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3c4c9dc1d2
Web version of https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale-android/pull/370 This allows us to update the prefs rather than creating new prefs Updates tailscale/tailscale#11731 Signed-off-by: kari-ts <kari@tailscale.com>
1352 lines
43 KiB
Go
1352 lines
43 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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// Package web provides the Tailscale client for web.
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package web
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"os"
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"path"
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"path/filepath"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
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"tailscale.com/client/tailscale"
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"tailscale.com/client/tailscale/apitype"
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"tailscale.com/clientupdate"
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"tailscale.com/envknob"
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"tailscale.com/hostinfo"
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"tailscale.com/ipn"
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"tailscale.com/ipn/ipnstate"
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"tailscale.com/licenses"
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"tailscale.com/net/netutil"
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"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
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"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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"tailscale.com/util/httpm"
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"tailscale.com/version"
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"tailscale.com/version/distro"
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)
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// ListenPort is the static port used for the web client when run inside tailscaled.
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// (5252 are the numbers above the letters "TSTS" on a qwerty keyboard.)
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const ListenPort = 5252
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// Server is the backend server for a Tailscale web client.
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type Server struct {
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mode ServerMode
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logf logger.Logf
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lc *tailscale.LocalClient
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timeNow func() time.Time
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// devMode indicates that the server run with frontend assets
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// served by a Vite dev server, allowing for local development
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// on the web client frontend.
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devMode bool
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cgiMode bool
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pathPrefix string
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apiHandler http.Handler // serves api endpoints; csrf-protected
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assetsHandler http.Handler // serves frontend assets
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assetsCleanup func() // called from Server.Shutdown
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// browserSessions is an in-memory cache of browser sessions for the
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// full management web client, which is only accessible over Tailscale.
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//
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// Users obtain a valid browser session by connecting to the web client
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// over Tailscale and verifying their identity by authenticating on the
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// control server.
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//
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// browserSessions get reset on every Server restart.
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//
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// The map provides a lookup of the session by cookie value
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// (browserSession.ID => browserSession).
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browserSessions sync.Map
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// newAuthURL creates a new auth URL that can be used to validate
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// a browser session to manage this web client.
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newAuthURL func(ctx context.Context, src tailcfg.NodeID) (*tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse, error)
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// waitWebClientAuthURL blocks until the associated auth URL has
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// been completed by its user, or until ctx is canceled.
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waitAuthURL func(ctx context.Context, id string, src tailcfg.NodeID) (*tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse, error)
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}
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// ServerMode specifies the mode of a running web.Server.
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type ServerMode string
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const (
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// LoginServerMode serves a readonly login client for logging a
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// node into a tailnet, and viewing a readonly interface of the
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// node's current Tailscale settings.
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//
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// In this mode, API calls are authenticated via platform auth.
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LoginServerMode ServerMode = "login"
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// ReadOnlyServerMode is identical to LoginServerMode,
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// but does not present a login button to switch to manage mode,
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// even if the management client is running and reachable.
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//
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// This is designed for platforms where the device is configured by other means,
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// such as Home Assistant's declarative YAML configuration.
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ReadOnlyServerMode ServerMode = "readonly"
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// ManageServerMode serves a management client for editing tailscale
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// settings of a node.
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//
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// This mode restricts the app to only being assessible over Tailscale,
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// and API calls are authenticated via browser sessions associated with
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// the source's Tailscale identity. If the source browser does not have
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// a valid session, a readonly version of the app is displayed.
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ManageServerMode ServerMode = "manage"
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)
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var (
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exitNodeRouteV4 = netip.MustParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0")
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exitNodeRouteV6 = netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")
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)
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// ServerOpts contains options for constructing a new Server.
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type ServerOpts struct {
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// Mode specifies the mode of web client being constructed.
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Mode ServerMode
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// CGIMode indicates if the server is running as a CGI script.
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CGIMode bool
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// PathPrefix is the URL prefix added to requests by CGI or reverse proxy.
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PathPrefix string
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// LocalClient is the tailscale.LocalClient to use for this web server.
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// If nil, a new one will be created.
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LocalClient *tailscale.LocalClient
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// TimeNow optionally provides a time function.
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// time.Now is used as default.
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TimeNow func() time.Time
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// Logf optionally provides a logger function.
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// log.Printf is used as default.
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Logf logger.Logf
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// The following two fields are required and used exclusively
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// in ManageServerMode to facilitate the control server login
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// check step for authorizing browser sessions.
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// NewAuthURL should be provided as a function that generates
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// a new tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse.
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// This field is required for ManageServerMode mode.
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NewAuthURL func(ctx context.Context, src tailcfg.NodeID) (*tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse, error)
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// WaitAuthURL should be provided as a function that blocks until
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// the associated tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse has been marked
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// as completed.
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// This field is required for ManageServerMode mode.
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WaitAuthURL func(ctx context.Context, id string, src tailcfg.NodeID) (*tailcfg.WebClientAuthResponse, error)
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}
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// NewServer constructs a new Tailscale web client server.
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// If err is empty, s is always non-nil.
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// ctx is only required to live the duration of the NewServer call,
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// and not the lifespan of the web server.
