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
We previously baked in the LetsEncrypt x509 root CA for our tlsdial package. This moves that out into a new "bakedroots" package and is now also shared by ipn/ipnlocal's cert validation code (validCertPEM) that decides whether it's time to fetch a new cert. Otherwise, a machine without LetsEncrypt roots locally in its system roots is unable to use tailscale cert/serve and fetch certs. Fixes #14690 Change-Id: Ic88b3bdaabe25d56b9ff07ada56a27e3f11d7159 Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
264 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
264 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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// Package tlsdial generates tls.Config values and does x509 validation of
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// certs. It bakes in the LetsEncrypt roots so even if the user's machine
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// doesn't have TLS roots, we can at least connect to Tailscale's LetsEncrypt
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// services. It's the unified point where we can add shared policy on outgoing
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// TLS connections from the three places in the client that connect to Tailscale
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// (logs, control, DERP).
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package tlsdial
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"tailscale.com/envknob"
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"tailscale.com/health"
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"tailscale.com/hostinfo"
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"tailscale.com/net/bakedroots"
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"tailscale.com/net/tlsdial/blockblame"
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)
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var counterFallbackOK int32 // atomic
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// If SSLKEYLOGFILE is set, it's a file to which we write our TLS private keys
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// in a way that WireShark can read.
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//
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// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format
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var sslKeyLogFile = os.Getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE")
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var debug = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_TLS_DIAL")
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// tlsdialWarningPrinted tracks whether we've printed a warning about a given
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// hostname already, to avoid log spam for users with custom DERP servers,
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// Headscale, etc.
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var tlsdialWarningPrinted sync.Map // map[string]bool
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var mitmBlockWarnable = health.Register(&health.Warnable{
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Code: "blockblame-mitm-detected",
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Title: "Network may be blocking Tailscale",
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Text: func(args health.Args) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("Network equipment from %q may be blocking Tailscale traffic on this network. Connect to another network, or contact your network administrator for assistance.", args["manufacturer"])
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},
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Severity: health.SeverityMedium,
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ImpactsConnectivity: true,
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})
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// Config returns a tls.Config for connecting to a server.
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// If base is non-nil, it's cloned as the base config before
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// being configured and returned.
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// If ht is non-nil, it's used to report health errors.
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func Config(host string, ht *health.Tracker, base *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
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var conf *tls.Config
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if base == nil {
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conf = new(tls.Config)
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} else {
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conf = base.Clone()
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}
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conf.ServerName = host
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if n := sslKeyLogFile; n != "" {
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f, err := os.OpenFile(n, os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0600)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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log.Printf("WARNING: writing to SSLKEYLOGFILE %v", n)
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conf.KeyLogWriter = f
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}
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if conf.InsecureSkipVerify {
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panic("unexpected base.InsecureSkipVerify")
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}
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if conf.VerifyConnection != nil {
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panic("unexpected base.VerifyConnection")
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}
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// Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its
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// own cert verification, as do the same work that it'd do
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// (with the baked-in fallback root) in the VerifyConnection hook.
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conf.InsecureSkipVerify = true
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conf.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) (retErr error) {
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if host == "log.tailscale.com" && hostinfo.IsNATLabGuestVM() {
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// Allow log.tailscale.com TLS MITM for integration tests when
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// the client's running within a NATLab VM.
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return nil
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}
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// Perform some health checks on this certificate before we do
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// any verification.
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var cert *x509.Certificate
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var selfSignedIssuer string
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if certs := cs.PeerCertificates; len(certs) > 0 {
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cert = certs[0]
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if certIsSelfSigned(cert) {
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selfSignedIssuer = cert.Issuer.String()
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}
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}
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if ht != nil {
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defer func() {
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if retErr != nil && cert != nil {
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// Is it a MITM SSL certificate from a well-known network appliance manufacturer?
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// Show a dedicated warning.
