Fixestailscale/tailscale#13685
logtail currently has a LowMemory flag, which is enabled upon initialization on memory-constrained platforms like iOS. This flag reduces the ring buffer size from 256 log lines to 64. It was introduced over four years ago, back when Tailscale supported iOS 14 and earlier, where network extensions were limited to 15 MB of RAM.
Since the memory limit has now increased to 50 MB on all supported iOS versions (with our minimum requirement being iOS 15.0), the need to conserve a few kilobytes of RAM by reducing buffer entries and the size of each flush is minimal.
The additional code paths are more things we need to maintain over time... with little benefit. This PR removes that.
To be merged after we cut the first 1.77 unstable, as this might be a risky change.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@gottardo.me>
Adds a new reconciler that reconciles ExternalName Services that define a
tailnet target that should be exposed to cluster workloads on a ProxyGroup's
proxies.
The reconciler ensures that for each such service, the config mounted to
the proxies is updated with the tailnet target definition and that
and EndpointSlice and ClusterIP Service are created for the service.
Adds a new reconciler that ensures that as proxy Pods become ready to route
traffic to a tailnet target, the EndpointSlice for the target is updated
with the Pods' endpoints.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#13406
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
The AddSNATRuleForDst rule was adding a new rule each time it was called including:
- if a rule already existed
- if a rule matching the destination, but with different desired source already existed
This was causing issues especially for the in-progress egress HA proxies work,
where the rules are now refreshed more frequently, so more redundant rules
were being created.
This change:
- only creates the rule if it doesn't already exist
- if a rule for the same dst, but different source is found, delete it
- also ensures that egress proxies refresh firewall rules
if the node's tailnet IP changes
Updates tailscale/tailscale#13406
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
Add the ability to specify Strict-Transport-Security options in response
to BrowserMux HTTP requests in safeweb.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/23375
Signed-off-by: Patrick O'Doherty <patrick@tailscale.com>
Updates tailscale/tailscale#3363
We know `log.tailscale.io` supports TLS 1.3, so we can enforce its usage in the client to shake some bytes off the TLS handshake each time a connection is opened to upload logs.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@gottardo.me>
Not just its code.
Updates tailscale/corp#23584
Change-Id: I8001a675372fe15da797adde22f04488d8683448
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
The new logging in 2dd71e64ac is spammy at shutdown:
Receive func ReceiveIPv6 exiting with error: *net.OpError, read udp [::]:38869: raw-read udp6 [::]:38869: use of closed network connection
Receive func ReceiveIPv4 exiting with error: *net.OpError, read udp 0.0.0.0:36123: raw-read udp4 0.0.0.0:36123: use of closed network connection
Skip it if we're in the process of shutting down.
Updates #10976
Change-Id: I4f6d1c68465557eb9ffe335d43d740e499ba9786
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
We were selectively uploading it, but we were still gathering it,
which can be a waste of CPU.
Also remove a bunch of complexity that I don't think matters anymore.
And add an envknob to force service collection off on a single node,
even if the tailnet policy permits it.
Fixes#13463
Change-Id: Ib6abe9e29d92df4ffa955225289f045eeeb279cf
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
When an Exit Node is used, we create a WFP rule to block all inbound and outbound traffic,
along with several rules to permit specific types of traffic. Notably, we allow all inbound and
outbound traffic to and from LocalRoutes specified in wgengine/router.Config. The list of allowed
routes always includes routes for internal interfaces, such as loopback and virtual Hyper-V/WSL2
interfaces, and may also include LAN routes if the "Allow local network access" option is enabled.
However, these permitting rules do not allow link-local multicast on the corresponding interfaces.
This results in broken mDNS/LLMNR, and potentially other similar issues, whenever an exit node is used.
In this PR, we update (*wf.Firewall).UpdatePermittedRoutes() to create rules allowing outbound and
inbound link-local multicast traffic to and from the permitted IP ranges, partially resolving the mDNS/LLMNR
and *.local name resolution issue.
Since Windows does not attempt to send mDNS/LLMNR queries if a catch-all NRPT rule is present,
it is still necessary to disable the creation of that rule using the disable-local-dns-override-via-nrpt nodeAttr.
Updates #13571
Signed-off-by: Nick Khyl <nickk@tailscale.com>
Of tests we wish we could easily add. One day.