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func NewServer(opts ServerOpts) (s *Server, err error) {
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switch opts.Mode {
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case LoginServerMode, ReadOnlyServerMode, ManageServerMode:
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// valid types
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case "":
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("must specify a Mode")
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid Mode provided")
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}
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if opts.LocalClient == nil {
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opts.LocalClient = &tailscale.LocalClient{}
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}
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s = &Server{
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mode: opts.Mode,
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logf: opts.Logf,
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devMode: envknob.Bool("TS_DEBUG_WEB_CLIENT_DEV"),
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lc: opts.LocalClient,
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cgiMode: opts.CGIMode,
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pathPrefix: opts.PathPrefix,
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timeNow: opts.TimeNow,
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newAuthURL: opts.NewAuthURL,
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waitAuthURL: opts.WaitAuthURL,
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}
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if opts.PathPrefix != "" {
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// Enforce that path prefix always has a single leading '/'
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// so that it is treated as a relative URL path.
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// We strip multiple leading '/' to prevent schema-less offsite URLs like "//example.com".
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//
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// See https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/16268.
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s.pathPrefix = "/" + strings.TrimLeft(path.Clean(opts.PathPrefix), "/\\")
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}
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if s.mode == ManageServerMode {
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if opts.NewAuthURL == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("must provide a NewAuthURL implementation")
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}
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if opts.WaitAuthURL == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("must provide WaitAuthURL implementation")
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}
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}
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if s.timeNow == nil {
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s.timeNow = time.Now
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}
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if s.logf == nil {
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s.logf = log.Printf
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}
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s.assetsHandler, s.assetsCleanup = assetsHandler(s.devMode)
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var metric string // clientmetric to report on startup
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// Create handler for "/api" requests with CSRF protection.
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// We don't require secure cookies, since the web client is regularly used
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// on network appliances that are served on local non-https URLs.
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// The client is secured by limiting the interface it listens on,
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// or by authenticating requests before they reach the web client.
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csrfProtect := csrf.Protect(s.csrfKey(), csrf.Secure(false))
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switch s.mode {
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case LoginServerMode:
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s.apiHandler = csrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(s.serveLoginAPI))
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metric = "web_login_client_initialization"
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case ReadOnlyServerMode:
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s.apiHandler = csrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(s.serveLoginAPI))
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metric = "web_readonly_client_initialization"
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case ManageServerMode:
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s.apiHandler = csrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(s.serveAPI))
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metric = "web_client_initialization"
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}
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// Don't block startup on reporting metric.
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// Report in separate go routine with 5 second timeout.
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go func() {
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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s.lc.IncrementCounter(ctx, metric, 1)
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}()
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return s, nil
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}
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func (s *Server) Shutdown() {
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s.logf("web.Server: shutting down")
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if s.assetsCleanup != nil {
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s.assetsCleanup()
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}
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}
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// ServeHTTP processes all requests for the Tailscale web client.
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func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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handler := s.serve
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// if path prefix is defined, strip it from requests.
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if s.cgiMode && s.pathPrefix != "" {
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handler = enforcePrefix(s.pathPrefix, handler)
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}
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handler(w, r)
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}
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func (s *Server) serve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if s.mode == ManageServerMode {
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// In manage mode, requests must be sent directly to the bare Tailscale IP address.
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// If a request comes in on any other hostname, redirect.
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if s.requireTailscaleIP(w, r) {
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return // user was redirected
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}
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// serve HTTP 204 on /ok requests as connectivity check
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if r.Method == httpm.GET && r.URL.Path == "/ok" {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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if !s.devMode {
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// This hash corresponds to the inline script in index.html that runs when the react app is unavailable.
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// It was generated from https://csplite.com/csp/sha/.
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// If the contents of the script are changed, this hash must be updated.
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const indexScriptHash = "sha384-CW2AYVfS14P7QHZN27thEkMLKiCj3YNURPoLc1elwiEkMVHeuYTWkJOEki1F3nZc"
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; img-src * data:; script-src 'self' '"+indexScriptHash+"'")
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w.Header().Set("Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", "same-origin")
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}
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
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switch {
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
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s.serveAPIAuth(w, r) // serve auth status
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return
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth/session/new" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
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s.serveAPIAuthSessionNew(w, r) // create new session
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return
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth/session/wait" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
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s.serveAPIAuthSessionWait(w, r) // wait for session to be authorized
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return
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}
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if ok := s.authorizeRequest(w, r); !ok {
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http.Error(w, "not authorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Pass API requests through to the API handler.
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s.apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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s.assetsHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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}
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// requireTailscaleIP redirects an incoming request if the HTTP request was not made to a bare Tailscale IP address.
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// The request will be redirected to the Tailscale IP, port 5252, with the original request path.
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// This allows any custom hostname to be used to access the device, but protects against DNS rebinding attacks.
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// Returns true if the request has been fully handled, either be returning a redirect or an HTTP error.
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func (s *Server) requireTailscaleIP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (handled bool) {
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const (
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ipv4ServiceHost = tsaddr.TailscaleServiceIPString
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ipv6ServiceHost = "[" + tsaddr.TailscaleServiceIPv6String + "]"
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)
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// allow requests on quad-100 (or ipv6 equivalent)
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if r.Host == ipv4ServiceHost || r.Host == ipv6ServiceHost {
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return false
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}
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st, err := s.lc.StatusWithoutPeers(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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s.logf("error getting status: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return true
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}
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ipv4, ipv6 := s.selfNodeAddresses(r, st)
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if r.Host == fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", ipv4.String(), ListenPort) {
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return false // already accessing over Tailscale IP
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}
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if r.Host == fmt.Sprintf("[%s]:%d", ipv6.String(), ListenPort) {
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return false // already accessing over Tailscale IP
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}
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// Not currently accessing via Tailscale IP,
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// redirect them.
