mirror of
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale.git
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95f266f1ce
Updates corp#17075 Co-Authored-By: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com> Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Dalby <kristoffer@tailscale.com>
687 lines
21 KiB
Go
687 lines
21 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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// Package tsweb contains code used in various Tailscale webservers.
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package tsweb
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import (
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"bufio"
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"bytes"
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"cmp"
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"context"
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"errors"
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"expvar"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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_ "net/http/pprof"
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"net/netip"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"go4.org/mem"
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"tailscale.com/envknob"
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"tailscale.com/metrics"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
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"tailscale.com/tsweb/varz"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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"tailscale.com/util/vizerror"
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)
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// DevMode controls whether extra output in shown, for when the binary is being run in dev mode.
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var DevMode bool
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func DefaultCertDir(leafDir string) string {
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cacheDir, err := os.UserCacheDir()
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if err == nil {
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return filepath.Join(cacheDir, "tailscale", leafDir)
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}
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return ""
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}
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// IsProd443 reports whether addr is a Go listen address for port 443.
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func IsProd443(addr string) bool {
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_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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return port == "443" || port == "https"
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}
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// AllowDebugAccess reports whether r should be permitted to access
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// various debug endpoints.
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func AllowDebugAccess(r *http.Request) bool {
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if allowDebugAccessWithKey(r) {
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return true
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}
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if r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For") != "" {
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// TODO if/when needed. For now, conservative:
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return false
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}
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ipStr, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(ipStr)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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if tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ip) || ip.IsLoopback() || ipStr == envknob.String("TS_ALLOW_DEBUG_IP") {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func allowDebugAccessWithKey(r *http.Request) bool {
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if r.Method != "GET" {
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return false
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}
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urlKey := r.FormValue("debugkey")
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keyPath := envknob.String("TS_DEBUG_KEY_PATH")
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if urlKey != "" && keyPath != "" {
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slurp, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
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if err == nil && string(bytes.TrimSpace(slurp)) == urlKey {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// AcceptsEncoding reports whether r accepts the named encoding
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// ("gzip", "br", etc).
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func AcceptsEncoding(r *http.Request, enc string) bool {
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h := r.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding")
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if h == "" {
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return false
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}
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if !strings.Contains(h, enc) && !mem.ContainsFold(mem.S(h), mem.S(enc)) {
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return false
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}
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remain := h
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for len(remain) > 0 {
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var part string
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part, remain, _ = strings.Cut(remain, ",")
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part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
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part, _, _ = strings.Cut(part, ";")
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if part == enc {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// Protected wraps a provided debug handler, h, returning a Handler
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// that enforces AllowDebugAccess and returns forbidden replies for
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// unauthorized requests.
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func Protected(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !AllowDebugAccess(r) {
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msg := "debug access denied"
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if DevMode {
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ipStr, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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msg += fmt.Sprintf("; to permit access, set TS_ALLOW_DEBUG_IP=%v", ipStr)
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}
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http.Error(w, msg, http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// Port80Handler is the handler to be given to
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// autocert.Manager.HTTPHandler. The inner handler is the mux
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// returned by NewMux containing registered /debug handlers.
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type Port80Handler struct {
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Main http.Handler
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// FQDN is used to redirect incoming requests to https://<FQDN>.
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// If it is not set, the hostname is calculated from the incoming
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// request.
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FQDN string
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}
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func (h Port80Handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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path := r.RequestURI
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if path == "/debug" || strings.HasPrefix(path, "/debug") {
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h.Main.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" {
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http.Error(w, "Use HTTPS", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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if path == "/" && AllowDebugAccess(r) {
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// Redirect authorized user to the debug handler.
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path = "/debug/"
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}
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host := cmp.Or(h.FQDN, r.Host)
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target := "https://" + host + path
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http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
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}
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// ReturnHandler is like net/http.Handler, but the handler can return an
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// error instead of writing to its ResponseWriter.
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type ReturnHandler interface {
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// ServeHTTPReturn is like http.Handler.ServeHTTP, except that
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// it can choose to return an error instead of writing to its
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// http.ResponseWriter.
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//
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// If ServeHTTPReturn returns an error, it caller should handle
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// an error by serving an HTTP 500 response to the user. The
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// error details should not be sent to the client, as they may
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// contain sensitive information. If the error is an
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// HTTPError, though, callers should use the HTTP response
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// code and message as the response to the client.
