mirror of
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale.git
synced 2024-12-04 23:45:34 +00:00
280255acae
This adds an initial and intentionally minimal configuration for golang-ci, fixes the issues reported, and adds a GitHub Action to check new pull requests against this linter configuration. Signed-off-by: Andrew Dunham <andrew@du.nham.ca> Change-Id: I8f38fbc315836a19a094d0d3e986758b9313f163
366 lines
10 KiB
Go
366 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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// The pgproxy server is a proxy for the Postgres wire protocol.
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package main
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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crand "crypto/rand"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"expvar"
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"tailscale.com/client/tailscale"
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"tailscale.com/metrics"
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"tailscale.com/tsnet"
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"tailscale.com/tsweb"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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)
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var (
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hostname = flag.String("hostname", "", "Tailscale hostname to serve on")
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port = flag.Int("port", 5432, "Listening port for client connections")
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debugPort = flag.Int("debug-port", 80, "Listening port for debug/metrics endpoint")
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upstreamAddr = flag.String("upstream-addr", "", "Address of the upstream Postgres server, in host:port format")
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upstreamCA = flag.String("upstream-ca-file", "", "File containing the PEM-encoded CA certificate for the upstream server")
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tailscaleDir = flag.String("state-dir", "", "Directory in which to store the Tailscale auth state")
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)
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func main() {
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flag.Parse()
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if *hostname == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --hostname")
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}
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if *upstreamAddr == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --upstream-addr")
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}
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if *upstreamCA == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --upstream-ca-file")
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}
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if *tailscaleDir == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --state-dir")
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}
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ts := &tsnet.Server{
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Dir: *tailscaleDir,
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Hostname: *hostname,
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// Make the stdout logs a clean audit log of connections.
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Logf: logger.Discard,
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}
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if os.Getenv("TS_AUTHKEY") == "" {
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log.Print("Note: you need to run this with TS_AUTHKEY=... the first time, to join your tailnet of choice.")
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}
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tsclient, err := ts.LocalClient()
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("getting tsnet API client: %v", err)
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}
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p, err := newProxy(*upstreamAddr, *upstreamCA, tsclient)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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expvar.Publish("pgproxy", p.Expvar())
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if *debugPort != 0 {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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tsweb.Debugger(mux)
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srv := &http.Server{
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Handler: mux,
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}
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dln, err := ts.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", *debugPort))
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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go func() {
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log.Fatal(srv.Serve(dln))
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}()
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}
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ln, err := ts.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", *port))
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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log.Printf("serving access to %s on port %d", *upstreamAddr, *port)
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log.Fatal(p.Serve(ln))
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}
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// proxy is a postgres wire protocol proxy, which strictly enforces
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// the security of the TLS connection to its upstream regardless of
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// what the client's TLS configuration is.
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type proxy struct {
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upstreamAddr string // "my.database.com:5432"
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upstreamHost string // "my.database.com"
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upstreamCertPool *x509.CertPool
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downstreamCert []tls.Certificate
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client *tailscale.LocalClient
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activeSessions expvar.Int
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startedSessions expvar.Int
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errors metrics.LabelMap
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}
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// newProxy returns a proxy that forwards connections to
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// upstreamAddr. The upstream's TLS session is verified using the CA
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// cert(s) in upstreamCAPath.
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func newProxy(upstreamAddr, upstreamCAPath string, client *tailscale.LocalClient) (*proxy, error) {
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bs, err := os.ReadFile(upstreamCAPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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upstreamCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
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if !upstreamCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(bs) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CA cert in %q", upstreamCAPath)
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}
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h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(upstreamAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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downstreamCert, err := mkSelfSigned(h)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &proxy{
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upstreamAddr: upstreamAddr,
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upstreamHost: h,
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upstreamCertPool: upstreamCertPool,
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downstreamCert: []tls.Certificate{downstreamCert},
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client: client,
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errors: metrics.LabelMap{Label: "kind"},
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}, nil
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}
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// Expvar returns p's monitoring metrics.
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func (p *proxy) Expvar() expvar.Var {
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ret := &metrics.Set{}
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ret.Set("sessions_active", &p.activeSessions)
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ret.Set("sessions_started", &p.startedSessions)
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ret.Set("session_errors", &p.errors)
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return ret
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}
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// Serve accepts postgres client connections on ln and proxies them to
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// the configured upstream. ln can be any net.Listener, but all client
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// connections must originate from tailscale IPs that can be verified
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// with WhoIs.
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func (p *proxy) Serve(ln net.Listener) error {
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var lastSessionID int64
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for {
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c, err := ln.Accept()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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id := time.Now().UnixNano()
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if id == lastSessionID {
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// Bluntly enforce SID uniqueness, even if collisions are
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// fantastically unlikely (but OSes vary in how much timer
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// precision they expose to the OS, so id might be rounded
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// e.g. to the same millisecond)
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id++
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}
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lastSessionID = id
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go func(sessionID int64) {
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if err := p.serve(sessionID, c); err != nil {
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log.Printf("%d: session ended with error: %v", sessionID, err)
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}
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}(id)
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}
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}
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var (
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// sslStart is the magic bytes that postgres clients use to indicate
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// that they want to do a TLS handshake. Servers should respond with
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// the single byte "S" before starting a normal TLS handshake.
