// Copyright (c) 2020 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. // Package filter contains a stateful packet filter. package filter import ( "fmt" "net" "sync" "time" "github.com/golang/groupcache/lru" "golang.org/x/time/rate" "tailscale.com/tailcfg" "tailscale.com/types/logger" "tailscale.com/wgengine/packet" ) type filterState struct { mu sync.Mutex lru *lru.Cache // of tuple } // Filter is a stateful packet filter. type Filter struct { logf logger.Logf // localNets is the list of IP prefixes that we know to be "local" // to this node. All packets coming in over tailscale must have a // destination within localNets, regardless of the policy filter // below. A nil localNets rejects all incoming traffic. localNets []Net // matches is a list of match->action rules applied to all packets // arriving over tailscale tunnels. Matches are checked in order, // and processing stops at the first matching rule. The default // policy if no rules match is to drop the packet. matches Matches // state is the connection tracking state attached to this // filter. It is used to allow incoming traffic that is a response // to an outbound connection that this node made, even if those // incoming packets don't get accepted by matches above. state *filterState } // Response is a verdict: either a Drop, Accept, or noVerdict skip to // continue processing. type Response int const ( Drop Response = iota Accept noVerdict // Returned from subfilters to continue processing. ) func (r Response) String() string { switch r { case Drop: return "Drop" case Accept: return "Accept" case noVerdict: return "noVerdict" default: return "???" } } // RunFlags controls the filter's debug log verbosity at runtime. type RunFlags int const ( LogDrops RunFlags = 1 << iota LogAccepts HexdumpDrops HexdumpAccepts ) type tuple struct { SrcIP packet.IP DstIP packet.IP SrcPort uint16 DstPort uint16 } const lruMax = 512 // max entries in UDP LRU cache // MatchAllowAll matches all packets. var MatchAllowAll = Matches{ Match{[]NetPortRange{NetPortRangeAny}, []Net{NetAny}}, } // NewAllowAll returns a packet filter that accepts everything to and // from localNets. func NewAllowAll(localNets []Net, logf logger.Logf) *Filter { return New(MatchAllowAll, localNets, nil, logf) } // NewAllowNone returns a packet filter that rejects everything. func NewAllowNone(logf logger.Logf) *Filter { return New(nil, nil, nil, logf) } // New creates a new packet filter. The filter enforces that incoming // packets must be destined to an IP in localNets, and must be allowed // by matches. If shareStateWith is non-nil, the returned filter // shares state with the previous one, to enable rules to be changed // at runtime without breaking existing flows. func New(matches Matches, localNets []Net, shareStateWith *Filter, logf logger.Logf) *Filter { var state *filterState if shareStateWith != nil { state = shareStateWith.state } else { state = &filterState{ lru: lru.New(lruMax), } } f := &Filter{ logf: logf, matches: matches, localNets: localNets, state: state, } return f } func maybeHexdump(flag RunFlags, b []byte) string { if flag == 0 { return "" } return packet.Hexdump(b) + "\n" } // MatchesFromFilterRules parse a number of wire-format FilterRule values into // the Matches format. // If an error is returned, the Matches result is still valid, containing the rules that // were successfully converted. func MatchesFromFilterRules(pf []tailcfg.FilterRule) (Matches, error) { mm := make([]Match, 0, len(pf)) var erracc error for _, r := range pf { m := Match{} for i, s := range r.SrcIPs { bits := 32 if len(r.SrcBits) > i { bits = r.SrcBits[i] } net, err := parseIP(s, bits) if err != nil && erracc == nil { erracc = err continue } m.Srcs = append(m.Srcs, net) } for _, d := range r.DstPorts { bits := 32 if d.Bits != nil { bits = *d.Bits } net, err := parseIP(d.IP, bits) if err != nil && erracc == nil { erracc = err continue } m.Dsts = append(m.Dsts, NetPortRange{ Net: net, Ports: PortRange{ First: d.Ports.First, Last: d.Ports.Last, }, }) } mm = append(mm, m) } return mm, erracc } func parseIP(host string, defaultBits int) (Net, error) { ip := net.ParseIP(host) if ip != nil && ip.IsUnspecified() { // For clarity, reject 0.0.0.0 as an input return NetNone, fmt.Errorf("ports=%#v: to allow all IP addresses, use *:port, not 0.0.0.0:port", host) } else if ip == nil && host == "*" { // User explicitly requested wildcard dst ip return NetAny, nil } else { if ip != nil { ip = ip.To4() } if ip == nil || len(ip) != 4 { return NetNone, fmt.Errorf("ports=%#v: invalid IPv4 address", host) } if len(ip) == 4 && (defaultBits < 0 || defaultBits > 32) { return NetNone, fmt.Errorf("invalid CIDR size %d for host %q", defaultBits, host) } return Net{ IP: NewIP(ip), Mask: Netmask(defaultBits), }, nil } } // TODO(apenwarr): use a bigger bucket for specifically TCP SYN accept logging? // Logging is a quick way to record every newly opened TCP connection, but // we have to be cautious about flooding the logs vs letting people use // flood protection to hide their traffic. We could use a rate limiter in // the actual *filter* for SYN accepts, perhaps. var acceptBucket = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(10*time.Second), 3) var dropBucket = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(5*time.Second), 10) func (f *Filter) logRateLimit(runflags RunFlags, q *packet.ParsedPacket, dir direction, r Response, why string) { var verdict string if r == Drop && omitDropLogging(q, dir) { return } if r == Drop && (runflags&LogDrops) != 0 && dropBucket.Allow() { verdict = "Drop" runflags &= HexdumpDrops } else if r == Accept && (runflags&LogAccepts) != 0 && acceptBucket.Allow() { verdict = "Accept" runflags &= HexdumpAccepts } // Note: it is crucial that q.String() be called only if {accept,drop}Bucket.Allow() passes, // since it causes an allocation. if verdict != "" { b := q.Buffer() f.logf("%s: %s %d %s\n%s", verdict, q.String(), len(b), why, maybeHexdump(runflags, b)) } } // RunIn determines whether this node is allowed to receive q from a Tailscale peer. func (f *Filter) RunIn(q *packet.ParsedPacket, rf RunFlags) Response { dir := in r := f.pre(q, rf, dir) if r == Accept || r == Drop { // already logged return r } r, why := f.runIn(q) f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, r, why) return r } // RunOut determines whether this node is allowed to send q to a Tailscale peer. func (f *Filter) RunOut(q *packet.ParsedPacket, rf RunFlags) Response { dir := out r := f.pre(q, rf, dir) if r == Drop || r == Accept { // already logged return r } r, why := f.runOut(q) f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, r, why) return r } func (f *Filter) runIn(q *packet.ParsedPacket) (r Response, why string) { // A compromised peer could try to send us packets for // destinations we didn't explicitly advertise. This check is to // prevent that. if !ipInList(q.DstIP, f.localNets) { return Drop, "destination not allowed" } if q.IPVersion == 6 { // TODO: support IPv6. return Drop, "no rules matched" } switch q.IPProto { case packet.ICMP: if q.IsEchoResponse() || q.IsError() { // ICMP responses are allowed. // TODO(apenwarr): consider using conntrack state. // We could choose to reject all packets that aren't // related to an existing ICMP-Echo, TCP, or UDP // session. return Accept, "icmp response ok" } else if matchIPWithoutPorts(f.matches, q) { // If any port is open to an IP, allow ICMP to it. return Accept, "icmp ok" } case packet.TCP: // For TCP, we want to allow *outgoing* connections, // which means we want to allow return packets on those // connections. To make this restriction work, we need to // allow non-SYN packets (continuation of an existing session) // to arrive. This should be okay since a new incoming session // can't be initiated without first sending a SYN. // It