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ServeHTTPReturn(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) error
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}
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// BucketedStatsOptions describes tsweb handler options surrounding
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// the generation of metrics, grouped into buckets.
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type BucketedStatsOptions struct {
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// Bucket returns which bucket the given request is in.
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// If nil, [NormalizedPath] is used to compute the bucket.
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Bucket func(req *http.Request) string
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// If non-nil, Started maintains a counter of all requests which
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// have begun processing.
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Started *metrics.LabelMap
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// If non-nil, Finished maintains a counter of all requests which
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// have finished processing with success (that is, the HTTP handler has
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// returned).
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Finished *metrics.LabelMap
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}
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// normalizePathRegex matches components in a HTTP request path
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// that should be replaced.
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//
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// See: https://regex101.com/r/WIfpaR/3 for the explainer and test cases.
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var normalizePathRegex = regexp.MustCompile("([a-fA-F0-9]{9,}|([^\\/])+\\.([^\\/]){2,}|((n|k|u|L|t|S)[a-zA-Z0-9]{5,}(CNTRL|Djz1H|LV5CY|mxgaY|jNy1b))|(([^\\/])+\\@passkey))")
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// NormalizedPath returns the given path with the following modifications:
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//
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// - any query parameters are removed
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// - any path component with a hex string of 9 or more characters is
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// replaced by an ellipsis
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// - any path component containing a period with at least two characters
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// after the period (i.e. an email or domain)
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// - any path component consisting of a common Tailscale Stable ID
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// - any path segment *@passkey.
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func NormalizedPath(p string) string {
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// Fastpath: No hex sequences in there we might have to trim.
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// Avoids allocating.
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if normalizePathRegex.FindStringIndex(p) == nil {
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b, _, _ := strings.Cut(p, "?")
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return b
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}
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// If we got here, there's at least one hex sequences we need to
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// replace with an ellipsis.
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replaced := normalizePathRegex.ReplaceAllString(p, "…")
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b, _, _ := strings.Cut(replaced, "?")
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return b
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}
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func (o *BucketedStatsOptions) bucketForRequest(r *http.Request) string {
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if o.Bucket != nil {
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return o.Bucket(r)
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}
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return NormalizedPath(r.URL.Path)
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}
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type HandlerOptions struct {
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QuietLoggingIfSuccessful bool // if set, do not log successfully handled HTTP requests (200 and 304 status codes)
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Logf logger.Logf
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Now func() time.Time // if nil, defaults to time.Now
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// If non-nil, StatusCodeCounters maintains counters
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// of status codes for handled responses.
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// The keys are "1xx", "2xx", "3xx", "4xx", and "5xx".
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StatusCodeCounters *expvar.Map
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// If non-nil, StatusCodeCountersFull maintains counters of status
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// codes for handled responses.
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// The keys are HTTP numeric response codes e.g. 200, 404, ...
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StatusCodeCountersFull *expvar.Map
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// If non-nil, BucketedStats computes and exposes statistics
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// for each bucket based on the contained parameters.
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BucketedStats *BucketedStatsOptions
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// OnError is called if the handler returned a HTTPError. This
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// is intended to be used to present pretty error pages if
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// the user agent is determined to be a browser.
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OnError ErrorHandlerFunc
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// OnCompletion is called when ServeHTTP is finished and gets
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// useful data that the implementor can use for metrics.
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OnCompletion OnCompletionFunc
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}
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// ErrorHandlerFunc is called to present a error response.
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type ErrorHandlerFunc func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, HTTPError)
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// OnCompletionFunc is called when ServeHTTP is finished and gets
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// useful data that the implementor can use for metrics.
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type OnCompletionFunc func(*http.Request, AccessLogRecord)
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// ReturnHandlerFunc is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary
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// functions as ReturnHandlers. If f is a function with the
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// appropriate signature, ReturnHandlerFunc(f) is a ReturnHandler that
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// calls f.
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type ReturnHandlerFunc func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) error
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// A Middleware is a function that wraps an http.Handler to extend or modify
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// its behaviour.
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//
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// The implementation of the wrapper is responsible for delegating its input
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// request to the underlying handler, if appropriate.
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type Middleware func(h http.Handler) http.Handler
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// ServeHTTPReturn calls f(w, r).
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func (f ReturnHandlerFunc) ServeHTTPReturn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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return f(w, r)
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}
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// StdHandler converts a ReturnHandler into a standard http.Handler.