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var preferV6 bool
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if ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.Host); err == nil {
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// If Host was already ipv6, keep them on same protocol.
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preferV6 = ap.Addr().Is6()
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}
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newURL := *r.URL
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if (preferV6 && ipv6.IsValid()) || !ipv4.IsValid() {
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newURL.Host = fmt.Sprintf("[%s]:%d", ipv6.String(), ListenPort)
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} else {
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newURL.Host = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", ipv4.String(), ListenPort)
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, newURL.String(), http.StatusMovedPermanently)
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return true
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}
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// selfNodeAddresses return the Tailscale IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for the self node.
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// st is expected to be a status with peers included.
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func (s *Server) selfNodeAddresses(r *http.Request, st *ipnstate.Status) (ipv4, ipv6 netip.Addr) {
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for _, ip := range st.Self.TailscaleIPs {
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if ip.Is4() {
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ipv4 = ip
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} else if ip.Is6() {
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ipv6 = ip
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}
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if ipv4.IsValid() && ipv6.IsValid() {
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break // found both IPs
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}
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}
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if whois, err := s.lc.WhoIs(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
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// The source peer connecting to this node may know it by a different
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// IP than the node knows itself as. Specifically, this may be the case
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// if the peer is coming from a different tailnet (sharee node), as IPs
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// are specific to each tailnet.
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// Here, we check if the source peer knows the node by a different IP,
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// and return the peer's version if so.
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if knownIPv4 := whois.Node.SelfNodeV4MasqAddrForThisPeer; knownIPv4 != nil {
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ipv4 = *knownIPv4
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}
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if knownIPv6 := whois.Node.SelfNodeV6MasqAddrForThisPeer; knownIPv6 != nil {
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ipv6 = *knownIPv6
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}
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}
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return ipv4, ipv6
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}
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// authorizeRequest reports whether the request from the web client
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// is authorized to be completed.
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// It reports true if the request is authorized, and false otherwise.
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// authorizeRequest manages writing out any relevant authorization
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// errors to the ResponseWriter itself.
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func (s *Server) authorizeRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (ok bool) {
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if s.mode == ManageServerMode { // client using tailscale auth
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session, _, _, err := s.getSession(r)
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, errNotUsingTailscale):
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// All requests must be made over tailscale.
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http.Error(w, "must access over tailscale", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return false
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/data" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
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// Readonly endpoint allowed without valid browser session.
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return true
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/device-details-click" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
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// Special case metric endpoint that is allowed without a browser session.
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return true
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case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/"):
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// All other /api/ endpoints require a valid browser session.
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if err != nil || !session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()) {
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http.Error(w, "no valid session", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return false
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}
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return true
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default:
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// No additional auth on non-api (assets, index.html, etc).
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return true
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}
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}
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// Client using system-specific auth.
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switch distro.Get() {
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case distro.Synology:
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authorized, _ := authorizeSynology(r)
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return authorized
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case distro.QNAP:
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authorized, _ := authorizeQNAP(r)
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return authorized
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default:
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return true // no additional auth for this distro
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}
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}
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// serveLoginAPI serves requests for the web login client.
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// It should only be called by Server.ServeHTTP, via Server.apiHandler,
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// which protects the handler using gorilla csrf.
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func (s *Server) serveLoginAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r))
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switch {
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/data" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
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s.serveGetNodeData(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/up" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
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s.serveTailscaleUp(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/device-details-click" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
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s.serveDeviceDetailsClick(w, r)
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default:
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http.Error(w, "invalid endpoint or method", http.StatusNotFound)
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}
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}
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type apiHandler[data any] struct {
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s *Server
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w http.ResponseWriter
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r *http.Request
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// permissionCheck allows for defining whether a requesting peer's
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// capabilities grant them access to make the given data update.
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// If permissionCheck reports false, the request fails as unauthorized.
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permissionCheck func(data data, peer peerCapabilities) bool
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}
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// newHandler constructs a new api handler which restricts the given request
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// to the specified permission check. If the permission check fails for
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// the peer associated with the request, an unauthorized error is returned
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// to the client.
