# Which Problems Are Solved
When executing many concurrent authentication requests on a single
machine user, there were performance issues. As the same aggregate is
being searched and written to concurrently, we traced it down to a
locking issue on the used index.
We already optimized the token endpoint by creating a separate OIDC
aggregate.
At the time we decided to push a single event to the user aggregate, for
the user audit log. See [technical advisory
10010](https://zitadel.com/docs/support/advisory/a10010) for more
details.
However, a recent security fix introduced an additional search query on
the user aggregate, causing the locking issue we found.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add a feature flag which disables pushing of the `user.token.v2.added`.
The event has no importance and was only added for informational
purposes on the user objects. The `oidc_session.access_token.added` is
the actual payload event and is pushed on the OIDC session aggregate and
can still be used for audit trail.
# Additional Changes
- Fix an event mapper type for
`SystemOIDCSingleV1SessionTerminationEventType`
# Additional Context
- Reported by support request
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/7822 changed the token
aggregate
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/8631 introduced user state
check
Load test trace graph with `user.token.v2.added` **enabled**. Query
times are steadily increasing:
Load test trace graph with `user.token.v2.added` **disabled**. Query
times constant:
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
# Which Problems Are Solved
ZITADEL's user account deactivation mechanism did not work correctly
with service accounts. Deactivated service accounts retained the ability
to request tokens, which could lead to unauthorized access to
applications and resources.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Additionally to checking the user state on the session API and login UI,
the state is checked on all oidc session methods resulting in a new
token or when returning the user information (userinfo, introspection,
id_token / access_token and saml attributes)
# Which Problems Are Solved
id_tokens issued for auth requests created through the login UI
currently do not provide a sid claim.
This is due to the fact that (SSO) sessions for the login UI do not have
one and are only computed by the userAgent(ID), the user(ID) and the
authentication checks of the latter.
This prevents client to track sessions and terminate specific session on
the end_session_endpoint.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- An `id` column is added to the `auth.user_sessions` table.
- The `id` (prefixed with `V1_`) is set whenever a session is added or
updated to active (from terminated)
- The id is passed to the `oidc session` (as v2 sessionIDs), to expose
it as `sid` claim
# Additional Changes
- refactored `getUpdateCols` to handle different column value types and
add arguments for query
# Additional Context
- closes#8499
- relates to #8501
# Which Problems Are Solved
We noticed logging where 500: Internal Server errors were returned from
the token endpoint, mostly for the `refresh_token` grant. The error was
thrown by the database as it received non-UTF8 strings for token IDs
Zitadel uses symmetric encryption for opaque tokens, including refresh
tokens. Encrypted values are base64 encoded. It appeared to be possible
to send garbage base64 to the token endpoint, which will pass decryption
and string-splitting. In those cases the resulting ID is not a valid
UTF-8 string.
Invalid non-UTF8 strings are now rejected during token decryption.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- `AESCrypto.DecryptString()` checks if the decrypted bytes only contain
valid UTF-8 characters before converting them into a string.
- `AESCrypto.Decrypt()` is unmodified and still allows decryption on
non-UTF8 byte strings.
- `FromRefreshToken` now uses `DecryptString` instead of `Decrypt`
# Additional Changes
- Unit tests added for `FromRefreshToken` and
`AESCrypto.DecryptString()`.
- Fuzz tests added for `FromRefreshToken` and
`AESCrypto.DecryptString()`. This was to pinpoint the problem
- Testdata with values that resulted in invalid strings are committed.
In the pipeline this results in the Fuzz tests to execute as regular
unit-test cases. As we don't use the `-fuzz` flag in the pipeline no
further fuzzing is performed.
# Additional Context
- Closes#7765
- https://go.dev/doc/tutorial/fuzz
* implement code exchange
* port tokenexchange to v2 tokens
* implement refresh token
* implement client credentials
* implement jwt profile
* implement device token
* cleanup unused code
* fix current unit tests
* add user agent unit test
* unit test domain package
* need refresh token as argument
* test commands create oidc session
* test commands device auth
* fix device auth build error
* implicit for oidc session API
* implement authorize callback handler for legacy implicit mode
* upgrade oidc module to working draft
* add missing auth methods and time
* handle all errors in defer
* do not fail auth request on error
the oauth2 Go client automagically retries on any error. If we fail the auth request on the first error, the next attempt will always fail with the Errors.AuthRequest.NoCode, because the auth request state is already set to failed.
