DNSSEC is an availability issue, as recently demonstrated by the
Slack issue, with limited security advantage. DoH on the other hand
is a critical security upgrade. This change adds DoH support for the
non-DNSSEC endpoints of Quad9.
https://www.quad9.net/service/service-addresses-and-features#unsec
Signed-off-by: Filippo Valsorda <hi@filippo.io>
We currently plumb full URLs for DNS resolvers from the control server
down to the client. But when we pass the values into the net/dns
package, we throw away any URL that isn't a bare IP. This commit
continues the plumbing, and gets the URL all the way to the built in
forwarder. (It stops before plumbing URLs into the OS configurations
that can handle them.)
For #2596
Signed-off-by: David Crawshaw <crawshaw@tailscale.com>
Previously, we hashed the question and combined it with the original
txid which was useful when concurrent queries were multiplexed on a
single local source port. We encountered some situations where the DNS
server canonicalizes the question in the response (uppercase converted
to lowercase in this case), which resulted in responses that we couldn't
match to the original request due to hash mismatches. This includes a
new test to cover that situation.
Fixes#2597
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
I don't know how to get access to a real packet. Basing this commit
entirely off:
+------------+--------------+------------------------------+
| Field Name | Field Type | Description |
+------------+--------------+------------------------------+
| NAME | domain name | MUST be 0 (root domain) |
| TYPE | u_int16_t | OPT (41) |
| CLASS | u_int16_t | requestor's UDP payload size |
| TTL | u_int32_t | extended RCODE and flags |
| RDLEN | u_int16_t | length of all RDATA |
| RDATA | octet stream | {attribute,value} pairs |
+------------+--------------+------------------------------+
From https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6891#section-6.1.2
Signed-off-by: David Crawshaw <crawshaw@tailscale.com>
Instead of blasting away at all upstream resolvers at the same time,
make a timing plan upon reconfiguration and have each upstream have an
associated start delay, depending on the overall forwarding config.
So now if you have two or four upstream Google or Cloudflare DNS
servers (e.g. two IPv4 and two IPv6), we now usually only send a
query, not four.
This is especially nice on iOS where we start fewer DoH queries and
thus fewer HTTP/1 requests (because we still disable HTTP/2 on iOS),
fewer sockets, fewer goroutines, and fewer associated HTTP buffers,
etc, saving overall memory burstiness.
Fixes#2436
Updates tailscale/corp#2250
Updates tailscale/corp#2238
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Add a place to hang state in a future change for #2436.
For now this just simplifies the send signature without
any functional change.
Updates #2436
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Recognize Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 which are by far the
majority of upstream DNS servers that people use.
RELNOTE=MagicDNS now uses DNS-over-HTTPS when querying popular upstream resolvers,
so DNS queries aren't sent in the clear over the Internet.
Updates #915 (might fix it?)
Updates #988 (gets us closer, if it fixes Android)
Updates #74 (not yet configurable, but progress)
Updates #2056 (not yet configurable, dup of #74?)
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This change (subject to some limitations) looks for the EDNS OPT record
in queries and responses, clamping the size field to fit within our DNS
receive buffer. If the size field is smaller than the DNS receive buffer
then it is left unchanged.
I think we will eventually need to transition to fully processing the
DNS queries to handle all situations, but this should cover the most
common case.
Mostly fixes#2066
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
This raises the maximum DNS response message size from 512 to 4095. This
should be large enough for almost all situations that do not need TCP.
We still do not recognize EDNS, so we will still forward requests that
claim support for a larger response size than 4095 (that will be solved
later). For now, when a response comes back that is too large to fit in
our receive buffer, we now set the truncation flag in the DNS header,
which is an improvement from before but will prompt attempts to use TCP
which isn't supported yet.
On Windows, WSARecvFrom into a buffer that's too small returns an error
in addition to the data. On other OSes, the extra data is silently
discarded. In this case, we prefer the latter so need to catch the error
on Windows.
Partially addresses #1123
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