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// Handled requests are logged using opts.Logf, as are any errors.
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// Errors are handled as specified by the Handler interface.
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func StdHandler(h ReturnHandler, opts HandlerOptions) http.Handler {
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if opts.Now == nil {
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opts.Now = time.Now
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}
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if opts.Logf == nil {
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opts.Logf = logger.Discard
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}
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return retHandler{h, opts}
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}
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// retHandler is an http.Handler that wraps a Handler and handles errors.
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type retHandler struct {
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rh ReturnHandler
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opts HandlerOptions
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}
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// ServeHTTP implements the http.Handler interface.
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func (h retHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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msg := AccessLogRecord{
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Time: h.opts.Now(),
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RemoteAddr: r.RemoteAddr,
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Proto: r.Proto,
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TLS: r.TLS != nil,
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Host: r.Host,
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Method: r.Method,
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RequestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
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UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
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Referer: r.Referer(),
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RequestID: RequestIDFromContext(r.Context()),
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}
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var bucket string
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var startRecorded bool
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if bs := h.opts.BucketedStats; bs != nil {
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bucket = bs.bucketForRequest(r)
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if bs.Started != nil {
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switch v := bs.Started.Map.Get(bucket).(type) {
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case *expvar.Int:
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// If we've already seen this bucket for, count it immediately.
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// Otherwise, for newly seen paths, only count retroactively
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// (so started-finished doesn't go negative) so we don't fill
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// this LabelMap up with internet scanning spam.
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v.Add(1)
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startRecorded = true
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}
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}
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}
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lw := &loggingResponseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, logf: h.opts.Logf}
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// In case the handler panics, we want to recover and continue logging the
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// error before raising the panic again for the server to handle.
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var (
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didPanic bool
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panicRes any
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)
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defer func() {
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if didPanic {
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panic(panicRes)
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}
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}()
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runWithPanicProtection := func() (err error) {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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didPanic = true
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panicRes = r
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// Even if r is an error, do not wrap it as an error here as
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// that would allow things like panic(vizerror.New("foo")) which
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// is really hard to define the behavior of.
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err = fmt.Errorf("panic: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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return h.rh.ServeHTTPReturn(lw, r)
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}
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err := runWithPanicProtection()
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var hErr HTTPError
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var hErrOK bool
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if errors.As(err, &hErr) {
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hErrOK = true
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} else if vizErr, ok := vizerror.As(err); ok {
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hErrOK = true
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hErr = HTTPError{Msg: vizErr.Error()}
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}
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if lw.code == 0 && err == nil && !lw.hijacked {
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// If the handler didn't write and didn't send a header, that still means 200.
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// (See https://play.golang.org/p/4P7nx_Tap7p)
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lw.code = 200
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}
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msg.Seconds = h.opts.Now().Sub(msg.Time).Seconds()
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msg.Code = lw.code
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msg.Bytes = lw.bytes
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switch {
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case lw.hijacked:
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// Connection no longer belongs to us, just log that we
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// switched protocols away from HTTP.
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if msg.Code == 0 {
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msg.Code = http.StatusSwitchingProtocols
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}
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case err != nil && r.Context().Err() == context.Canceled:
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msg.Code = 499 // nginx convention: Client Closed Request
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msg.Err = context.Canceled.Error()
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case hErrOK:
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// Handler asked us to send an error. Do so, if we haven't
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// already sent a response.
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msg.Err = hErr.Msg
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if hErr.Err != nil {
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if msg.Err == "" {
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msg.Err = hErr.Err.Error()
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} else {
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msg.Err = msg.Err + ": " + hErr.Err.Error()
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}
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}
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if lw.code != 0 {
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h.opts.Logf("[unexpected] handler returned HTTPError %v, but already sent a response with code %d", hErr, lw.code)
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break
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}
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msg.Code = hErr.Code
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if msg.Code == 0 {
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h.opts.Logf("[unexpected] HTTPError %v did not contain an HTTP status code, sending internal server error", hErr)
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msg.Code = http.StatusInternalServerError
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}
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if h.opts.OnError != nil {
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h.opts.OnError(lw, r, hErr)
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} else {
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// Default headers set by http.Error.
