Tom Proctor 969927c47c cmd/{containerboot,k8s-operator}: reissue auth keys for broken proxies
Adds logic for containerboot to signal that it can't auth, so the
operator can reissue a new auth key. This only applies when running with
a config file and with a kube state store.

If the operator sees reissue_authkey in a state Secret, it will create a
new auth key iff the config has no auth key or its auth key matches the
value of reissue_authkey from the state Secret. This is to ensure we
don't reissue auth keys in a tight loop if the proxy is slow to start or
failing for some other reason. The reissue logic also uses a burstable
rate limiter to ensure there's no way a terminally misconfigured
or buggy operator can automatically generate new auth keys in a tight loop.

Updates #14080

Change-Id: I6982f8e741932a6891f2f48a2936f7f6a455317f
Signed-off-by: Tom Proctor <tomhjp@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-07-03 13:48:48 +01:00

224 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
//go:build linux
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"tailscale.com/ipn"
"tailscale.com/kube/egressservices"
"tailscale.com/kube/ingressservices"
"tailscale.com/kube/kubeapi"
"tailscale.com/kube/kubeclient"
"tailscale.com/kube/kubetypes"
"tailscale.com/logtail/backoff"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/types/logger"
)
const fieldManager = "tailscale-container"
// kubeClient is a wrapper around Tailscale's internal kube client that knows how to talk to the kube API server. We use
// this rather than any of the upstream Kubernetes client libaries to avoid extra imports.
type kubeClient struct {
kubeclient.Client
stateSecret string
canPatch bool // whether the client has permissions to patch Kubernetes Secrets
}
func newKubeClient(root string, stateSecret string) (*kubeClient, error) {
if root != "/" {
// If we are running in a test, we need to set the root path to the fake
// service account directory.
kubeclient.SetRootPathForTesting(root)
}
var err error
kc, err := kubeclient.New("tailscale-container")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error creating kube client: %w", err)
}
if (root != "/") || os.Getenv("TS_KUBERNETES_READ_API_SERVER_ADDRESS_FROM_ENV") == "true" {
// Derive the API server address from the environment variables
// Used to set http server in tests, or optionally enabled by flag
kc.SetURL(fmt.Sprintf("https://%s:%s", os.Getenv("KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST"), os.Getenv("KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS")))
}
return &kubeClient{Client: kc, stateSecret: stateSecret}, nil
}
// storeDeviceID writes deviceID to 'device_id' data field of the client's state Secret.
func (kc *kubeClient) storeDeviceID(ctx context.Context, deviceID tailcfg.StableNodeID) error {
s := &kubeapi.Secret{
Data: map[string][]byte{
kubetypes.KeyDeviceID: []byte(deviceID),
},
}
return kc.StrategicMergePatchSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret, s, fieldManager)
}
// storeDeviceEndpoints writes device's tailnet IPs and MagicDNS name to fields 'device_ips', 'device_fqdn' of client's
// state Secret.
func (kc *kubeClient) storeDeviceEndpoints(ctx context.Context, fqdn string, addresses []netip.Prefix) error {
var ips []string
for _, addr := range addresses {
ips = append(ips, addr.Addr().String())
}
deviceIPs, err := json.Marshal(ips)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s := &kubeapi.Secret{
Data: map[string][]byte{
kubetypes.KeyDeviceFQDN: []byte(fqdn),
kubetypes.KeyDeviceIPs: deviceIPs,
},
}
return kc.StrategicMergePatchSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret, s, fieldManager)
}
// storeHTTPSEndpoint writes an HTTPS endpoint exposed by this device via 'tailscale serve' to the client's state
// Secret. In practice this will be the same value that gets written to 'device_fqdn', but this should only be called
// when the serve config has been successfully set up.
func (kc *kubeClient) storeHTTPSEndpoint(ctx context.Context, ep string) error {
s := &kubeapi.Secret{
Data: map[string][]byte{
kubetypes.KeyHTTPSEndpoint: []byte(ep),
