mirror of
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale.git
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29e98e18f8
ErrDenied was added in [our fork of
x/crypto/ssh](acc6f8fe8d
)
to short-circuit auth attempts once one fails.
In the case of our callbacks, this error is returned when SSH policy
check determines that a connection should not be allowed. Both
`NoClientAuthCallback` and `PublicKeyHandler` check the policy and will
fail anyway. The `fakePasswordHandler` returns true only if
`NoClientAuthCallback` succeeds the policy check, so it checks it
indirectly too.
The difference here is that a client might attempt all 2-3 auth methods
instead of just `none` but will fail to authenticate regardless.
Updates #8593
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
1949 lines
56 KiB
Go
1949 lines
56 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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//go:build linux || (darwin && !ios) || freebsd || openbsd
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// Package tailssh is an SSH server integrated into Tailscale.
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package tailssh
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptrace"
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"net/netip"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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gossh "github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh"
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"tailscale.com/envknob"
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"tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal"
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"tailscale.com/logtail/backoff"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsdial"
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"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
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"tailscale.com/tempfork/gliderlabs/ssh"
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"tailscale.com/types/key"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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"tailscale.com/types/netmap"
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"tailscale.com/util/clientmetric"
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"tailscale.com/util/httpm"
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"tailscale.com/util/mak"
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"tailscale.com/util/multierr"
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)
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var (
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sshVerboseLogging = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_SSH_VLOG")
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sshDisableSFTP = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_SFTP")
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sshDisableForwarding = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING")
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sshDisablePTY = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_SSH_DISABLE_PTY")
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)
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const (
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// forcePasswordSuffix is the suffix at the end of a username that forces
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// Tailscale SSH into password authentication mode to work around buggy SSH
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// clients that get confused by successful replies to auth type "none".
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forcePasswordSuffix = "+password"
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)
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// ipnLocalBackend is the subset of ipnlocal.LocalBackend that we use.
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// It is used for testing.
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type ipnLocalBackend interface {
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GetSSH_HostKeys() ([]gossh.Signer, error)
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ShouldRunSSH() bool
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NetMap() *netmap.NetworkMap
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WhoIs(ipp netip.AddrPort) (n tailcfg.NodeView, u tailcfg.UserProfile, ok bool)
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DoNoiseRequest(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
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Dialer() *tsdial.Dialer
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TailscaleVarRoot() string
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NodeKey() key.NodePublic
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}
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type server struct {
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lb ipnLocalBackend
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logf logger.Logf
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tailscaledPath string
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pubKeyHTTPClient *http.Client // or nil for http.DefaultClient
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timeNow func() time.Time // or nil for time.Now
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sessionWaitGroup sync.WaitGroup
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// mu protects the following
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mu sync.Mutex
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activeConns map[*conn]bool // set; value is always true
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fetchPublicKeysCache map[string]pubKeyCacheEntry // by https URL
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shutdownCalled bool
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}
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func (srv *server) now() time.Time {
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if srv != nil && srv.timeNow != nil {
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return srv.timeNow()
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}
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return time.Now()
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}
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func init() {
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ipnlocal.RegisterNewSSHServer(func(logf logger.Logf, lb *ipnlocal.LocalBackend) (ipnlocal.SSHServer, error) {
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tsd, err := os.Executable()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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srv := &server{
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lb: lb,
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logf: logf,
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tailscaledPath: tsd,
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timeNow: func() time.Time {
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return lb.ControlNow(time.Now())
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},
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}
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return srv, nil
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})
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}
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// attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown ensures that srv is not shutdown before
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// attaching the session to the conn. This ensures that once Shutdown is called,
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// new sessions are not allowed and existing ones are cleaned up.
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// It reports whether ss was attached to the conn.
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func (srv *server) attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss *sshSession) bool {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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if srv.shutdownCalled {
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// Do not start any new sessions.
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return false
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}
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ss.conn.attachSession(ss)
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return true
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}
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func (srv *server) trackActiveConn(c *conn, add bool) {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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if add {
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mak.Set(&srv.activeConns, c, true)
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return
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}
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delete(srv.activeConns, c)
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}
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// HandleSSHConn handles a Tailscale SSH connection from c.
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// This is the entry point for all SSH connections.
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// When this returns, the connection is closed.
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func (srv *server) HandleSSHConn(nc net.Conn) error {
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metricIncomingConnections.Add(1)
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c, err := srv.newConn()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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srv.trackActiveConn(c, true) // add
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defer srv.trackActiveConn(c, false) // remove
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c.HandleConn(nc)
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// Return nil to signal to netstack's interception that it doesn't need to
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// log. If ss.HandleConn had problems, it can log itself (ideally on an
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// sshSession.logf).
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return nil
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}
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// Shutdown terminates all active sessions.
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func (srv *server) Shutdown() {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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srv.shutdownCalled = true
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for c := range srv.activeConns {
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c.Close()
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}
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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srv.sessionWaitGroup.Wait()
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}
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// OnPolicyChange terminates any active sessions that no longer match
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// the SSH access policy.
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func (srv *server) OnPolicyChange() {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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defer srv.mu.Unlock()
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for c := range srv.activeConns {
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if c.info == nil {
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// c.info is nil when the connection hasn't been authenticated yet.
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// In that case, the connection will be terminated when it is.
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continue
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}
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go c.checkStillValid()
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}
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}
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// conn represents a single SSH connection and its associated
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// ssh.Server.
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//
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// During the lifecycle of a connection, the following are called in order:
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// Setup and discover server info
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// - ServerConfigCallback
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//
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// Do the user auth
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// - NoClientAuthHandler
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// - PublicKeyHandler (only if NoClientAuthHandler returns errPubKeyRequired)
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//
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// Once auth is done, the conn can be multiplexed with multiple sessions and
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// channels concurrently. At which point any of the following can be called
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// in any order.
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// - c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth
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// - c.mayForwardLocalPortTo followed by ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler
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type conn struct {
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*ssh.Server
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srv *server
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insecureSkipTailscaleAuth bool // used by tests.
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// idH is the RFC4253 sec8 hash H. It is used to identify the connection,
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// and is shared among all sessions. It should not be shared outside
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// process. It is confusingly referred to as SessionID by the gliderlabs/ssh
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// library.
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idH string
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connID string // ID that's shared with control
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// anyPasswordIsOkay is whether the client is authorized but has requested
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// password-based auth to work around their buggy SSH client. When set, we
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// accept any password in the PasswordHandler.
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anyPasswordIsOkay bool // set by NoClientAuthCallback
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action0 *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth; first matching action
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currentAction *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth, updated by resolveNextAction
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finalAction *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth or resolveNextAction
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finalActionErr error // set by doPolicyAuth or resolveNextAction
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info *sshConnInfo // set by setInfo
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localUser *userMeta // set by doPolicyAuth
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userGroupIDs []string // set by doPolicyAuth
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pubKey gossh.PublicKey // set by doPolicyAuth
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// mu protects the following fields.
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//
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// srv.mu should be acquired prior to mu.
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// It is safe to just acquire mu, but unsafe to
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// acquire mu and then srv.mu.
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mu sync.Mutex // protects the following
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sessions []*sshSession
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}
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func (c *conn) logf(format string, args ...any) {
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format = fmt.Sprintf("%v: %v", c.connID, format)
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c.srv.logf(format, args...)
