ipn,cmd/tailscale: implement resigning nodes on tka key removal

Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom DNetto 2023-03-01 12:47:29 -08:00 committed by Tom
parent 3f8e8b04fd
commit e2d652ec4d
5 changed files with 332 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/tka"
"tailscale.com/types/key"
"tailscale.com/types/tkatype"
)
// defaultLocalClient is the default LocalClient when using the legacy
@ -886,6 +887,15 @@ type signRequest struct {
return nil
}
// NetworkLockAffectedSigs returns all signatures signed by the specified keyID.
func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockAffectedSigs(ctx context.Context, keyID tkatype.KeyID) ([]tkatype.MarshaledSignature, error) {
body, err := lc.send(ctx, "POST", "/localapi/v0/tka/affected-sigs", 200, bytes.NewReader(keyID))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error: %w", err)
}
return decodeJSON[[]tkatype.MarshaledSignature](body)
}
// NetworkLockLog returns up to maxEntries number of changes to network-lock state.
func (lc *LocalClient) NetworkLockLog(ctx context.Context, maxEntries int) ([]ipnstate.NetworkLockUpdate, error) {
v := url.Values{}

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@ -267,14 +267,78 @@ func runNetworkLockStatus(ctx context.Context, args []string) error {
},
}
var nlRemoveArgs struct {
resign bool
}
var nlRemoveCmd = &ffcli.Command{
Name: "remove",
ShortUsage: "remove <public-key>...",
ShortUsage: "remove [--re-sign=false] <public-key>...",
ShortHelp: "Removes one or more trusted signing keys from tailnet lock",
LongHelp: "Removes one or more trusted signing keys from tailnet lock",
Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args []string) error {
return runNetworkLockModify(ctx, nil, args)
},
Exec: runNetworkLockRemove,
FlagSet: (func() *flag.FlagSet {
fs := newFlagSet("lock remove")
fs.BoolVar(&nlRemoveArgs.resign, "re-sign", true, "resign signatures which would be invalidated by removal of trusted signing keys")
return fs
})(),
}
func runNetworkLockRemove(ctx context.Context, args []string) error {
removeKeys, _, err := parseNLArgs(args, true, false)
if err != nil {
return err
}
st, err := localClient.NetworkLockStatus(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fixTailscaledConnectError(err)
}
if !st.Enabled {
return errors.New("tailnet lock is not enabled")
}
if nlRemoveArgs.resign {
// Validate we are not removing trust in ourselves while resigning. This is because
// we resign with our own key, so the signatures would be immediately invalid.
for _, k := range removeKeys {
kID, err := k.ID()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("computing KeyID for key %v: %w", k, err)
}
if bytes.Equal(st.PublicKey.KeyID(), kID) {
return errors.New("cannot remove local trusted signing key while resigning; run command on a different node or with --re-sign=false")
}
}
// Resign affected signatures for each of the keys we are removing.
for _, k := range removeKeys {
kID, _ := k.ID() // err already checked above
sigs, err := localClient.NetworkLockAffectedSigs(ctx, kID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("affected sigs for key %X: %w", kID, err)
}
for _, sigBytes := range sigs {
var sig tka.NodeKeySignature
if err := sig.Unserialize(sigBytes); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed decoding signature: %w", err)
}
var nodeKey key.NodePublic
if err := nodeKey.UnmarshalBinary(sig.Pubkey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed decoding pubkey for signature: %w", err)
}
// Safety: NetworkLockAffectedSigs() verifies all signatures before
// successfully returning.
rotationKey, _ := sig.UnverifiedWrappingPublic()
if err := localClient.NetworkLockSign(ctx, nodeKey, []byte(rotationKey)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to sign %v: %w", nodeKey, err)
}
}
}
}
return localClient.NetworkLockModify(ctx, nil, removeKeys)
}
// parseNLArgs parses a slice of strings into slices of tka.Key & disablement

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@ -784,6 +784,64 @@ func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockLog(maxEntries int) ([]ipnstate.NetworkLockUpd
return out, nil
}
// NetworkLockAffectedSigs returns the signatures which would be invalidated
// by removing trust in the specified KeyID.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockAffectedSigs(keyID tkatype.KeyID) ([]tkatype.MarshaledSignature, error) {
var (
ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
err error
)
b.mu.Lock()
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
}
if b.tka == nil {
err = errNetworkLockNotActive
}
b.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := b.tkaReadAffectedSigs(ourNodeKey, keyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
// Confirm for ourselves tha the signatures would actually be invalidated
// by removal of trusted in the specified key.
for i, sigBytes := range resp.Signatures {
var sig tka.NodeKeySignature
if err := sig.Unserialize(sigBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed decoding signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
sigKeyID, err := sig.UnverifiedAuthorizingKeyID()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting SigID from signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(keyID, sigKeyID) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("got signature with keyID %X from request for %X", sigKeyID, keyID)
}
var nodeKey key.NodePublic
if err := nodeKey.UnmarshalBinary(sig.Pubkey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed decoding pubkey for signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
if err := b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorized(nodeKey, sigBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature %d is not valid: %w", i, err)
}
}
return resp.Signatures, nil
}
func signNodeKey(nodeInfo tailcfg.TKASignInfo, signer key.NLPrivate) (*tka.NodeKeySignature, error) {
p, err := nodeInfo.NodePublic.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
@ -1110,3 +1168,39 @@ func (b *LocalBackend) tkaSubmitSignature(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, sig tkatype
return a, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaReadAffectedSigs(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, key tkatype.KeyID) (*tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyResponse, error) {
var encodedReq bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&encodedReq).Encode(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
KeyID: key,
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/affected-sigs", &encodedReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
resp, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: resp.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}