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func newHandler[data any](s *Server, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, permissionCheck func(data data, peer peerCapabilities) bool) *apiHandler[data] {
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return &apiHandler[data]{
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s: s,
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w: w,
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r: r,
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permissionCheck: permissionCheck,
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}
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}
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// alwaysAllowed can be passed as the permissionCheck argument to newHandler
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// for requests that are always allowed to complete regardless of a peer's
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// capabilities.
|
|
func alwaysAllowed[data any](_ data, _ peerCapabilities) bool { return true }
|
|
|
|
func (a *apiHandler[data]) getPeer() (peerCapabilities, error) {
|
|
// TODO(tailscale/corp#16695,sonia): We also call StatusWithoutPeers and
|
|
// WhoIs when originally checking for a session from authorizeRequest.
|
|
// Would be nice if we could pipe those through to here so we don't end
|
|
// up having to re-call them to grab the peer capabilities.
|
|
status, err := a.s.lc.StatusWithoutPeers(a.r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
whois, err := a.s.lc.WhoIs(a.r.Context(), a.r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
peer, err := toPeerCapabilities(status, whois)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return peer, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type noBodyData any // empty type, for use from serveAPI for endpoints with empty body
|
|
|
|
// handle runs the given handler if the source peer satisfies the
|
|
// constraints for running this request.
|
|
//
|
|
// handle is expected for use when `data` type is empty, or set to
|
|
// `noBodyData` in practice. For requests that expect JSON body data
|
|
// to be attached, use handleJSON instead.
|
|
func (a *apiHandler[data]) handle(h http.HandlerFunc) {
|
|
peer, err := a.getPeer()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var body data // not used
|
|
if !a.permissionCheck(body, peer) {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h(a.w, a.r)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleJSON manages decoding the request's body JSON and passing
|
|
// it on to the provided function if the source peer satisfies the
|
|
// constraints for running this request.
|
|
func (a *apiHandler[data]) handleJSON(h func(ctx context.Context, data data) error) {
|
|
defer a.r.Body.Close()
|
|
var body data
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(a.r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
peer, err := a.getPeer()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !a.permissionCheck(body, peer) {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := h(a.r.Context(), body); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(a.w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
a.w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveAPI serves requests for the web client api.
|
|
// It should only be called by Server.ServeHTTP, via Server.apiHandler,
|
|
// which protects the handler using gorilla csrf.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method == httpm.PATCH {
|
|
// Enforce that PATCH requests are always application/json.
|
|
if ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r))
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api")
|
|
switch {
|
|
case path == "/data" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.serveGetNodeData)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/exit-nodes" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.serveGetExitNodes)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/routes" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
peerAllowed := func(d postRoutesRequest, p peerCapabilities) bool {
|
|
if d.SetExitNode && !p.canEdit(capFeatureExitNodes) {
|
|
return false
|
|
} else if d.SetRoutes && !p.canEdit(capFeatureSubnets) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
newHandler[postRoutesRequest](s, w, r, peerAllowed).
|
|
handleJSON(s.servePostRoutes)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/device-details-click" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.serveDeviceDetailsClick)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/logout" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
peerAllowed := func(_ noBodyData, peer peerCapabilities) bool {
|
|
return peer.canEdit(capFeatureAccount)
|
|
}
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, peerAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/prefs" && r.Method == httpm.PATCH:
|
|
peerAllowed := func(data maskedPrefs, peer peerCapabilities) bool {
|
|
if data.RunSSHSet && !peer.canEdit(capFeatureSSH) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
newHandler[maskedPrefs](s, w, r, peerAllowed).
|
|
handleJSON(s.serveUpdatePrefs)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/update/check" && r.Method == httpm.GET:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/update/check" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
peerAllowed := func(_ noBodyData, peer peerCapabilities) bool {
|
|
return peer.canEdit(capFeatureAccount)
|
|
}
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, peerAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/update/progress" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI)
|
|
return
|
|
case path == "/local/v0/upload-client-metrics" && r.Method == httpm.POST:
|
|
newHandler[noBodyData](s, w, r, alwaysAllowed).
|
|
handle(s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid endpoint", http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type authResponse struct {
|
|
ServerMode ServerMode `json:"serverMode"`
|
|
Authorized bool `json:"authorized"` // has an authorized management session
|
|
ViewerIdentity *viewerIdentity `json:"viewerIdentity,omitempty"`
|
|
NeedsSynoAuth bool `json:"needsSynoAuth,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// viewerIdentity is the Tailscale identity of the source node
|
|
// connected to this web client.
|
|
type viewerIdentity struct {
|
|
LoginName string `json:"loginName"`
|
|
NodeName string `json:"nodeName"`
|
|
NodeIP string `json:"nodeIP"`
|
|
ProfilePicURL string `json:"profilePicUrl,omitempty"`
|
|
Capabilities peerCapabilities `json:"capabilities"` // features peer is allowed to edit
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serverAPIAuth handles requests to the /api/auth endpoint
|
|
// and returns an authResponse indicating the current auth state and any steps the user needs to take.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveAPIAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
var resp authResponse
|
|
resp.ServerMode = s.mode
|
|
session, whois, status, sErr := s.getSession(r)
|
|
var caps peerCapabilities
|
|
|
|
if whois != nil {
|
|
var err error
|
|
caps, err = toPeerCapabilities(status, whois)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, sErr.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
resp.ViewerIdentity = &viewerIdentity{
|
|
LoginName: whois.UserProfile.LoginName,
|
|
NodeName: whois.Node.Name,
|
|
ProfilePicURL: whois.UserProfile.ProfilePicURL,
|
|
Capabilities: caps,
|
|
}
|
|
if addrs := whois.Node.Addresses; len(addrs) > 0 {
|
|
resp.ViewerIdentity.NodeIP = addrs[0].Addr().String()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First verify platform auth.
|
|
// If platform auth is needed, this should happen first.