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}
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func (c *conn) vlogf(format string, args ...any) {
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if sshVerboseLogging() {
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c.logf(format, args...)
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}
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}
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// isAuthorized walks through the action chain and returns nil if the connection
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// is authorized. If the connection is not authorized, it returns
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// errDenied. If the action chain resolution fails, it returns the
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// resolution error.
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func (c *conn) isAuthorized(ctx ssh.Context) error {
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action := c.currentAction
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for {
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if action.Accept {
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if c.pubKey != nil {
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metricPublicKeyAccepts.Add(1)
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}
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return nil
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}
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if action.Reject || action.HoldAndDelegate == "" {
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return errDenied
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}
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var err error
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action, err = c.resolveNextAction(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if action.Message != "" {
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if err := ctx.SendAuthBanner(action.Message); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// errDenied is returned by auth callbacks when a connection is denied by the
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// policy.
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var errDenied = errors.New("ssh: access denied")
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// errPubKeyRequired is returned by NoClientAuthCallback to make the client
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// resort to public-key auth; not user visible.
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var errPubKeyRequired = errors.New("ssh publickey required")
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// NoClientAuthCallback implements gossh.NoClientAuthCallback and is called by
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// the ssh.Server when the client first connects with the "none"
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// authentication method.
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//
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// It is responsible for continuing policy evaluation from BannerCallback (or
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// starting it afresh). It returns an error if the policy evaluation fails, or
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// if the decision is "reject"
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//
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// It either returns nil (accept) or errPubKeyRequired or errDenied
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// (reject). The errors may be wrapped.
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func (c *conn) NoClientAuthCallback(ctx ssh.Context) error {
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if c.insecureSkipTailscaleAuth {
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return nil
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}
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if err := c.doPolicyAuth(ctx, nil /* no pub key */); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := c.isAuthorized(ctx); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Let users specify a username ending in +password to force password auth.
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// This exists for buggy SSH clients that get confused by success from
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// "none" auth.
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if strings.HasSuffix(ctx.User(), forcePasswordSuffix) {
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c.anyPasswordIsOkay = true
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return errors.New("any password please") // not shown to users
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (c *conn) nextAuthMethodCallback(cm gossh.ConnMetadata, prevErrors []error) (nextMethod []string) {
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switch {
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case c.anyPasswordIsOkay:
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nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "password")
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case len(prevErrors) > 0 && prevErrors[len(prevErrors)-1] == errPubKeyRequired:
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nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "publickey")
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}
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// The fake "tailscale" method is always appended to next so OpenSSH renders
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// that in parens as the final failure. (It also shows up in "ssh -v", etc)
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nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "tailscale")
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return
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}
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// fakePasswordHandler is our implementation of the PasswordHandler hook that
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// checks whether the user's password is correct. But we don't actually use
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// passwords. This exists only for when the user's username ends in "+password"
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// to signal that their SSH client is buggy and gets confused by auth type
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// "none" succeeding and they want our SSH server to require a dummy password
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// prompt instead. We then accept any password since we've already authenticated
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// & authorized them.
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func (c *conn) fakePasswordHandler(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool {
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return c.anyPasswordIsOkay
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}
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// PublicKeyHandler implements ssh.PublicKeyHandler is called by the
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// ssh.Server when the client presents a public key.
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func (c *conn) PublicKeyHandler(ctx ssh.Context, pubKey ssh.PublicKey) error {
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if err := c.doPolicyAuth(ctx, pubKey); err != nil {
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// TODO(maisem/bradfitz): surface the error here.
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c.logf("rejecting SSH public key %s: %v", bytes.TrimSpace(gossh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pubKey)), err)
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return err
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}
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if err := c.isAuthorized(ctx); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.logf("accepting SSH public key %s", bytes.TrimSpace(gossh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pubKey)))
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return nil
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}
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// doPolicyAuth verifies that conn can proceed with the specified (optional)
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// pubKey. It returns nil if the matching policy action is Accept or
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// HoldAndDelegate. If pubKey is nil, there was no policy match but there is a
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// policy that might match a public key it returns errPubKeyRequired. Otherwise,
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// it returns errDenied.
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func (c *conn) doPolicyAuth(ctx ssh.Context, pubKey ssh.PublicKey) error {
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if err := c.setInfo(ctx); err != nil {
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c.logf("failed to get conninfo: %v", err)
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return errDenied
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}
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a, localUser, err := c.evaluatePolicy(pubKey)
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if err != nil {
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if pubKey == nil && c.havePubKeyPolicy() {
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return errPubKeyRequired
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errDenied, err)
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}
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c.action0 = a
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c.currentAction = a
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c.pubKey = pubKey
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if a.Message != "" {
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if err := ctx.SendAuthBanner(a.Message); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("SendBanner: %w", err)
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}
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}
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if a.Accept || a.HoldAndDelegate != "" {
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if a.Accept {
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c.finalAction = a
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}
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lu, err := userLookup(localUser)
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if err != nil {
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c.logf("failed to look up %v: %v", localUser, err)
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ctx.SendAuthBanner(fmt.Sprintf("failed to look up %v\r\n", localUser))
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return err
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}
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gids, err := lu.GroupIds()
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if err != nil {
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c.logf("failed to look up local user's group IDs: %v", err)
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return err
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}
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c.userGroupIDs = gids
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c.localUser = lu
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return nil
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}
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if a.Reject {
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c.finalAction = a
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return errDenied
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}
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// Shouldn't get here, but:
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return errDenied
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}
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// ServerConfig implements ssh.ServerConfigCallback.
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func (c *conn) ServerConfig(ctx ssh.Context) *gossh.ServerConfig {
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return &gossh.ServerConfig{
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NoClientAuth: true, // required for the NoClientAuthCallback to run
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NextAuthMethodCallback: c.nextAuthMethodCallback,
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}
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}
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func (srv *server) newConn() (*conn, error) {
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srv.mu.Lock()
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if srv.shutdownCalled {
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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// Stop accepting new connections.
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// Connections in the auth phase are handled in handleConnPostSSHAuth.
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// Existing sessions are terminated by Shutdown.
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return nil, errDenied
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}
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srv.mu.Unlock()
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c := &conn{srv: srv}
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now := srv.now()
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c.connID = fmt.Sprintf("ssh-conn-%s-%02x", now.UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5))
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fwdHandler := &ssh.ForwardedTCPHandler{}
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c.Server = &ssh.Server{
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Version: "Tailscale",
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ServerConfigCallback: c.ServerConfig,
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NoClientAuthHandler: c.NoClientAuthCallback,
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PublicKeyHandler: c.PublicKeyHandler,
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PasswordHandler: c.fakePasswordHandler,
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Handler: c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth,
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LocalPortForwardingCallback: c.mayForwardLocalPortTo,
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ReversePortForwardingCallback: c.mayReversePortForwardTo,
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SubsystemHandlers: map[string]ssh.SubsystemHandler{
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"sftp": c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth,
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},
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// Note: the direct-tcpip channel handler and LocalPortForwardingCallback
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// only adds support for forwarding ports from the local machine.
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// TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add remote port forwarding support.