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m, ok := blockblame.VerifyCertificate(cert)
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if ok {
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log.Printf("tlsdial: server cert for %q looks like %q equipment (could be blocking Tailscale)", host, m.Name)
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ht.SetUnhealthy(mitmBlockWarnable, health.Args{"manufacturer": m.Name})
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} else {
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ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable)
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}
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} else {
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ht.SetHealthy(mitmBlockWarnable)
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}
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if retErr != nil && selfSignedIssuer != "" {
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// Self-signed certs are never valid.
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//
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// TODO(bradfitz): plumb down the selfSignedIssuer as a
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// structured health warning argument.
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ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, fmt.Errorf("likely intercepted connection; certificate is self-signed by %v", selfSignedIssuer))
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} else {
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// Ensure we clear any error state for this ServerName.
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ht.SetTLSConnectionError(cs.ServerName, nil)
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if selfSignedIssuer != "" {
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// Log the self-signed issuer, but don't treat it as an error.
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log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q passed x509 validation but is self-signed by %q", host, selfSignedIssuer)
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}
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}
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}()
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}
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// First try doing x509 verification with the system's
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// root CA pool.
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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DNSName: cs.ServerName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for _, cert := range cs.PeerCertificates[1:] {
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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_, errSys := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts)
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if debug() {
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log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q): %v", host, errSys)
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}
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// Always verify with our baked-in Let's Encrypt certificate,
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// so we can log an informational message. This is useful for
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// detecting SSL MiTM.
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opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get()
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_, bakedErr := cs.PeerCertificates[0].Verify(opts)
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if debug() {
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log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q): %v", host, bakedErr)
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} else if bakedErr != nil {
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if _, loaded := tlsdialWarningPrinted.LoadOrStore(host, true); !loaded {
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if errSys == nil {
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log.Printf("tlsdial: warning: server cert for %q is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host)
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} else {
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log.Printf("tlsdial: error: server cert for %q failed to verify and is not a Let's Encrypt cert", host)
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}
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}
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}
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if errSys == nil {
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return nil
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} else if bakedErr == nil {
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atomic.AddInt32(&counterFallbackOK, 1)
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return nil
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}
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return errSys
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}
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return conf
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}
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func certIsSelfSigned(cert *x509.Certificate) bool {
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// A certificate is determined to be self-signed if the certificate's
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// subject is the same as its issuer.
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return bytes.Equal(cert.RawSubject, cert.RawIssuer)
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}
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// SetConfigExpectedCert modifies c to expect and verify that the server returns
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// a certificate for the provided certDNSName.
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//
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// This is for user-configurable client-side domain fronting support,
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// where we send one SNI value but validate a different cert.
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func SetConfigExpectedCert(c *tls.Config, certDNSName string) {
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if c.ServerName == certDNSName {
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return
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}
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if c.ServerName == "" {
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c.ServerName = certDNSName
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return
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}
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if c.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
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panic("refusing to override tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate")
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}
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// Set InsecureSkipVerify to prevent crypto/tls from doing its
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// own cert verification, but do the same work that it'd do
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// (but using certDNSName) in the VerifyPeerCertificate hook.
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c.InsecureSkipVerify = true
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c.VerifyConnection = nil
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c.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
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if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
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return errors.New("no certs presented")
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}
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(rawCerts))
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for i, asn1Data := range rawCerts {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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CurrentTime: time.Now(),
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DNSName: certDNSName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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_, errSys := certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if debug() {
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log.Printf("tlsdial(sys %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, errSys)
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}
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if errSys == nil {
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return nil
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}
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opts.Roots = bakedroots.Get()
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_, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if debug() {
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log.Printf("tlsdial(bake %q/%q): %v", c.ServerName, certDNSName, err)
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}
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if err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return errSys
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}
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}
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// NewTransport returns a new HTTP transport that verifies TLS certs using this
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// package, including its baked-in LetsEncrypt fallback roots.
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func NewTransport() *http.Transport {
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return &http.Transport{
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DialTLSContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var d tls.Dialer
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d.Config = Config(host, nil, nil)
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return d.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
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},
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}
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}
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