|
|
if s.mode == LoginServerMode || s.mode == ReadOnlyServerMode {
|
|
switch distro.Get() {
|
|
case distro.Synology:
|
|
authorized, err := authorizeSynology(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !authorized {
|
|
resp.NeedsSynoAuth = true
|
|
writeJSON(w, resp)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
case distro.QNAP:
|
|
if _, err := authorizeQNAP(r); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
// no additional auth for this distro
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case sErr != nil && errors.Is(sErr, errNotUsingTailscale):
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_local", 1)
|
|
resp.Authorized = false // restricted to the readonly view
|
|
case sErr != nil && errors.Is(sErr, errNotOwner):
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_not_owner", 1)
|
|
resp.Authorized = false // restricted to the readonly view
|
|
case sErr != nil && errors.Is(sErr, errTaggedLocalSource):
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_local_tag", 1)
|
|
resp.Authorized = false // restricted to the readonly view
|
|
case sErr != nil && errors.Is(sErr, errTaggedRemoteSource):
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_remote_tag", 1)
|
|
resp.Authorized = false // restricted to the readonly view
|
|
case sErr != nil && !errors.Is(sErr, errNoSession):
|
|
// Any other error.
|
|
http.Error(w, sErr.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
case session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()):
|
|
if whois.Node.StableID == status.Self.ID {
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_managing_local", 1)
|
|
} else {
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_managing_remote", 1)
|
|
}
|
|
// User has a valid session. They're now authorized to edit if they
|
|
// have any edit capabilities. In practice, they won't be sent through
|
|
// the auth flow if they don't have edit caps, but their ACL granted
|
|
// permissions may change at any time. The frontend views and backend
|
|
// endpoints are always restricted to their current capabilities in
|
|
// addition to a valid session.
|
|
//
|
|
// But, we also check the caps here for a better user experience on
|
|
// the frontend login toggle, which uses resp.Authorized to display
|
|
// "viewing" vs "managing" copy. If they don't have caps, we want to
|
|
// display "viewing" even if they have a valid session.
|
|
resp.Authorized = !caps.isEmpty()
|
|
default:
|
|
if whois == nil || (whois.Node.StableID == status.Self.ID) {
|
|
// whois being nil implies local as the request did not come over Tailscale.
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_local", 1)
|
|
} else {
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_viewing_remote", 1)
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Authorized = false // not yet authorized
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type newSessionAuthResponse struct {
|
|
AuthURL string `json:"authUrl,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveAPIAuthSessionNew handles requests to the /api/auth/session/new endpoint.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveAPIAuthSessionNew(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
session, whois, _, err := s.getSession(r)
|
|
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSession) {
|
|
// Source associated with request not allowed to create
|
|
// a session for this web client.
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if session == nil {
|
|
// Create a new session.
|
|
// If one already existed, we return that authURL rather than creating a new one.
|
|
session, err = s.newSession(r.Context(), whois)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Set the cookie on browser.
|
|
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
|
|
Name: sessionCookieName,
|
|
Value: session.ID,
|
|
Raw: session.ID,
|
|
Path: "/",
|
|
HttpOnly: true,
|
|
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
|
|
Expires: session.expires(),
|
|
// We can't set Secure to true because we serve over HTTP
|
|
// (but only on Tailscale IPs, hence over encrypted
|
|
// connections that a LAN-local attacker cannot sniff).
|
|
// In the future, we could support HTTPS requests using
|
|
// the full MagicDNS hostname, and could set this.
|
|
// Secure: true,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, newSessionAuthResponse{AuthURL: session.AuthURL})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveAPIAuthSessionWait handles requests to the /api/auth/session/wait endpoint.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveAPIAuthSessionWait(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
session, _, _, err := s.getSession(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()) {
|
|
return // already authorized
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.awaitUserAuth(r.Context(), session); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type nodeData struct {
|
|
ID tailcfg.StableNodeID
|
|
Status string
|
|
DeviceName string
|
|
TailnetName string // TLS cert name
|
|
DomainName string
|
|
IPv4 string
|
|
IPv6 string
|
|
OS string
|
|
IPNVersion string
|
|
|
|
Profile tailcfg.UserProfile
|
|
IsTagged bool
|
|
Tags []string
|
|
|
|
KeyExpiry string // time.RFC3339
|
|
KeyExpired bool
|
|
|
|
TUNMode bool
|
|
IsSynology bool
|
|
DSMVersion int // 6 or 7, if IsSynology=true
|
|
IsUnraid bool
|
|
UnraidToken string
|
|
URLPrefix string // if set, the URL prefix the client is served behind
|
|
|
|
UsingExitNode *exitNode
|
|
AdvertisingExitNode bool
|
|
AdvertisingExitNodeApproved bool // whether running this node as an exit node has been approved by an admin
|
|
AdvertisedRoutes []subnetRoute // excludes exit node routes
|
|
RunningSSHServer bool
|
|
|
|
ClientVersion *tailcfg.ClientVersion
|
|
|
|
// whether tailnet ACLs allow access to port 5252 on this device
|
|
ACLAllowsAnyIncomingTraffic bool
|
|
|
|
ControlAdminURL string
|
|
LicensesURL string
|
|
|
|
// Features is the set of available features for use on the
|
|
// current platform. e.g. "ssh", "advertise-exit-node", etc.
|
|
// Map value is true if the given feature key is available.
|
|
//
|
|
// See web.availableFeatures func for population of this field.