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ChannelHandlers: map[string]ssh.ChannelHandler{
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"direct-tcpip": ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler,
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},
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RequestHandlers: map[string]ssh.RequestHandler{
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"tcpip-forward": fwdHandler.HandleSSHRequest,
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"cancel-tcpip-forward": fwdHandler.HandleSSHRequest,
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},
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}
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ss := c.Server
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for k, v := range ssh.DefaultRequestHandlers {
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ss.RequestHandlers[k] = v
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}
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for k, v := range ssh.DefaultChannelHandlers {
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ss.ChannelHandlers[k] = v
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}
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for k, v := range ssh.DefaultSubsystemHandlers {
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ss.SubsystemHandlers[k] = v
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}
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keys, err := srv.lb.GetSSH_HostKeys()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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for _, signer := range keys {
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ss.AddHostKey(signer)
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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// mayReversePortPortForwardTo reports whether the ctx should be allowed to port forward
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// to the specified host and port.
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// TODO(bradfitz/maisem): should we have more checks on host/port?
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func (c *conn) mayReversePortForwardTo(ctx ssh.Context, destinationHost string, destinationPort uint32) bool {
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if sshDisableForwarding() {
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return false
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}
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if c.finalAction != nil && c.finalAction.AllowRemotePortForwarding {
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metricRemotePortForward.Add(1)
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return true
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}
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return false
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|
}
|
|
|
|
// mayForwardLocalPortTo reports whether the ctx should be allowed to port forward
|
|
// to the specified host and port.
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz/maisem): should we have more checks on host/port?
|
|
func (c *conn) mayForwardLocalPortTo(ctx ssh.Context, destinationHost string, destinationPort uint32) bool {
|
|
if sshDisableForwarding() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if c.finalAction != nil && c.finalAction.AllowLocalPortForwarding {
|
|
metricLocalPortForward.Add(1)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// havePubKeyPolicy reports whether any policy rule may provide access by means
|
|
// of a ssh.PublicKey.
|
|
func (c *conn) havePubKeyPolicy() bool {
|
|
if c.info == nil {
|
|
panic("havePubKeyPolicy called before setInfo")
|
|
}
|
|
// Is there any rule that looks like it'd require a public key for this
|
|
// sshUser?
|
|
pol, ok := c.sshPolicy()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, r := range pol.Rules {
|
|
if c.ruleExpired(r) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if mapLocalUser(r.SSHUsers, c.info.sshUser) == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
for _, p := range r.Principals {
|
|
if len(p.PubKeys) > 0 && c.principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sshPolicy returns the SSHPolicy for current node.
|
|
// If there is no SSHPolicy in the netmap, it returns a debugPolicy
|
|
// if one is defined.
|
|
func (c *conn) sshPolicy() (_ *tailcfg.SSHPolicy, ok bool) {
|
|
lb := c.srv.lb
|
|
if !lb.ShouldRunSSH() {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
nm := lb.NetMap()
|
|
if nm == nil {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
if pol := nm.SSHPolicy; pol != nil && !envknob.SSHIgnoreTailnetPolicy() {
|
|
return pol, true
|
|
}
|
|
debugPolicyFile := envknob.SSHPolicyFile()
|
|
if debugPolicyFile != "" {
|
|
c.logf("reading debug SSH policy file: %v", debugPolicyFile)
|
|
f, err := os.ReadFile(debugPolicyFile)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("error reading debug SSH policy file: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
p := new(tailcfg.SSHPolicy)
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(f, p); err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid JSON in %v: %v", debugPolicyFile, err)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
return p, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func toIPPort(a net.Addr) (ipp netip.AddrPort) {
|
|
ta, ok := a.(*net.TCPAddr)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tanetaddr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ta.IP)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
return netip.AddrPortFrom(tanetaddr.Unmap(), uint16(ta.Port))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connInfo returns a populated sshConnInfo from the provided arguments,
|
|
// validating only that they represent a known Tailscale identity.
|
|
func (c *conn) setInfo(ctx ssh.Context) error {
|
|
if c.info != nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
ci := &sshConnInfo{
|
|
sshUser: strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.User(), forcePasswordSuffix),
|
|
src: toIPPort(ctx.RemoteAddr()),
|
|
dst: toIPPort(ctx.LocalAddr()),
|
|
}
|
|
if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.dst.Addr()) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale local address %v", ci.dst)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.src.Addr()) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale remote address %v", ci.src)
|
|
}
|
|
node, uprof, ok := c.srv.lb.WhoIs(ci.src)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unknown Tailscale identity from src %v", ci.src)
|
|
}
|
|
ci.node = node
|
|
ci.uprof = uprof
|
|
|
|
c.idH = ctx.SessionID()
|
|
c.info = ci
|
|
c.logf("handling conn: %v", ci.String())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// evaluatePolicy returns the SSHAction and localUser after evaluating
|
|
// the SSHPolicy for this conn. The pubKey may be nil for "none" auth.
|
|
func (c *conn) evaluatePolicy(pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (_ *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, _ error) {
|
|
pol, ok := c.sshPolicy()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting connection; no SSH policy")
|
|
}
|
|
a, localUser, ok := c.evalSSHPolicy(pol, pubKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting connection; no matching policy")
|
|
}
|
|
return a, localUser, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pubKeyCacheEntry is the cache value for an HTTPS URL of public keys (like
|
|
// "https://github.com/foo.keys")
|
|
type pubKeyCacheEntry struct {
|
|
lines []string
|
|
etag string // if sent by server
|
|
at time.Time
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
pubKeyCacheDuration = time.Minute // how long to cache non-empty public keys
|
|
pubKeyCacheEmptyDuration = 15 * time.Second // how long to cache empty responses
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (srv *server) fetchPublicKeysURLCached(url string) (ce pubKeyCacheEntry, ok bool) {
|
|
srv.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer srv.mu.Unlock()
|
|
// Mostly don't care about the size of this cache. Clean rarely.
|
|
if m := srv.fetchPublicKeysCache; len(m) > 50 {
|
|
tooOld := srv.now().Add(pubKeyCacheDuration * 10)
|
|
for k, ce := range m {
|
|
if ce.at.Before(tooOld) {
|
|
delete(m, k)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ce, ok = srv.fetchPublicKeysCache[url]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ce, false
|
|
}
|
|
maxAge := pubKeyCacheDuration
|
|
if len(ce.lines) == 0 {
|
|
maxAge = pubKeyCacheEmptyDuration
|
|
}
|
|
return ce, srv.now().Sub(ce.at) < maxAge
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (srv *server) pubKeyClient() *http.Client {
|
|
if srv.pubKeyHTTPClient != nil {
|
|
return srv.pubKeyHTTPClient
|
|
}
|
|
return http.DefaultClient
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fetchPublicKeysURL fetches the public keys from a URL. The strings are in the
|
|
// the typical public key "type base64-string [comment]" format seen at e.g.
|
|
// https://github.com/USER.keys
|
|
func (srv *server) fetchPublicKeysURL(url string) ([]string, error) {
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(url, "https://") {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("invalid URL scheme")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ce, ok := srv.fetchPublicKeysURLCached(url)
|
|
if ok {
|
|
return ce.lines, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if ce.etag != "" {
|
|
req.Header.Add("If-None-Match", ce.etag)
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := srv.pubKeyClient().Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer res.Body.Close()
|
|
var lines []string
|
|
var etag string
|
|
switch res.StatusCode {
|
|
default:
|
|
err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected status %v", res.Status)
|
|
srv.logf("fetching public keys from %s: %v", url, err)
|
|
case http.StatusNotModified:
|
|
lines = ce.lines
|
|
etag = ce.etag
|
|
case http.StatusOK:
|
|
var all []byte
|
|
all, err = io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, 4<<10))
|
|
if s := strings.TrimSpace(string(all)); s != "" {
|
|
lines = strings.Split(s, "\n")
|
|
}
|
|
etag = res.Header.Get("Etag")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
srv.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer srv.mu.Unlock()
|
|
mak.Set(&srv.fetchPublicKeysCache, url, pubKeyCacheEntry{
|
|
at: srv.now(),
|
|
lines: lines,
|
|
etag: etag,
|
|
})
|
|
return lines, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleSessionPostSSHAuth runs an SSH session after the SSH-level authentication,
|
|
// but not necessarily before all the Tailscale-level extra verification has
|
|
// completed. It also handles SFTP requests.