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lw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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lw.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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for k, vs := range hErr.Header {
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lw.Header()[k] = vs
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}
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lw.WriteHeader(msg.Code)
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fmt.Fprintln(lw, hErr.Msg)
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if msg.RequestID != "" {
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fmt.Fprintln(lw, msg.RequestID)
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}
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}
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case err != nil:
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const internalServerError = "internal server error"
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errorMessage := internalServerError
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if msg.RequestID != "" {
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errorMessage += "\n" + string(msg.RequestID)
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}
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// Handler returned a generic error. Serve an internal server
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// error, if necessary.
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msg.Err = err.Error()
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if lw.code == 0 {
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msg.Code = http.StatusInternalServerError
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http.Error(lw, errorMessage, msg.Code)
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}
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}
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if h.opts.OnCompletion != nil {
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h.opts.OnCompletion(r, msg)
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}
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if bs := h.opts.BucketedStats; bs != nil && bs.Finished != nil {
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// Only increment metrics for buckets that result in good HTTP statuses
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// or when we know the start was already counted.
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// Otherwise they get full of internet scanning noise. Only filtering 404
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// gets most of the way there but there are also plenty of URLs that are
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// almost right but result in 400s too. Seem easier to just only ignore
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// all 4xx and 5xx.
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if startRecorded {
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bs.Finished.Add(bucket, 1)
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} else if msg.Code < 400 {
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// This is the first non-error request for this bucket,
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// so count it now retroactively.
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bs.Started.Add(bucket, 1)
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bs.Finished.Add(bucket, 1)
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}
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}
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if !h.opts.QuietLoggingIfSuccessful || (msg.Code != http.StatusOK && msg.Code != http.StatusNotModified) {
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h.opts.Logf("%s", msg)
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}
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if h.opts.StatusCodeCounters != nil {
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h.opts.StatusCodeCounters.Add(responseCodeString(msg.Code/100), 1)
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}
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if h.opts.StatusCodeCountersFull != nil {
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h.opts.StatusCodeCountersFull.Add(responseCodeString(msg.Code), 1)
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}
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}
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func responseCodeString(code int) string {
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if v, ok := responseCodeCache.Load(code); ok {
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return v.(string)
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}
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var ret string
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if code < 10 {
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ret = fmt.Sprintf("%dxx", code)
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} else {
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ret = strconv.Itoa(code)
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}
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responseCodeCache.Store(code, ret)
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return ret
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}
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// responseCodeCache memoizes the string form of HTTP response codes,
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// so that the hot request-handling codepath doesn't have to allocate
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// in strconv/fmt for every request.
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//
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// Keys are either full HTTP response code ints (200, 404) or "family"
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// ints representing entire families (e.g. 2 for 2xx codes). Values
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// are the string form of that code/family.
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|
var responseCodeCache sync.Map
|
|
|
|
// loggingResponseWriter wraps a ResponseWriter and record the HTTP
|
|
// response code that gets sent, if any.
|
|
type loggingResponseWriter struct {
|
|
http.ResponseWriter
|
|
code int
|
|
bytes int
|
|
hijacked bool
|
|
logf logger.Logf
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// WriteHeader implements http.Handler.
|
|
func (l *loggingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(statusCode int) {
|
|
if l.code != 0 {
|
|
l.logf("[unexpected] HTTP handler set statusCode twice (%d and %d)", l.code, statusCode)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
l.code = statusCode
|
|
l.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(statusCode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write implements http.Handler.
|
|
func (l *loggingResponseWriter) Write(bs []byte) (int, error) {
|
|
if l.code == 0 {
|
|
l.code = 200
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := l.ResponseWriter.Write(bs)
|
|
l.bytes += n
|
|
return n, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Hijack implements http.Hijacker. Note that hijacking can still fail
|
|
// because the wrapped ResponseWriter is not required to implement
|
|
// Hijacker, as this breaks HTTP/2.
|
|
func (l *loggingResponseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
|
|
h, ok := l.ResponseWriter.(http.Hijacker)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, errors.New("ResponseWriter is not a Hijacker")
|
|
}
|
|
conn, buf, err := h.Hijack()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
l.hijacked = true
|
|
}
|
|
return conn, buf, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (l loggingResponseWriter) Flush() {
|
|
f, _ := l.ResponseWriter.(http.Flusher)
|
|
if f == nil {
|
|
l.logf("[unexpected] tried to Flush a ResponseWriter that can't flush")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.Flush()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HTTPError is an error with embedded HTTP response information.
|
|
//
|
|
// It is the error type to be (optionally) used by Handler.ServeHTTPReturn.