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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@ -877,3 +878,135 @@ func TestTKAForceDisable(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("tka was re-initalized")
}
}
func TestTKAAffectedSigs(t *testing.T) {
nodePriv := key.NewNode()
// toSign := key.NewNode()
nlPriv := key.NewNLPrivate()
pm := must.Get(newProfileManager(new(mem.Store), t.Logf))
must.Do(pm.SetPrefs((&ipn.Prefs{
Persist: &persist.Persist{
PrivateNodeKey: nodePriv,
NetworkLockKey: nlPriv,
},
}).View()))
// Make a fake TKA authority, to seed local state.
disablementSecret := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xa5}, 32)
tkaKey := tka.Key{Kind: tka.Key25519, Public: nlPriv.Public().Verifier(), Votes: 2}
temp := t.TempDir()
tkaPath := filepath.Join(temp, "tka-profile", string(pm.CurrentProfile().ID))
os.Mkdir(tkaPath, 0755)
chonk, err := tka.ChonkDir(tkaPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
authority, _, err := tka.Create(chonk, tka.State{
Keys: []tka.Key{tkaKey},
DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{tka.DisablementKDF(disablementSecret)},
}, nlPriv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tka.Create() failed: %v", err)
}
untrustedKey := key.NewNLPrivate()
tcs := []struct {
name string
makeSig func() *tka.NodeKeySignature
wantErr string
}{
{
"no error",
func() *tka.NodeKeySignature {
sig, _ := signNodeKey(tailcfg.TKASignInfo{NodePublic: nodePriv.Public()}, nlPriv)
return sig
},
"",
},
{
"signature for different keyID",
func() *tka.NodeKeySignature {
sig, _ := signNodeKey(tailcfg.TKASignInfo{NodePublic: nodePriv.Public()}, untrustedKey)
return sig
},
fmt.Sprintf("got signature with keyID %X from request for %X", untrustedKey.KeyID(), nlPriv.KeyID()),
},
{
"invalid signature",
func() *tka.NodeKeySignature {
sig, _ := signNodeKey(tailcfg.TKASignInfo{NodePublic: nodePriv.Public()}, nlPriv)
copy(sig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) // overwrite with trash to invalid signature
return sig
},
"signature 0 is not valid: invalid signature",
},
}
for _, tc := range tcs {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := tc.makeSig()
ts, client := fakeNoiseServer(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer r.Body.Close()
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/machine/tka/affected-sigs":
body := new(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyRequest)
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(body); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if body.Version != tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion {
t.Errorf("sign CapVer = %v, want %v", body.Version, tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion)
}
if body.NodeKey != nodePriv.Public() {
t.Errorf("nodeKey = %v, want %v", body.NodeKey, nodePriv.Public())
}
w.WriteHeader(200)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyResponse{
Signatures: []tkatype.MarshaledSignature{s.Serialize()},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
default:
t.Errorf("unhandled endpoint path: %v", r.URL.Path)
w.WriteHeader(404)
}
}))
defer ts.Close()
cc := fakeControlClient(t, client)
b := LocalBackend{
varRoot: temp,
cc: cc,
ccAuto: cc,
logf: t.Logf,
tka: &tkaState{
authority: authority,
storage: chonk,
},
pm: pm,
store: pm.Store(),
}
sigs, err := b.NetworkLockAffectedSigs(nlPriv.KeyID())
switch {
case tc.wantErr == "" && err != nil:
t.Errorf("NetworkLockAffectedSigs() failed: %v", err)
case tc.wantErr != "" && err == nil:
t.Errorf("NetworkLockAffectedSigs().err = nil, want %q", tc.wantErr)
case tc.wantErr != "" && err.Error() != tc.wantErr:
t.Errorf("NetworkLockAffectedSigs().err = %q, want %q", err.Error(), tc.wantErr)
}
if tc.wantErr == "" {
if len(sigs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(sigs) = %d, want 1", len(sigs))
}
if !bytes.Equal(s.Serialize(), sigs[0]) {
t.Errorf("unexpected signature: got %v, want %v", sigs[0], s.Serialize())
}
}
})
}
}

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@ -99,6 +99,7 @@
"tka/status": (*Handler).serveTKAStatus,
"tka/disable": (*Handler).serveTKADisable,
"tka/force-local-disable": (*Handler).serveTKALocalDisable,
"tka/affected-sigs": (*Handler).serveTKAAffectedSigs,
"upload-client-metrics": (*Handler).serveUploadClientMetrics,
"watch-ipn-bus": (*Handler).serveWatchIPNBus,
"whois": (*Handler).serveWhoIs,
@ -1601,6 +1602,32 @@ func (h *Handler) serveTKALog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Write(j)
}
func (h *Handler) serveTKAAffectedSigs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != httpm.POST {
http.Error(w, "use POST", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
keyID, err := ioutil.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 2048))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "reading body", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sigs, err := h.b.NetworkLockAffectedSigs(keyID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
j, err := json.MarshalIndent(sigs, "", "\t")
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "JSON encoding error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Write(j)
}
// serveProfiles serves profile switching-related endpoints. Supported methods
// and paths are:
// - GET /profiles/: list all profiles (JSON-encoded array of ipn.LoginProfiles)