|
|
func (c *conn) handleSessionPostSSHAuth(s ssh.Session) {
|
|
// Do this check after auth, but before starting the session.
|
|
switch s.Subsystem() {
|
|
case "sftp":
|
|
if sshDisableSFTP() {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(s.Stderr(), "sftp disabled\r\n")
|
|
s.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
metricSFTP.Add(1)
|
|
case "":
|
|
// Regular SSH session.
|
|
default:
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(s.Stderr(), "Unsupported subsystem %q\r\n", s.Subsystem())
|
|
s.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss := c.newSSHSession(s)
|
|
ss.logf("handling new SSH connection from %v (%v) to ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.info.src.Addr(), c.localUser.Username)
|
|
ss.logf("access granted to %v as ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.localUser.Username)
|
|
ss.run()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolveNextAction starts at c.currentAction and makes it way through the
|
|
// action chain one step at a time. An action without a HoldAndDelegate is
|
|
// considered the final action. Once a final action is reached, this function
|
|
// will keep returning that action. It updates c.currentAction to the next
|
|
// action in the chain. When the final action is reached, it also sets
|
|
// c.finalAction to the final action.
|
|
func (c *conn) resolveNextAction(sctx ssh.Context) (action *tailcfg.SSHAction, err error) {
|
|
if c.finalAction != nil || c.finalActionErr != nil {
|
|
return c.finalAction, c.finalActionErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if action != nil {
|
|
c.currentAction = action
|
|
if action.Accept || action.Reject {
|
|
c.finalAction = action
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.finalActionErr = err
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(sctx)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
// Loop processing/fetching Actions until one reaches a
|
|
// terminal state (Accept, Reject, or invalid Action), or
|
|
// until fetchSSHAction times out due to the context being
|
|
// done (client disconnect) or its 30 minute timeout passes.
|
|
// (Which is a long time for somebody to see login
|
|
// instructions and go to a URL to do something.)
|
|
action = c.currentAction
|
|
if action.Accept || action.Reject {
|
|
if action.Reject {
|
|
metricTerminalReject.Add(1)
|
|
} else {
|
|
metricTerminalAccept.Add(1)
|
|
}
|
|
return action, nil
|
|
}
|
|
url := action.HoldAndDelegate
|
|
if url == "" {
|
|
metricTerminalMalformed.Add(1)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("reached Action that lacked Accept, Reject, and HoldAndDelegate")
|
|
}
|
|
metricHolds.Add(1)
|
|
url = c.expandDelegateURLLocked(url)
|
|
nextAction, err := c.fetchSSHAction(ctx, url)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
metricTerminalFetchError.Add(1)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetching SSHAction from %s: %w", url, err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nextAction, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) expandDelegateURLLocked(actionURL string) string {
|
|
nm := c.srv.lb.NetMap()
|
|
ci := c.info
|
|
lu := c.localUser
|
|
var dstNodeID string
|
|
if nm != nil {
|
|
dstNodeID = fmt.Sprint(int64(nm.SelfNode.ID()))
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.NewReplacer(
|
|
"$SRC_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.src.Addr().String()),
|
|
"$SRC_NODE_ID", fmt.Sprint(int64(ci.node.ID())),
|
|
"$DST_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.dst.Addr().String()),
|
|
"$DST_NODE_ID", dstNodeID,
|
|
"$SSH_USER", url.QueryEscape(ci.sshUser),
|
|
"$LOCAL_USER", url.QueryEscape(lu.Username),
|
|
).Replace(actionURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) expandPublicKeyURL(pubKeyURL string) string {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(pubKeyURL, "$") {
|
|
return pubKeyURL
|
|
}
|
|
loginName := c.info.uprof.LoginName
|
|
localPart, _, _ := strings.Cut(loginName, "@")
|
|
return strings.NewReplacer(
|
|
"$LOGINNAME_EMAIL", loginName,
|
|
"$LOGINNAME_LOCALPART", localPart,
|
|
).Replace(pubKeyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sshSession is an accepted Tailscale SSH session.
|
|
type sshSession struct {
|
|
ssh.Session
|
|
sharedID string // ID that's shared with control
|
|
logf logger.Logf
|
|
|
|
ctx context.Context
|
|
cancelCtx context.CancelCauseFunc
|
|
conn *conn
|
|
agentListener net.Listener // non-nil if agent-forwarding requested+allowed
|
|
|
|
// initialized by launchProcess:
|
|
cmd *exec.Cmd
|
|
wrStdin io.WriteCloser
|
|
rdStdout io.ReadCloser
|
|
rdStderr io.ReadCloser // rdStderr is nil for pty sessions
|
|
ptyReq *ssh.Pty // non-nil for pty sessions
|
|
|
|
// childPipes is a list of pipes that need to be closed when the process exits.
|
|
// For pty sessions, this is the tty fd.
|
|
// For non-pty sessions, this is the stdin, stdout, stderr fds.
|
|
childPipes []io.Closer
|
|
|
|
// We use this sync.Once to ensure that we only terminate the process once,
|
|
// either it exits itself or is terminated
|
|
exitOnce sync.Once
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) vlogf(format string, args ...any) {
|
|
if sshVerboseLogging() {
|
|
ss.logf(format, args...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) newSSHSession(s ssh.Session) *sshSession {
|
|
sharedID := fmt.Sprintf("sess-%s-%02x", c.srv.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5))
|
|
c.logf("starting session: %v", sharedID)
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancelCause(s.Context())
|
|
return &sshSession{
|
|
Session: s,
|
|
sharedID: sharedID,
|
|
ctx: ctx,
|
|
cancelCtx: cancel,
|
|
conn: c,
|
|
logf: logger.WithPrefix(c.srv.logf, "ssh-session("+sharedID+"): "),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isStillValid reports whether the conn is still valid.
|
|
func (c *conn) isStillValid() bool {
|
|
a, localUser, err := c.evaluatePolicy(c.pubKey)
|
|
c.vlogf("stillValid: %+v %v %v", a, localUser, err)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if !a.Accept && a.HoldAndDelegate == "" {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return c.localUser.Username == localUser
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkStillValid checks that the conn is still valid per the latest SSHPolicy.
|
|
// If not, it terminates all sessions associated with the conn.