happens to also be much faster. // TODO(apenwarr): Skip the rest of decoding in this path? if q.IPProto == packet.TCP && !q.IsTCPSyn() { return Accept, "tcp non-syn" } if matchIPPorts(f.matches, q) { return Accept, "tcp ok" } case packet.UDP: t := tuple{q.SrcIP, q.DstIP, q.SrcPort, q.DstPort} f.state.mu.Lock() _, ok := f.state.lru.Get(t) f.state.mu.Unlock() if ok { return Accept, "udp cached" } if matchIPPorts(f.matches, q) { return Accept, "udp ok" } default: return Drop, "Unknown proto" } return Drop, "no rules matched" } func (f *Filter) runOut(q *packet.ParsedPacket) (r Response, why string) { if q.IPProto == packet.UDP { t := tuple{q.DstIP, q.SrcIP, q.DstPort, q.SrcPort} var ti interface{} = t // allocate once, rather than twice inside mutex f.state.mu.Lock() f.state.lru.Add(ti, ti) f.state.mu.Unlock() } return Accept, "ok out" } // direction is whether a packet was flowing in to this machine, or flowing out. type direction int const ( in direction = iota out ) func (d direction) String() string { switch d { case in: return "in" case out: return "out" default: return fmt.Sprintf("[??dir=%d]", int(d)) } } func (f *Filter) pre(q *packet.ParsedPacket, rf RunFlags, dir direction) Response { if len(q.Buffer()) == 0 { // wireguard keepalive packet, always permit. return Accept } if len(q.Buffer()) < 20 { f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Drop, "too short") return Drop } if q.IPVersion == 6 { f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Drop, "ipv6") return Drop } if q.DstIP.IsMulticast() { f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Drop, "multicast") return Drop } if q.DstIP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() { f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Drop, "link-local-unicast") return Drop } switch q.IPProto { case packet.Unknown: // Unknown packets are dangerous; always drop them. f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Drop, "unknown") return Drop case packet.Fragment: // Fragments after the first always need to be passed through. // Very small fragments are considered Junk by ParsedPacket. f.logRateLimit(rf, q, dir, Accept, "fragment") return Accept } return noVerdict } const ( // ipv6AllRoutersLinkLocal is ff02::2 (All link-local routers) ipv6AllRoutersLinkLocal = "\xff\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02" // ipv6AllMLDv2CapableRouters is ff02::16 (All MLDv2-capable routers) ipv6AllMLDv2CapableRouters = "\xff\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x16" ) // omitDropLogging reports whether packet p, which has already been // deemded a packet to Drop, should bypass the [rate-limited] logging. // We don't want to log scary & spammy reject warnings for packets that // are totally normal, like IPv6 route announcements. func omitDropLogging(p *packet.ParsedPacket, dir direction) bool { b := p.Buffer() switch dir { case out: switch p.IPVersion { case 4: // ParsedPacket.Decode zeros out ParsedPacket.IPProtocol for protocols // it doesn't know about, so parse it out ourselves if needed. ipProto := p.IPProto if ipProto == 0 && len(b) > 8 { ipProto = packet.IPProto(b[9]) } // Omit logging about outgoing IGMP. if ipProto == packet.IGMP { return true } if p.DstIP.IsMulticast() || p.DstIP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() { return true } case 6: if len(b) < 40 { return false } src, dst := b[8:8+16], b[24:24+16] // Omit logging for outgoing IPv6 ICMP-v6 queries to ff02::2, // as sent by the OS, looking for routers. if p.IPProto == packet.ICMPv6 { if isLinkLocalV6(src) && string(dst) == ipv6AllRoutersLinkLocal { return true } } if string(dst) == ipv6AllMLDv2CapableRouters { return true } // Actually, just catch all multicast. if dst[0] == 0xff { return true } } } return false } // isLinkLocalV6 reports whether src is in fe80::/10. func isLinkLocalV6(src []byte) bool { return len(src) == 16 && src[0] == 0xfe && src[1]>>6 == 0x80>>6 }