// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause // Package tlsdial generates tls.Config values and does x509 validation of // certs. It bakes in the LetsEncrypt roots so even if the user's machine // doesn't have TLS roots, we can at least connect to Tailscale's LetsEncrypt // services. It's the unified point where we can add shared policy on outgoing // TLS connections from the three places in the client that connect to Tailscale // (logs, control, DERP). package tlsdial import ( "bytes" "context" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "errors" "fmt" "log" "net" "net/http" "os" "sync" "sync/atomic" "time" "tailscale.com/envknob" "tailscale.com/health" "tailscale.com/hostinfo" "tailscale.com/net/bakedroots" "tailscale.com/net/tlsdial/blockblame" ) var counterFallbackOK int32 // atomic // If SSLKEYLOGFILE is set, it's a file to which we write our TLS private keys // in a way that WireShark can read. // // See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format var sslKeyLogFile = os.Getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE") var debug = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_TLS_DIAL") // tlsdialWarningPrinted tracks whether we've printed a warning about a given // hostname already, to avoid log spam for users with custom DERP servers, // Headscale, etc. var tlsdialWarningPrinted sync.Map // map[string]bool var mitmBlockWarnable = health.Register(&health.Warnable{ Code: "blockblame-mitm-detected", Title: "Network may be blocking Tailscale", Text: func(args health.Args) string { return fmt.Sprintf("Network equipment from %q may be blocking Tailscale traffic on this network. Connect to another network, or contact your network administrator for assistance.", args["manufacturer"]) }, Severity: health.SeverityMedium, ImpactsConnectivity: true, }) // Config returns a tls.Config for connecting to a server. // If base is non-nil, it's cloned as the base config before // being configured and returned. // If ht is non-nil, it's used to report health errors. func Config(host string, ht *health.Tracker, base *tls.Config) *tls.Config { var conf *tls.Config if base == nil { conf = new(tls.Config) } else { conf = base.Clone() } conf.ServerName = host if n := sslKeyLogFile; n != "" { f, err := os.OpenFile(n, os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0600) if err != nil { log.Fatal(err) } log.Printf("WARNING: writing to SSLKEYLOGFILE %v", n) conf.KeyLogWriter = f } if conf.InsecureSkipVerify { panic("unexpected base.InsecureSkipVerify") } if conf.VerifyConnection != nil { panic("unexpected base.VerifyConnection") } // Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its // own cert verification, as do the same work that it'd do // (with the baked-in fallback root) in the VerifyConnection hook. conf.InsecureSkipVerify = true conf.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) (retErr error) { if host == "log.tailscale.com" && hostinfo.IsNATLabGuestVM() { // Allow log.tailscale.com TLS MITM for integration tests when // the client's running within a NATLab VM. return nil } // Perform some health checks on this certificate before we do // any verification. var cert *x509.Certificate var selfSignedIssuer string if certs := cs.PeerCertificates; len(certs) > 0 { cert = certs[0] if certIsSelfSigned(cert) { selfSignedIssuer = cert.Issuer.String() } } if ht != nil { defer func() { if retErr != nil && cert != nil { // Is it a MITM SSL certificate from a well-known network appliance manufacturer? // Show a dedicated warning. m, ok := blockblame.VerifyCertificate(cert) if ok { log.Printf("tlsdial: server cert for %q looks like %q equipment (could be blocking Tailscale)", host, m.Name) ht.SetUnhealthy(mitmBlockWarnable, health.Args{"manufacturer": m.Name}) } else { ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable) } } else { ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable) } if retErr != nil && selfSignedIssuer != "" { // Self-signed certs are never valid. // // TODO(bradfitz): plumb down the selfSignedIssuer as a // structured health warning argument. ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, fmt.Errorf("likely intercepted connection; certificate is self-signed by %v", selfSignedIssuer)) } else { // Ensure we clear any error state for this ServerName. ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, nil) if selfSignedIssuer != "" { // Log the self-signed issuer, but don't treat it as an error. log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q passed x509 validation but is self-signed by %q", host, selfSignedIssuer) } } }() } // First try doing x509 verification with the system's // root CA pool. opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ DNSName: cs.ServerName, Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), } for _, cert := range cs.PeerCertificates[1:] { opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) } _, errSys := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts) if debug() { log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q): %v", host, errSys) } // Always verify with our baked-in Let's Encrypt certificate, // so we can log an informational message. This is useful for // detecting SSL MiTM. opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get() _, bakedErr := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts) if debug() { log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q): %v", host, bakedErr) } else if bakedErr != nil { if _, loaded := tlsdialWarningPrinted.LoadOrStore(host, true); !loaded { if errSys == nil { log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host) } else { log.Printf("tlsdial: error: server cert for %q failed to verify and is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host) } } } if errSys == nil { return nil } else if bakedErr == nil { atomic.AddInt32(&counterFallbackOK, 1) return nil } return errSys } return conf } func certIsSelfSigned(cert *x509.Certificate) bool { // A certificate is determined to be self-signed if the certificate's // subject is the same as its issuer. return bytes.Equal(cert.RawSubject, cert.RawIssuer) } // SetConfigExpectedCert modifies c to expect and verify that the server returns // a certificate for the provided certDNSName. // // This is for user-configurable client-side domain fronting support, // where we send one SNI value but validate a different cert. func SetConfigExpectedCert(c *tls.Config, certDNSName string) { if c.ServerName == certDNSName { return } if c.ServerName == "" { c.ServerName = certDNSName return } if c.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { panic("refusing to override tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate") } // Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its // own cert verification, but do the same work that it'd do // (but using certDNSName) in the VerifyPeerCertificate hook. c.InsecureSkipVerify = true c.VerifyConnection = nil c.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error { if len(rawCerts) == 0 { return errors.New("no certs presented") } certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(rawCerts)) for i, asn1Data := range rawCerts { cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) if err != nil { return err } certs[i] = cert } opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ CurrentTime: time.Now(), DNSName: certDNSName, Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), } for _, cert := range certs[1:] { opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) } _, errSys := certs[0].Verify(opts) if debug() { log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, errSys) } if errSys == nil { return nil } opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get() _, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) if debug() { log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, err) } if err == nil { return nil } return errSys } } // NewTransport returns a new HTTP transport that verifies TLS certs using this // package, including its baked-in LetsEncrypt fallback roots. func NewTransport() *http.Transport { return &http.Transport{ DialTLSContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } var d tls.Dialer d.Config = Config(host, nil, nil) return d.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) }, } }