|
|
func (c *conn) checkStillValid() {
|
|
if c.isStillValid() {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
metricPolicyChangeKick.Add(1)
|
|
c.logf("session no longer valid per new SSH policy; closing")
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, s := range c.sessions {
|
|
s.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Access revoked.\r\n"),
|
|
context.Canceled,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) fetchSSHAction(ctx context.Context, url string) (*tailcfg.SSHAction, error) {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Minute)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
bo := backoff.NewBackoff("fetch-ssh-action", c.logf, 10*time.Second)
|
|
for {
|
|
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := c.srv.lb.DoNoiseRequest(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
|
|
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
|
|
res.Body.Close()
|
|
if len(body) > 1<<10 {
|
|
body = body[:1<<10]
|
|
}
|
|
c.logf("fetch of %v: %s, %s", url, res.Status, body)
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status: %v", res.Status))
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
a := new(tailcfg.SSHAction)
|
|
err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(a)
|
|
res.Body.Close()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid next SSHAction JSON from %v: %v", url, err)
|
|
bo.BackOff(ctx, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return a, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// killProcessOnContextDone waits for ss.ctx to be done and kills the process,
|
|
// unless the process has already exited.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) killProcessOnContextDone() {
|
|
<-ss.ctx.Done()
|
|
// Either the process has already exited, in which case this does nothing.
|
|
// Or, the process is still running in which case this will kill it.
|
|
ss.exitOnce.Do(func() {
|
|
err := context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
if serr, ok := err.(SSHTerminationError); ok {
|
|
msg := serr.SSHTerminationMessage()
|
|
if msg != "" {
|
|
io.WriteString(ss.Stderr(), "\r\n\r\n"+msg+"\r\n\r\n")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("terminating SSH session from %v: %v", ss.conn.info.src.Addr(), err)
|
|
// We don't need to Process.Wait here, sshSession.run() does
|
|
// the waiting regardless of termination reason.
|
|
|
|
// TODO(maisem): should this be a SIGTERM followed by a SIGKILL?
|
|
ss.cmd.Process.Kill()
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// attachSession registers ss as an active session.
|
|
func (c *conn) attachSession(ss *sshSession) {
|
|
c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Add(1)
|
|
if ss.sharedID == "" {
|
|
panic("empty sharedID")
|
|
}
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
c.sessions = append(c.sessions, ss)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// detachSession unregisters s from the list of active sessions.
|
|
func (c *conn) detachSession(ss *sshSession) {
|
|
defer c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Done()
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i, s := range c.sessions {
|
|
if s == ss {
|
|
c.sessions = append(c.sessions[:i], c.sessions[i+1:]...)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var errSessionDone = errors.New("session is done")
|
|
|
|
// handleSSHAgentForwarding starts a Unix socket listener and in the background
|
|
// forwards agent connections between the listener and the ssh.Session.
|
|
// On success, it assigns ss.agentListener.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) handleSSHAgentForwarding(s ssh.Session, lu *userMeta) error {
|
|
if !ssh.AgentRequested(ss) || !ss.conn.finalAction.AllowAgentForwarding {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if sshDisableForwarding() {
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz): or do we want to return an error here instead so the user
|
|
// gets an error if they ran with ssh -A? But for now we just silently
|
|
// don't work, like the condition above.
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("ssh: agent forwarding requested")
|
|
ln, err := ssh.NewAgentListener()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err != nil && ln != nil {
|
|
ln.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Uid, 10, 32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Gid, 10, 32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
socket := ln.Addr().String()
|
|
dir := filepath.Dir(socket)
|
|
// Make sure the socket is accessible only by the user.
|
|
if err := os.Chmod(socket, 0600); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.Chown(socket, int(uid), int(gid)); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// Make sure the dir is also accessible.
|
|
if err := os.Chmod(dir, 0755); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
go ssh.ForwardAgentConnections(ln, s)
|
|
ss.agentListener = ln
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// run is the entrypoint for a newly accepted SSH session.
|
|
//
|
|
// It handles ss once it's been accepted and determined
|
|
// that it should run.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) run() {
|
|
metricActiveSessions.Add(1)
|
|
defer metricActiveSessions.Add(-1)
|
|
defer ss.cancelCtx(errSessionDone)
|
|
|
|
if attached := ss.conn.srv.attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss); !attached {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "Tailscale SSH is shutting down\r\n")
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer ss.conn.detachSession(ss)
|
|
|
|
lu := ss.conn.localUser
|
|
logf := ss.logf
|
|
|
|
if ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration != 0 {
|
|
t := time.AfterFunc(ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration, func() {
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Session timeout of %v elapsed.", ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration),
|
|
context.DeadlineExceeded,
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
defer t.Stop()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if euid := os.Geteuid(); euid != 0 {
|
|
if lu.Uid != fmt.Sprint(euid) {
|
|
ss.logf("can't switch to user %q from process euid %v", lu.Username, euid)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't switch user\r\n")
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Take control of the PTY so that we can configure it below.
|
|
// See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/4146
|
|
ss.DisablePTYEmulation()
|
|
|
|
var rec *recording // or nil if disabled
|
|
if ss.Subsystem() != "sftp" {
|
|
if err := ss.handleSSHAgentForwarding(ss, lu); err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("agent forwarding failed: %v", err)
|
|
} else if ss.agentListener != nil {
|
|
// TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add a way to close all session resources
|
|
defer ss.agentListener.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ss.shouldRecord() {
|
|
var err error
|
|
rec, err = ss.startNewRecording()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var uve userVisibleError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &uve) {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve.SSHTerminationMessage())
|
|
} else {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't start new recording\r\n")
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("startNewRecording: %v", err)
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("startNewRecording: <nil>")
|
|
if rec != nil {
|
|
defer rec.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := ss.launchProcess()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logf("start failed: %v", err.Error())
|
|
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
|
|
err := context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
var uve userVisibleError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &uve) {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
go ss.killProcessOnContextDone()
|
|
|
|
var processDone atomic.Bool
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.wrStdin.Close()
|
|
if _, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("i", ss.wrStdin), ss); err != nil {
|
|
logf("stdin copy: %v", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
outputDone := make(chan struct{})
|
|
var openOutputStreams atomic.Int32
|
|
if ss.rdStderr != nil {
|
|
openOutputStreams.Store(2)
|
|
} else {
|
|
openOutputStreams.Store(1)
|
|
}
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.rdStdout.Close()
|
|
_, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("o", ss), ss.rdStdout)
|
|
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
|
|
isErrBecauseProcessExited := processDone.Load() && errors.Is(err, syscall.EIO)
|
|
if !isErrBecauseProcessExited {
|
|
logf("stdout copy: %v, %T", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 {
|
|
ss.CloseWrite()
|
|
close(outputDone)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
// rdStderr is nil for ptys.
|
|
if ss.rdStderr != nil {
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer ss.rdStderr.Close()
|
|
_, err := io.Copy(ss.Stderr(), ss.rdStderr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logf("stderr copy: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 {
|
|
ss.CloseWrite()
|
|
close(outputDone)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = ss.cmd.Wait()
|
|
processDone.Store(true)
|
|
|
|
// This will either make the SSH Termination goroutine be a no-op,
|
|
// or itself will be a no-op because the process was killed by the
|
|
// aforementioned goroutine.
|
|
ss.exitOnce.Do(func() {})
|
|
|
|
// Close the process-side of all pipes to signal the asynchronous
|
|
// io.Copy routines reading/writing from the pipes to terminate.
|
|
// Block for the io.Copy to finish before calling ss.Exit below.
|
|
closeAll(ss.childPipes...)