|
|
// Contents are expected to match values defined in node-data.ts
|
|
// on the frontend.
|
|
Features map[string]bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type subnetRoute struct {
|
|
Route string
|
|
Approved bool // approved by control server
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) serveGetNodeData(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
st, err := s.lc.Status(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
prefs, err := s.lc.GetPrefs(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
filterRules, _ := s.lc.DebugPacketFilterRules(r.Context())
|
|
data := &nodeData{
|
|
ID: st.Self.ID,
|
|
Status: st.BackendState,
|
|
DeviceName: strings.Split(st.Self.DNSName, ".")[0],
|
|
OS: st.Self.OS,
|
|
IPNVersion: strings.Split(st.Version, "-")[0],
|
|
Profile: st.User[st.Self.UserID],
|
|
IsTagged: st.Self.IsTagged(),
|
|
KeyExpired: st.Self.Expired,
|
|
TUNMode: st.TUN,
|
|
IsSynology: distro.Get() == distro.Synology || envknob.Bool("TS_FAKE_SYNOLOGY"),
|
|
DSMVersion: distro.DSMVersion(),
|
|
IsUnraid: distro.Get() == distro.Unraid,
|
|
UnraidToken: os.Getenv("UNRAID_CSRF_TOKEN"),
|
|
RunningSSHServer: prefs.RunSSH,
|
|
URLPrefix: strings.TrimSuffix(s.pathPrefix, "/"),
|
|
ControlAdminURL: prefs.AdminPageURL(),
|
|
LicensesURL: licenses.LicensesURL(),
|
|
Features: availableFeatures(),
|
|
|
|
ACLAllowsAnyIncomingTraffic: s.aclsAllowAccess(filterRules),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ipv4, ipv6 := s.selfNodeAddresses(r, st)
|
|
data.IPv4 = ipv4.String()
|
|
data.IPv6 = ipv6.String()
|
|
|
|
if hostinfo.GetEnvType() == hostinfo.HomeAssistantAddOn && data.URLPrefix == "" {
|
|
// X-Ingress-Path is the path prefix in use for Home Assistant
|
|
// https://developers.home-assistant.io/docs/add-ons/presentation#ingress
|
|
data.URLPrefix = r.Header.Get("X-Ingress-Path")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cv, err := s.lc.CheckUpdate(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logf("could not check for updates: %v", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
data.ClientVersion = cv
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if st.CurrentTailnet != nil {
|
|
data.TailnetName = st.CurrentTailnet.MagicDNSSuffix
|
|
data.DomainName = st.CurrentTailnet.Name
|
|
}
|
|
if st.Self.Tags != nil {
|
|
data.Tags = st.Self.Tags.AsSlice()
|
|
}
|
|
if st.Self.KeyExpiry != nil {
|
|
data.KeyExpiry = st.Self.KeyExpiry.Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
routeApproved := func(route netip.Prefix) bool {
|
|
if st.Self == nil || st.Self.AllowedIPs == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return st.Self.AllowedIPs.ContainsFunc(func(p netip.Prefix) bool {
|
|
return p == route
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
data.AdvertisingExitNodeApproved = routeApproved(exitNodeRouteV4) || routeApproved(exitNodeRouteV6)
|
|
|
|
for _, r := range prefs.AdvertiseRoutes {
|
|
if r == exitNodeRouteV4 || r == exitNodeRouteV6 {
|
|
data.AdvertisingExitNode = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
data.AdvertisedRoutes = append(data.AdvertisedRoutes, subnetRoute{
|
|
Route: r.String(),
|
|
Approved: routeApproved(r),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if e := st.ExitNodeStatus; e != nil {
|
|
data.UsingExitNode = &exitNode{
|
|
ID: e.ID,
|
|
Online: e.Online,
|
|
}
|
|
for _, ps := range st.Peer {
|
|
if ps.ID == e.ID {
|
|
data.UsingExitNode.Name = ps.DNSName
|
|
data.UsingExitNode.Location = ps.Location
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if data.UsingExitNode.Name == "" {
|
|
// Falling back to TailscaleIP/StableNodeID when the peer
|
|
// is no longer included in status.
|
|
if len(e.TailscaleIPs) > 0 {
|
|
data.UsingExitNode.Name = e.TailscaleIPs[0].Addr().String()
|
|
} else {
|
|
data.UsingExitNode.Name = string(e.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, *data)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func availableFeatures() map[string]bool {
|
|
env := hostinfo.GetEnvType()
|
|
features := map[string]bool{
|
|
"advertise-exit-node": true, // available on all platforms
|
|
"advertise-routes": true, // available on all platforms
|
|
"use-exit-node": canUseExitNode(env) == nil,
|
|
"ssh": envknob.CanRunTailscaleSSH() == nil,
|
|
"auto-update": version.IsUnstableBuild() && clientupdate.CanAutoUpdate(),
|
|
}
|
|
if env == hostinfo.HomeAssistantAddOn {
|
|
// Setting SSH on Home Assistant causes trouble on startup
|
|
// (since the flag is not being passed to `tailscale up`).
|
|
// Although Tailscale SSH does work here,
|
|
// it's not terribly useful since it's running in a separate container.