Updates #13038
Change-Id: If44646f8d477674bbf2c9a6e58c3cd8f94a4e8df
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Updates tailscale/tailscale#6148
This is the result of some observations we made today with @raggi. The DNS over HTTPS client currently doesn't cap the number of connections it uses, either in-use or idle. A burst of DNS queries will open multiple connections. Idle connections remain open for 30 seconds (this interval is defined in the dohTransportTimeout constant). For DoH providers like NextDNS which send keep-alives, this means the cellular modem will remain up more than expected to send ACKs if any keep-alives are received while a connection remains idle during those 30 seconds. We can set the IdleConnTimeout to 10 seconds to ensure an idle connection is terminated if no other DNS queries come in after 10 seconds. Additionally, we can cap the number of connections to 1. This ensures that at all times there is only one open DoH connection, either active or idle. If idle, it will be terminated within 10 seconds from the last query.
We also observed all the DoH providers we support are capable of TLS 1.3. We can force this TLS version to reduce the number of packets sent/received each time a TLS connection is established.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@gottardo.me>
1eaad7d3de regressed some tests in another repo that were starting up
a control server on `http://127.0.0.1:nnn`. Because there was no https
running, and because of a bug in 1eaad7d3de (which ended up checking
the recently-dialed-control check twice in a single dial call), we
ended up forcing only the use of TLS dials in a test that only had
plaintext HTTP running.
Instead, plumb down support for explicitly disabling TLS fallbacks and
use it only when running in a test and using `http` scheme control
plane URLs to 127.0.0.1 or localhost.
This fixes the tests elsewhere.
Updates #13597
Change-Id: I97212ded21daf0bd510891a278078daec3eebaa6
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
I noticed while debugging a test failure elsewhere that our failure
logs (when verbosity is cranked up) were uselessly attributing dial
failures to failure to dial an invalid IP address (this IPv6 address
we didn't have), rather than showing me the actual IPv4 connection
failure.
Updates #13597 (tangentially)
Change-Id: I45ffbefbc7e25ebfb15768006413a705b941dae5
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Updates tailscale/tailscale#1634
Updates tailscale/tailscale#13265
Captive portal detection uses a custom `net.Dialer` in its `http.Client`. This custom Dialer ensures that the socket is bound specifically to the Wi-Fi interface. This is crucial because without it, if any default routes are set, the outgoing requests for detecting a captive portal would bypass Wi-Fi and go through the default route instead.
The Dialer did not have a Timeout property configured, so the default system timeout was applied. This caused issues in #13265, where we attempted to make captive portal detection requests over an IPsec interface used for Wi-Fi Calling. The call to `connect()` would fail and remain blocked until the system timeout (approximately 1 minute) was reached.
In #13598, I simply excluded the IPsec interface from captive portal detection. This was a quick and safe mitigation for the issue. This PR is a follow-up to make the process more robust, by setting a 3 seconds timeout on any connection establishment on any interface (this is the same timeout interval we were already setting on the HTTP client).
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@gottardo.me>
We were previously not checking that the external IP that we got back
from a UPnP portmap was a valid endpoint; add minimal validation that
this endpoint is something that is routeable by another host.
Updates tailscale/corp#23538
Signed-off-by: Andrew Dunham <andrew@du.nham.ca>
Change-Id: Id9649e7683394aced326d5348f4caa24d0efd532
This pulls out the clock and forceNoise443 code into methods on the
Dialer as cleanup in its own commit to make a future change less
distracting.
Updates #13597
Change-Id: I7001e57fe7b508605930c5b141a061b6fb908733
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
In prep for a future port 80 MITM fix, make the 'debug ts2021' command
retry once after a failure to give it a chance to pick a new strategy.
Updates #13597
Change-Id: Icb7bad60cbf0dbec78097df4a00e9795757bc8e4
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Add logic to set environment variables that match the SSH rule's
`acceptEnv` settings in the SSH session's environment.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/22775
Signed-off-by: Mario Minardi <mario@tailscale.com>
* cmd/containerboot,kube,util/linuxfw: configure kube egress proxies to route to 1+ tailnet targets
This commit is first part of the work to allow running multiple
replicas of the Kubernetes operator egress proxies per tailnet service +
to allow exposing multiple tailnet services via each proxy replica.
This expands the existing iptables/nftables-based proxy configuration
mechanism.
A proxy can now be configured to route to one or more tailnet targets
via a (mounted) config file that, for each tailnet target, specifies:
- the target's tailnet IP or FQDN
- mappings of container ports to which cluster workloads will send traffic to
tailnet target ports where the traffic should be forwarded.