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-outputDone:
|
|
case <-ss.ctx.Done():
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
ss.logf("Session complete")
|
|
ss.Exit(0)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
|
|
code := ee.ProcessState.ExitCode()
|
|
ss.logf("Wait: code=%v", code)
|
|
ss.Exit(code)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss.logf("Wait: %v", err)
|
|
ss.Exit(1)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recordSSHToLocalDisk is a deprecated dev knob to allow recording SSH sessions
|
|
// to local storage. It is only used if there is no recording configured by the
|
|
// coordination server. This will be removed in the future.
|
|
var recordSSHToLocalDisk = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_LOG_SSH")
|
|
|
|
// recorders returns the list of recorders to use for this session.
|
|
// If the final action has a non-empty list of recorders, that list is
|
|
// returned. Otherwise, the list of recorders from the initial action
|
|
// is returned.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) recorders() ([]netip.AddrPort, *tailcfg.SSHRecorderFailureAction) {
|
|
if len(ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders) > 0 {
|
|
return ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders, ss.conn.finalAction.OnRecordingFailure
|
|
}
|
|
return ss.conn.action0.Recorders, ss.conn.action0.OnRecordingFailure
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) shouldRecord() bool {
|
|
recs, _ := ss.recorders()
|
|
return len(recs) > 0 || recordSSHToLocalDisk()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type sshConnInfo struct {
|
|
// sshUser is the requested local SSH username ("root", "alice", etc).
|
|
sshUser string
|
|
|
|
// src is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came from.
|
|
src netip.AddrPort
|
|
|
|
// dst is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came for.
|
|
dst netip.AddrPort
|
|
|
|
// node is srcIP's node.
|
|
node tailcfg.NodeView
|
|
|
|
// uprof is node's UserProfile.
|
|
uprof tailcfg.UserProfile
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ci *sshConnInfo) String() string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%v->%v@%v", ci.src, ci.sshUser, ci.dst)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) ruleExpired(r *tailcfg.SSHRule) bool {
|
|
if r.RuleExpires == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return r.RuleExpires.Before(c.srv.now())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) evalSSHPolicy(pol *tailcfg.SSHPolicy, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, ok bool) {
|
|
for _, r := range pol.Rules {
|
|
if a, localUser, err := c.matchRule(r, pubKey); err == nil {
|
|
return a, localUser, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// internal errors for testing; they don't escape to callers or logs.
|
|
var (
|
|
errNilRule = errors.New("nil rule")
|
|
errNilAction = errors.New("nil action")
|
|
errRuleExpired = errors.New("rule expired")
|
|
errPrincipalMatch = errors.New("principal didn't match")
|
|
errUserMatch = errors.New("user didn't match")
|
|
errInvalidConn = errors.New("invalid connection state")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) matchRule(r *tailcfg.SSHRule, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, err error) {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
c.vlogf("matchRule(%+v): %v", r, err)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if c == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", errInvalidConn
|
|
}
|
|
if c.info == nil {
|
|
c.logf("invalid connection state")
|
|
return nil, "", errInvalidConn
|
|
}
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", errNilRule
|
|
}
|
|
if r.Action == nil {
|
|
return nil, "", errNilAction
|
|
}
|
|
if c.ruleExpired(r) {
|
|
return nil, "", errRuleExpired
|
|
}
|
|
if !r.Action.Reject {
|
|
// For all but Reject rules, SSHUsers is required.
|
|
// If SSHUsers is nil or empty, mapLocalUser will return an
|
|
// empty string anyway.
|
|
localUser = mapLocalUser(r.SSHUsers, c.info.sshUser)
|
|
if localUser == "" {
|
|
return nil, "", errUserMatch
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ok, err := c.anyPrincipalMatches(r.Principals, pubKey); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, "", err
|
|
} else if !ok {
|
|
return nil, "", errPrincipalMatch
|
|
}
|
|
return r.Action, localUser, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func mapLocalUser(ruleSSHUsers map[string]string, reqSSHUser string) (localUser string) {
|
|
v, ok := ruleSSHUsers[reqSSHUser]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
v = ruleSSHUsers["*"]
|
|
}
|
|
if v == "=" {
|
|
return reqSSHUser
|
|
}
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) anyPrincipalMatches(ps []*tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) {
|
|
for _, p := range ps {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if ok, err := c.principalMatches(p, pubKey); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
} else if ok {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) principalMatches(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) {
|
|
if !c.principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p) {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return c.principalMatchesPubKey(p, pubKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity reports whether one of p's four fields
|
|
// that match the Tailscale identity match (Node, NodeIP, UserLogin, Any).
|
|
// This function does not consider PubKeys.
|
|
func (c *conn) principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal) bool {
|
|
ci := c.info
|
|
if p.Any {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if !p.Node.IsZero() && ci.node.Valid() && p.Node == ci.node.StableID() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if p.NodeIP != "" {
|
|
if ip, _ := netip.ParseAddr(p.NodeIP); ip == ci.src.Addr() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if p.UserLogin != "" && ci.uprof.LoginName == p.UserLogin {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *conn) principalMatchesPubKey(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, clientPubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) {
|
|
if len(p.PubKeys) == 0 {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if clientPubKey == nil {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
knownKeys := p.PubKeys
|
|
if len(knownKeys) == 1 && strings.HasPrefix(knownKeys[0], "https://") {
|
|
var err error
|
|
knownKeys, err = c.srv.fetchPublicKeysURL(c.expandPublicKeyURL(knownKeys[0]))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, knownKey := range knownKeys {
|
|
if pubKeyMatchesAuthorizedKey(clientPubKey, knownKey) {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func pubKeyMatchesAuthorizedKey(pubKey ssh.PublicKey, wantKey string) bool {
|
|
wantKeyType, rest, ok := strings.Cut(wantKey, " ")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if pubKey.Type() != wantKeyType {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
wantKeyB64, _, _ := strings.Cut(rest, " ")
|
|
wantKeyData, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(wantKeyB64)
|
|
return len(wantKeyData) > 0 && bytes.Equal(pubKey.Marshal(), wantKeyData)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func randBytes(n int) []byte {
|
|
b := make([]byte, n)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
|
panic(err)
|
|
}
|
|
return b
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CastHeader is the header of an asciinema file.
|
|
type CastHeader struct {
|
|
// Version is the asciinema file format version.
|
|
Version int `json:"version"`
|
|
|
|
// Width is the terminal width in characters.
|
|
// It is non-zero for Pty sessions.
|
|
Width int `json:"width"`
|
|
|
|
// Height is the terminal height in characters.
|
|
// It is non-zero for Pty sessions.
|
|
Height int `json:"height"`
|
|
|
|
// Timestamp is the unix timestamp of when the recording started.
|
|
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
|
|
|
|
// Env is the environment variables of the session.
|
|
// Only "TERM" is set (2023-03-22).
|
|
Env map[string]string `json:"env"`
|
|
|
|
// Command is the command that was executed.
|
|
// Typically empty for shell sessions.
|
|
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// Tailscale-specific fields:
|
|
// SrcNode is the FQDN of the node originating the connection.
|
|
// It is also the MagicDNS name for the node.
|
|
// It does not have a trailing dot.
|
|
// e.g. "host.tail-scale.ts.net"
|
|
SrcNode string `json:"srcNode"`
|
|
|
|
// SrcNodeID is the node ID of the node originating the connection.
|
|
SrcNodeID tailcfg.StableNodeID `json:"srcNodeID"`
|
|
|
|
// SrcNodeTags is the list of tags on the node originating the connection (if any).