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sslStart = [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 8, 0x04, 0xd2, 0x16, 0x2f}
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// plaintextStart is the magic bytes that postgres clients use to
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// indicate that they're starting a plaintext authentication
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// handshake.
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plaintextStart = [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 86, 0, 3, 0, 0}
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)
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// serve proxies the postgres client on c to the proxy's upstream,
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// enforcing strict TLS to the upstream.
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func (p *proxy) serve(sessionID int64, c net.Conn) error {
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defer c.Close()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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whois, err := p.client.WhoIs(ctx, c.RemoteAddr().String())
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if err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("whois-failed", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("getting client identity: %v", err)
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}
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// Before anything else, log the connection attempt.
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user, machine := "", ""
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if whois.Node != nil {
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if whois.Node.Hostinfo.ShareeNode() {
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machine = "external-device"
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} else {
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machine = strings.TrimSuffix(whois.Node.Name, ".")
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}
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}
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if whois.UserProfile != nil {
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user = whois.UserProfile.LoginName
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if user == "tagged-devices" && whois.Node != nil {
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user = strings.Join(whois.Node.Tags, ",")
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}
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}
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if user == "" || machine == "" {
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p.errors.Add("no-ts-identity", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("couldn't identify source user and machine (user %q, machine %q)", user, machine)
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}
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log.Printf("%d: session start, from %s (machine %s, user %s)", sessionID, c.RemoteAddr(), machine, user)
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start := time.Now()
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defer func() {
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elapsed := time.Since(start)
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log.Printf("%d: session end, from %s (machine %s, user %s), lasted %s", sessionID, c.RemoteAddr(), machine, user, elapsed.Round(time.Millisecond))
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}()
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// Read the client's opening message, to figure out if it's trying
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// to TLS or not.
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var buf [8]byte
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, buf[:len(sslStart)]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("initial magic read: %v", err)
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}
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var clientIsTLS bool
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switch {
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case buf == sslStart:
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clientIsTLS = true
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case buf == plaintextStart:
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clientIsTLS = false
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default:
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p.errors.Add("client-bad-protocol", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("unrecognized initial packet = % 02x", buf)
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}
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// Dial & verify upstream connection.
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var d net.Dialer
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d.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
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upc, err := d.Dial("tcp", p.upstreamAddr)
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if err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream dial: %v", err)
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}
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defer upc.Close()
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if _, err := upc.Write(sslStart[:]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream write of start-ssl magic: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(upc, buf[:1]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("reading upstream start-ssl response: %v", err)
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}
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if buf[0] != 'S' {
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p.errors.Add("upstream-bad-protocol", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream didn't acknowledge start-ssl, said %q", buf[0])
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}
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tlsConf := &tls.Config{
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ServerName: p.upstreamHost,
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RootCAs: p.upstreamCertPool,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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}
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uptc := tls.Client(upc, tlsConf)
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if err = uptc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("upstream-tls", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS handshake: %v", err)
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}
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// Accept the client conn and set it up the way the client wants.
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var clientConn net.Conn
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if clientIsTLS {
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io.WriteString(c, "S") // yeah, we're good to speak TLS
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s := tls.Server(c, &tls.Config{
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ServerName: p.upstreamHost,
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Certificates: p.downstreamCert,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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})
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if err = uptc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("client-tls", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("client TLS handshake: %v", err)
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}
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clientConn = s
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} else {
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// Repeat the header we read earlier up to the server.
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if _, err := uptc.Write(plaintextStart[:]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("sending initial client bytes to upstream: %v", err)
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}
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clientConn = c
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}
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// Finally, proxy the client to the upstream.
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errc := make(chan error, 1)
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go func() {
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_, err := io.Copy(uptc, clientConn)
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errc <- err
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}()
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go func() {
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_, err := io.Copy(clientConn, uptc)
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errc <- err
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}()
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if err := <-errc; err != nil {
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// Don't increment error counts here, because the most common
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// cause of termination is client or server closing the
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// connection normally, and it'll obscure "interesting"
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// handshake errors.
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return fmt.Errorf("session terminated with error: %v", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// mkSelfSigned creates and returns a self-signed TLS certificate for
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// hostname.
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func mkSelfSigned(hostname string) (tls.Certificate, error) {
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priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), crand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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return tls.Certificate{}, err
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}
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pub := priv.Public()
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template := x509.Certificate{
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SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
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Subject: pkix.Name{
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Organization: []string{"pgproxy"},
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},
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DNSNames: []string{hostname},
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NotBefore: time.Now(),
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NotAfter: time.Now().Add(10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour),
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KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
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ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
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BasicConstraintsValid: true,
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}
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derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(crand.Reader, &template, &template, pub, priv)
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if err != nil {
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return tls.Certificate{}, err
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return tls.Certificate{}, err
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}
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return tls.Certificate{
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Certificate: [][]byte{derBytes},
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PrivateKey: priv,
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Leaf: cert,
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}, nil
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}
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