cannot revoke all trusted keys") + } + state.LastAUMHash = nil // checkpoints can't specify a LastAUMHash + + forkingAUM := &AUM{ + MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, + State: &state, + PrevAUMHash: parent[:], + } + + return forkingAUM, forkingAUM.StaticValidate() +} diff --git a/tka/tka_test.go b/tka/tka_test.go index 4443d7b52..9e3c4e79d 100644 --- a/tka/tka_test.go +++ b/tka/tka_test.go @@ -524,3 +524,131 @@ func TestAuthorityCompact(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("ancestor = %v, want %v", anc, c.AUMHashes["C"]) } } + +func TestFindParentForRewrite(t *testing.T) { + pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1) + k1 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 1} + + pub2, _ := testingKey25519(t, 2) + k2 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub2, Votes: 1} + k2ID, _ := k2.ID() + pub3, _ := testingKey25519(t, 3) + k3 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub3, Votes: 1} + + c := newTestchain(t, ` + A -> B -> C -> D -> E + A.template = genesis + B.template = add2 + C.template = add3 + D.template = remove2 + `, + optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{ + Keys: []Key{k1}, + DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})}, + }}), + optTemplate("add2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k2}), + optTemplate("add3", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k3}), + optTemplate("remove2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMRemoveKey, KeyID: k2ID})) + + a, err := Open(c.Chonk()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // k1 was trusted at genesis, so there's no better rewrite parent + // than the genesis. + k1ID, _ := k1.ID() + k1P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k1ID}, k1ID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k1) failed: %v", err) + } + if k1P != a.oldestAncestor.Hash() { + t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k1) = %v, want %v", k1P, a.oldestAncestor.Hash()) + } + + // k3 was trusted at C, so B would be an ideal rewrite point. + k3ID, _ := k3.ID() + k3P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k3ID}, k1ID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k3) failed: %v", err) + } + if k3P != c.AUMHashes["B"] { + t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k3) = %v, want %v", k3P, c.AUMHashes["B"]) + } + + // k2 was added but then removed, so HEAD is an appropriate rewrite point. + k2P, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID}, k1ID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite(k2) failed: %v", err) + } + if k3P != c.AUMHashes["B"] { + t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite(k2) = %v, want %v", k2P, a.Head()) + } + + // There's no appropriate point where both k2 and k3 are simultaneously not trusted, + // so the best rewrite point is the genesis AUM. + doubleP, err := a.findParentForRewrite(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID, k3ID}, k1ID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FindParentForRewrite({k2, k3}) failed: %v", err) + } + if doubleP != a.oldestAncestor.Hash() { + t.Errorf("FindParentForRewrite({k2, k3}) = %v, want %v", doubleP, a.oldestAncestor.Hash()) + } +} + +func TestMakeRetroactiveRevocation(t *testing.T) { + pub, _ := testingKey25519(t, 1) + k1 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 1} + + pub2, _ := testingKey25519(t, 2) + k2 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub2, Votes: 1} + pub3, _ := testingKey25519(t, 3) + k3 := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub3, Votes: 1} + + c := newTestchain(t, ` + A -> B -> C -> D + A.template = genesis + C.template = add2 + D.template = add3 + `, + optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{ + Keys: []Key{k1}, + DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{DisablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})}, + }}), + optTemplate("add2", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k2}), + optTemplate("add3", AUM{MessageKind: AUMAddKey, Key: &k3})) + + a, err := Open(c.Chonk()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // k2 was added by C, so a forking revocation should: + // - have B as a parent + // - trust the remaining keys at the time, k1 & k3. + k1ID, _ := k1.ID() + k2ID, _ := k2.ID() + k3ID, _ := k3.ID() + forkingAUM, err := a.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k2ID}, k1ID, AUMHash{}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("MakeRetroactiveRevocation(k2) failed: %v", err) + } + if bHash := c.AUMHashes["B"]; !bytes.Equal(forkingAUM.PrevAUMHash, bHash[:]) { + t.Errorf("forking AUM has parent %v, want %v", forkingAUM.PrevAUMHash, bHash[:]) + } + if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k1ID); err != nil { + t.Error("Forked state did not trust k1") + } + if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k3ID); err != nil { + t.Error("Forked state did not trust k3") + } + if _, err := forkingAUM.State.GetKey(k2ID); err == nil { + t.Error("Forked state trusted removed-key k2") + } + + // Test that removing all trusted keys results in an error. + _, err = a.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(c.Chonk(), []tkatype.KeyID{k1ID, k2ID, k3ID}, k1ID, AUMHash{}) + if wantErr := "cannot revoke all trusted keys"; err == nil || err.Error() != wantErr { + t.Fatalf("MakeRetroactiveRevocation({k1, k2, k3}) returned %v, expected %q", err, wantErr) + } +}