|
|
SrcNodeTags []string `json:"srcNodeTags,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// SrcNodeUserID is the user ID of the node originating the connection (if not tagged).
|
|
SrcNodeUserID tailcfg.UserID `json:"srcNodeUserID,omitempty"` // if not tagged
|
|
|
|
// SrcNodeUser is the LoginName of the node originating the connection (if not tagged).
|
|
SrcNodeUser string `json:"srcNodeUser,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// SSHUser is the username as presented by the client.
|
|
SSHUser string `json:"sshUser"` // as presented by the client
|
|
|
|
// LocalUser is the effective username on the server.
|
|
LocalUser string `json:"localUser"`
|
|
|
|
// ConnectionID uniquely identifies a connection made to the SSH server.
|
|
// It may be shared across multiple sessions over the same connection in
|
|
// case of SSH multiplexing.
|
|
ConnectionID string `json:"connectionID"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sessionRecordingClient returns an http.Client that uses srv.lb.Dialer() to
|
|
// dial connections. This is used to make requests to the session recording
|
|
// server to upload session recordings.
|
|
// It uses the provided dialCtx to dial connections, and limits a single dial
|
|
// to 5 seconds.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) sessionRecordingClient(dialCtx context.Context) (*http.Client, error) {
|
|
dialer := ss.conn.srv.lb.Dialer()
|
|
if dialer == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no peer API transport")
|
|
}
|
|
tr := dialer.PeerAPITransport().Clone()
|
|
dialContextFn := tr.DialContext
|
|
|
|
tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
|
perAttemptCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
go func() {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-perAttemptCtx.Done():
|
|
case <-dialCtx.Done():
|
|
cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
return dialContextFn(perAttemptCtx, network, addr)
|
|
}
|
|
return &http.Client{
|
|
Transport: tr,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connectToRecorder connects to the recorder at any of the provided addresses.
|
|
// It returns the first successful response, or a multierr if all attempts fail.
|
|
//
|
|
// On success, it returns a WriteCloser that can be used to upload the
|
|
// recording, and a channel that will be sent an error (or nil) when the upload
|
|
// fails or completes.
|
|
//
|
|
// In both cases, a slice of SSHRecordingAttempts is returned which detail the
|
|
// attempted recorder IP and the error message, if the attempt failed. The
|
|
// attempts are in order the recorder(s) was attempted. If successful a
|
|
// successful connection is made, the last attempt in the slice is the
|
|
// attempt for connected recorder.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) connectToRecorder(ctx context.Context, recs []netip.AddrPort) (io.WriteCloser, []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt, <-chan error, error) {
|
|
if len(recs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("no recorders configured")
|
|
}
|
|
// We use a special context for dialing the recorder, so that we can
|
|
// limit the time we spend dialing to 30 seconds and still have an
|
|
// unbounded context for the upload.
|
|
dialCtx, dialCancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
|
|
defer dialCancel()
|
|
hc, err := ss.sessionRecordingClient(dialCtx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var errs []error
|
|
var attempts []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt
|
|
for _, ap := range recs {
|
|
attempt := &tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt{
|
|
Recorder: ap,
|
|
}
|
|
attempts = append(attempts, attempt)
|
|
|
|
// We dial the recorder and wait for it to send a 100-continue
|
|
// response before returning from this function. This ensures that
|
|
// the recorder is ready to accept the recording.
|
|
|
|
// got100 is closed when we receive the 100-continue response.
|
|
got100 := make(chan struct{})
|
|
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
|
|
Got100Continue: func() {
|
|
close(got100)
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
pr, pw := io.Pipe()
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%d/record", ap.Addr(), ap.Port()), pr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
err = fmt.Errorf("recording: error starting recording: %w", err)
|
|
attempt.FailureMessage = err.Error()
|
|
errs = append(errs, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// We set the Expect header to 100-continue, so that the recorder
|
|
// will send a 100-continue response before it starts reading the
|
|
// request body.
|
|
req.Header.Set("Expect", "100-continue")
|
|
|
|
// errChan is used to indicate the result of the request.
|
|
errChan := make(chan error, 1)
|
|
go func() {
|
|
resp, err := hc.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errChan <- fmt.Errorf("recording: error starting recording: %w", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
|
|
errChan <- fmt.Errorf("recording: unexpected status: %v", resp.Status)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
errChan <- nil
|
|
}()
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-got100:
|
|
case err := <-errChan:
|
|
// If we get an error before we get the 100-continue response,
|
|
// we need to try another recorder.
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
// If the error is nil, we got a 200 response, which
|
|
// is unexpected as we haven't sent any data yet.
|
|
err = errors.New("recording: unexpected EOF")
|
|
}
|
|
attempt.FailureMessage = err.Error()
|
|
errs = append(errs, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return pw, attempts, errChan, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, attempts, nil, multierr.New(errs...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) openFileForRecording(now time.Time) (_ io.WriteCloser, err error) {
|
|
varRoot := ss.conn.srv.lb.TailscaleVarRoot()
|
|
if varRoot == "" {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no var root for recording storage")
|
|
}
|
|
dir := filepath.Join(varRoot, "ssh-sessions")
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
f, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, fmt.Sprintf("ssh-session-%v-*.cast", now.UnixNano()))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return f, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// startNewRecording starts a new SSH session recording.
|
|
// It may return a nil recording if recording is not available.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) startNewRecording() (_ *recording, err error) {
|
|
// We store the node key as soon as possible when creating
|
|
// a new recording incase of FUS.
|
|
nodeKey := ss.conn.srv.lb.NodeKey()
|
|
if nodeKey.IsZero() {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("ssh server is unavailable: no node key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
recorders, onFailure := ss.recorders()
|
|
var localRecording bool
|
|
if len(recorders) == 0 {
|
|
if recordSSHToLocalDisk() {
|
|
localRecording = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no recorders configured")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var w ssh.Window
|
|
if ptyReq, _, isPtyReq := ss.Pty(); isPtyReq {
|
|
w = ptyReq.Window
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
term := envValFromList(ss.Environ(), "TERM")
|
|
if term == "" {
|
|
term = "xterm-256color" // something non-empty
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rec := &recording{
|
|
ss: ss,
|
|
start: now,
|
|
failOpen: onFailure == nil || onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage == "",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We want to use a background context for uploading and not ss.ctx.
|
|
// ss.ctx is closed when the session closes, but we don't want to break the upload at that time.
|
|
// Instead we want to wait for the session to close the writer when it finishes.