The original error is then already lost and the oauth2 library does not return the original error.
Therefore we should not fail the auth request.
Might be worth discussing and perhaps send a bug report to Oauth2?
* fix code flow tests by explicitly setting code exchanged
* fix unit tests in command package
* return allowed scope from client credential client
* add device auth done reducer
* carry nonce thru session into ID token
* fix token exchange integration tests
* allow project role scope prefix in client credentials client
* gci formatting
* do not return refresh token in client credentials and jwt profile
* check org scope
* solve linting issue on authorize callback error
* end session based on v2 session ID
* use preferred language and user agent ID for v2 access tokens
* pin oidc v3.23.2
* add integration test for jwt profile and client credentials with org scopes
* refresh token v1 to v2
* add user token v2 audit event
* add activity trigger
* cleanup and set panics for unused methods
* use the encrypted code for v1 auth request get by code
* add missing event translation
* fix pipeline errors (hopefully)
* fix another test
* revert pointer usage of preferred language
* solve browser info panic in device auth
* remove duplicate entries in AMRToAuthMethodTypes to prevent future `mfa` claim
* revoke v1 refresh token to prevent reuse
* fix terminate oidc session
* always return a new refresh toke in refresh token grant
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
* fix(oidc): return bad request for base64 errors
We've recently noticed an increased amount of 500: internal server error status returns on zitadel cloud.
The source of these errors appear to be erroneous input in fields that are supposed to be bas64 formatted.
```
time=2024-04-08T14:05:47.600Z level=ERROR msg="request error" oidc_error.parent="ID=OIDC-AhX2u Message=Errors.Internal Parent=(illegal base64 data at input byte 8)" oidc_error.description=Errors.Internal oidc_error.type=server_error status_code=500
```
Within the possible code paths of the token endpoint there are a couple of uses of base64.Encoding.DecodeString of which a returned error was not properly wrapped, but returned as-is.
This causes the oidc error handler to return a 500 with the `OIDC-AhX2u` ID.
We were not able to pinpoint the exact errors that are happening to any one call of `DecodeString`.
This fix wraps all errors from `DecodeString` so that proper 400: bad request is returned with information about the error. Each wrapper now has an unique error ID, so that logs will contain the source of the error as well.
This bug was reported internally by the ops team.
* catch op.ErrInvalidRefreshToken
* add token exchange feature flag
* allow setting reason and actor to access tokens
* impersonation
* set token types and scopes in response
* upgrade oidc to working draft state
* fix tests
* audience and scope validation
* id toke and jwt as input
* return id tokens
* add grant type token exchange to app config
* add integration tests
* check and deny actors in api calls
* fix instance setting tests by triggering projection on write and cleanup
* insert sleep statements again
* solve linting issues
* add translations
* pin oidc v3.15.0
* resolve comments, add event translation
* fix refreshtoken test
* use ValidateAuthReqScopes from oidc
* apparently the linter can't make up its mind
* persist actor thru refresh tokens and check in tests
* remove unneeded triggers
* fix: add resource owner of user and change the one of session to instance
* use user resource owner from session projection
* fix session permission check
* integration tests and fixes
* update api docs
This PR adds support for OAuth2 token revocation of V2 tokens.
Unlike with V1 tokens, it's now possible to revoke a token not only from the authorized client / client which the token was issued to, but rather from all trusted clients (audience)
This PR adds support for userinfo and introspection of V2 tokens. Further V2 access tokens and session tokens can be used for authentication on the ZITADEL API (like the current access tokens).
This PR changes the information stored on the SessionLinkedEvent and (OIDC Session) AddedEvent from OIDC AMR strings to domain.UserAuthMethodTypes, so no information is lost in the process (e.g. authentication with an IDP)
This PR starts the OIDC implementation for the API V2 including the Implicit and Code Flow.
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tim Möhlmann <tim+github@zitadel.com>
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <46600784+stebenz@users.noreply.github.com>
