zitadel/internal/authz/repository/eventsourcing/eventstore/token_verifier.go
Livio Spring a3fcf6431a
fix(oidc): remove MFA requirement on ZITADEL API based on user auth methods (#8069)
# Which Problems Are Solved

Request to the ZITADEL API currently require multi factor authentication
if the user has set up any second factor.
However, the login UI will only prompt the user to check factors that
are allowed by the login policy.
This can lead to situations, where the user has set up a factor (e.g.
some OTP) which was not allowed by the policy, therefore will not have
to verify the factor, the ZITADEL API however will require the check
since the user has set it up.

# How the Problems Are Solved

The requirement for multi factor authentication based on the user's
authentication methods is removed when accessing the ZITADEL APIs.
Those requests will only require MFA in case the login policy does so
because of `requireMFA` or `requireMFAForLocalUsers`.

# Additional Changes

None.

# Additional Context

- a customer reached out to support
- discussed internally
- relates #7822
- backport to 2.53.x

(cherry picked from commit fb2b1610f9)
2024-06-13 13:55:05 +02:00

356 lines
13 KiB
Go

package eventstore
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/muhlemmer/gu"
"github.com/zitadel/logging"
"github.com/zitadel/oidc/v3/pkg/oidc"
"github.com/zitadel/oidc/v3/pkg/op"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/authz"
http_util "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/http"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/authz/repository/eventsourcing/view"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/command"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/crypto"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/domain"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/eventstore"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/query"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/telemetry/tracing"
usr_model "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/model"
usr_view "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/repository/view"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/repository/view/model"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/zerrors"
)
type TokenVerifierRepo struct {
TokenVerificationKey crypto.EncryptionAlgorithm
Eventstore *eventstore.Eventstore
View *view.View
Query *query.Queries
ExternalSecure bool
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) Health() error {
return repo.View.Health()
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) tokenByID(ctx context.Context, tokenID, userID string) (_ *usr_model.TokenView, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
instanceID := authz.GetInstance(ctx).InstanceID()
// always load the latest sequence first, so in case the token was not found by id,
// the sequence will be equal or lower than the actual projection and no events are lost
sequence, err := repo.View.GetLatestState(ctx)
logging.WithFields("instanceID", instanceID, "userID", userID, "tokenID", tokenID).
OnError(err).
Errorf("could not get current sequence for token check")
token, viewErr := repo.View.TokenByIDs(tokenID, userID, instanceID)
if viewErr != nil && !zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) {
return nil, viewErr
}
if zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) {
token = new(model.TokenView)
token.ID = tokenID
token.UserID = userID
if sequence != nil {
token.ChangeDate = sequence.EventCreatedAt
}
}
events, esErr := repo.getUserEvents(ctx, userID, instanceID, token.ChangeDate, token.GetRelevantEventTypes())
if zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) && len(events) == 0 {
return nil, zerrors.ThrowNotFound(nil, "EVENT-4T90g", "Errors.Token.NotFound")
}
if esErr != nil {
logging.WithError(viewErr).WithField("traceID", tracing.TraceIDFromCtx(ctx)).Debug("error retrieving new events")
return model.TokenViewToModel(token), nil
}
viewToken := *token
for _, event := range events {
err := token.AppendEventIfMyToken(event)
if err != nil {
return model.TokenViewToModel(&viewToken), nil
}
}
if !token.Expiration.After(time.Now().UTC()) || token.Deactivated {
return nil, zerrors.ThrowNotFound(nil, "EVENT-5Bm9s", "Errors.Token.NotFound")
}
return model.TokenViewToModel(token), nil
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) VerifyAccessToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID string, agentID string, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
tokenID, subject, ok := repo.getTokenIDAndSubject(ctx, tokenString)
if !ok {
return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-Reb32", "invalid token")
}
if strings.HasPrefix(tokenID, command.IDPrefixV2) {
return repo.verifyAccessTokenV2(ctx, tokenID, verifierClientID, projectID)