Example configfile contents:
{
"some-svc": {"tailnetTarget":{"fqdn":"foo.tailnetxyz.ts.net","ports"{"tcp:4006:80":{"protocol":"tcp","matchPort":4006,"targetPort":80},"tcp:4007:443":{"protocol":"tcp","matchPort":4007,"targetPort":443}}}}
}
A proxy that is configured with this config file will configure firewall rules
to route cluster traffic to the tailnet targets. It will then watch the config file
for updates as well as monitor relevant netmap updates and reconfigure firewall
as needed.
This adds a bunch of new iptables/nftables functionality to make it easier to dynamically update
the firewall rules without needing to restart the proxy Pod as well as to make
it easier to debug/understand the rules:
- for iptables, each portmapping is a DNAT rule with a comment pointing
at the 'service',i.e:
-A PREROUTING ! -i tailscale0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 4006 -m comment --comment "some-svc:tcp:4006 -> tcp:80" -j DNAT --to-destination 100.64.1.18:80
Additionally there is a SNAT rule for each tailnet target, to mask the source address.
- for nftables, a separate prerouting chain is created for each tailnet target
and all the portmapping rules are placed in that chain. This makes it easier
to look up rules and delete services when no longer needed.
(nftables allows hooking a custom chain to a prerouting hook, so no extra work
is needed to ensure that the rules in the service chains are evaluated).
The next steps will be to get the Kubernetes Operator to generate
the configfile and ensure it is mounted to the relevant proxy nodes.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#13406
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
The operator creates a non-reusable auth key for each of
the cluster proxies that it creates and puts in the tailscaled
configfile mounted to the proxies.
The proxies are always tagged, and their state is persisted
in a Kubernetes Secret, so their node keys are expected to never
be regenerated, so that they don't need to re-auth.
Some tailnet configurations however have seen issues where the auth
keys being left in the tailscaled configfile cause the proxies
to end up in unauthorized state after a restart at a later point
in time.
Currently, we have not found a way to reproduce this issue,
however this commit removes the auth key from the config once
the proxy can be assumed to have logged in.
If an existing, logged-in proxy is upgraded to this version,
its redundant auth key will be removed from the conffile.
If an existing, logged-in proxy is downgraded from this version
to a previous version, it will work as before without re-issuing key
as the previous code did not enforce that a key must be present.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#13451
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
The ProxyGroup CRD specifies a set of N pods which will each be a
tailnet device, and will have M different ingress or egress services
mapped onto them. It is the mechanism for specifying how highly
available proxies need to be. This commit only adds the definition, no
controller loop, and so it is not currently functional.
This commit also splits out TailnetDevice and RecorderTailnetDevice
into separate structs because the URL field is specific to recorders,
but we want a more generic struct for use in the ProxyGroup status field.
Updates #13406
Signed-off-by: Tom Proctor <tomhjp@users.noreply.github.com>
Updates tailscale/tailscale#1634
Logs from some iOS users indicate that we're pointlessly performing captive portal detection on certain interfaces named ipsec*. These are tunnels with the cellular carrier that do not offer Internet access, and are only used to provide internet calling functionality (VoLTE / VoWiFi).
```
attempting to do captive portal detection on interface ipsec1
attempting to do captive portal detection on interface ipsec6
```
This PR excludes interfaces with the `ipsec` prefix from captive portal detection.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@gottardo.me>
Add logic for parsing and matching against our planned format for
AcceptEnv values. Namely, this supports direct matches against string
values and matching where * and ? are treated as wildcard characters
which match against an arbitrary number of characters and a single
character respectively.
Actually using this logic in non-test code will come in subsequent
changes.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/22775
Signed-off-by: Mario Minardi <mario@tailscale.com>
Like Linux, macOS will reply to sendto(2) with EPERM if the firewall is
currently blocking writes, though this behavior is like Linux
undocumented. This is often caused by a faulting network extension or
content filter from EDR software.
Updates #11710
Updates #12891
Updates #13511
Signed-off-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
This breaks its ability to be used as an expvar and is blocking a trunkd
deploy. Revert for now, and add a test to ensure that we don't break it
in a future change.
Updates #13550
Signed-off-by: Andrew Dunham <andrew@du.nham.ca>
Change-Id: I1f1221c257c1de47b4bff0597c12f8530736116d
When querying for an exit node suggestion, occasionally it triggers a
new report concurrently with an existing report in progress. Generally,
there should always be a recent report or one in progress, so it is
redundant to start one there, and it causes concurrency issues.
Fixes#12643
Change-Id: I66ab9003972f673e5d4416f40eccd7c6676272a5
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
this commit changes usermetrics to be non-global, this is a building
block for correct metrics if a go process runs multiple tsnets or
in tests.
Updates #13420
Updates tailscale/corp#22075
Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Dalby <kristoffer@tailscale.com>
