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165c8f898e
After this, there should be one final PR to implement the Sync algorithm! Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
339 lines
10 KiB
Go
339 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2022 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tka
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s"
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)
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// AUMHash represents the BLAKE2s digest of an Authority Update Message (AUM).
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type AUMHash [blake2s.Size]byte
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// AUMSigHash represents the BLAKE2s digest of an Authority Update
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// Message (AUM), sans any signatures.
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type AUMSigHash [blake2s.Size]byte
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// AUMKind describes valid AUM types.
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type AUMKind uint8
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// Valid AUM types. Do NOT reorder.
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const (
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AUMInvalid AUMKind = iota
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// An AddKey AUM describes a new key trusted by the TKA.
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//
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// Only the Key optional field may be set.
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AUMAddKey
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// A RemoveKey AUM describes hte removal of a key trusted by TKA.
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//
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// Only the KeyID optional field may be set.
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AUMRemoveKey
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// A DisableNL AUM describes the disablement of TKA.
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//
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// Only the DisablementSecret optional field may be set.
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AUMDisableNL
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// A NoOp AUM carries no information and is used in tests.
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AUMNoOp
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// A UpdateKey AUM updates the metadata or votes of an existing key.
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//
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// Only KeyID, along with either/or Meta or Votes optional fields
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// may be set.
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AUMUpdateKey
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// A Checkpoint AUM specifies the full state of the TKA.
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//
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// Only the State optional field may be set.
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AUMCheckpoint
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)
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func (k AUMKind) String() string {
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switch k {
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case AUMInvalid:
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return "invalid"
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case AUMAddKey:
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return "add-key"
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case AUMRemoveKey:
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return "remove-key"
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case AUMDisableNL:
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return "disable-nl"
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case AUMNoOp:
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return "no-op"
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case AUMCheckpoint:
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return "checkpoint"
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case AUMUpdateKey:
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return "update-key"
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default:
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return fmt.Sprintf("AUM?<%d>", int(k))
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}
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}
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// AUM describes an Authority Update Message.
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//
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// The rules for adding new types of AUMs (MessageKind):
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// - CBOR key IDs must never be changed.
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// - New AUM types must not change semantics that are manipulated by other
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// AUM types.
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// - The serialization of existing data cannot change (in other words, if
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// an existing serialization test in aum_test.go fails, you need to try a
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// different approach).
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//
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// The rules for adding new fields are as follows:
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// - Must all be optional.
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// - An unset value must not result in serialization overhead. This is
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// necessary so the serialization of older AUMs stays the same.
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// - New processing semantics of the new fields must be compatible with the
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// behavior of old clients (which will ignore the field).
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// - No floats!
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type AUM struct {
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MessageKind AUMKind `cbor:"1,keyasint"`
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PrevAUMHash []byte `cbor:"2,keyasint"`
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// Key encodes a public key to be added to the key authority.
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// This field is used for AddKey AUMs.
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Key *Key `cbor:"3,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// KeyID references a public key which is part of the key authority.
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// This field is used for RemoveKey and UpdateKey AUMs.
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KeyID KeyID `cbor:"4,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// State describes the full state of the key authority.
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// This field is used for Checkpoint AUMs.
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State *State `cbor:"5,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// DisablementSecret is used to transmit a secret for disabling
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// the TKA.
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// This field is used for DisableNL AUMs.
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DisablementSecret []byte `cbor:"6,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// Votes and Meta describe properties of a key in the key authority.
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// These fields are used for UpdateKey AUMs.
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Votes *uint `cbor:"7,keyasint,omitempty"`
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Meta map[string]string `cbor:"8,keyasint,omitempty"`
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// Signatures lists the signatures over this AUM.
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// CBOR key 23 is the last key which can be encoded as a single byte.
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Signatures []Signature `cbor:"23,keyasint,omitempty"`
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}
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// Upper bound on checkpoint elements, chosen arbitrarily. Intended to
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// cap out insanely large AUMs.
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const (
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maxDisablementSecrets = 32
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maxKeys = 512
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)
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// StaticValidate returns a nil error if the AUM is well-formed.
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func (a *AUM) StaticValidate() error {
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if a.Key != nil {
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if err := a.Key.StaticValidate(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if a.PrevAUMHash != nil && len(a.PrevAUMHash) == 0 {
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return errors.New("absent parent must be represented by a nil slice")
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}
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for i, sig := range a.Signatures {
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if len(sig.KeyID) == 0 || len(sig.Signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
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return fmt.Errorf("signature %d has missing keyID or malformed signature", i)
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}
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}
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if a.State != nil {
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if a.State.LastAUMHash != nil {
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return errors.New("checkpoint state cannot specify a parent AUM")
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}
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if len(a.State.DisablementSecrets) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one disablement secret required")
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}
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if numDS := len(a.State.DisablementSecrets); numDS > maxDisablementSecrets {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many disablement secrets (%d, max %d)", numDS, maxDisablementSecrets)
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}
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for i, ds := range a.State.DisablementSecrets {
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if len(ds) != disablementLength {
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return fmt.Errorf("disablement[%d]: invalid length (got %d, want %d)", i, len(ds), disablementLength)
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}
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}
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// TODO(tom): Check for duplicate disablement secrets.
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if len(a.State.Keys) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one key is required")
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}
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if numKeys := len(a.State.Keys); numKeys > maxKeys {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many keys (%d, max %d)", numKeys, maxKeys)
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}
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for i, k := range a.State.Keys {
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if err := k.StaticValidate(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("key[%d]: %v", i, err)
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}
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}
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// TODO(tom): Check for duplicate keys.