|
|
features["ssh"] = false
|
|
}
|
|
return features
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func canUseExitNode(env hostinfo.EnvType) error {
|
|
switch dist := distro.Get(); dist {
|
|
case distro.Synology, // see https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/1995
|
|
distro.QNAP,
|
|
distro.Unraid:
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Tailscale exit nodes cannot be used on %s.", dist)
|
|
}
|
|
if env == hostinfo.HomeAssistantAddOn {
|
|
return errors.New("Tailscale exit nodes cannot be used on Home Assistant.")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// aclsAllowAccess returns whether tailnet ACLs (as expressed in the provided filter rules)
|
|
// permit any devices to access the local web client.
|
|
// This does not currently check whether a specific device can connect, just any device.
|
|
func (s *Server) aclsAllowAccess(rules []tailcfg.FilterRule) bool {
|
|
for _, rule := range rules {
|
|
for _, dp := range rule.DstPorts {
|
|
if dp.Ports.Contains(ListenPort) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type exitNode struct {
|
|
ID tailcfg.StableNodeID
|
|
Name string
|
|
Location *tailcfg.Location
|
|
Online bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) serveGetExitNodes(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
st, err := s.lc.Status(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var exitNodes []*exitNode
|
|
for _, ps := range st.Peer {
|
|
if !ps.ExitNodeOption {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
exitNodes = append(exitNodes, &exitNode{
|
|
ID: ps.ID,
|
|
Name: ps.DNSName,
|
|
Location: ps.Location,
|
|
Online: ps.Online,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, exitNodes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// maskedPrefs is the subset of ipn.MaskedPrefs that are
|
|
// allowed to be editable via the web UI.
|
|
type maskedPrefs struct {
|
|
RunSSHSet bool
|
|
RunSSH bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) serveUpdatePrefs(ctx context.Context, prefs maskedPrefs) error {
|
|
_, err := s.lc.EditPrefs(ctx, &ipn.MaskedPrefs{
|
|
RunSSHSet: prefs.RunSSHSet,
|
|
Prefs: ipn.Prefs{
|
|
RunSSH: prefs.RunSSH,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type postRoutesRequest struct {
|
|
SetExitNode bool // when set, UseExitNode and AdvertiseExitNode values are applied
|
|
SetRoutes bool // when set, AdvertiseRoutes value is applied
|
|
UseExitNode tailcfg.StableNodeID
|
|
AdvertiseExitNode bool
|
|
AdvertiseRoutes []string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) servePostRoutes(ctx context.Context, data postRoutesRequest) error {
|
|
prefs, err := s.lc.GetPrefs(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
var currNonExitRoutes []string
|
|
var currAdvertisingExitNode bool
|
|
for _, r := range prefs.AdvertiseRoutes {
|
|
if r == exitNodeRouteV4 || r == exitNodeRouteV6 {
|
|
currAdvertisingExitNode = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
currNonExitRoutes = append(currNonExitRoutes, r.String())
|
|
}
|
|
// Set non-edited fields to their current values.
|
|
if data.SetExitNode {
|
|
data.AdvertiseRoutes = currNonExitRoutes
|
|
} else if data.SetRoutes {
|
|
data.AdvertiseExitNode = currAdvertisingExitNode
|
|
data.UseExitNode = prefs.ExitNodeID
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Calculate routes.
|
|
routesStr := strings.Join(data.AdvertiseRoutes, ",")
|
|
routes, err := netutil.CalcAdvertiseRoutes(routesStr, data.AdvertiseExitNode)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hasExitNodeRoute := func(all []netip.Prefix) bool {
|
|
return slices.Contains(all, exitNodeRouteV4) ||
|
|
slices.Contains(all, exitNodeRouteV6)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !data.UseExitNode.IsZero() && hasExitNodeRoute(routes) {
|
|
return errors.New("cannot use and advertise exit node at same time")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Make prefs update.
|
|
p := &ipn.MaskedPrefs{
|
|
AdvertiseRoutesSet: true,
|
|
ExitNodeIDSet: true,
|
|
Prefs: ipn.Prefs{
|
|
ExitNodeID: data.UseExitNode,
|
|
AdvertiseRoutes: routes,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = s.lc.EditPrefs(ctx, p)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tailscaleUp starts the daemon with the provided options.
|
|
// If reauthentication has been requested, an authURL is returned to complete device registration.
|
|
func (s *Server) tailscaleUp(ctx context.Context, st *ipnstate.Status, opt tailscaleUpOptions) (authURL string, retErr error) {
|
|
origAuthURL := st.AuthURL
|
|
isRunning := st.BackendState == ipn.Running.String()
|
|
|
|
if !opt.Reauthenticate {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case origAuthURL != "":
|
|
return origAuthURL, nil
|
|
case isRunning:
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
case st.BackendState == ipn.Stopped.String():
|
|
// stopped and not reauthenticating, so just start running
|
|
_, err := s.lc.EditPrefs(ctx, &ipn.MaskedPrefs{
|
|
Prefs: ipn.Prefs{
|
|
WantRunning: true,
|
|
},
|
|
WantRunningSet: true,
|
|
})
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// printAuthURL reports whether we should print out the
|
|
// provided auth URL from an IPN notify.