},
}
return kc.StrategicMergePatchSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret, s, fieldManager)
}
// deleteAuthKey deletes the 'authkey' field of the given kube
// secret. No-op if there is no authkey in the secret.
func (kc *kubeClient) deleteAuthKey(ctx context.Context) error {
// m is a JSON Patch data structure, see https://jsonpatch.com/ or RFC 6902.
m := []kubeclient.JSONPatch{
{
Op: "remove",
Path: "/data/authkey",
},
}
if err := kc.JSONPatchResource(ctx, kc.stateSecret, kubeclient.TypeSecrets, m); err != nil {
if s, ok := err.(*kubeapi.Status); ok && s.Code == http.StatusUnprocessableEntity {
// This is kubernetes-ese for "the field you asked to
// delete already doesn't exist", aka no-op.
return nil
}
return err
}
return nil
}
// resetContainerbootState resets state from previous runs of containerboot to
// ensure the operator doesn't use stale state when a Pod is first recreated.
func (kc *kubeClient) resetContainerbootState(ctx context.Context, podUID string, tailscaledConfigAuthkey string) error {
s := &kubeapi.Secret{
Data: map[string][]byte{
kubetypes.KeyCapVer: fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d", tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion),
// TODO(tomhjp): Perhaps shouldn't clear device ID and use a different signal, as this could leak tailnet devices.
kubetypes.KeyDeviceID: nil,
kubetypes.KeyDeviceFQDN: nil,
kubetypes.KeyDeviceIPs: nil,
kubetypes.KeyHTTPSEndpoint: nil,
egressservices.KeyEgressServices: nil,
ingressservices.IngressConfigKey: nil,
},
}
if podUID != "" {
s.Data[kubetypes.KeyPodUID] = []byte(podUID)
}
// Only clear reissue_authkey if the operator has actioned it.
existingSecret, err := kc.GetSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read state Secret %q to reset state: %w", kc.stateSecret, err)
}
brokenAuthkey, ok := existingSecret.Data[kubetypes.KeyReissueAuthkey]
if ok && tailscaledConfigAuthkey != "" && string(brokenAuthkey) != tailscaledConfigAuthkey {
s.Data[kubetypes.KeyReissueAuthkey] = nil
}
return kc.StrategicMergePatchSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret, s, fieldManager)
}
func (kc *kubeClient) setReissueAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKey string) error {
s := &kubeapi.Secret{
Data: map[string][]byte{
kubetypes.KeyReissueAuthkey: []byte(authKey), // Empty string means no auth key.
},
}
return kc.StrategicMergePatchSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret, s, fieldManager)
}
// waitForConsistentState waits for tailscaled to finish writing state if it
// looks like it's started. It is designed to reduce the likelihood that
// tailscaled gets shut down in the window between authenticating to control
// and finishing writing state. However, it's not bullet proof because we can't
// atomically authenticate and write state.
func (kc *kubeClient) waitForConsistentState(ctx context.Context) error {
var logged bool
bo := backoff.NewBackoff("", logger.Discard, 2*time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
default:
}
secret, err := kc.GetSecret(ctx, kc.stateSecret)
if ctx.Err() != nil || kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("getting Secret %q: %v", kc.stateSecret, err)
}
if hasConsistentState(secret.Data) {
return nil
}
if !logged {
log.Printf("Waiting for tailscaled to finish writing state to Secret %q", kc.stateSecret)
logged = true
}
bo.BackOff(ctx, errors.New("")) // Fake error to trigger actual sleep.
}
}
// hasConsistentState returns true is there is either no state or the full set
// of expected keys are present.
func hasConsistentState(d map[string][]byte) bool {
var (
_, hasCurrent = d[string(ipn.CurrentProfileStateKey)]
_, hasKnown = d[string(ipn.KnownProfilesStateKey)]
_, hasMachine = d[string(ipn.MachineKeyStateKey)]
hasProfile bool
)
for k := range d {
if strings.HasPrefix(k, "profile-") {
if hasProfile {
return false // We only expect one profile.
}
hasProfile = true
}
}
// Approximate check, we don't want to reimplement all of profileManager.
return (hasCurrent && hasKnown && hasMachine && hasProfile) ||
(!hasCurrent && !hasKnown && !hasMachine && !hasProfile)
}