tailscale/net/tlsdial/tlsdial.go
Brad Fitzpatrick 8009ad74a3 cmd/derper, net/tlsdial: fix client's self-signed cert validation
This fixes the implementation and test from #15208 which apparently
never worked.

Ignore the metacert when counting the number of expected certs
presented.

And fix the test, pulling out the TLSConfig setup code into something
shared between the real cmd/derper and the test.

Fixes #15579

Change-Id: I90526e38e59f89b480629b415f00587b107de10a
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
2025-05-19 10:57:28 -07:00

315 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
// Package tlsdial generates tls.Config values and does x509 validation of
// certs. It bakes in the LetsEncrypt roots so even if the user's machine
// doesn't have TLS roots, we can at least connect to Tailscale's LetsEncrypt
// services. It's the unified point where we can add shared policy on outgoing
// TLS connections from the three places in the client that connect to Tailscale
// (logs, control, DERP).
package tlsdial
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"tailscale.com/derp/derpconst"
"tailscale.com/envknob"
"tailscale.com/health"
"tailscale.com/hostinfo"
"tailscale.com/net/bakedroots"
"tailscale.com/net/tlsdial/blockblame"
)
var counterFallbackOK int32 // atomic
// If SSLKEYLOGFILE is set, it's a file to which we write our TLS private keys
// in a way that WireShark can read.
//
// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format
var sslKeyLogFile = os.Getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE")
var debug = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_TLS_DIAL")
// tlsdialWarningPrinted tracks whether we've printed a warning about a given
// hostname already, to avoid log spam for users with custom DERP servers,
// Headscale, etc.
var tlsdialWarningPrinted sync.Map // map[string]bool
var mitmBlockWarnable = health.Register(&health.Warnable{
Code: "blockblame-mitm-detected",
Title: "Network may be blocking Tailscale",
Text: func(args health.Args) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("Network equipment from %q may be blocking Tailscale traffic on this network. Connect to another network, or contact your network administrator for assistance.", args["manufacturer"])
},
Severity: health.SeverityMedium,
ImpactsConnectivity: true,
})
// Config returns a tls.Config for connecting to a server.
// If base is non-nil, it's cloned as the base config before
// being configured and returned.
// If ht is non-nil, it's used to report health errors.
func Config(host string, ht *health.Tracker, base *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
var conf *tls.Config
if base == nil {
conf = new(tls.Config)
} else {
conf = base.Clone()
}
conf.ServerName = host
if n := sslKeyLogFile; n != "" {
f, err := os.OpenFile(n, os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0600)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
log.Printf("WARNING: writing to SSLKEYLOGFILE %v", n)
conf.KeyLogWriter = f
}
if conf.InsecureSkipVerify {
panic("unexpected base.InsecureSkipVerify")
}
if conf.VerifyConnection != nil {
panic("unexpected base.VerifyConnection")
}
// Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its
// own cert verification, as do the same work that it'd do
// (with the baked-in fallback root) in the VerifyConnection hook.
conf.InsecureSkipVerify = true
conf.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) (retErr error) {
if host == "log.tailscale.com" && hostinfo.IsNATLabGuestVM() {
// Allow log.tailscale.com TLS MITM for integration tests when
// the client's running within a NATLab VM.
return nil
}
// Perform some health checks on this certificate before we do
// any verification.
var cert *x509.Certificate
var selfSignedIssuer string
if certs := cs.PeerCertificates; len(certs) > 0 {
cert = certs[0]
if certIsSelfSigned(cert) {
selfSignedIssuer = cert.Issuer.String()
}
}
if ht != nil {
defer func() {
if retErr != nil && cert != nil {
// Is it a MITM SSL certificate from a well-known network appliance manufacturer?
// Show a dedicated warning.
m, ok := blockblame.VerifyCertificate(cert)
if ok {
log.Printf("tlsdial: server cert for %q looks like %q equipment (could be blocking Tailscale)", host, m.Name)
ht.SetUnhealthy(mitmBlockWarnable, health.Args{"manufacturer": m.Name})
} else {
ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable)
}
} else {
ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable)
}
if retErr != nil && selfSignedIssuer != "" {
// Self-signed certs are never valid.
//
// TODO(bradfitz): plumb down the selfSignedIssuer as a
// structured health warning argument.
ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, fmt.Errorf("likely intercepted connection; certificate is self-signed by %v", selfSignedIssuer))
} else {
// Ensure we clear any error state for this ServerName.
ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, nil)
if selfSignedIssuer != "" {
// Log the self-signed issuer, but don't treat it as an error.
log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q passed x509 validation but is self-signed by %q", host, selfSignedIssuer)
}
}
}()
}
// First try doing x509 verification with the system's