|
|
type HTTPError struct {
|
|
Code int // HTTP response code to send to client; 0 means 500
|
|
Msg string // Response body to send to client
|
|
Err error // Detailed error to log on the server
|
|
Header http.Header // Optional set of HTTP headers to set in the response
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Error implements the error interface.
|
|
func (e HTTPError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("httperror{%d, %q, %v}", e.Code, e.Msg, e.Err) }
|
|
func (e HTTPError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
|
|
|
|
// Error returns an HTTPError containing the given information.
|
|
func Error(code int, msg string, err error) HTTPError {
|
|
return HTTPError{Code: code, Msg: msg, Err: err}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// VarzHandler writes expvar values as Prometheus metrics.
|
|
// TODO: migrate all users to varz.Handler or promvarz.Handler and remove this.
|
|
func VarzHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
varz.Handler(w, r)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CleanRedirectURL ensures that urlStr is a valid redirect URL to the
|
|
// current server, or one of allowedHosts. Returns the cleaned URL or
|
|
// a validation error.
|
|
func CleanRedirectURL(urlStr string, allowedHosts []string) (*url.URL, error) {
|
|
if urlStr == "" {
|
|
return &url.URL{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// In some places, we unfortunately query-escape the redirect URL
|
|
// too many times, and end up needing to redirect to a URL that's
|
|
// still escaped by one level. Try to unescape the input.
|
|
unescaped, err := url.QueryUnescape(urlStr)
|
|
if err == nil && unescaped != urlStr {
|
|
urlStr = unescaped
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Go's URL parser and browser URL parsers disagree on the meaning
|
|
// of malformed HTTP URLs. Given the input https:/evil.com, Go
|
|
// parses it as hostname="", path="/evil.com". Browsers parse it
|
|
// as hostname="evil.com", path="". This means that, using
|
|
// malformed URLs, an attacker could trick us into approving of a
|
|
// "local" redirect that in fact sends people elsewhere.
|
|
//
|
|
// This very blunt check enforces that we'll only process
|
|
// redirects that are definitely well-formed URLs.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note that the check for just / also allows URLs of the form
|
|
// "//foo.com/bar", which are scheme-relative redirects. These
|
|
// must be handled with care below when determining whether a
|
|
// redirect is relative to the current host. Notably,
|
|
// url.URL.IsAbs reports // URLs as relative, whereas we want to
|
|
// treat them as absolute redirects and verify the target host.
|
|
if !hasSafeRedirectPrefix(urlStr) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid redirect URL %q", urlStr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
url, err := url.Parse(urlStr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid redirect URL %q: %w", urlStr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Redirects to self are always allowed. A self redirect must
|
|
// start with url.Path, all prior URL sections must be empty.
|
|
isSelfRedirect := url.Scheme == "" && url.Opaque == "" && url.User == nil && url.Host == ""
|
|
if isSelfRedirect {
|
|
return url, nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, allowed := range allowedHosts {
|
|
if strings.EqualFold(allowed, url.Hostname()) {
|
|
return url, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("disallowed target host %q in redirect URL %q", url.Hostname(), urlStr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasSafeRedirectPrefix reports whether url starts with a slash, or
|
|
// one of the case-insensitive strings "http://" or "https://".
|
|
func hasSafeRedirectPrefix(url string) bool {
|
|
if len(url) >= 1 && url[0] == '/' {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
const http = "http://"
|
|
if len(url) >= len(http) && strings.EqualFold(url[:len(http)], http) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
const https = "https://"
|
|
if len(url) >= len(https) && strings.EqualFold(url[:len(https)], https) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AddBrowserHeaders sets various HTTP security headers for browser-facing endpoints.
|
|
//
|
|
// The specific headers:
|
|
// - require HTTPS access (HSTS)
|
|
// - disallow iframe embedding
|
|
// - mitigate MIME confusion attacks
|
|
//
|
|
// These headers are based on
|
|
// https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/web_security
|
|
func AddBrowserHeaders(w http.ResponseWriter) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'self'; block-all-mixed-content; object-src 'none'")
|
|
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
|
|
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BrowserHeaderHandler wraps the provided http.Handler with a call to
|
|
// AddBrowserHeaders.
|
|
func BrowserHeaderHandler(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
AddBrowserHeaders(w)
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BrowserHeaderHandlerFunc wraps the provided http.HandlerFunc with a call to
|
|
// AddBrowserHeaders.
|
|
func BrowserHeaderHandlerFunc(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
AddBrowserHeaders(w)
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|