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
if localRecording {
|
|
rec.out, err = ss.openFileForRecording(now)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
var errChan <-chan error
|
|
var attempts []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt
|
|
rec.out, attempts, errChan, err = ss.connectToRecorder(ctx, recorders)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.NotifyURL != "" && len(attempts) > 0 {
|
|
eventType := tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingFailed
|
|
if onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
eventType = tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingRejected
|
|
}
|
|
ss.notifyControl(ctx, nodeKey, eventType, attempts, onFailure.NotifyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (rejecting session): %v", err)
|
|
return nil, userVisibleError{
|
|
error: err,
|
|
msg: onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (failing open): %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
go func() {
|
|
err := <-errChan
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
// Success.
|
|
ss.logf("recording: finished uploading recording")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.NotifyURL != "" && len(attempts) > 0 {
|
|
lastAttempt := attempts[len(attempts)-1]
|
|
lastAttempt.FailureMessage = err.Error()
|
|
|
|
eventType := tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingFailed
|
|
if onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
eventType = tailcfg.SSHSessionRecordingTerminated
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss.notifyControl(ctx, nodeKey, eventType, attempts, onFailure.NotifyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
if onFailure != nil && onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage != "" {
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (closing session): %v", err)
|
|
ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{
|
|
error: err,
|
|
msg: onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage,
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (failing open): %v", err)
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch := CastHeader{
|
|
Version: 2,
|
|
Width: w.Width,
|
|
Height: w.Height,
|
|
Timestamp: now.Unix(),
|
|
Command: strings.Join(ss.Command(), " "),
|
|
Env: map[string]string{
|
|
"TERM": term,
|
|
// TODO(bradfitz): anything else important?
|
|
// including all seems noisey, but maybe we should
|
|
// for auditing. But first need to break
|
|
// launchProcess's startWithStdPipes and
|
|
// startWithPTY up so that they first return the cmd
|
|
// without starting it, and then a step that starts
|
|
// it. Then we can (1) make the cmd, (2) start the
|
|
// recording, (3) start the process.
|
|
},
|
|
SSHUser: ss.conn.info.sshUser,
|
|
LocalUser: ss.conn.localUser.Username,
|
|
SrcNode: strings.TrimSuffix(ss.conn.info.node.Name(), "."),
|
|
SrcNodeID: ss.conn.info.node.StableID(),
|
|
ConnectionID: ss.conn.connID,
|
|
}
|
|
if !ss.conn.info.node.IsTagged() {
|
|
ch.SrcNodeUser = ss.conn.info.uprof.LoginName
|
|
ch.SrcNodeUserID = ss.conn.info.node.User()
|
|
} else {
|
|
ch.SrcNodeTags = ss.conn.info.node.Tags().AsSlice()
|
|
}
|
|
j, err := json.Marshal(ch)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
j = append(j, '\n')
|
|
if _, err := rec.out.Write(j); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, io.ErrClosedPipe) && ss.ctx.Err() != nil {
|
|
// If we got an io.ErrClosedPipe, it's likely because
|
|
// the recording server closed the connection on us. Return
|
|
// the original context error instead.
|
|
return nil, context.Cause(ss.ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return rec, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// notifyControl sends a SSHEventNotifyRequest to control over noise.
|
|
// A SSHEventNotifyRequest is sent when an action or state reached during
|
|
// an SSH session is a defined EventType.
|
|
func (ss *sshSession) notifyControl(ctx context.Context, nodeKey key.NodePublic, notifyType tailcfg.SSHEventType, attempts []*tailcfg.SSHRecordingAttempt, url string) {
|
|
re := tailcfg.SSHEventNotifyRequest{
|
|
EventType: notifyType,
|
|
ConnectionID: ss.conn.connID,
|
|
CapVersion: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
|
|
NodeKey: nodeKey,
|
|
SrcNode: ss.conn.info.node.ID(),
|
|
SSHUser: ss.conn.info.sshUser,
|
|
LocalUser: ss.conn.localUser.Username,
|
|
RecordingAttempts: attempts,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body, err := json.Marshal(re)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to marshal SSHNotifyRequest:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, httpm.POST, url, bytes.NewReader(body))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to create request:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp, err := ss.conn.srv.lb.DoNoiseRequest(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: unable to send noise request:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
ss.logf("notifyControl: noise request returned status code %v", resp.StatusCode)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recording is the state for an SSH session recording.
|
|
type recording struct {
|
|
ss *sshSession
|
|
start time.Time
|
|
|
|
// failOpen specifies whether the session should be allowed to
|
|
// continue if writing to the recording fails.
|
|
failOpen bool
|
|
|
|
mu sync.Mutex // guards writes to, close of out
|
|
out io.WriteCloser
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *recording) Close() error {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if r.out == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
err := r.out.Close()
|
|
r.out = nil
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writer returns an io.Writer around w that first records the write.
|
|
//
|
|
// The dir should be "i" for input or "o" for output.
|
|
//
|
|
// If r is nil, it returns w unchanged.
|
|
//
|
|
// Currently (2023-03-21) we only record output, not input.
|
|
func (r *recording) writer(dir string, w io.Writer) io.Writer {
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return w
|
|
}
|
|
if dir == "i" {
|
|
// TODO: record input? Maybe not, since it might contain
|
|
// passwords.
|
|
return w
|
|
}
|
|
return &loggingWriter{r: r, dir: dir, w: w}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// loggingWriter is an io.Writer wrapper that writes first an
|
|
// asciinema JSON cast format recording line, and then writes to w.
|
|
type loggingWriter struct {
|
|
r *recording
|
|
dir string // "i" or "o" (input or output)
|
|
w io.Writer // underlying Writer, after writing to r.out
|
|
|
|
// recordingFailedOpen specifies whether we've failed to write to
|
|
// r.out and should stop trying. It is set to true if we fail to write
|
|
// to r.out and r.failOpen is set.
|
|
recordingFailedOpen bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (w *loggingWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
|
if !w.recordingFailedOpen {
|
|
j, err := json.Marshal([]any{
|
|
time.Since(w.r.start).Seconds(),
|
|
w.dir,
|
|
string(p),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, err
|
|
}
|
|
j = append(j, '\n')
|
|
if err := w.writeCastLine(j); err != nil {
|
|
if !w.r.failOpen {
|
|
return 0, err
|
|
}
|
|
w.recordingFailedOpen = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return w.w.Write(p)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (w loggingWriter) writeCastLine(j []byte) error {
|
|
w.r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer w.r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if w.r.out == nil {
|
|
return errors.New("logger closed")
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := w.r.out.Write(j)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("logger Write: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func envValFromList(env []string, wantKey string) (v string) {
|
|
for _, kv := range env {
|
|
if thisKey, v, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "="); ok && envEq(thisKey, wantKey) {
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// envEq reports whether environment variable a == b for the current
|
|
// operating system.
|
|
func envEq(a, b string) bool {
|
|
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
|
|
return strings.EqualFold(a, b)
|
|
}
|
|
return a == b
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
metricActiveSessions = clientmetric.NewGauge("ssh_active_sessions")
|
|
metricIncomingConnections = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_incoming_connections")
|
|
metricPublicKeyAccepts = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_publickey_accepts") // accepted subset of ssh_publickey_connections
|
|
metricTerminalAccept = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_accept")
|
|
metricTerminalReject = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_reject")
|
|
metricTerminalMalformed = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_malformed")
|
|
metricTerminalFetchError = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_fetch_error")
|
|
metricHolds = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_holds")
|
|
metricPolicyChangeKick = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_policy_change_kick")
|
|
metricSFTP = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_sftp_sessions")
|
|
metricLocalPortForward = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_local_port_forward_requests")
|
|
metricRemotePortForward = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_remote_port_forward_requests")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// userVisibleError is a wrapper around an error that implements
|
|
// SSHTerminationError, so msg is written to their session.
|
|
type userVisibleError struct {
|
|
msg string
|
|
error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ue userVisibleError) SSHTerminationMessage() string { return ue.msg }
|
|
|
|
// SSHTerminationError is implemented by errors that terminate an SSH
|
|
// session and should be written to user's sessions.
|
|
type SSHTerminationError interface {
|
|
error
|
|
SSHTerminationMessage() string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func closeAll(cs ...io.Closer) {
|
|
for _, c := range cs {
|
|
if c != nil {
|
|
c.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|