// root CA pool.
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
DNSName: cs.ServerName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for _, cert := range cs.PeerCertificates[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
_, errSys := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts)
if debug() {
log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q): %v", host, errSys)
}
// Always verify with our baked-in Let's Encrypt certificate,
// so we can log an informational message. This is useful for
// detecting SSL MiTM.
opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get()
_, bakedErr := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts)
if debug() {
log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q): %v", host, bakedErr)
} else if bakedErr != nil {
if _, loaded := tlsdialWarningPrinted.LoadOrStore(host, true); !loaded {
if errSys == nil {
log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host)
} else {
log.Printf("tlsdial: error: server cert for %q failed to verify and is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host)
}
}
}
if errSys == nil {
return nil
} else if bakedErr == nil {
atomic.AddInt32(&counterFallbackOK, 1)
return nil
}
return errSys
}
return conf
}
func certIsSelfSigned(cert *x509.Certificate) bool {
// A certificate is determined to be self-signed if the certificate's
// subject is the same as its issuer.
return bytes.Equal(cert.RawSubject, cert.RawIssuer)
}
// SetConfigExpectedCert modifies c to expect and verify that the server returns
// a certificate for the provided certDNSName.
//
// This is for user-configurable client-side domain fronting support,
// where we send one SNI value but validate a different cert.
func SetConfigExpectedCert(c *tls.Config, certDNSName string) {
if c.ServerName == certDNSName {
return
}
if c.ServerName == "" {
c.ServerName = certDNSName
return
}
if c.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
panic("refusing to override tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate")
}
// Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its
// own cert verification, but do the same work that it'd do
// (but using certDNSName) in the VerifyPeerCertificate hook.
c.InsecureSkipVerify = true
c.VerifyConnection = nil
c.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
return errors.New("no certs presented")
}
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(rawCerts))
for i, asn1Data := range rawCerts {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certs[i] = cert
}
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
CurrentTime: time.Now(),
DNSName: certDNSName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
_, errSys := certs[0].Verify(opts)
if debug() {
log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, errSys)
}
if errSys == nil {
return nil
}
opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get()
_, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
if debug() {
log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, err)
}
if err == nil {
return nil
}
return errSys
}
}
// SetConfigExpectedCertHash configures c's VerifyPeerCertificate function to
// require that exactly 1 cert is presented (not counting any present MetaCert),
// and that the hex of its SHA256 hash is equal to wantFullCertSHA256Hex and
// that it's a valid cert for c.ServerName.
func SetConfigExpectedCertHash(c *tls.Config, wantFullCertSHA256Hex string) {
if c.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
panic("refusing to override tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate")
}
// Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its
// own cert verification, but do the same work that it'd do
// (but using certDNSName) in the VerifyPeerCertificate hook.
c.InsecureSkipVerify = true
c.VerifyConnection = nil
c.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
var sawGoodCert bool
for _, rawCert := range rawCerts {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ParseCertificate: %w", err)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(cert.Subject.CommonName, derpconst.MetaCertCommonNamePrefix) {
continue
}
if sawGoodCert {
return errors.New("unexpected multiple certs presented")
}
if fmt.Sprintf("%02x", sha256.Sum256(rawCert)) != wantFullCertSHA256Hex {
return fmt.Errorf("cert hash does not match expected cert hash")
}
if err := cert.VerifyHostname(c.ServerName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cert does not match server name %q: %w", c.ServerName, err)
}
now := time.Now()
if now.After(cert.NotAfter) {
return fmt.Errorf("cert expired %v", cert.NotAfter)
}
if now.Before(cert.NotBefore) {
return fmt.Errorf("cert not yet valid until %v; is your clock correct?", cert.NotBefore)
}
sawGoodCert = true
}
if !sawGoodCert {
return errors.New("expected cert not presented")
}
return nil
}
}
// NewTransport returns a new HTTP transport that verifies TLS certs using this
// package, including its baked-in LetsEncrypt fallback roots.
func NewTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialTLSContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var d tls.Dialer
d.Config = Config(host, nil, nil)
return d.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
},
}
}