}
if sessionID, ok := strings.CutPrefix(tokenID, authz.SessionTokenPrefix); ok {
userID, clientID, resourceOwner, err = repo.verifySessionToken(ctx, sessionID, tokenString)
return
}
return repo.verifyAccessTokenV1(ctx, tokenID, subject, verifierClientID, projectID)
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifyAccessTokenV1(ctx context.Context, tokenID, subject, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID, agentID, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
_, tokenSpan := tracing.NewNamedSpan(ctx, "tokenByID")
token, err := repo.tokenByID(ctx, tokenID, subject)
tokenSpan.EndWithError(err)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(err, "APP-BxUSiL", "invalid token")
}
if token.Actor != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "APP-wai8O", "Errors.TokenExchange.Token.NotForAPI")
}
if !token.Expiration.After(time.Now().UTC()) {
return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(err, "APP-k9KS0", "invalid token")
}
if token.IsPAT {
return token.UserID, "", "", "", token.ResourceOwner, nil
}
if err = verifyAudience(token.Audience, verifierClientID, projectID); err != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", err
}
return token.UserID, token.UserAgentID, token.ApplicationID, token.PreferredLanguage, token.ResourceOwner, nil
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifyAccessTokenV2(ctx context.Context, token, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID, agentID, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
activeToken, err := repo.Query.ActiveAccessTokenByToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", err
}
if activeToken.Actor != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "APP-Shi0J", "Errors.TokenExchange.Token.NotForAPI")
}
if err = verifyAudience(activeToken.Audience, verifierClientID, projectID); err != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", err
}
if err = repo.checkAuthentication(ctx, activeToken.AuthMethods, activeToken.UserID); err != nil {
return "", "", "", "", "", err
}
prefLang = gu.Value(activeToken.PreferredLanguage).String()
agentID = gu.Value(gu.Value(activeToken.UserAgent).FingerprintID)
return activeToken.UserID, agentID, activeToken.ClientID, prefLang, activeToken.ResourceOwner, nil
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifySessionToken(ctx context.Context, sessionID, token string) (userID, clientID, resourceOwner string, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
session, err := repo.Query.SessionByID(ctx, true, sessionID, token)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
if !session.Expiration.IsZero() && session.Expiration.Before(time.Now()) {
return "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-EGDo3", "session expired")
}
if err = repo.checkAuthentication(ctx, authMethodsFromSession(session), session.UserFactor.UserID); err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
return session.UserFactor.UserID, "", session.UserFactor.ResourceOwner, nil
}
// checkAuthentication ensures the session or token was authenticated (at least a single [domain.UserAuthMethodType]).
// It will also check if there was a multi factor authentication, if either MFA is forced by the login policy or if the user has set up any second factor
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) checkAuthentication(ctx context.Context, authMethods []domain.UserAuthMethodType, userID string) error {
if len(authMethods) == 0 {
return zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-Kl3p0", "authentication required")
}
if domain.HasMFA(authMethods) {
return nil
}
requirements, err := repo.Query.ListUserAuthMethodTypesRequired(setCallerCtx(ctx, userID), userID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if requirements.UserType == domain.UserTypeMachine {
return nil
}
if domain.RequiresMFA(
requirements.ForceMFA,
requirements.ForceMFALocalOnly,
!hasIDPAuthentication(authMethods),
) {
return zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-Kl3p0", "mfa required")
}
return nil
}
func hasIDPAuthentication(authMethods []domain.UserAuthMethodType) bool {
for _, method := range authMethods {
if method == domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func authMethodsFromSession(session *query.Session) []domain.UserAuthMethodType {
types := make([]domain.UserAuthMethodType, 0, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP)
if !session.PasswordFactor.PasswordCheckedAt.IsZero() {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypePassword)
}
if !session.WebAuthNFactor.WebAuthNCheckedAt.IsZero() {
if session.WebAuthNFactor.UserVerified {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypePasswordless)
} else {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeU2F)
}
}
if !session.IntentFactor.IntentCheckedAt.IsZero() {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP)