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}
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switch a.MessageKind {
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case AUMAddKey:
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if a.Key == nil {
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return errors.New("AddKey AUMs must contain a key")
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}
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if a.KeyID != nil || a.DisablementSecret != nil || a.State != nil || a.Votes != nil || a.Meta != nil {
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return errors.New("AddKey AUMs may only specify a Key")
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}
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case AUMRemoveKey:
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if len(a.KeyID) == 0 {
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return errors.New("RemoveKey AUMs must specify a key ID")
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}
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if a.Key != nil || a.DisablementSecret != nil || a.State != nil || a.Votes != nil || a.Meta != nil {
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return errors.New("RemoveKey AUMs may only specify a KeyID")
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}
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case AUMUpdateKey:
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if len(a.KeyID) == 0 {
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return errors.New("UpdateKey AUMs must specify a key ID")
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}
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if a.Meta == nil && a.Votes == nil {
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return errors.New("UpdateKey AUMs must contain an update to votes or key metadata")
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}
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if a.Key != nil || a.DisablementSecret != nil || a.State != nil {
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return errors.New("UpdateKey AUMs may only specify KeyID, Votes, and Meta")
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}
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case AUMCheckpoint:
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if a.State == nil {
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return errors.New("Checkpoint AUMs must specify the state")
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}
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if a.KeyID != nil || a.DisablementSecret != nil || a.Key != nil || a.Votes != nil || a.Meta != nil {
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return errors.New("Checkpoint AUMs may only specify State")
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}
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case AUMDisableNL:
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if len(a.DisablementSecret) == 0 {
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return errors.New("DisableNL AUMs must specify a disablement secret")
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}
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if a.KeyID != nil || a.State != nil || a.Key != nil || a.Votes != nil || a.Meta != nil {
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return errors.New("DisableNL AUMs may only a disablement secret")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Serialize returns the given AUM in a serialized format.
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func (a *AUM) Serialize() []byte {
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// Why CBOR and not something like JSON?
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//
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// The main function of an AUM is to carry signed data. Signatures are
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// over digests, so the serialized representation must be deterministic.
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// Further, experience with other attempts (JWS/JWT,SAML,X509 etc) has
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// taught us that even subtle behaviors such as how you handle invalid
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// or unrecognized fields + any invariants in subsequent re-serialization
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// can easily lead to security-relevant logic bugs. Its certainly possible
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// to invent a workable scheme by massaging a JSON parsing library, though
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// profoundly unwise.
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//
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// CBOR is one of the few encoding schemes that are appropriate for use
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// with signatures and has security-conscious parsing + serialization
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// rules baked into the spec. We use the CTAP2 mode, which is well
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// understood + widely-implemented, and already proven for use in signing
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// assertions through its use by FIDO2 devices.
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out := bytes.NewBuffer(make([]byte, 0, 128))
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encoder, err := cbor.CTAP2EncOptions().EncMode()
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if err != nil {
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// Deterministic validation of encoding options, should
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// never fail.
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panic(err)
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}
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if err := encoder.NewEncoder(out).Encode(a); err != nil {
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// Writing to a bytes.Buffer should never fail.
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panic(err)
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}
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return out.Bytes()
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}
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// Hash returns a cryptographic digest of all AUM contents.
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func (a *AUM) Hash() AUMHash {
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return blake2s.Sum256(a.Serialize())
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}
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// SigHash returns the cryptographic digest which a signature
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// is over.
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//
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// This is identical to Hash() except the Signatures are not
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// serialized. Without this, the hash used for signatures
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// would be circularly dependent on the signatures.
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func (a AUM) SigHash() AUMSigHash {
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dupe := a
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dupe.Signatures = nil
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return blake2s.Sum256(dupe.Serialize())
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}
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// Parent returns the parent's AUM hash and true, or a
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// zero value and false if there was no parent.
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func (a *AUM) Parent() (h AUMHash, ok bool) {
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if len(a.PrevAUMHash) > 0 {
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copy(h[:], a.PrevAUMHash)
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return h, true
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}
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return h, false
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}
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func (a *AUM) sign25519(priv ed25519.PrivateKey) {
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key := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)}
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sigHash := a.SigHash()
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a.Signatures = append(a.Signatures, Signature{
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KeyID: key.ID(),
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Signature: ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:]),
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})
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}
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// Weight computes the 'signature weight' of the AUM
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// based on keys in the state machine. The caller must
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// ensure that all signatures are valid.
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//
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// More formally: W = Sum(key.votes)
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//
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// AUMs with a higher weight than their siblings
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// are preferred when resolving forks in the AUM chain.
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func (a *AUM) Weight(state State) uint {
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var weight uint
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// Track the keys that have already been used, so two
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// signatures with the same key do not result in 2x
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// the weight.
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//
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// We use the first 8 bytes as the key for this map,
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// because KeyIDs are either a blake2s hash or
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// the 25519 public key, both of which approximate
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// random distribution.
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seenKeys := make(map[uint64]struct{}, 6)
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for _, sig := range a.Signatures {
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if len(sig.KeyID) < 8 {
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// Invalid, don't count it
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continue
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}
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keyID := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(sig.KeyID)
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key, err := state.GetKey(sig.KeyID)
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if err != nil {
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if err == ErrNoSuchKey {
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// Signatures with an unknown key do not contribute
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// to the weight.
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continue
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}
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panic(err)
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}
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if _, seen := seenKeys[keyID]; seen {
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continue
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}
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weight += key.Votes
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seenKeys[keyID] = struct{}{}
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}
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return weight
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}
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