|
|
printAuthURL := func(url string) bool {
|
|
return url != origAuthURL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
watchCtx, cancelWatch := context.WithCancel(ctx)
|
|
defer cancelWatch()
|
|
watcher, err := s.lc.WatchIPNBus(watchCtx, 0)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
defer watcher.Close()
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
if !isRunning {
|
|
ipnOptions := ipn.Options{AuthKey: opt.AuthKey}
|
|
if opt.ControlURL != "" {
|
|
_, err := s.lc.EditPrefs(ctx, &ipn.MaskedPrefs{
|
|
Prefs: ipn.Prefs{
|
|
ControlURL: opt.ControlURL,
|
|
},
|
|
ControlURLSet: true,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logf("edit prefs: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.lc.Start(ctx, ipnOptions); err != nil {
|
|
s.logf("start: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if opt.Reauthenticate {
|
|
if err := s.lc.StartLoginInteractive(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
s.logf("startLogin: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
for {
|
|
n, err := watcher.Next()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
if n.State != nil && *n.State == ipn.Running {
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
if n.ErrMessage != nil {
|
|
msg := *n.ErrMessage
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("backend error: %v", msg)
|
|
}
|
|
if url := n.BrowseToURL; url != nil && printAuthURL(*url) {
|
|
return *url, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type tailscaleUpOptions struct {
|
|
// If true, force reauthentication of the client.
|
|
// Otherwise simply reconnect, the same as running `tailscale up`.
|
|
Reauthenticate bool
|
|
|
|
ControlURL string
|
|
AuthKey string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveTailscaleUp serves requests to /api/up.
|
|
// If the user needs to authenticate, an authURL is provided in the response.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveTailscaleUp(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
defer r.Body.Close()
|
|
|
|
st, err := s.lc.Status(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var opt tailscaleUpOptions
|
|
type mi map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&opt); err != nil {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(400)
|
|
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
s.logf("tailscaleUp(reauth=%v) ...", opt.Reauthenticate)
|
|
url, err := s.tailscaleUp(r.Context(), st, opt)
|
|
s.logf("tailscaleUp = (URL %v, %v)", url != "", err)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if url != "" {
|
|
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"url": url})
|
|
} else {
|
|
io.WriteString(w, "{}")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveDeviceDetailsClick increments the web_client_device_details_click metric
|
|
// by one.
|
|
//
|
|
// Metric logging from the frontend typically is proxied to the localapi. This event
|
|
// has been special cased as access to the localapi is gated upon having a valid
|
|
// session which is not always the case when we want to be logging this metric (e.g.,
|
|
// when in readonly mode).
|
|
//
|
|
// Other metrics should not be logged in this way without a good reason.
|
|
func (s *Server) serveDeviceDetailsClick(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_device_details_click", 1)
|
|
|
|
io.WriteString(w, "{}")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// proxyRequestToLocalAPI proxies the web API request to the localapi.
|
|
//
|
|
// The web API request path is expected to exactly match a localapi path,
|
|
// with prefix /api/local/ rather than /localapi/.
|
|
func (s *Server) proxyRequestToLocalAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/local")
|
|
if r.URL.Path == path { // missing prefix
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
localAPIURL := "http://" + apitype.LocalAPIHost + "/localapi" + path
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(r.Context(), r.Method, localAPIURL, r.Body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "failed to construct request", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Make request to tailscaled localapi.
|
|
resp, err := s.lc.DoLocalRequest(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), resp.StatusCode)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
|
|
// Send response back to web frontend.
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
|
|
w.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)
|
|
if _, err := io.Copy(w, resp.Body); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// csrfKey returns a key that can be used for CSRF protection.
|
|
// If an error occurs during key creation, the error is logged and the active process terminated.
|
|
// If the server is running in CGI mode, the key is cached to disk and reused between requests.
|
|
// If an error occurs during key storage, the error is logged and the active process terminated.
|
|
func (s *Server) csrfKey() []byte {
|
|
csrfFile := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "tailscale-web-csrf.key")
|
|
|
|
// if running in CGI mode, try to read from disk, but ignore errors
|
|
if s.cgiMode {
|
|
key, _ := os.ReadFile(csrfFile)
|
|
if len(key) == 32 {
|
|
return key
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// create a new key
|
|
key := make([]byte, 32)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
|
|
log.Fatalf("error generating CSRF key: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if running in CGI mode, try to write the newly created key to disk, and exit if it fails.
|
|
if s.cgiMode {
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(csrfFile, key, 0600); err != nil {
|
|
log.Fatalf("unable to store CSRF key: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return key
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// enforcePrefix returns a HandlerFunc that enforces a given path prefix is used in requests,
|
|
// then strips it before invoking h.
|
|
// Unlike http.StripPrefix, it does not return a 404 if the prefix is not present.
|
|
// Instead, it returns a redirect to the prefix path.
|
|
func enforcePrefix(prefix string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
if prefix == "" {
|
|
return h
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ensure that prefix always has both a leading and trailing slash so
|
|
// that relative links for JS and CSS assets work correctly.
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "/") {
|
|
prefix = "/" + prefix
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, "/") {
|
|
prefix += "/"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, prefix) {
|
|
http.Redirect(w, r, prefix, http.StatusFound)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
prefix = strings.TrimSuffix(prefix, "/")
|
|
http.StripPrefix(prefix, h).ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, data any) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data); err != nil {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
|
|
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|