}
if !session.TOTPFactor.TOTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeTOTP)
}
if !session.OTPSMSFactor.OTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeOTPSMS)
}
if !session.OTPEmailFactor.OTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeOTPEmail)
}
return types
}
func setCallerCtx(ctx context.Context, userID string) context.Context {
ctxData := authz.GetCtxData(ctx)
ctxData.UserID = userID
return authz.SetCtxData(ctx, ctxData)
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) ProjectIDAndOriginsByClientID(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (projectID string, origins []string, err error) {
app, err := repo.View.ApplicationByOIDCClientID(ctx, clientID)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
return app.ProjectID, app.OIDCConfig.AllowedOrigins, nil
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) VerifierClientID(ctx context.Context, appName string) (clientID, projectID string, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
app, err := repo.View.ApplicationByProjecIDAndAppName(ctx, authz.GetInstance(ctx).ProjectID(), appName)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if app.OIDCConfig != nil {
clientID = app.OIDCConfig.ClientID
} else if app.APIConfig != nil {
clientID = app.APIConfig.ClientID
}
return clientID, app.ProjectID, nil
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) getUserEvents(ctx context.Context, userID, instanceID string, changeDate time.Time, eventTypes []eventstore.EventType) (_ []eventstore.Event, err error) {
ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
query, err := usr_view.UserByIDQuery(userID, instanceID, changeDate, eventTypes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return repo.Eventstore.Filter(ctx, query)
}
// getTokenIDAndSubject returns the TokenID and Subject of both opaque tokens and JWTs
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) getTokenIDAndSubject(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) (tokenID string, subject string, valid bool) {
// accessToken can be either opaque or JWT
// let's try opaque first:
tokenIDSubject, err := repo.decryptAccessToken(accessToken)
if err != nil {
logging.WithError(err).Warn("token verifier repo: decrypt access token")
// if decryption did not work, it might be a JWT
accessTokenClaims, err := op.VerifyAccessToken[*oidc.AccessTokenClaims](ctx, accessToken, repo.jwtTokenVerifier(ctx))
if err != nil {
logging.WithError(err).Warn("token verifier repo: verify JWT access token")
return "", "", false
}
return accessTokenClaims.JWTID, accessTokenClaims.Subject, true
}
splitToken := strings.Split(tokenIDSubject, ":")
if len(splitToken) != 2 {
return "", "", false
}
return splitToken[0], splitToken[1], true
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) jwtTokenVerifier(ctx context.Context) *op.AccessTokenVerifier {
keySet := &openIDKeySet{repo.Query}
issuer := http_util.BuildOrigin(authz.GetInstance(ctx).RequestedHost(), repo.ExternalSecure)
return op.NewAccessTokenVerifier(issuer, keySet)
}
func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) decryptAccessToken(token string) (string, error) {
tokenData, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
if err != nil {
return "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-ASdgg", "invalid token")
}
tokenIDSubject, err := repo.TokenVerificationKey.DecryptString(tokenData, repo.TokenVerificationKey.EncryptionKeyID())
if err != nil {
return "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-8EF0zZ", "invalid token")
}
return tokenIDSubject, nil
}
func verifyAudience(audience []string, verifierClientID, projectID string) error {
for _, aud := range audience {
if verifierClientID == aud || projectID == aud {
return nil
}
}
return zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-Zxfako", "invalid audience")
}
type openIDKeySet struct {
*query.Queries
}
// VerifySignature implements the oidc.KeySet interface
// providing an implementation for the keys retrieved directly from Queries
func (o *openIDKeySet) VerifySignature(ctx context.Context, jws *jose.JSONWebSignature) ([]byte, error) {
keySet, err := o.Queries.ActivePublicKeys(ctx, time.Now())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error fetching keys: %w", err)
}
keyID, alg := oidc.GetKeyIDAndAlg(jws)
key, err := oidc.FindMatchingKey(keyID, oidc.KeyUseSignature, alg, jsonWebKeys(keySet.Keys)...)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature: %w", err)
}
return jws.Verify(&key)
}
func jsonWebKeys(keys []query.PublicKey) []jose.JSONWebKey {
webKeys := make([]jose.JSONWebKey, len(keys))
for i, key := range keys {
webKeys[i] = jose.JSONWebKey{
KeyID: key.ID(),
Algorithm: key.Algorithm(),
Use: key.Use().String(),
Key: key.Key(),
}
}
return webKeys
}