# Which Problems Are Solved
The recently added possibility to generate and verify codes through
Twilio verification service did failed on checking OTP SMS code through
the session API. Additionally, password codes generated by the V2 API
and sent through phone would always use the internal generator and
verification mechanism rather than the configured.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Correctly set the verifier for OTP SMS for the session API
- Always use the internal verifier for OTP Email (for now)
- Select the generator / verifier based on the configuration for
password codes with notification type SMS for V2 APIs
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- relates to #8678
- reported by customer
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <46600784+stebenz@users.noreply.github.com>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Twilio supports a robust, multi-channel verification service that
notably supports multi-region SMS sender numbers required for our use
case. Currently, Zitadel does much of the work of the Twilio Verify (eg.
localization, code generation, messaging) but doesn't support the pool
of sender numbers that Twilio Verify does.
# How the Problems Are Solved
To support this API, we need to be able to store the Twilio Service ID
and send that in a verification request where appropriate: phone number
verification and SMS 2FA code paths.
This PR does the following:
- Adds the ability to use Twilio Verify of standard messaging through
Twilio
- Adds support for international numbers and more reliable verification
messages sent from multiple numbers
- Adds a new Twilio configuration option to support Twilio Verify in the
admin console
- Sends verification SMS messages through Twilio Verify
- Implements Twilio Verification Checks for codes generated through the
same
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
- base was implemented by @zhirschtritt in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/8268❤️
- closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8581
---------
Co-authored-by: Zachary Hirschtritt <zachary.hirschtritt@klaviyo.com>
Co-authored-by: Joey Biscoglia <joey.biscoglia@klaviyo.com>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The session API was designed to be flexible enough for multiple use
cases / login scenarios, where the login could respect the login policy
or not. The session API itself does not have a corresponding policy and
would not check for a required MFA or alike. It therefore also did not
yet respect the lockout policy and would leave it to the login UI to
handle that.
Since the lockout policy is related to the user and not the login
itself, we decided to handle the lockout also on calls of the session
API.
# How the Problems Are Solved
If a lockout policy is set for either password or (T)OTP checks, the
corresponding check on the session API be run against the lockout check.
This means that any failed check, regardless if occurred in the session
API or the current hosted login will be counted against the maximum
allowed checks of that authentication mechanism. TOTP, OTP SMS and OTP
Email are each treated as a separate mechanism.
For implementation:
- The existing lockout check functions were refactored to be usable for
session API calls.
- `SessionCommand` type now returns not only an error, but also
`[]eventstore.Command`
- these will be executed in case of an error
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
Closes#7967
---------
Co-authored-by: Elio Bischof <elio@zitadel.com>
# Which Problems Are Solved
If an IdP intent succeeded with the user was not linked yet, the IdP
link was then added, the following IdP check on the session API would
then fail with `Intent meant for another user (COMMAND-O8xk3w)`.
This issue was introduced with when allowing IdP intents from other
organizations (https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/7871)
# How the Problems Are Solved
The IdP link is now correctly checked in the session API (using the
user's organization instead of the one from the intent).
# Additional Changes
- Improved the corresponding integration test to cover the exact
bahvior.
- Tests, which had to be updated with newer cases where additionally
changed to use expectEventstore instead of deprecated eventstoreExpect
and the two eventstore mocks of the session_tests.go where combined.
# Additional Context
- Relates to #7871
- This issue was reported by a customer.
- will be back ported to 2.52.x
# Which Problems Are Solved
The session update requires the current session token as argument.
Since this adds extra complexity but no real additional security and
prevents case like magic links, we want to remove this requirement.
We still require the session token on other resouces / endpoints, e.g.
for finalizing the auth request or on idp intents.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Removed the session token verifier in the Update Session GRPc call.
- Removed the session token from login UI examples session update calls
# Additional Changes
- none
# Additional Context
- Closes#7883
* implement code exchange
* port tokenexchange to v2 tokens
* implement refresh token
* implement client credentials
* implement jwt profile
* implement device token
* cleanup unused code
* fix current unit tests
* add user agent unit test
* unit test domain package
* need refresh token as argument
* test commands create oidc session
* test commands device auth
* fix device auth build error
* implicit for oidc session API
* implement authorize callback handler for legacy implicit mode
* upgrade oidc module to working draft
* add missing auth methods and time
* handle all errors in defer
* do not fail auth request on error
the oauth2 Go client automagically retries on any error. If we fail the auth request on the first error, the next attempt will always fail with the Errors.AuthRequest.NoCode, because the auth request state is already set to failed.
The original error is then already lost and the oauth2 library does not return the original error.
Therefore we should not fail the auth request.
Might be worth discussing and perhaps send a bug report to Oauth2?
* fix code flow tests by explicitly setting code exchanged
* fix unit tests in command package
* return allowed scope from client credential client
* add device auth done reducer
* carry nonce thru session into ID token
* fix token exchange integration tests
* allow project role scope prefix in client credentials client
* gci formatting
* do not return refresh token in client credentials and jwt profile
* check org scope
* solve linting issue on authorize callback error
* end session based on v2 session ID
* use preferred language and user agent ID for v2 access tokens
* pin oidc v3.23.2
* add integration test for jwt profile and client credentials with org scopes
* refresh token v1 to v2
* add user token v2 audit event
* add activity trigger
* cleanup and set panics for unused methods
* use the encrypted code for v1 auth request get by code
* add missing event translation
* fix pipeline errors (hopefully)
* fix another test
* revert pointer usage of preferred language
* solve browser info panic in device auth
* remove duplicate entries in AMRToAuthMethodTypes to prevent future `mfa` claim
* revoke v1 refresh token to prevent reuse
* fix terminate oidc session
* always return a new refresh toke in refresh token grant
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
* fix: add https status to activity log
* create prerelease
* create RC
* pass info from gateway to grpc server
* fix: update releaserc to create RC version
* cleanup
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
* fix: add resource owner of user and change the one of session to instance
* use user resource owner from session projection
* fix session permission check
* integration tests and fixes
* update api docs
This change adds the ability to set and get user agent data, such as fingerprint, IP, request headers and a description to the session. All fields are optional.
Closes#6028
* feat: add otp (sms and email) checks in session api
* implement sending
* fix tests
* add tests
* add integration tests
* fix merge main and add tests
* put default OTP Email url into config
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <46600784+stebenz@users.noreply.github.com>
This PR adds support for the OIDC end_session_endpoint for V2 tokens. Sending an id_token_hint as parameter will directly terminate the underlying (SSO) session and all its tokens. Without this param, the user will be redirected to the Login UI, where he will able to choose if to logout.
* feat: use passwap for human user passwords
* fix tests
* passwap config
* add the event mapper
* cleanup query side and api
* solve linting errors
* regression test
* try to fix linter errors again
* pass systemdefaults into externalConfigChange migration
* fix: user password set in auth view
* pin passwap v0.2.0
* v2: validate hashed password hash based on prefix
* resolve remaining comments
* add error tag and translation for unsupported hash encoding
* fix unit test
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>
This fix provides a possibility to pass a domain on the session, which
will be used (as rpID) to create a passkey / u2f assertion and
attestation. This is useful in cases where the login UI is served under
a different domain / origin than the ZITADEL API.
